Adair became exceedingly bitter; that of the former beyond all restraint
toward his respondent. The issue of this controversy, tradition says,
was a challenge to meet upon the field of honor, then so called, and to
settle it at the pistol's point. The challenge was accepted. By whom it
was sent, the author has not been able to learn. In the absence of any
record, written or in print, of this affair, he has to rely upon oral
recitals which have come down through members of the Adair family in
Kentucky, and are remembered in the main facts to-day. The would-be
combatants met by appointment at a spot selected on the border line of
their respective States, accompanied each by his second, his surgeon,
and a few invited friends. The unfriendly breach between Jackson and
Adair, and its possible tragic issue, seems to have given deep concern
to some of their friends. There was no other cause of enmity between
them save what grew out of the unfortunate occurrences at New Orleans.
They were of the same political party--Jeffersonian Republicans, as they
were known then, in distinction from Federalists. Jackson had won renown
and prestige as no other in America, and his name had already been
mentioned in connection with the highest office within the gift of the
people. Adair was held in high esteem by the people of Kentucky, and
bright hopes of political preferment were held out by his party friends.
Other considerations added, induced friends on either side to urge a
reconciliation, which was happily effected on terms mutually
satisfactory. The above account of this meeting on the field of honor
was related to the author by General D.L. Adair, of Hawesville,
Kentucky, now long past his fourscore years. He gave the facts to the
writer, he said, as he received them from his father, Doctor Adair, of
Hardin County, Kentucky, many years ago. Doctor Adair was a cousin of
General Adair, of Jackson's army, and was one of the intimate friends
whom the General invited to be present upon the ground.
The correspondence of Jackson and Adair throws light upon the subject of
this controversy, and reveals to us some of the causes of the errors and
contentions of this affair. We have mentioned that Adair, in his
eagerness to arm as many as possible of the Kentucky militia and place
them in line for the main battle of the eighth, went into the city and
plead with the Committee of Safety to loan him four hundred stand of
arms, held in the city armory for the protection of New Orleans, for a
few days. This urgent request was granted, and the arms privately moved
out, hauled to the camp of the Kentuckians, and delivered there about
nightfall of the seventh. Four hundred more of the Kentuckians were thus
armed and moved up to the rear of the breastwork, ready for the battle
next morning. Adair believed that he was acting in the line of his duty,
and that Jackson would approve of his device for arming more of his idle
men in camp. Busy as he was that day in New Orleans, and in equipping
and marshaling the men of his command for battle, he was not made aware
of the urgent need of reinforcements on the opposite bank of the river,
nor did he know of the purpose of the commander-in-chief to arm these
from the city armory. While Adair's device very much strengthened
Jackson's line on the left bank, it unfortunately defeated Jackson's
plan of sending four hundred more men to reinforce General Morgan on the
right bank, and may in this way have largely contributed to the latter's
defeat.
When Jackson, late on the seventh, ordered a detail of five hundred of
the Kentucky militia to be marched at once to New Orleans, there to be
armed, to cross the river and report by daylight to General Morgan, he
expected to use the arms from the city armory. There was no other
supply.
We may readily imagine the feeling of disappointed chagrin and passion
that stirred to its depths the strong nature of Jackson, when the
intelligence quickly came to him across the river of the disaster to
Morgan's command, and of its retreat toward New Orleans, followed by the
enemy. It was in this tumult of passion and excitement that the report
of Morgan, followed by that of Patterson, was brought to him, imputing
the cause of defeat and disaster to the cowardly retreat of the Kentucky
detachment. Under the promptings of these incidents of the day,
Jackson's report to the Secretary of War was made, in which the words of
censure were so unjustly employed. Jackson must have informed Morgan on
the evening of the seventh that he would reinforce him with five hundred
armed soldiers. When Colonel Davis reported to Morgan, one hour before
daylight, the arrival of the Kentucky contingent, the latter was
expecting five hundred men to reinforce him. Had this been done, the
Kentucky troops and Major Arnaud's one hundred and fifty Louisianians
would have made the forces sent to the front to check the advance of the
British under Colonel Thornton over six hundred men. Such a force, well
officered, would probably have held the enemy in check, fallen back in
good order, and made a stubborn fight on the line of battle. But there
was only one third the Kentucky force expected; and when Major Arnaud's
command retreated, there was but this contingent of one hundred and
seventy Kentucky militia left to resist the advance of one thousand
British veterans, and to meet their main assault on the center and right
of the long line of battle. It made its march from New Orleans at
midnight, and was reported to General Morgan before daybreak. These
facts give a more intelligible view of the plan of battle arranged by
this officer. It was undoubtedly marred and broken up by the unforeseen
incidents mentioned, unfortunately for General Morgan and for the
American cause. Commodore Patterson, in his report to the Secretary of
the Navy, five days after the battle, makes the force of Kentucky
militia that gave way before the British four hundred men, more than
double the real number; thus showing the error prevalent.
When the facts came out that General Adair had secured the four hundred
stand of city arms for his own immediate command with which Jackson had
designed to arm the reinforcement for General Morgan, the incident was
naturally very irritating to the Commander-in-chief. It was imputed as a
cause, in part, of the defeat and disaster on the right bank. Jackson
seems to have complained to Adair that the latter ought to have known of
his order to call out the detachment of five hundred Kentuckians in
time, and of his intention to arm them in the city. Adair replied that
the order came to General Thomas, in chief command of the Kentuckians,
lying ill in camp, while he was busily engaged in New Orleans and at the
front, preparing his own command for battle next day; that he did not
know of the intention of Jackson to use the city arms until too late to
repair the mistake. It made up a chapter of accidents and errors,
happening with best intentions. As for the little body of Kentucky
militia, who were made sensationally notorious, where there was honor
and fame for no one, poorly armed and wearied with fasting and a heavy
all-night march, they did as well as troops could do. It is doubtful if
any one hundred and seventy troops in Jackson's army would have done
better. Unsupported, and attacked and flanked by four times their own
number, no troops could have held their ground longer.
In the possession of Judge William H. Seymour, of New Orleans, is an
original letter of Major Latour, addressed to General Morgan in
anticipation of the publication of his "Historical Memoirs of the War of
1812-15," advising him that he would give an account also of the
military situation and battle on the west bank, as he viewed them; and
inviting any statement from General Morgan in his own vindication that
he might choose to make. This letter is not printed in the history, but
was seen and copied by the author, through the courtesy of Judge
Seymour, who is a lineal descendant of a sister of Andrew Jackson. A
diligent inquiry was made by the writer of this monograph for a copy of
General Morgan's report, and also of letters or documents from him in
vindication of his course in the affairs mentioned. If any such are in
print, or otherwise preserved, the author did not succeed in finding
them, to his regret.
NEW ORLEANS, LA., April, 1815. TO GENERAL DAVID
MORGAN.
_Sir_: I send you herewith a copy of the publication that I am
preparing for the press, upon the last campaign, relating to the
transaction that took place on the right bank, on the 8th of January.
As I am of opinion that you are to bear the blame of our disgrace on
that part of our defense, I thought myself in duty bound, as a man
of honor, to participate to you what I wrote on the subject previous
to my putting it to the press. What I have stated is, I believe,
strictly true; however, sir, you are in a situation to furnish me
with such observations as may tend to rectify what should not be
printed, in its true light.
Be persuaded, sir, that I have no enmity against you; on the
contrary, as a private citizen, I have the regard for you that I
think you deserve. Then I hope you will not take my conscientious
caution in a bad part, and that you will direct to me in
Philadelphia, where I am departing for in a day or two, anything you
will choose to write for your vindication. It will find room in the
appendix, at all events, should it be founded upon proper
authorities.
I remain, sir, your most respectful servant,
A. LACARRIERE LATOUR.
Incidental prominence has been given to this episode of the battle of
the eighth, on the west bank of the river, far beyond its real merits as
an event of the military operations around New Orleans. Worse panic and
confusion resulted among the American militia at Bladensburg, in front
of Washington, and at other places, during the War of 1812-15, and
passed into history without unusual criticism, as incidents common to
warfare. But the injustice done to the little band of Kentucky militia,
imputing to them cowardly conduct, on the part of some of the highest
officials of the army, aroused a spirit of indignant protest that
echoed far and wide, and would not down. Had it not been for the
misleading report of General Morgan, followed by that of Commodore
Patterson, and prompting that of General Jackson to the Secretary of
War, saying that "the Kentuckians ingloriously fled," and imputing blame
to no other party, the incident of the battle and defeat would have been
mentioned and passed without comment.
THE COVERT RETREAT OF THE BRITISH.
The battles of the eighth were decisive of the campaign, and of the War
of 1812-15, so far as military operations were concerned. The British
had been beaten in generalship and beaten upon the field of battle,
until they were made to feel and to confess to defeat so crushing as to
leave no hope of retrieving disaster. Within fifteen days after landing,
they had sustained losses equal to one third of their entire army of
invasion. With prestige gone and spirit broken, and their ranks
shattered, there was but one thing left to do. To cover their retreat
and get safely back to their ships before the broken remnants of their
army were made to capitulate by surrender became a matter of gravest
concern. The situation is set forth in the following official letter to
the Secretary of War:
CAMP BELOW NEW ORLEANS, January 19, 1815.
_Sir_: Last night, at 12 o'clock, the enemy precipitately decamped
and returned to his boats, leaving behind him, under medical
attendance, eighty of his wounded, fourteen pieces of heavy
artillery, and a quantity of ammunition. Such was the situation of
the ground he abandoned, and that through which he retired, protected
by canals, redoubts, intrenchments, and swamps on his right and the
river on his left, that I could not, without great risk, which true
policy did not seem to require, much annoy him on his retreat.
Whether it is the purpose of the enemy to renew his efforts at some
other point, or not, I can not certainly determine. In my own mind,
however, there is little doubt that his last exertions have been made
in this quarter, at least for the present season. In this belief I am
strengthened by the prodigious losses he has sustained at the
position he has just quitted, and by the failure of his fleet to pass
Fort St. Philip. His loss on this ground, since the debarkation of
his troops, as stated by the last prisoners and deserters, and as
confirmed by many additional circumstances, must have exceeded four
thousand men. We succeeded on the 8th, in getting from the enemy
about one thousand stand of arms of various kinds.
Since the action of the 8th, the enemy have been allowed but very
little respite, my artillery from both sides of the river being
constantly employed until the hour of their departure, in annoying
them. They were permitted to find no rest.
I am advised by Major Overton, who commands at Fort St. Philip, in a
letter of the 18th, that the enemy having bombarded his fort for nine
days, with thirteen-inch mortars, without effect, had on the morning
of that day retired. I have little doubt that he would have sunk
their vessels had they attempted to run by.
Do not think me too sanguine in the belief that Louisiana is now
clear of the enemy. I need not assure you, however, that wherever I
command, such a belief shall never occasion any relaxation in the
measures for resistance. I am but too sensible that while the enemy
is opposing us, is not the most proper time to provide for them. On
the 18th, our prisoners on shore were delivered to us, an exchange
having been agreed to. I shall have on hand an excess of several
hundred.
I have the honor to be, &c.,
ANDREW JACKSON,
_Commander-in-Chief_.
The losses to the American army, in the five battles fought from the
twenty-third of December to the eighth of January, inclusive, are
summarized in the report of the Adjutant-general, which we give:
CAMP BELOW NEW ORLEANS, Jan'y 16, 1815.
Sir: I enclose for the information of the War Department, a report of
the killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under Major-general
Jackson, in the different actions with the enemy since their landing.
ROB'T BUTLER,
_Adjutant-General_.
BATTLE. KILLED. WOUNDED. MISSING.
December 23d 24 115 74
December 28th 9 8 None.
January 1st 11 23 None.
January 8th 13 39 19
----- ------ -----
57 185 93
A total of three hundred and thirty-five men. This includes the killed,
wounded, and missing in the two battles on the eighth.
Our English authorities are so marked with exaggerations and
discrepancies as to numbers in either army, and also as to losses and
casualties, that they are unreliable. There is with nearly all their
writers, and in the reports of their officers, a disposition to minimize
numbers on their own side, and to overstate those on the side of the
Americans. This was no doubt due to a sense of mortified pride and deep
chagrin over their repeated defeats and final expulsion from the
country, under humiliations such as English armies and navies had rarely
before known in history. General Jackson was not far wrong in estimating
the entire losses of the British, during the two weeks of invasion, at
more than four thousand men. If the large number who deserted from their
ranks after the battles of the eighth of January be included, the excess
would doubtless swell the numbers much above four thousand. Their
killed, wounded, and missing on the eighth approximated three thousand.
So decimated and broken up were their columns that they dared not risk
another battle.
REPULSE OF THE BRITISH FLEET BEFORE FORT ST. PHILIP.
On the first of January, Major W.H. Overton, in command of Fort St.
Philip, which guards the passage of the Mississippi River from its mouth
for the protection of New Orleans, received information that the enemy
intended to capture or pass the fort, to cooperate with their land
forces threatening the city. On the seventh, a fleet of two
bomb-vessels, one sloop, one brig, and one schooner appeared and
anchored below the fortification and began an attack. For nine days they
continued a heavy bombardment from four large sea-mortars and other
ordnance, but without the effect they desired. Making but little
impression toward destroying the fort, and fearing to risk an attempt
finally to pass our batteries, the fleet withdrew on the morning of the
eighteenth, and passed again into the Gulf. Our loss in this affair was
but two killed and seven wounded. During the nine days of attack the
enemy threw more than one thousand bombs from four ten-and thirteen-inch
mortars, besides many shells and round shot from howitzers and cannon.
AN ENGLISH SOLDIER'S VIEW OF DEFEAT.
A graphic pen-picture of the chaotic and wretched condition of the
English army after the crushing defeat of the eighth, and until its
final return to the fleet, is given by Gleig in his "Narrative of the
Campaigns." It will be read with all the more interest because it is the
frank admission of a brave though prejudiced officer, giving an enemy's
view of the great disaster that befell the British arms, in which he
fully shared:
General Lambert prudently determined not to risk the safety of his
army by another attempt upon works evidently so much beyond our
strength. He considered that his chances of success were in every
respect lessened by the late repulse. An extraordinary degree of
confidence was given to the enemy, while our forces were greatly
diminished in numbers. If again defeated, nothing could save our army
from destruction; it could only now retreat in force. A retreat,
therefore, was resolved upon while the measure appeared practicable,
and toward that end all our future operations were directed.
One great obstacle existed; by what road were the troops to travel to
regain the fleet? On landing, we had taken advantage of the bayou,
and thus come within two miles of the cultivated country, in our
barges. To return by the same route was impossible. In spite of our
losses there were not enough boats to transport above one half of the
army at one time. If we separated, the chances were that both
divisions would be destroyed; for those embarked might be
intercepted, and those left behind might be attacked by the whole
American army. To obviate the difficulty, it required that we should
build a passable road through the swamp, to Lake Borgne, some twenty
miles away. The task was burthened with innumerable difficulties.
There was no firm foundation on which to work, and no trees to assist
in forming hurdles. All we could do was to bind together large
quantities of swamp weeds and lay them across the quagmire. It was
but the semblance of a road, without firmness and solidity.
To complete this road, bad as it was, occupied nine days, during
which our army lay in camp, making no attempt to molest the enemy.
The Americans, however, were not so inactive. A battery of six guns,
mounted on the opposite bank, kept up a continued fire upon our men.
The same mode of proceeding was adopted in front, and thus, night and
day we were harassed by danger, against which there was no fortifying
ourselves. Of the extreme unpleasantness of our situation, it is
hardly possible to convey an adequate conception. We never closed our
eyes in peace, for we were sure to be awaked before the lapse of many
minutes, by the splash of a roundshot or shell in the mud beside us.
Tents we had none, but lay some in open air, and some in huts of
boards, or any material we could procure. From the moment of our
landing, December 23d, not a man had undressed, except to bathe; many
had worn the same shirt for weeks. Heavy rains now set in, with
violent storms of thunder and lightning, and keen frosts at night.
Thus we were wet all day, and nearly frozen at night. With our
outposts there was constant skirmishing. Every day they were attacked
by the Americans, and compelled to maintain their ground by dint of
hard fighting. No one but those who belonged to this army can form a
notion of the hardships it endured, and the fatigue it underwent.
Nor were these the only evils which tended to lessen our numbers. To
our soldiers every inducement was held out by the enemy to desert.
Printed papers, offering lands and money as the price of desertion,
were thrown into the pickets, while individuals would persuade our
sentinels to quit their stations. It could not be expected that
bribes so tempting would always be refused. Many desertions began
daily to take place, and ere long became so frequent, that the evil
rose to be of a serious nature. In the course of a week, many men
quitted their colors, and fled to the enemy.
Meanwhile, the wounded, except such as were too severely hurt to be
removed, were embarked in the boats and sent off to the fleet. Next
followed the baggage and stores, with the civil officers,
commissaries, and purveyors; and last of all such of the light
artillery as could be drawn without risk of discovery. But of the
heavy artillery, no account was taken. It was determined to leave
them behind, retaining their stations. By the 17th, no part of the
forces was left in camp but the infantry. On the evening of the 18th,
it also began the retreat. Trimming the fires, and arranging all in
the order as if no change were to take place, regiment after regiment
stole away, as soon as darkness concealed their motions, leaving the
pickets to follow as a rear guard, with injunctions not to retire
till daylight appeared. Profound silence was maintained; not a man
opened his mouth, except to issue necessary orders in a whisper. Not
a cough or any other noise was to be heard from the head to the rear
of the column. Even the steps of the soldiers were planted with care,
to prevent the slightest echo. Nor was this precaution unnecessary.
In spite of every endeavor to the contrary, a rumor of our intention
had reached the Americans; for we found them of late very watchful
and prying.
While our route lay alongside the river, the march was agreeable
enough, but as soon as we entered the marsh, all comfort was at an
end. Our roadway, constructed of materials so slight, and resting on
a foundation so infirm, was trodden to pieces by the first corps.
Those who followed were compelled to flounder on the best way they
could. By the time the rear of the column gained the morass, all
trace of a way had disappeared. Not only were the reeds torn asunder
and sunk by the pressure of those in front, but the bog itself was
trodden into the consistency of mud. Every step sunk us to the knees,
and sometimes higher. Near the ditches, we had the utmost difficulty
in crossing at all. There being no light, except what the stars
supplied, it was difficult to select our steps, or follow those who
called to us that they were safe on the other side. At one of those
ditches, I myself beheld an unfortunate wretch gradually sink until
he totally disappeared. I saw him flounder, heard his cry for help,
and ran forward with the intention of saving him; but before I had
taken a second step, I myself sunk to my breast in the mire. How I
kept from smothering is more than I can tell, for I felt no solid
bottom under me, and sank slowly deeper and deeper, till the mud
reached my arms. Instead of rescuing the poor soldier, I was forced
to beg assistance for myself. A leathern canteen strap being thrown
to me, I laid hold of it, and was dragged out, just as my
fellow-sufferer was buried alive, and seen no more.