finally rallied by the heroic efforts of the officers, reinforced with
fresh troops, and led to a second attempt at assault; but the carnage
and destruction were as great as in the first attempt, while almost no
impression was made upon the defensive line of the Americans. The
British were again compelled to retreat in disorder, leaving great
numbers of their comrades dead or wounded on the ground, or prisoners to
the Americans. The hope of victory had now become a forlorn one to the
British. They were broken in numbers, broken in order and discipline,
and broken in prestige. Yet the brave officers, led by their
commanders-in-chief, determined not to give up the contest without a
last desperate effort. A part of the troops had dispersed and retreated
to shelter among the bushes on their right; the rest retired to the
ditch where they were first perceived in the morning, about five hundred
yards in our front. In vain did the officers call upon the men to rally
and form again for another advance, striking some with the flat of their
swords, and appealing to them by every incentive. They felt that it was
almost certain destruction to venture again into the storm of fire that
awaited them, and were insensible to everything but escape from
impending death. They would not move from the ditch, and here sheltered
the rest of the day. The ground over which they had twice advanced and
twice retreated was strewn thickly with their dead and wounded. Such
slaughter of their own men, with no apparent loss on our side, was
enough to appal the bravest of mankind.
Nearly one hundred of the enemy reached the ditch in front of the
American breastwork, half of whom were killed and the other half
captured. A detachment of British troops had penetrated into the wood
toward our extreme left, to divert attention by a feint attack. The
troops under General Coffee opened on these with their rifles, and soon
forced them to retire.
After the main attack on the American left and center had begun, another
column of over twenty-five hundred men, under the command of General
Keene, advanced along the road near the levee, and between the levee and
the river, to attack the American line on the extreme right. They were
partly sheltered by the levee from the fire of the artillery, except
that of Battery 1 and the guns across the river. Our outposts were
driven in, and the head of the column pushing forward occupied the
unfinished redoubt in front of our entrenched line before more than two
or three discharges of artillery could be made. Overpowering the small
force here, they compelled it to fall back, after killing and wounding a
few men. Bravely led by Colonel Rence and other officers of rank, the
British gained a momentary advantage, and threatened to storm the
entrenchment itself. But Beale's Rifles from the city, defending this
extreme, poured fatal volleys upon the head of the column, while
Batteries 1 and 2 mowed down the ranks. The Seventh Regiment, the only
infantry besides Beale's in musket range, did deadly execution also. By
these, the farther advance of the enemy was made impossible, while the
nearest ground they occupied was strewn with their dead and wounded,
among whom were General Keene, Colonel Rence, and other prominent
officers. Many passed the ditch and scaled the parapet only to be shot
down in the redoubt by the unerring riflemen behind the entrenched line.
Like the main column on the left, this second column on the right,
broken and shattered, was compelled to fall back in great disorder upon
the reserve, with no effort after to renew the assault. The dead and
wounded lay thick along the road, the levee, and the river bank, as far
out as the range of our guns. A flanking fire from the battery across
the river harassed the troops in this column both in the advance and
retreat, as they passed in plain view, from which fire they sustained
severe losses.
The battle was now ended as far as the firing of musketry and small arms
was concerned. The last volleys from these ceased one hour after the
British column first in motion attacked our line upon the left center,
at half-past seven o'clock. In that brief time, one of the best equipped
and best disciplined armies that England ever sent forth was defeated
and shattered beyond hope by one half its number of American soldiers,
mostly militia. For one hour after the opening attack the firing along
the American line had been incessant, and the roar of the cannon,
mingling with the rattling noise of the musketry and rifles,
reverberated over the open plains and echoed back from the wood and
swamp, until the issue of combat sent the enemy to cover beyond range.
The artillery from our batteries, however, kept up a continuous fire
against the guns of the enemy, or against squads of their troops who
might expose themselves, until two o'clock in the afternoon, when the
lull of strife came to all.
The scene upon the field of contest was one that can not be pictured in
words to convey an adequate impression. British officers who campaigned
in Europe, in the wars of the Peninsula, testified that in all their
military experiences they had witnessed nothing to equal the stubborn
fierceness of the contending forces, and the fearful carnage that befell
the troops of the British army. We have mentioned how thickly strewn was
the ground along the levee and the road, on the right next to the river,
with the dead and the wounded of the enemy. The fatality among the
officers here was fearful. General Keene, in command of this second
attacking column, was borne from the field badly wounded. Colonel Rence,
next in command with Keene, was killed while leading the assault in the
redoubt. Near by fell Major King, mortally wounded, and others of rank,
leaving the command with but few leaders to conduct the broken ranks in
precipitate retreat. On our left, in the front of the Tennesseans and
Kentuckians, the greatest execution had been done. The slaughter here
was appalling. Within a space three hundred yards wide, and extending
out two hundred yards from our breastwork on the battlefield, an area of
about ten acres, the ground was literally covered with the dead and
desperately wounded. A British officer, who became also historian, says
that under the temporary truce he rode forward to view this scene. Such
a one he never witnessed elsewhere. There lay before him in this small
compass not less than one thousand men, dead or disabled by wounds, all
in the uniform of the British soldier; not one American among the
number. The fatality to the English officers had been even greater on
our left than on our right. Lord Pakenham, commander-in-chief, after the
first repulse of the main column, with a courage as reckless as it was
vain rode forward to rally his troops and lead them to a second attack
in person, and in the midst of a hail of missiles from cannon and
small-arms fell mortally hurt with several wounds, and died within an
hour. Major-general Gibbs, next in command, was stricken down a few
minutes after, dying within a few hours. Others in high rank were
carried down in the holocaust of casualties, until the British army
became unnerved for the want of leadership in the hour of disaster and
peril.
Adjutant-general Robert Butler, in his official report to General
Jackson a few days after the battle of the eighth, placed the losses of
the British at seven hundred killed, fourteen hundred wounded, and five
hundred prisoners; twenty-six hundred men, or almost one third the
entire number the enemy admitted to have taken part in the contest of
the day. The loss of the Americans was six killed and seven wounded,
thirteen in all. Instead of comment upon this remarkable disparity of
losses, and the causes that led to such a signal victory for the
Americans and such a humiliating defeat for our enemies, it will be more
interesting to our readers to quote from English writers who were
participants in the battle, and eye-witnesses of the scenes they
describe with graphic pen. We are ever curious to know what others see
and say of us, especially if they honestly criticize us with a spice of
prejudice.
AN ENGLISH OFFICER'S ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE.
Gleig, in his "History of British Campaigns," says:
Dividing his troops into three columns, Sir Edward Pakenham directed
that General Keene, at the head of the Ninety-fifth, the light
companies of the Twenty-first, Fourth, and Forty-fourth Regiments,
and the two black corps, should make a demonstration on the right;
that General Gibbs, with the Fourth, Twenty-first, Forty-fourth, and
Ninety-third, should force the enemy's left; while General Lambert,
with the Seventh and Forty-third, remained in reserve. Our numbers
now amounted to a little short of eight thousand, a force which, in
any other part of America, would have been irresistible. The forces
of the enemy were reported at twenty-three to thirty thousand. I
suppose their whole force to have been twenty-five thousand. All
things were arranged on the night of the 7th, for the 8th was fixed
upon as the day decisive of the fate of New Orleans.
On the morning of the 8th, the entire army was in battle array. A
little after daylight, General Pakenham gave the word to advance The
troops on the right and the left, having the Forty-fourth to follow
with the fascines and ladders, rushed on to the assault. On the left,
next to the river, a detachment of the Ninety-fifth, Twenty-first and
Fourth, stormed a three-gun battery and took it. It was in advance of
the main line of works. The enemy, in overpowering numbers, repulsed
our attacking force and recaptured the battery _with immense
slaughter_. On our right again, the Twenty-first and Fourth being
almost cut to pieces, and thrown into some confusion by the enemy's
fire, the Ninety-third pushed up and took the lead. Hastening
forward, our troops soon reached the ditch; but to scale the parapet
without ladders was impossible. Some few indeed, by mounting upon
each others' shoulders, succeeded in entering the works; but these
were, most of them, instantly killed or captured. As many as stood
without were exposed to a sweeping fire, which cut them down by whole
companies. It was in vain that the most obstinate courage was
displayed. They fell by the hands of men they could not see. The
Americans, without lifting their faces above the rampart, swung their
fire-locks over the wall and discharged them directly upon their
heads.
Poor Pakenham saw how things were going, and did all that a general
could do to rally his broken troops. He prepared to lead them on
himself, when he received a slight wound in the knee, which killed
his horse. Mounting another, he again headed the Forty-fourth, when a
second ball took effect more fatally, and he dropped lifeless in the
arms of his aid-de-camp. Bravely leading their divisions, Generals
Gibbs and Keene were both wounded, and borne helpless from the field.
All was now confusion and dismay. Without leaders, and ignorant of
what was to be next done, the troops first halted, and then began to
retire, till finally, the retreat was changed into a flight, and they
quitted the ground in the utmost disorder. But the retreat was
covered in gallant style by the reserve. The Seventh and Forty-third,
under General Lambert, presented the appearance of a renewed attack,
and the enemy, overawed, did not pursue.
On the granting of a two-days' truce for the burial of the dead,
prompted by curiosity, I mounted my horse and rode to the front. Of
all the sights I ever witnessed, that which met me there was, beyond
comparison, the most shocking and the most humiliating. Within the
compass of a few hundred yards, were gathered together nearly a
thousand bodies, all of them arrayed in British uniforms. Not a
single American was among them; all were English. And they were
thrown by dozens into shallow holes, scarcely deep enough to hide
their bodies. Nor was this all. An American officer stood by smoking
a cigar, and abruptly counting the slain with a look of savage
exultation, repeating that their loss amounted only to eight killed
and fourteen wounded. I confess that, when I beheld the scene, I hung
down my head half in sorrow, and half in anger. With my officious
informant, I had every inclination to pick a quarrel. But he was on
duty, and an armistice existed, both of which forbade. I turned my
horse's head and galloped back to the camp.
The changes of expression now visible in every countenance, no
language can portray. Only twenty hours ago, and all was hope and
animation; wherever you went, you were enlivened by the sounds of
merriment and raillery. The expected attack was mentioned, not only
in terms of sanguine hope, but in perfect confidence as to the
result. Now gloom and discontent everywhere prevailed.
Disappointment, grief, indignation and rage succeeded each other in
all bosoms; nay, so were the troops overwhelmed by a sense of
disgrace, that, for awhile they retained their sorrow without hinting
at the cause. Nor was this dejection because of laurels tarnished,
wholly. The loss of comrades was to the full, as afflicting as the
loss of honor; for, out of more than seven thousand in action on this
side, no fewer than two thousand had fallen. Among these were two
generals in chief command, and many officers of courage and ability.
Hardly an individual survived who had not to mourn the loss of some
special and boon companion.
BRITISH EXCUSES FOR DEFEAT.
Many causes for the failure of the campaign of invasion, and for the
disastrous issue of the battle of the eighth, were conjectured in the
English army. Almost universal blame was attributed to Colonel Mullins,
of the Forty-fourth Regiment, which was detailed under orders to prepare
and have ready, and to carry to the front on the morning of the eighth,
fascines and ladders with which to cross the ditch and scale the
parapet, as the soldiers fought their way to the breastwork of the
Americans. It was freely charged that the Colonel deserted his trust and
at the moment of need was half a mile to the rear. It was then that
Pakenham, learning of Mullins' conduct, placed himself at the head of
the Forty-fourth and endeavored to lead them to the front with the
implements needed to storm the works, when he fell mortally wounded. Of
this incident another British officer, Major B.E. Hill, writes:
Before sunset of the 7th, I was directed to carry instructions to
Colonel Mullins, of the 44th, respecting the redoubt in which the
fascines and scaling ladders were placed, and to report the result of
my interview to Sir Edward Pakenham. I saw Colonel Mullins, and read
to him the directions from headquarters, begging to know if he
thoroughly understood their purport? I was assured that nothing could
be clearer. Reporting to Sir Edward, he thanked me for so completely
satisfying him that the orders so important would be certainly and
well executed.
Colonel Mullins may have been guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer,
for which he was tried and cashiered in England; he probably saved his
life at the expense of his honor, in being absent from his post on that
day. But the British officers magnified the importance of the presence
of himself and his regiment with their fascines and ladders ready for
use. Even with the help of these devices, there were not men enough in
the English army to have crossed the ditch, climbed the parapet, and
made a breach in the breastwork line of the Americans. Some of them
might have reached the ditch alive, as did some of their comrades, but
like those comrades they would have died in the ditch or been made
prisoners. The Americans, too, could have used the bayonet as well as
the British, if necessary.
BATTLE OF THE EIGHTH OF JANUARY ON THE WEST BANK OF THE RIVER.
We have mentioned that after the night battle of the twenty-third of
December General Jackson ordered General Morgan to move his command of
Louisiana troops from English Turn, seven miles below the British camp
at Villere's, and to take a position on the west bank of the
Mississippi, opposite to the American camp. Very naturally, the
possibility, and even the probability, of the enemy, when his army was
made formidable by all the reinforcements coming up, throwing a heavy
flanking force across the river, marching it to a point opposite New
Orleans and forcing a surrender of the city, suggested itself to the
military eye of Jackson. After the latter entrenched at Rodrique Canal,
by the first of January, there was no other strategical route by which
the British could have successfully assailed the city. The importance of
this seems to have been fully comprehended neither by the one combatant
nor the other until too late to fully remedy the omission.
Just such a flanking movement was undertaken by the English at the
latest day, which brought on a second battle on the eighth, on the right
bank of the river, resulting in a defeat to the American forces, and
well-nigh ending in disaster to the American cause. It is in evidence
that this strategic movement was the result of a council of war held by
the British officers, at which Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane was
present. This idea of reaching the city by a heavy detachment thrown
across the river and marching up to a point opposite, in cannon reach,
had occurred before; but the difficulty was in finding a way to cross
over the troops and artillery, with the Americans in command of the
means of transportation. The suggestion came from Admiral Cochrane that
the Villere Canal from the bayou could be easily deepened and widened to
the river bank and opened into the river for the passage of the boats
and barges from the fleet, and a sufficient force thrown across the
river in that way under cover of night. This seemed feasible, and the
strategy determined on. It is related further that Lord Pakenham
insisted that the main attack upon the city for its capture should be
made by a heavy detachment in this direction, and at the same time only
a demonstration in force made on the American breastworks with the whole
army, supported by the artillery. He urged that to directly assault the
fortified line in front would be at a fearful loss of life, if
successful; if it failed it would be disastrous. The Admiral replied to
this tauntingly, that there was no cause for alarm over anticipated
defeat; he would undertake to force the lines of the American militia
with two or three thousand marines. In allusion to this, Latour says:
"If the British commander-in-chief was so unmindful of what he owed to
his country, and to the army committed to his charge, as to yield to the
ill-judged and rash advice of the Admiral, he sacrificed reason in a
moment of irritation; though he atoned with his life for having acted
contrary to his own judgment." Undoubtedly the English made their last
and most fatal blunder here.
As the English writers who were with the army have so variously
minimized the forces under Colonel Thornton, and so exaggerated the
numbers of the Americans in this affair on the west bank, we quote from
the official report of Major-general Lambert, who succeeded to the
immediate command of the invading army after the fall of Generals
Pakenham, Gibbs, and Keene, what appears to be reliable:
_To Lord Bathurst_: JANUARY 10th, 1815.
It becomes my duty to lay before your Lordship the proceedings of the
force lately employed on the right bank of the Mississippi River.
Preparations had been made on our side to clear out and widen the
canal that led from the bayou to the river, by which our boats had
been brought up to the point of disembarkation, and to open it to the
Mississippi, by which our troops could be got over to the right bank,
and the cooperation of armed boats be secured. A corps consisting of
the 85th light infantry, two hundred seamen, four hundred marines,
the 5th West India Regiment, and four pieces of artillery, under the
command of Colonel Thornton, of the 85th, were to pass over during
the night, and move along the right bank toward New Orleans, clearing
its front, until it reached the flanking battery of the enemy on that
side, which it had orders to carry. Unlooked for difficulties caused
delay in the entrance of the armed boats from the canal into the
river, destined to land Colonel Thornton's corps, by which several
hours' delay was caused. The ensemble of the general movement was
lost, a point of the last importance to the main attack on the left
bank, although Colonel Thornton ably executed his instructions.
MAJ.-GEN. LAMBERT, _Com'd'g._
The two regiments above, with the seamen and marines, if all were
present, would have given Colonel Thornton a command of nearly two
thousand men. But it is said that in consequence of some difficulties in
getting the boats through the canal into the river, and delay consequent
thereon, a part of the forces were left behind. From the best
authorities, there were twelve hundred British troops landed upon the
west bank of the river on the morning of the eighth, by daybreak--all
except the West India regiment.
DEFENSIVE WORKS AND FORCES ON THE WEST BANK, OPPOSITE JACKSON'S
CAMP.
General Morgan, commanding the Louisiana militia, was in position on
Raquet's old canal site, next to the river. Major Latour, chief of the
engineer corps, had been instructed by General Jackson, a week or two
before the battle, to proceed across the river and to select on that
side a suitable line for defensive works for General Morgan, in case the
enemy should attempt a flanking movement on the right bank. Of this
mission, Major Latour writes:
Agreeable to orders, I waited on General Morgan, and in the presence
of Commodore Patterson communicated to him my orders, and told him I
was at his disposal. The General seemed not to come to a conclusion,
but inclined to make choice of Raquet's line. He then desired that I
inspect the different situations myself, and make my report to him.
My orders were to assist him, and my opinion was subordinate to his.
I chose for the intended line of defense an intermediate position,
nearly at equal distances from Raquet's and Jourdan's canal, where
the wood inclines to the river, leaving a space of only about nine
hundred yards between the swampy wood and the river. Works occupying
this space could not well be turned, without a siege and assault in
heavy force by the enemy. I made a rough draft of the intended line,
and immediately the overseer set his negroes to execute the work.
Returning to the left bank, I made my report to the
Commander-in-chief, who approved the disposition made. One thousand
men could have guarded a breastwork line here, and half that number
would have been sufficient had pieces of cannon been mounted in the
intended outworks. That line, defended by the eight hundred troops
and the artillery of General Morgan's command, on the 8th, could have
defied three or four times the number of British who crossed over to
the right bank that day. But these dispositions had been changed by
General Morgan, and the negroes ordered to work on the Raquet line.
Major Latour had selected for General Jackson his line of defense on the
left bank of the river, and had directed the construction of the
breastwork and redoubts to the entire satisfaction of the General. He
objected to the Raquet line favored by General Morgan, as wholly
unsuited for defense. The space here from the river to the wood swamp
was two thousand yards, or considerably over one mile, a much longer
line than Jackson's on the other side. To be effective against an
attacking force, the entrenchment and outworks must be extended to cover
the entire space. It would require then more than double the number of
troops and of pieces of artillery for defense than the situation
selected by Latour.