judgment and warning of the chief of the engineer corps, General Morgan
seems to have been influenced by one consideration paramount to all
others. He was in daily council with Commodore Patterson, and was
assured of the powerful aid of his battery on the right bank, which had
done such execution in the ranks of the British across the river. Should
the enemy attack General Morgan's position at Raquet's line, the
Commodore could turn his twelve pieces of cannon in their embrasures,
sweep the field, and drive back any reasonable force in range. With
this support of his artillery, the few hundred militia of Morgan's
command could more successfully repulse an attack at Raquet's line than
at the line selected by Latour farther away. This change in the
situation and plan of defense is characterized by Latour and other
authorities as an unmilitary proceeding, as it abandoned the idea of a
fortified line behind which a successful defense could have been made
probable, if not certain, for an almost open field subject to the
flanking movement of veteran troops against raw militia, with no
auxiliary support except a park of artillery with guns turned another
way, and of most doubtful use in case of need. General Morgan must not
share alone the criticism which has been so freely made of his
disposition of forces and changes of strategic plans which resulted in
sensational disaster to his command. Commodore Patterson, experienced in
military affairs as well as naval, advised with him, and must have
approved. This change of line, made some days before the eighth, must
have been known, and on the representations of Morgan and Patterson,
approved by General Jackson. It is not conceivable that so important a
change of plans would have been made by a subordinate officer, affecting
seriously the safety of New Orleans, without the consent of the
commander-in-chief. The latter seemed always to have held in very high
personal esteem these two officers, and to have had confidence in their
abilities as commanders.
As mentioned above, the dispositions made for a line of defense by Major
Latour were changed by General Morgan, and the negroes set to work on
Raquet's line. A breastwork fortification was thrown up by the seventh
of January, extending but two hundred yards from the river bank out on
the site of the old canal. From this terminus across the plantation land
to the wooded swamp was an open plain, with scarce an obstruction to the
deploy of troops or the sweep of artillery. The old canal had long been
in disuse, and the ditch was filled nearly full with the washings and
deposits of years. Behind this two hundred yards of entrenchment General
Morgan massed all the Louisiana troops of his command and planted his
artillery, three pieces in all. From the end of the breastwork on the
right, one mile or eighteen hundred yards to the swamp, there were no
defensive works from behind which to repulse the assault of an enemy,
nor any means of resistance in sight to an attack, other than the guns
in battery of Commodore Patterson, of more than doubtful use, and the
yet very doubtful contingent of reinforcements sufficient from General
Jackson's limited supply of men and arms.
On the seventh, the forces of Morgan's immediate command were the First
Louisiana Militia on the left, next to the river; on the right of these,
the Second Louisiana; and on the right of the latter, the drafted
Louisiana militia, in all about five hundred men, who occupied the
fortified line of two hundred yards. It was not until late this day that
General Jackson seemed to fully awaken to the impending dangers of this
formidable flanking movement across the river. He at once gave orders
that five hundred of the unarmed Kentucky militia in camp should be
marched up the river to New Orleans and receive certain arms in store
there; then cross the river, and march down five miles on the west bank
and reinforce General Morgan's command by, or before, daylight next
morning. It was late afternoon when they started on this tramp of ten
miles, through mud and mire ankle deep. Arriving at New Orleans, it was
found that four hundred stand of arms which were expected to be obtained
from the city armory had been loaned to General Adair, and sent to him
at the Kentucky camp for other use. From other sources some
miscellaneous old guns were obtained to equip less than two hundred of
the detailed Kentuckians, who crossed the river, began their weary night
march, and reported to General Morgan before daylight of the eighth,
ready for duty, though they had not slept for twenty-four hours, nor
eaten anything since noon of the previous day. Their arms, a mongrel
lot, were many of them unfit for combat; old muskets and hunting-pieces,
some without flints, and others too small-bored for the cartridges.
THE BRITISH CROSS THE RIVER AND LAND AT DAYBREAK; THEY BEGIN THE
ATTACK--THE BATTLE AND RETREAT.
About sunset on the evening of the seventh, General Morgan was notified
of the intention of the enemy to cross the river by Commodore Patterson,
who had closely observed his movements in the afternoon. Before day-dawn
on the eighth, the General received information of the enemy landing on
the west bank, at Andry's plantation. The rapid current of the
Mississippi had carried his little flotilla three miles below the point
he had desired to land. Having debarked his troops, he marched up the
river; his boats, manned by four pieces of artillery, keeping abreast
and covering his flank. A detachment of Louisiana militia, about one
hundred and fifty men, under command of Major Arnaud, had been sent in
the night a mile or two down the river to oppose the landing and to
check the advance of the British. These raw militia, very poorly armed,
retired before the enemy. The detachment of one hundred and seventy
Kentuckians just arrived, under command of Colonel Davis, was ordered to
move forward to the support of the command of Major Arnaud. Though
wearied with the toilsome all-night march, the Kentucky troops went
forward about one mile below Morgan's line and took position on Mayhew's
Canal, their left resting on the bank of the river. Major Arnaud halted
his Louisiana militia on the right of these in line. The enemy, over one
thousand strong, came up in force under Colonel Thornton, who commanded
the British in the night battle of the twenty-third. A heavy fire of
musketry from the front was supported by a flanking fire of artillery
and rockets from the boats. The command of Major Arnaud gave way and
hastily retreated to the wood, appearing no more during the day on the
field of action. The Kentuckians returned the fire of the enemy with
several effective volleys, when they were ordered by an aid-de-camp of
General Morgan's, just arrived, to fall back and take a position on his
line of defense.
The falling back of the Kentuckians before the enemy was under orders
which they could not but obey. They were holding him in check and
inflicting heavier losses than they were receiving, against four or five
times their own numbers. They fell back one mile in good order. By
disposition of the commanding officer, they were placed in line, with an
open space of two hundred yards between their extreme left and the
extreme right of the entrenched Louisianians, and stretched out to cover
a space of three hundred yards, or one man to nearly two yards of space.
The remainder of the line stretching to the wood on the extreme right,
twelve hundred yards, was wholly without defensive works, or any defense
excepting a picket of eighteen men under Colonel Caldwell, stationed out
two hundred yards beyond the extreme right of the Kentuckians. Less than
two hundred poorly armed militia were thus isolated and distributed in
thin ranks to defend a line one mile in length, while General Morgan lay
behind his entrenchment, defending a space of two hundred yards with
five hundred troops and three pieces of artillery, which could have been
easily held by two hundred men.
Colonel Thornton, in command of the British troops, in advancing to the
attack, readily perceived with his trained military eye the vulnerable
situation of the American forces. Gleig, the English author present,
gives the disposition of the enemy's assaulting columns as follows: The
Eighty-fifth, Colonel Thornton's own regiment, about seven hundred men,
stretched across the field, covering our front, with the sailors, two
hundred in number, prepared to storm the battery and works; while the
marines formed a reserve, protecting the fleet of barges. It is not
probable that the attack upon the entrenchments next to the river was
intended to be more than a demonstration in force to hold the attention
of General Morgan and his command there, while the main assault was
being directed with the Eighty-fifth Regiment against the thin and
unsupported line of the Kentucky militia, with a view of flanking these
and getting in the rear of General Morgan's breastworks.
We quote from Major Latour's "Historical Memoir" a further account:
The enemy advancing rapidly by the road opposite the left of the
line, the artillery played on him with effect; and as he came nearer,
the musketry began to fire also. This having obliged him to fall
back, he next directed his attack against the detached Kentuckians on
our right, one column moving toward the wood and the other toward the
centre of the line. Now was felt the effect of the bad position that
we occupied. One of the enemy's columns turned our troops at the
extremity of Colonel Davis' command, while the other penetrated into
the unguarded space between the Kentuckians and the breastwork of the
Louisianians. Flanked at both extremes by four times their own
number, and unsupported, the Kentucky militia, after firing several
volleys, gave way; nor was it possible again to rally them.
Confidence had vanished, and with it all spirit of resistance. If
instead of extending over so much space, those troops had been
formed in close column, the confusion that took place might have been
avoided, and a retreat in good order made.
The enemy having turned our right, pushed on towards the rear of our
left, which continued firing as long as possible. At length the
cannon were spiked just as the enemy arrived on the bank of the
canal. Commodore Patterson had kept up an artillery fire on the
British over the river. As they advanced up the road, he would now
have turned his cannon in their embrasures, and fired on those of the
enemy who had turned our line and come in range. But the Kentucky
troops and the Louisianians masked the guns, and made it impossible
to fire without killing our own men. Seeing this, he determined to
spike his guns and retreat.
The Louisiana militia under General Morgan now fell back and took a
position on the Bois Gervais line, where a number of the fleeing
troops rallied. A small detachment of the enemy advanced as far as
Cazelards, but retired before evening. In the course of the night all
the enemy's troops recrossed the river, to join their main body. The
result of this attack of the enemy on the right bank was, the loss of
one hundred and twenty of his men, killed and wounded. The
commander-in-chief, receiving intelligence of the retreat of our
troops on the right bank, ordered General Humbert, formerly of the
French army, who had tendered his services as a volunteer, to cross
over with a reinforcement of four hundred men, assume command, and
repulse the enemy, cost what it might. The order was verbal; some
dispute having arisen over the question of military precedence, and
the enemy withdrawing, no further steps were taken.
"THE KENTUCKIANS INGLORIOUSLY FLED"--A PROFOUND SENSATION.
In this historic review, we dwell exhaustively upon the episode of this
battle on the west bank, on the 8th of January, 1815, not because of any
intrinsic importance of the subject, but rather from the sensational
incidents which attended the movements of the belligerents, and which
were consequent upon the issue. The galling words of General Jackson,
hastily and unguardedly uttered in an attempt to throw the blame of
defeat upon a small detachment of Kentucky militia, "the Kentuckians
ingloriously fled," were resented as an undeserved stigma upon the honor
and good name of all the Kentuckians in the army, and upon the State of
Kentucky herself. The epigrammatic phrase, construed to mean more than
was intended, perhaps, like Burchard's "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion,"
struck a chord of sympathetic emotion that vibrated not only in the army
and the community of Louisiana, but throughout the entire country. These
burning words are of record in the archives at Washington, and
remembered in history; but the facts in full, which vindicate the truth
and render justice to whom it is due, are known to but few, if known to
any now living. In the words of Latour: "What took place on the right
bank had made so much sensation in the immediate seat of war, and had
been so variously reported abroad, to the disparagement of many brave
men, that I thought it a duty incumbent on me to inquire into
particulars and trace the effect to its cause."
Rather than give our own impressions, we quote from "Reid and Eaton's
Life of Jackson" an account of this affair, interesting because written
when the subject was yet fresh in the public mind, and from the intimacy
of the authors with the personal and public life of General Jackson:
On the night of the 7th, two hundred Louisiana militia were sent one
mile down the river, to watch the movements of the enemy. They slept
upon their arms until, just at day, an alarm was given of the
approach of the British. They at once fell back towards General
Morgan's line. The Kentucky detachment of one hundred and seventy
men, having arrived at five in the morning, after a toilsome
all-night march, were sent forward to cooperate with the Louisiana
militia, whom Major Davis met retreating up the road. They now formed
behind a mill-race near the river. Here a stand was made, and the
British advance checked by several effective volleys. General
Morgan's aid-de-camp being present, now ordered a retreat back to the
main line of defense, which was made in good order. In the panic and
disorderly retreat afterwards are to be found incidents of
justification, which might have occasioned similar conduct in the
most disciplined troops. The weakest part of the line was assailed
by the greatest strength of the enemy. This was defended by one
hundred and seventy Kentuckians, who were stretched out to an extent
of three hundred yards, unsupported by artillery. Openly exposed to
the attack of a greatly superior force, and weakened by the extent of
ground they covered, it is not deserving reproach that they abandoned
a post they had strong reasons for believing they could not maintain.
General Morgan reported to General Jackson the misfortune of defeat
he had met, and attributed it to the flight of these troops, who had
drawn along with them the rest of his forces. True, they were the
first to flee; and their example may have had some effect in alarming
others. But, in situation, the troops differed. The one were exposed
and enfeebled by the manner of their arrangement; the other, much
superior in numbers, covered a less extent of ground, were defended
by an excellent breastwork manned by several pieces of artillery; and
with this difference,--the loss of confidence of the former was not
without cause. Of these facts, Commodore Patterson was not apprised;
General Morgan was. Both reported that the disaster was owing to the
flight of the Kentucky militia. Upon this information, General
Jackson founded his report to the Secretary of War, by which these
troops were exposed to censures they did not merit. Had all the
circumstances as they existed, been disclosed, reproach would have
been prevented. At the mill-race no troops could have behaved better;
they bravely resisted the advance of the enemy. Until an order to
that effect was given, they entertained no thought of retreating.
Intelligence quickly came to General Jackson of the defeat and rout of
General Morgan's command, imperiling the safety of the city of New
Orleans, in the midst of the congratulations over the great victory of
the main army on the east bank. Naturally, a state of intense excitement
followed, bordering on consternation for a few hours. When the danger
was ended by the withdrawal of the British forces to recross the river,
the report of General Morgan, followed by that of Commodore Patterson,
came to headquarters, laying the blame of defeat and disaster to the
alleged cowardly retreat of the Kentucky militia. With General Jackson's
great personal regard for the authors of these reports, he took for
granted the correctness of the charge of censurable conduct. Amid the
tumult of emotions that must have been felt, rapidly succeeding the
changes of scenes and incidents and issues of strategy and battle during
that eventful twenty-four hours, the great commander yielded to the
impulse of the moment to write in his official report to the Secretary
of War, on the ninth, the day succeeding the battles, the following
words:
Simultaneously with his advance upon my lines, the enemy had thrown
over in his boats a considerable force to the other side of the
river. These having landed, were hardly enough to advance against the
works of General Morgan; and what is strange and difficult to
account for, at the very moment when their discomfiture was looked
for with a confidence approaching to certainty, the Kentucky
reinforcement, in whom so much reliance had been placed, ingloriously
fled, drawing after them by their example the remainder of the
forces, and thus yielding to the enemy that most formidable position.
The batteries which had rendered me, for many days, the most
important service, though bravely defended, were of course now
abandoned; not, however, until the guns had been spiked.
Commodore Patterson also sent in a report to the Secretary of the Navy,
characterizing the little detachment of Kentucky militia in terms as
censurable and as unjust as were the words of General Jackson. When
these official reports became publicly known, imputing all blame of
disaster to the retreat of the Kentuckians, an indignant protest was
entered by General Adair and by the entire Kentucky contingent of the
army. In this protest they had the sympathy and support of a large
portion of other troops of the army, and of the community. Language at
this late day of forgetfulness and calmer reason would be too tame to
really portray the irritations, the bitter recriminations, and the angry
protests which agitated army circles, and the civil community as well,
and which were echoed from many parts of the country at large.
A COURT OF INQUIRY APPOINTED BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF EXONERATES
THE KENTUCKIANS.
General Adair, supported by the officers of his command, insisted that
the statements made in these reports to the departments at Washington
were made upon a misapprehension of the facts, and that great injustice
had been done the Kentucky militia in General Morgan's command by
attempting to shift the responsibility of defeat from its real sources,
and placing it to their discredit. A military court of inquiry was
demanded, and granted by the commander-in-chief, the members of which
were officers of rank in the army, and disinterested by their relations
in the findings, and General Carroll, of Tennessee, appointed to
preside. The following notice was served on General Morgan, and similar
notices on other officers concerned:
NEW ORLEANS, LA., February 9, 1815. BRIGADIER-GENERAL
MORGAN.
_Sir_: A Court of Inquiry is now in session for the purpose of
inquiring into the conduct of the officers under your command, on the
morning of the 8th of January. As you are somewhat concerned, I have
to request that you will introduce such witnesses on to-morrow as you
may think necessary. The conduct of Colonel Cavalier, and of Majors
Tesla and Arnaud, is yet to be inquired into.
Your Most Obt. Servant,
WM. CARROLL, Maj.-Gen'l,
_Prest. of Court_.
The following opinion was rendered:
REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY.
HEADQUARTERS 7TH MILITARY DISTRICT. NEW ORLEANS, LA.,
February 19, 1815.
GENERAL ORDERS.
At a Court of Inquiry, convened at this place on the 9th inst., of
which Major-general Carroll is President, the military conduct of
Colonel Davis, of Kentucky Militia, and of Colonels Dijon and
Cavalier, of Louisiana Militia, in the engagement on the 8th of
January last, on the west bank of the Mississippi, were investigated;
the Court, after mature deliberation, is of opinion that the conduct
of those gentlemen in the action aforesaid, and retreat on the 8th of
January, on the western bank of the river, is not reprehensible. The
cause of the retreat the Court attributes to the shameful flight of
the command of Major Arnaud, sent to oppose the landing of the enemy.
The retreat of the Kentucky militia, which, considering their
position, the deficiency of their arms, and other causes, may be
excusable; and the panic and confusion introduced into every part of
the line, thereby occasioning the retreat and confusion of the
Orleans and Louisiana militia. While the Court found much to applaud
in the zeal and gallantry of the officer immediately commanding, they
believe that a further reason for the retreat may be found in the
manner in which the force was placed on the line; which they consider
exceptionable. The commands of Colonels Dijon, Cavalier, and
Declouet, composing five hundred men, supported by three pieces of
artillery, having in front a strong breastwork, occupying a space of
only two hundred yards; whilst the Kentucky militia, composing
Colonel Davis' command, only one hundred and seventy strong, occupied
over three hundred yards, covered by a small ditch only.
The Major-general approves the proceeding of the Court of Inquiry,
which is hereby dissolved.
By Command.
H. CHOTARD, _Asst. Adj. Gen._
CONTROVERSY BETWEEN JACKSON AND ADAIR.
General Adair seems to have regarded the decision of the Court of
Inquiry as a modifying compromise, in deference to the high personal
character and influence of a number of persons concerned, and not the
full vindication of the Kentucky militia from the imputations of
ungallant conduct on the field reflected upon them in the official
reports. The controversy, and other causes preceding it, had rankled the
bosoms of both General Jackson and himself, and estranged the warm
friendship that had before existed between them. Adair thought that
Jackson should withdraw, or modify, the language of his official report.
General Jackson was not a man to readily retract; and was certainly not
in the humor with Adair to retract anything he had said. He would do no
more than approve the opinion of the Court of Inquiry. This, perhaps,
was as much as General Adair should have asked at the time.
On the 10th of February, 1816, the Legislature of Kentucky, in a
resolution of thanks to General Adair for gallant services at New
Orleans, added: "And for his spirited vindication of a respectable
portion of the troops of Kentucky from the libelous imputation of
cowardice most unjustly thrown upon them by General Andrew Jackson."
This and other incidents intensified the animosity of feeling.
It was some two years after the close of hostilities that the
correspondence between Jackson and Adair was terminated in language and
spirit so intensely bitter as to make the issue personal. Adair had
reported all proceedings and facts concerning the Kentucky troops during
the campaign to Governor Shelby, who had taken a very active part in
sending all possible aid for the defense of New Orleans. In these
reports he reflected on what he deemed the injustice done the Kentucky
troops in several official publications; especially by General Jackson,
not only in the affair of Morgan's rout, but in his report of other
operations during the campaign. These were causes of irritation on the
part of the commander-in-chief. The burning words in the reports of
General Jackson, General Morgan, and Commodore Patterson, imputing
cowardice to a few of their comrades, had touched a sensitive chord and
sunk deep into the hearts of the Kentucky troops in the army. In their
resentments, expressed in words and sometimes in actions, all danger
from the enemy being over, they were perhaps not always so orderly as
soldiers should be while in camp, or on scout or picket service.
[Illustration: JOHN ADAIR.
Eighth Governor of Kentucky.]