THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME
Attack of the Seventh and Eighth Corps on
Gommecourt, Serre, and Beaumont Hamel
Line of battle in the Somme sector--Great preparations--Advance of
Forty-sixth North Midland Division--Advance of Fifty-sixth
Territorials (London)--Great valour and heavy losses--Advance of
Thirty-first Division--Advance of Fourth Division--Advance of
Twenty-ninth Division--Complete failure of the assault.
The continued German pressure at Verdun which had reached a high
point in June called insistently for an immediate allied attack at
the western end of the line. With a fine spirit of comradeship
General Haig had placed himself and his armies at the absolute
disposal of General Joffre, and was prepared to march them to Verdun,
or anywhere else where he could best render assistance. The solid
Joffre, strong and deliberate, was not disposed to allow the western
offensive to be either weakened or launched prematurely on account of
German attacks at the eastern frontier. He believed that Verdun
could for the time look after herself, and the result showed the
clearness of his vision. Meanwhile, he amassed a considerable French
army, containing many of his best active troops, on either side of
the Somme. General Foch was in command. They formed the right wing
of the {34} great allied force about to make a big effort to break or
shift the iron German line, which had been built up with two years of
labour, until it represented a tangled vista of trenches, parapets,
and redoubts mutually supporting and bristling with machine-guns and
cannon, for many miles of depth. Never in the whole course of
history have soldiers been confronted with such an obstacle. Yet
from general to private, both in the French and in the British
armies, there was universal joy that the long stagnant trench life
should be at an end, and that the days of action, even if they should
prove to be days of death, should at last have come. Our concern is
with the British forces, and so they are here set forth as they
stretched upon the left or north of their good allies.
The southern end of the whole British line was held by the Fourth
Army, commanded by General Rawlinson, an officer who has always been
called upon when desperate work was afoot. His army consisted of
five corps, each of which included from three to four divisions, so
that his infantry numbered about 200,000 men, many of whom were
veterans, so far as a man may live to be a veteran amid the slaughter
of such a campaign. The Corps, counting from the junction with the
French, were, the Thirteenth (Congreve), Fifteenth (Horne), Third
(Pulteney), Tenth (Morland), and Eighth (Hunter-Weston). Their
divisions, frontage, and the objectives will be discussed in the
description of the battle itself.
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{35}
[Illustration: BRITISH BATTLE LINE July 1st 1916]
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North of Rawlinson's Fourth Army, and touching it at the village of
Hébuterne, was Allenby's Third Army, of which one single corps, the
Seventh (Snow), was engaged in the battle. This added three {36}
divisions, or about 30,000 infantry, to the numbers quoted above.
It had taken months to get the troops into position, to accumulate
the guns, and to make the enormous preparations which such a battle
must entail. How gigantic and how minute these are can only be
appreciated by those who are acquainted with the work of the staffs.
As to the Chief Staff of all, if a civilian may express an opinion
upon so technical a matter, no praise seems to be too high for
General Kiggell and the others under the immediate direction of Sir
Douglas Haig, who had successively shown himself to be a great Corps
General, a great Army leader, and now a great General-in-Chief. The
preparations were enormous and meticulous, yet everything ran like a
well-oiled piston-rod. Every operation of the attack was practised
on similar ground behind the lines. New railheads were made, huge
sidings constructed, and great dumps accumulated. The corps and
divisional staffs were also excellent, but above all it was upon
those hard-worked and usually overlooked men, the sappers, that the
strain fell. Assembly trenches had to be dug, double communication
trenches had to be placed in parallel lines, one taking the
up-traffic and one the down, water supplies, bomb shelters, staff
dug-outs, poison-gas arrangements, tunnels and mines--there was no
end to the work of the sappers. The gunners behind laboured night
after night in hauling up and concealing their pieces, while day
after day they deliberately and carefully registered upon their
marks. The question of ammunition supply had assumed incredible
proportions. For the needs of one single corps forty-six miles of
motor-lorries were engaged in bringing up {37} the shells. However,
by the end of June all was in place and ready. The bombardment began
about June 23, and was at once answered by a German one of lesser
intensity. The fact that the attack was imminent was everywhere
known, for it was absolutely impossible to make such preparations and
concentrations in a secret fashion. "Come on, we are ready for you,"
was hoisted upon placards on several of the German trenches. The
result was to show that they spoke no more than the truth.
There were limits, however, to the German appreciation of the plans
of the Allies. They were apparently convinced that the attack would
come somewhat farther to the north, and their plans, which covered
more than half of the ground on which the attack actually did occur,
had made that region impregnable, as we were to learn to our cost.
Their heaviest guns and their best troops were there. They had made
a far less elaborate preparation, however, at the front which
corresponded with the southern end of the British line, and also on
that which faced the French. The reasons for this may be surmised.
The British front at that point is very badly supplied with roads (or
was before the matter was taken in hand), and the Germans may well
have thought that no advance upon a great scale was possible. So far
as the French were concerned they had probably over-estimated the
pre-occupation of Verdun and had not given our Allies credit for the
immense reserve vitality which they were to show. The French front
to the south of the Somme was also faced by a great bend of the river
which must impede any advance. Then again it is wooded, broken
country down there, and gives good concealment for masking an
operation. These {38} were probably the reasons which induced the
Germans to make a miscalculation which proved to be an exceedingly
serious one, converting what might have been a German victory into a
great, though costly, success for the Allies, a prelude to most vital
results in the future.
It is, as already stated, difficult to effect a surprise upon the
large scale in modern warfare. There are still, however, certain
departments in which with energy and ingenuity effects may be
produced as unforeseen as they are disconcerting. The Air Service of
the Allies, about which a book which would be one long epic of
heroism could be written, had been growing stronger, and had
dominated the situation during the last few weeks, but it had not
shown its full strength nor its intentions until the evening before
the bombardment. Then it disclosed both in most dramatic fashion.
Either side had lines of stationary airships from which shell-fire is
observed. To the stranger approaching the lines they are the first
intimation that he is in the danger area, and he sees them in a
double row, extending in a gradually dwindling vista to either
horizon. Now by a single raid and in a single night, every
observation airship of the Germans was brought in flames to the
earth. It was a splendid coup, splendidly carried out. Where the
setting sun had shone on a long German array the dawn showed an empty
eastern sky. From that day for many a month the Allies had command
of the air with all that it means to modern artillery. It was a good
omen for the coming fight, and a sign of the great efficiency to
which the British Air Service under General Trenchard had attained.
The various types for scouting, for artillery work, {39} for raiding,
and for fighting were all very highly developed and splendidly
handled by as gallant and chivalrous a band of heroic youths as
Britain has ever enrolled among her guardians. The new F.E. machine
and the de Haviland Biplane fighting machine were at this time equal
to anything the Germans had in the air.
The attack had been planned for June 28, but the weather was so
tempestuous that it was put off until it should moderate, a change
which was a great strain upon every one concerned. July 1 broke calm
and warm with a gentle south-western breeze. The day had come. All
morning from early dawn there was intense fire, intensely answered,
with smoke barrages thrown during the last half-hour to such points
as could with advantage be screened. At 7.30 the guns lifted, the
whistles blew, and the eager infantry were over the parapets. The
great Battle of the Somme, the fierce crisis of Armageddon, had come.
In following the fate of the various British forces during this
eventful and most bloody day we will begin at the northern end of the
line, where the Seventh Corps (Snow) faced the salient of Gommecourt.
This corps consisted of the Thirty-seventh, Forty-sixth, and
Fifty-sixth Divisions. The former was not engaged and lay to the
north. The others were told off to attack the bulge on the German
line, the Forty-sixth upon the north, and the Fifty-sixth upon the
south, with the village of Gommecourt as their immediate objective.
Both were well-tried and famous territorial units, the Forty-sixth
North Midland being the division which carried the Hohenzollern
Redoubt upon October 13, 1915, while the Fifty-sixth was made up of
the old London territorial battalions, {40} which had seen so much
fighting in earlier days while scattered among the regular brigades.
Taking our description of the battle always from the north end of the
line we shall begin with the attack of the Forty-sixth Division.
The assault was carried out by two brigades, each upon a
two-battalion front. Of these the 137th Brigade of Stafford men were
upon the right, while the 139th Brigade of Sherwood Foresters were on
the left, each accompanied by a unit of sappers. The 138th Brigade,
less one battalion, which was attached to the 137th, was in reserve.
The attack was covered so far as possible with smoke, which was
turned on five minutes before the hour. The general instructions to
both brigades were that after crossing No Man's Land and taking the
first German line they should bomb their way up the communication
trenches, and so force a passage into Gommecourt Wood. Each brigade
was to advance in four waves at fifty yards interval, with six feet
between each man. Warned by our past experience of the wastage of
precious material, not more than 20 officers of each battalion were
sent forward with the attack, and a proportional number of N.C.O.'s
were also withheld. The average equipment of the stormers, here and
elsewhere, consisted of steel helmet, haversack, water-bottle,
rations for two days, two gas helmets, tear-goggles, 220 cartridges,
two bombs, two sandbags, entrenching tool, wire-cutters, field
dressings, and signal-flare. With this weight upon them, and with
trenches which were half full of water, and the ground between a
morass of sticky mud, some idea can be formed of the strain upon the
infantry.
{41}
Both the attacking brigades got away with splendid steadiness upon
the tick of time. In the case of the 137th Brigade the 6th South
Staffords and 6th North Staffords were in the van, the former being
on the right flank where it joined up with the left of the
Fifty-sixth Division. The South Staffords came into a fatal blast of
machine-gun fire as they dashed forward, and their track was marked
by a thick litter of dead and wounded. None the less, they poured
into the trenches opposite to them but found them strongly held by
infantry of the Fifty-second German Division. There was some fierce
bludgeon work in the trenches, but the losses in crossing had been
too heavy and the survivors were unable to make good. The trench was
held by the Germans and the assault repulsed. The North Staffords
had also won their way into the front trenches, but in their case
also they had lost so heavily that they were unable to clear the
trench, which was well and stoutly defended. At the instant of
attack, here as elsewhere, the Germans had put so terrific a barrage
between the lines that it was impossible for the supports to get up
and no fresh momentum could be added to the failing attack.
The fate of the right attack had been bad, but that of the left was
even worse, for at this point we had experience of a German procedure
which was tried at several places along the line with most deadly
effect, and accounted for some of our very high losses. This device
was to stuff their front line dug-outs with machine-guns and men, who
would emerge when the wave of stormers had passed, attacking them
from the rear, confident that their own rear was safe on account of
the terrific barrage between the lines. {42} In this case the
stormers were completely trapped. The 5th and 7th Sherwood Foresters
dashed through the open ground, carried the trenches and pushed
forward on their fiery career. Instantly the barrage fell, the
concealed infantry rose behind them, and their fate was sealed. With
grand valour the leading four waves stormed their way up the
communication trenches and beat down all opposition until their own
dwindling numbers and the failure of their bombs left them helpless
among their enemies. Thus perished the first companies of two fine
battalions, and few survivors of them ever won their way back to the
British lines. Brave attempts were made during the day to get across
to their aid, but all were beaten down by the terrible barrage. In
the evening the 5th Lincolns made a most gallant final effort to
reach their lost comrades, and got across to the German front line
which they found to be strongly held. So ended a tragic episode.
The cause which produced it was, as will be seen, common to the whole
northern end of the line, and depended upon factors which neither
officers nor men could control, the chief of which were that the work
of our artillery, both in getting at the trench garrisons and in its
counter-battery effects had been far less deadly than we had
expected. The losses of the division came to about 2700 men.
The attack upon the southern side of the Gommecourt peninsula, though
urged with the utmost devotion and corresponding losses, had no more
success than that in the north. There is no doubt that the
unfortunate repulse of the 137th Brigade upon their left, occurring
as it did while the Fifty-sixth Division was still advancing, enabled
the {43} Germans to concentrate their guns and reserves upon the
Londoners, but knowing what we know, it can hardly be imagined that
under any circumstances, with failure upon either side of them, the
division could have held the captured ground. The preparations for
the attack had been made with great energy, and for two successive
nights as many as 3000 men were out digging between the lines, which
was done with such disciplined silence that there were not more than
50 casualties all told. The 167th Brigade was left in reserve,
having already suffered heavily while holding the water-logged
trenches during the constant shell-fall of the last week. The 7th
Middlesex alone had lost 12 officers and 300 men from this cause--a
proportion which may give some idea of what the heavy British
bombardment may have meant to the Germans. The advance was,
therefore, upon a two-brigade front, the 168th being on the right and
the 169th upon the left. The London Scottish and the 12th London
Rangers were the leading battalions of the 168th, while the
Westminsters and Victorias led the 169th with the 4th London, 13th
Kensingtons, 2nd London and London Rifle Brigade in support. The
advance was made with all the fiery dash with which the Cockney
soldiers have been associated. The first, second, and third German
lines of trench were successively carried, and it was not until they,
or those of them who were left, had reached the fourth line that they
were held. It was powerfully manned, bravely defended, and well
provided with bombs--a terrible obstacle for a scattered line of
weary and often wounded men. The struggle was a heroic one. Even
now had their rear been clear, or had there been a shadow of support
{44} these determined men would have burst the only barrier which
held them from Gommecourt. But the steel curtain of the barrage had
closed down behind them, and every overrun trench was sending out its
lurking occupants to fire into their defenceless backs. Bombs, too,
are essential in such a combat, and bombs must ever be renewed, since
few can be carried at a time. For long hours the struggle went on,
but it was the pitiful attempt of heroic men to postpone that retreat
which was inevitable. Few of the advanced line ever got back. The
3rd London, particularly, sent forward several hundred men with
bombs, but hardly any got across. Sixty London Scots started on the
same terrible errand. In the late afternoon the remains of the two
brigades were back in the British front line, having done all, and
more than all, that brave soldiers could be expected to do. The
losses were very heavy. Never has the manhood of London in one
single day sustained so grievous a loss. It is such hours which test
the very soul of the soldier. War is not all careless slang and
jokes and cigarettes, though such superficial sides of it may amuse
the public and catch the eye of the descriptive writer. It is the
most desperately earnest thing to which man ever sets his hand or his
mind. Many a hot oath and many a frenzied prayer go up from the
battle line. Strong men are shaken to the soul with the hysteria of
weaklings, and balanced brains are dulled into vacancy or worse by
the dreadful sustained shock of it. The more honour then to those
who, broken and wearied, still hold fast in the face of all that
human flesh abhors, bracing their spirits by a sense of soldierly
duty and personal honour which is strong enough to prevail over death
itself.
{45}
It is pleasing to be able to record an instance of good feeling upon
the part of the enemy. Some remains of the old German spirit would
now and again, though with sad rarity, shake itself free from the
acrid and poisonous Prussian taint. On this occasion a German
prisoner was sent back from our lines after nightfall with a note to
the officer in command asking for details as to the fate of the
British missing. An answer was found tied on to the barbed wire in
the morning which gave the desired information. It is fair to state
also that the wounded taken by the enemy appear to have met with good
treatment.
So much for the gallant and tragic attack of the Seventh Corps.
General Snow, addressing his men after the battle, pointed out that
their losses and their efforts had not been all in vain. "I can
assure you," he said, "that by your determined attack you managed to
keep large forces of the enemy at your front, thereby materially
assisting in the operations which were proceeding farther south with
such marked success." No doubt the claim is a just one, and even
while we mourn over the fate of four grand Army corps upon the left
wing of the Allied Army, we may feel that they sacrificed themselves
in order to assure the advance of those corps of their comrades to
the south who had profited by the accumulation of guns and men to the
north of them in order to burst their way through the German line.
It is possible that here as on some other occasions the bitter hatred
which the Germans had for the British, nurtured as it was by every
lie which could appeal to their passions, had distorted their vision
and twisted their counsels to an extent which proved to be their ruin.
{46}
The Eighth Corps, a magnificent body of troops, was under the command
of General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston. It consisted of the
Forty-eighth South Midland Territorial Division, the Fourth Regular
Division, the Twenty-ninth Regular Division, and the Thirty-first
Division of the New Army. Their front extended from Hébuterne in the
north, where they joined on to the Fifty-sixth Division, down to a
point just north of the Ancre, and it faced the very strong German
positions of Serre in the north, and of Beaumont Hamel in the centre.
The latter was an exceptionally difficult place, for it contained
enormous quarries and excavations in which masses of Germans could
remain concealed, almost immune to shell-fire and ready to sally out
when needed. In spite of the terrific bombardment the actual damage
done to the enemy was not excessive, and neither his numbers, his
_moral_, nor his guns had been seriously diminished.
The order of battle was as follows: the Forty-eighth Division was in
reserve, save for the 143rd Warwick Brigade. Of this brigade two
battalions, the 5th and 6th Warwicks, were placed on a defensive line
with orders to hold the trenches for about a mile south of Hebuterne.
The 7th and 8th Warwicks were attached to the Fourth Division for the
assault.
Immediately south of the defensive line held by the two Warwick
battalions was the Thirty-first Division, having Serre for its
objective. South of this, and opposite to Beaumont Hamel, was the
Fourth, and south of this again was the Twenty-ninth Division, which
had returned from the magnificent failure of the Dardanelles, bearing
with it a high reputation for efficiency and valour. Incorporated
with it was a regiment of Newfoundlanders, men recruited from {47}
among the fishers and farmers of that northern land, the oldest
colony of Britain. Such was the force, comprising nearly 50,000
excellent infantry, who set forth upon the formidable adventure of
forcing the lines of Beaumont Hamel. They were destined to show the
absolute impossibility of such a task in the face of a steadfast
unshaken enemy, supported by a tremendous artillery, but their story
is a most glorious one, and many a great British victory contains no
such record of tenacity and military virtue.
At a quarter past five the assaulting lines were in the assembly
trenches, and shortly afterwards the smoke and artillery barrages
were released. At 7.20 an enormous mine, which had been run under
Hawthorn Redoubt in front of the Fourth Division, was exploded, and a
monstrous column of debris, with the accompanying shock of an
earthquake, warned friend and foe that the hour of doom, the crisis
of such mighty preparations, was at hand. At 7.30 the whistles blew,
and the men, springing with eager alacrity over the parapet, advanced
in successive lines of assault against the German trenches.
Before giving in detail the circumstances which determined the result
in each division, it may be well to avoid wearisome iteration by
giving certain facts which are common to each. In every case the
troops advanced in an extended formation of companies in successive
waves. In nearly every case the German front line was seized and
penetrated, in no case was there any hesitation or disorder among the
advancing troops, but the highest possible degree of discipline and
courage was shown by regulars, territorials, and men of the New Army,
nor could it be said that there was any difference between them. In
each case also {48} the Germans met the assault with determined
valour; in each case the successive lines of trenches were more
strongly held, and the assailants were attacked from the rear by
those who emerged from the dug-outs behind them, and above all in
each case a most murderous artillery fire was opened from a
semi-circle all round the German position, but especially from one
huge accumulation of heavy guns, said to number a hundred batteries,
stationed on the high ground near Bucquoy and commanding the British
position. These guns formed successive lines of barrage with
shrapnel and high explosives, one of them about 200 yards behind the
British line, to cut off the supports; another 50 yards behind;
another 50 yards in front; and a fourth of shrapnel which was under
observed control, and followed the troops in their movements. The
advanced lines of assault were able in most cases to get through
before these barrages were effectively established, but they made it
difficult, deadly, and often impossible for the lines who followed.
None the less it is the opinion of skilled observers that the
shell-fire alone, however heavy, could not have taken the edge from
the inexorable insistence of the British attack. It is to the skill
and to the personal gallantry of the German machine-gunners that the
result is to be traced. The bombardment of the German line had been
so severe that it was hoped that most of the machine-guns had been
rooted out. So indeed they had, but they had been withdrawn to the
safety of excavations in the immediate rear. Suspecting this, the
British artillery sprayed the ground behind the trenches with showers
of shrapnel to prevent their being brought forward {49} again. This
barrage was not sufficient to subdue the gunners, who dashed forward
and established their pieces at the moment of the assault upon the
various parapets and points of vantage, from which, regardless of
their own losses, they poured a withering fire upon the infantry in
the open. These brave Würtembergers were seen, with riflemen at
their side, exposed waist-deep and dropping fast, but mowing the open
slope as with a scythe of steel. "I cannot," said a general officer,
who surveyed the whole scene, "adequately express my admiration for
the British who advanced, or for the Germans who stood up under such
a heavy barrage to oppose them." It was indeed that contest between
the chosen children of Odin in which Professor Cramb has declared
that the high gods of virility might well rejoice.
We will now turn to the left of the line and carry on the detailed
description of the general assault from that of the 56th Territorials
in the north, who were linked up by the defensive line of the
Warwicks. The Thirty-first Division was on the left of the Eighth
Corps. Of this division, two brigades, the 93rd and the 94th, were
in the line, with the 92nd in reserve. The 93rd, which consisted of
the 15th, 16th, 18th West Yorks, and the 18th Durhams, was on the
right, the 94th, including the 11th East Lancashires, and the 12th,
13th, and 14th York and Lancasters, was on the left. The advance was
made upon a front of two companies, each company on a front of two
platoons, the men extended to three paces interval. On the left the
leading battalions were the 11th East Lancashires and 12th York and
Lancasters, the latter on the extreme left {50} flank of the whole
division. That this position with its exposed flank was the place of
honour and of danger, may be best indicated by the fact that the
colonel and six orderlies were the only men who could be collected of
this heroic Sheffield battalion upon the next morning. On the right
the leading troops were the 15th and 16th West Yorks. These grand
North-countrymen swept across No Man's Land, dressed as if on parade,
followed in succession by the remaining battalions, two of which, the
13th and 14th York and Lancasters, were the special town units of
Barnsley and Leeds. "I have never seen and could not have imagined
such a magnificent display of gallantry, discipline, and
determination," said the observer who was been already quoted. The
men fell in lines, but the survivors with backs bent, heads bowed,
and rifles at the port, neither quickened nor slackened their
advance, but went forward as though it was rain and not lead which
lashed them. Here and elsewhere the German machine-gunners not only
lined the parapet, but actually rushed forward into the open, partly
to get a flank fire, and partly to come in front of the British
barrage. Before the blasts of bullets the lines melted away, and the
ever-decreasing waves only reached the parapet here and there,
lapping over the spot where the German front lines had been, and
sinking for ever upon the farther side. About a hundred gallant men
of the East Lancashires, favoured perhaps by some curve in the
ground, got past more than one line of trenches, and a few desperate
individuals even burst their way as far as Serre, giving a false
impression that the village was in our hands. But the losses had
been so heavy that the weight and momentum had gone out of the {51}
attack, while the density of the resistance thickened with every yard
of advance. By the middle of the afternoon the survivors of the two
attacking brigades were back in their own front line trenches, having
lost the greater part of their effectives. The 15th West Yorks had
lost heavily in officers, and the 16th and 18th were little better
off. The 18th Durhams suffered less, being partly in reserve. Of
the 94th Brigade the two splendid leading battalions, the 11th East
Lancashires and 12th York and Lancasters, had very many killed within
the enemy line. The heaviest loss in any single unit was in the 11th
East Lancashires. The strength of the position is indicated by the
fact that when attacked by two divisions in November, with a very
powerful backing of artillery, it was still able to hold its own.
The experiences of all the troops engaged upon the left of the
British attack were so similar and their gallantry was so uniform,
that any variety in description depends rather upon the units engaged
than upon what befell them. Thus in passing from the Thirty-first
Division to the Fourth upon their right, the general sequence of
cause and effect is still the same. In this instance the infantry
who rushed, or rather strode, to the assault were, counting from the
right, the 1st East Lancs, the 1st Rifle Brigade, and the 8th
Warwicks, who were immediately followed by the 1st Hants, the 1st
Somersets, and the 6th Warwicks, advancing with three companies in
front and one in support. The objective here as elsewhere upon the
left was the capture of the Serre-Grandcourt Ridge, with the further
design of furnishing a defensive flank for the operations lower down.
The troops enumerated belonged to the 11th Brigade, led by {52} the
gallant Prowse, who fell hit by a shell early in the assault, calling
after his troops that they should remember that they were the
Stonewall Brigade. The attack was pressed with incredible
resolution, and met with severe losses. Again the front line was
carried and again the thin fringe of survivors had no weight to drive
the assault forward, whilst they had no cover to shelter them in the
ruined lines which they had taken. The Somerset men had the honour
of reaching the farthest point attained by the division. "If
anything wants shifting the Somersets will do it." So said their
General before the action. But both their flanks were in the air,
and their position was an impossible one, while the right of the
attack north of Beaumont Hamel had been entirely held up. Two units
of the 10th Brigade advanced about 9 o'clock on the right, and two of
the 12th on the left. These were in their order, the 2nd Dublins,
2nd Seaforths, 2nd Essex, and 1st King's Own Lancasters. All went
forward with a will, but some could not get beyond their own front
trenches, and few got over the German line. All the weight of their
blood so lavishly and cheerfully given could not tilt the scale
towards victory. Slowly the survivors of the Somersets and Rifle
Brigade were beaten back with clouds of bombers at their heels. The
8th Warwicks, who, with some of the 6th Warwicks, had got as far
forward as any of the supporting line, could not turn the tide. Late
in the afternoon the assault had definitely failed, and the remainder
were back in their own front trenches, which had now to be organised
against the very possible counter-attack. Only two battalions of the
division remained intact, and the losses included {53} General
Prowse, Colonel the Hon. C. W. Palk of the Hampshires, Colonel
Thicknesse of the Somersets, Colonel Wood of the Rifle Brigade, and
Colonel Franklin of the 6th Warwicks, all killed; while Colonels
Innes of the 8th Warwicks, Hopkinson of the Seaforths, and Green of
the East Lancashires were wounded. For a long time a portion of the
enemy's trench was held by mixed units, but it was of no value when
detached from the rest and was abandoned in the evening. From the
afternoon onwards no possible course save defence was open to General
Lambton. There was considerable anxiety about one company of Irish
Fusiliers who were in a detached portion of the German trench, but
they succeeded in getting back next morning, bringing with them not
only their wounded but some prisoners.
Immediately to the right of the Fourth Division was the Twenty-ninth
Division[1] from Gallipoli, which rivalled in its constancy and
exceeded in its losses its comrades upon the left. The 86th Brigade
and the 87th formed the first line, with the 88th in support.
[1] Since the constituents of this famous regular Division have not
been given in full (as has been done with their comrades in preceding
volumes) they are here enumerated as they were on July 1, 1916:
86_th Brigade_.--2nd Royal Fusiliers, 1st Lancashire Fusiliers, 1st
Dublin Fusiliers, 16th Middlesex.
87_th Brigade_.--1st Inniskilling Fusiliers, 1st South Wales
Borderers, 1st Scottish Borderers, 1st Border Regiment.
88_th Brigade_.--1st Essex, 2nd Hants, 4th Worcesters, Newfoundland
Regiment.
The van of the attack upon the right of the division was formed by
the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers and the Welsh Borderers, while the van
upon the left was formed by the 2nd Royal Fusiliers and the 1st
Lancashire Fusiliers. The other battalions of the {54} brigades
formed the supporting line, and two battalions of the 88th Brigade,
the Essex and the Newfoundlanders, were also drawn into the fight, so
that, as in the Fourth Division, only two battalions remained intact
at the close, the nucleus upon which in each case a new division had
to be formed.
Upon the explosion of the great mine already mentioned two platoons
of the 2nd Royal Fusiliers with machine-guns and Stokes mortars
rushed forward to seize the crater. They got the near lip, but the
enemy were already in possession of the far side, and no farther
advance could be made. At this point, and indeed at nearly all
points down the line, the wire was found to have been very thoroughly
cut by the artillery fire, but for some reason our own wire had not
been cut to the same extent and was a serious obstacle to our own
advance.
Parties of the leading regiments were speedily up to the German
front-line trench, but their advance beyond it was delayed by the
fact that the dug-outs were found to be full of lurking soldiers who
had intended no doubt to rush out and attack the stormers in the
rear, as in the case of the Forty-sixth and Fifty-sixth Divisions in
the north, but who were discovered in time and had to fight for their
lives. These men were cleared out upon the right, and the advance
then made some progress, but on the left by 9 o'clock the 86th
Brigade had been completely held up by a murderous machine-gun fire
in front of Beaumont Hamel, a position which, as already explained,
presented peculiar difficulties. The Essex and Newfoundland men of
the 88th Brigade were ordered forward and charged with such splendid
resolution that the advance was carried forward again, and the {55}
whole situation changed for the better. By 10.15 the casualties had
become so great, however, through the fire of flanking machine-guns,
that it was clear that the attack could not possibly reach its
objective. The huge crater left by the explosion of the Beaumont
Hamel mine was held for hours as a redoubt, but it also was enfiladed
by fire and became untenable. By half-past ten the action had
resolved itself into a bombardment of the German front line once
more, and the assault had definitely failed. There was an attempt to
renew it, but when it was found that the 86th Brigade and the 87th
Brigade were equally reduced in numbers, it was recognised that only
a defensive line could be held. It is true that the Divisional
General had the Worcesters and the Hants still in hand, and was
prepared to attack with them, but a further loss might have
imperilled the Divisional line, so no advance was allowed.
All the troops of the Twenty-ninth Division had lived up to their
fame, but a special word should be said of the Newfoundlanders, who,
in their first action, kept pace with the veterans beside them. This
battalion of fishermen, lumbermen, and farmers proved once more the
grand stuff which is bred over the sea--the stuff which Bernhardi
dismissed in a contemptuous paragraph. "They attacked regardless of
loss, moving forward in extended order, wave behind wave. It was a
magnificent exhibition of disciplined courage." Well might General
Hunter-Weston say next day after visiting the survivors: "To hear men
cheering as they did, after undergoing such an experience, and in the
midst of such mud and rain, made one proud to have the command of
such a battalion." The losses of the Newfoundlanders {56} were
severe. Losses are always the index of the sorrow elsewhere, but
when they fall so heavily upon a small community, where every man
plays a vital part and knows his neighbour, they are particularly
distressing. From Cape Race to the coast of Labrador there was pride
and mourning over that day. The total losses of the division were
heavy, and included Colonels Pierce and Ellis of the Inniskillings
and Borderers.
It must have been with a heavy heart that General Hunter-Weston
realised, with the approach of night, that each of his divisions had
met with such losses that the renewal of the attack was impossible.
He, his Divisional Commanders, his officers and his men had done both
in their dispositions and in their subsequent actions everything
which wise leaders and brave soldiers could possibly accomplish. If
a criticism could be advanced it would be that the attack was urged
with such determined valour that it would not take No until long
after No was the inevitable answer. But grim persistence has won
many a fight, and no leader who is worthy to lead can ever have an
excess of it. They were up against the impossible, as were their
companions to right and left. It is easy to recognise it now, but it
could not be proved until it had been tested to the uttermost. Could
other tactics, other equipment, other methods of guarding the
soldiers have brought them across the fatal open levels? It may be
so, and can again only be tried by testing. But this at least was
proved for all time, that, given clear ground, unshaken troops,
prepared positions, and ample artillery, no human fire and no human
hardihood can ever hope to break such a defensive line. It should be
added that here as {57} elsewhere the British artillery, though less
numerous than it became at a later date, was admirable both in its
heavy and in its lighter pieces. Observers have recorded that under
its hammer blows the German trenches kept momentarily changing their
shape, while the barrage was as thick and accurate and the lifting as
well-timed as could have been wished. There was no slackness
anywhere, either in preparation or in performance, and nothing but
the absolute impossibility of the task under existing conditions
stood in the way of success.
{58}