The attempts at Russification made immediately after the 1877 war
by means of the scholastic method of Elminski resulted in the first
manifestations of the Pan-Turanian movement. They arose, not in Russia,
but in Russian Tatary. The Tatars of the huge territories of Central
Asia, by reason of their annexation to the Russian Empire and the
indirect contact with the West that it entailed, and also owing to
their reaction against the West, awoke to a consciousness of their
individuality and strength.
A series of ethnographic studies which were begun at that time by M.
de Ujfalvi upon the Hungarians—all the peoples speaking a Finno-Ugrian
idiom descending from the same stock as those who speak the Turkish,
Mongol, and Manchu languages—and were continued by scholars of various
nationalities, gave the Pan-Turanian doctrine a scientific basis;
the principles of this doctrine were laid down by H. Vambéry,[40]
and it was summed up by Léon Cahun in his _Introduction a l’histoire
de l’Asie_.[41] This Turco-Tartar movement expanded, and its most
authoritative leaders were Youssouf Ahtchoura Oglou; Ahmed Agayeff,
who was arrested at the beginning of the armistice by the English as a
Unionist and sent to Malta; and later Zia Geuk Alp, a Turkish poet and
publicist, the author of _Kizil-Elma_ (The Red Apple), who turned the
Union and Progress Committee towards the Pan-Turanian movement though
he had many opponents on that committee, and who was arrested too and
sent to Malta.
Islam for thirteen centuries, by creating a religious solidarity
between peoples of alien races, had brought about a kind of religious
nationality under its hegemony. But the ambitious scheme of
Pan-Islamism was jeopardised in modern times by new influences and
widely different political aspirations. It was hoped for some time that
by grouping the national elements of Turkey and pursuing a conciliatory
policy it would be possible to give a sound basis to that religious
nationality. But that nationality soon proved unable to curb the
separatist aspirations of the various peoples subjected to the Turkish
yoke, and then, again, it wounded the pride of some Turkish elements
by compelling them to obey the commandments of Islam, to which all the
Turanian populations had not fully adhered. The Pan-Islamic movement
later on grew more and more nationalist in character, and assumed a
Pan-Turkish tendency, though it remained Pan-Turanian—that is to say,
it still included the populations speaking the Turkish, Mongol, and
Manchu languages.
Without in any way giving up the Pan-Islamic idea, Turkish Nationalism
could not but support the Pan-Turanian movement, which it hoped would
add the 18 million Turks living in the former Russian Empire, Persia,
and Afghanistan, to the 8 million Turks of the territories of the
Ottoman Empire.
Owing to its origin and the character it has assumed, together with the
geographical situation and importance of the populations concerned,
this movement appears as a powerful obstacle to the policy which
England seems intent upon pursuing, and to which she seeks to bring
over Italy and France. It also exemplifies the latent antagonism which
had ever existed between the Arabian world and the Turkish world, and
which, under the pressure of events, soon asserted itself.
Indeed, the mutual relations of the Arabs and the Turks had been slowly
but deeply modified in the course of centuries.
After the great Islamic movement started by Mohammed in the seventh
century, the Arabs who had hitherto been mostly confined within the
boundaries of the Arabian peninsula spread to the west over the whole
of Northern Africa as far as Spain, and to the east over Mesopotamia
and a part of Persia. In the twelfth century Arabian culture reached
its climax, for the Arabian Caliphs of Baghdad ruled over huge
territories. At that time Arabic translations revealed to Europe the
works of Aristotle and of the Chaldean astronomers, and the Arabs,
through Spain, had an important influence on the first period of modern
civilisation.
In 1453, when the Turks, who had extended their dominion over all the
shores of the Mediterranean, settled at Constantinople, which became
the capital of the Islamic Empire, the influence of Arabia decreased;
yet the Arabs still enjoyed in various parts political independence and
a kind of religious predominance.
For instance, the Arabs settled in the north of Western Africa, after
losing Spain, became quite independent, and formed the Empire of
Morocco, which was not under the suzerainty of Constantinople.
The Arabian tribes and Berber communities of Algeria and Tunis, which
had more or less remained under the suzerainty of the Sultan, were no
longer amenable to him after the French conquest. The Pasha of Egypt,
by setting up as an independent Sovereign, and founding the hereditary
dynasty of the Khedives, deprived the Ottoman dominion of Egypt,
where the Arabs were not very numerous, but had played an important
part in the development of Islam. The Italian conquest took away from
Turkey the last province she still owned in Africa. Finally, when the
late war broke out, England deposed the Khedive Abbas Hilmi, who was
travelling in Europe and refused to go back to Egypt. She proclaimed
her protectorate over the Nile valley, and, breaking off the religious
bond that linked Egypt with the Ottoman Empire, she made Sultan of
Egypt, independent of the Sultan of Constantinople, Hussein Kamel,
uncle of the deposed Khedive, who made his entry into Cairo on December
20, 1914.
The Turks, however, kept possession of the Holy Places, Mecca and
Medina, which they garrisoned and governed. This sovereignty was
consolidated by the railway of the pilgrimage. The investiture of the
Sherif of Mecca was still vested in them, and they chose the member of
his family who was to succeed him, and who was detained as a hostage
at Constantinople. But after the failure of the expedition against the
Suez Canal during the late war, and at the instigation of England, the
Sherif, as we shall see, proclaimed himself independent, and assumed
the title of Melek, or King of Arabia.
On the other hand, the province of the Yemen, lying farther south
of the Hejaz, has always refused to acknowledge the authority of
Constantinople, and is practically independent. Lastly, at the southern
end of the Arabian peninsula, the English have held possession of Aden
since 1839, and have extended their authority, since the opening of the
Suez Canal in 1869, over all the Hadramaut. All the sheiks of this part
of Arabia along the southern coast, over whom the authority of Turkey
was but remotely exercised and was practically non-existent, naturally
accepted the protectorate of England without any difficulty, in return
for the commercial facilities she brought them and the allowances
she granted them, and in 1873 Turkey formally recognised the English
possession of this coast.
On the eastern coast of the Arabian peninsula the territory of the
Sultan of Oman, or Maskat, lying along the Persian Gulf, has been
since the beginning of the nineteenth century under the authority
of the Viceroy of India. This authority extends nowadays over all
the territories lying between Aden and Mesopotamia, which are in
consequence entirely under English sway.
Moreover, the English have proclaimed their protectorate over the Sheik
of Koweit.
Koweit had been occupied by the British Navy after the Kaiser’s visit
to Tangier, and thus Germany had been deprived of an outlet for her
railway line from Anatolia to Baghdad. The Rev. S. M. Zwemer, in a book
written some time ago, _Arabia, the Birthplace of Islam_, after showing
the exceptional situation occupied by England in these regions, owned
that British policy had ambitious designs on the Arabian peninsula and
the lands round the Persian Gulf.
Since the outbreak of the war, Ottoman sovereignty has also lost the
small Turkish province of Hasa, between Koweit and Maskat, inhabited
entirely by Arabian tribes.
The rebellion of the Sherif of Mecca against the temporal power of
the Sultans of Mecca shows how important was the change that had
taken place within the Arabian world, but also intimates that the
repercussions of the war, after accelerating the changes that were
already taking place in the relations between the Arabs and the Turks,
must needs later on bring about an understanding or alliance between
these two elements against any foreign dominion. In the same way, the
encroachments of England upon Arabian territories have brought about a
change in the relations between the Arabs and the English; in days of
yore the Arabs, through ignorance or because they were paid to do so,
more than once used English rifles against the Turks; but the recent
Arabian risings against the British in Mesopotamia seem to prove that
the Arabs have now seen their mistake, and have concluded that the
English were deceiving them when they said the Caliphate was in danger.
Finally, in order to pave the way to a British advance from Mesopotamia
to the Black Sea, England for a moment contemplated the formation of
a Kurdistan, though a long existence in common and the identity of
feelings and creed have brought about a deep union between the Kurds
and the Turks, and a separation is contrary to the express wishes of
both peoples.
* * * * *
It is a well-known fact that the descendants of Ali, the Prophet’s
cousin, who founded the dynasty of the Sherifs, or Nobles, took the
title of Emirs—_i.e._, Princes—of Mecca, and that the Emir of the Holy
Places of Arabia had always to be recognised by the Sherif to have a
right to bear the title of Caliph. This recognition of the Caliphs by
the Sherifs was made public by the mention of the name of the Caliph
in the Khoutba, or Friday prayer.
In consequence of political vicissitudes, the Emirs of Mecca
successively recognised the Caliphs of Baghdad, the Sultans of Egypt
until the conquest of Egypt by Selim I in 1517, and the Sultans of
Turkey, whose sovereignty over the Holy Places has always been more or
less nominal, and has hardly ever been effective over the Hejaz.
When the Wahhabi schism took place, the Wahhabis, who aimed at
restoring the purer doctrines of primitive Islam, and condemned the
worship of the holy relics and the Prophet’s tomb, captured Mecca and
Medina.
Mehmet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, was deputed by the Porte to reconquer the
Holy Places, which he governed from 1813 to 1840. Since that time the
Ottoman Government has always appointed a Governor of the Hejaz and
maintained a garrison there, and the Porte took care a member of the
Sherif’s family should reside in Constantinople in order to be able to
replace the one who bore the title of Sherif, should the latter ever
refuse to recognise the Caliph.
Long negotiations were carried on during the war between the British
Government and Hussein, Sherif of Mecca, the Emir Feisal’s father,
concerning the territorial conditions on which peace might be restored
in the East. These views were set forth in eight letters exchanged
between July, 1915, and January, 1916.
In July, 1915, the Sherif offered his military co-operation to the
British Government, in return for which he asked it to recognise the
independence of the Arabs within a territory including Mersina and
Adana on the northern side and then bounded by the thirty-seventh
degree of latitude; on the east its boundary was to be the Persian
frontier down to the Gulf of Basra; on the south the Indian Ocean, with
the exception of Aden; on the west the Red Sea and the Mediterranean as
far as Mersina.
On August 30, 1915, Sir Henry MacMahon, British resident in Cairo,
observed in his answer that discussion about the future frontiers was
rather premature.
In a letter dated September 9, forwarded to the Foreign Office on
October 18 by Sir Henry MacMahon, the Sherif insisted upon an immediate
discussion. As he forwarded this letter, Sir Henry MacMahon mentioned
the following statement made to him by the Sherif’s representative in
Egypt:
“The occupation by France of the thoroughly Arabian districts of
Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus would be opposed by force of arms
by the Arabs: but with the exception of these districts, the Arabs
are willing to accept a few modifications of the north-western
frontiers proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.”
On October 24, 1915, by his Government’s order, Sir Henry MacMahon
addressed the Sherif the following letter:
“The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the parts of Syria
lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and
Aleppo cannot be looked upon as merely Arabian, and should be
excluded from the limits and frontiers that are being discussed.
With these modifications, and without in any way impairing our
present treaties with the Arabian chiefs, we accept your limits
and frontiers. As to the territories within these limits, in
which Great Britain has a free hand as far as she does not injure
the interests of her ally, France, I am desired by the British
Government to make the following promise in answer to your letter.
“‘With the reservation of the above-mentioned modifications, Great
Britain is willing to recognise and support Arabian independence
within the territories included in the limits and frontiers
proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.’”
On November 5, 1915, the Sherif, in his answer, agreed to the
exclusion of Mersina and Adana, but maintained his claims on the other
territories, especially Beyrut.
On December 13 Sir Henry MacMahon took note of the Sherif’s
renunciation of Mersina and Adana.
On January 1, 1916, the Sherif wrote that, not to disturb the
Franco-British alliance, he would lay aside his claims to Lebanon
during the war; but he would urge them again on the conclusion of
hostilities.
On January 30, 1916, Sir Henry MacMahon took note of the Sherif’s wish
to avoid all that might be prejudicial to the alliance between France
and England, and stated that the friendship between France and England
would be maintained after the war.
On June 10, 1916, a rebellion broke out at Mecca. At daybreak the
barracks were encircled by Arabs. Hussein ibn Ali, who was at the head
of the movement, informed the Turkish commander that the Hejaz had
proclaimed its independence. On June 11 the Arabs captured the Turkish
fort of Bash-Karacal, and on the 12th Fort Hamadie. Soon after Jeddah
surrendered, and on September 21 El Taif.
In a proclamation dated June 27, 1916, the Sherif Hussein ibn Ali
stated the political and religious reasons that had induced him to
rebel against the Ottoman Government. He declared the latter was in
the hands of the Young Turk party, that the Committee of Union and
Progress had driven the country to war, was destroying the power of the
Sultan, and had violated the rights of the Caliphate.
On October 5 the Sherif Hussein formed an Arabian Cabinet, convened an
Assembly, and on November 6 caused himself to be proclaimed King of the
Arabs.
In November, 1916, he issued a second proclamation, not so lofty in
tone, but more wily in its wording, which seemed to lack personality
in its inspiration. It began thus: “It is a well-known fact that the
better informed people in the Moslem world, Ottomans and others, saw
with much misgiving Turkey rush into the war.” He then stated that—
“The Ottoman Empire is a Moslem empire, whose wide territories have
a considerable sea-frontage. So the policy of the great Ottoman
Sultans, inspired by this twofold consideration, has always aimed
at keeping on friendly terms with the Powers that rule over the
majority of Moslems and at the same time hold the mastery of the
seas.”
He went on as follows:
“The one cause of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and the
extermination of its populations was the short-sighted tyranny
of the leaders of the Unionist faction—Enver, Jemal, Talaat,
and their accomplices; it is the giving up of the political
traditions established by the great Ottoman statesmen and based
on the friendship of the two Powers that deserve most to be
glorified—England and France.”
He shared the opinion of those who reproached the Turks with the
“atrocities committed by Greeks and Armenians”; he called upon them
“the reprobation of the world”; and he wound up his proclamation with
these words:
“Our hatred and enmity go to the leaders who are responsible for
such doings—Enver, Jemal, Talaat, and their accomplices. We will
not have anything to do with such tyrants, and in communion with
all believers and all unprejudiced minds in the Ottoman Empire and
Islam throughout the world we declare our hatred and enmity towards
them, and before God we separate our cause from their cause.”
Great Britain later on insisted upon this point—that the question of
the territorial conditions with a view to restoring peace had not been
dealt with since the beginning of 1916, except in the above-mentioned
exchange of notes. In September, 1919, in a semi-official communication
to the Press, she emphatically declared that it followed from these
documents:
(1) That in the letter dated October 24, 1915, which formulates the
only engagement between Great Britain and the Sherif, the British
Government had not pledged itself to do anything contrary to the
Anglo-French treaty of 1916.
(2) That no fresh engagement had been entered into by Great Britain
with the Sherif since the beginning of the negotiations that M. Georges
Picot had been directed to carry on in London to pave the way to the
treaty of 1916. For the negotiators had met for the first time on
November 23, 1915, and the last two letters exchanged in January, 1916,
added nothing to the engagements made with King Hussein in the letter
of October 24 of the previous year.
Finally, on March 5, 1917, Hussein, now King of the Hejaz, sent an
appeal to all the Moslems of Turkey against the Ottoman Government,
which he charged with profaning the tomb of the Prophet in the course
of the operations of June, 1916.
On October 1, 1918, Feisal entered Damascus at the head of his own
victorious troops, but not with the Allied armies, after fighting all
the way from Maan to Aleppo, a distance of above 400 miles. By his
military and political activity, he had succeeded in quelling the
private quarrels between tribes, and grouping round him the Arabian
chiefs, between whom there had been much rivalry not long before, at
the same time protecting the right flank of the British army, which was
in a hazardous position.
Without giving up his favourite scheme, he was thus brought face to
face with the Syrian question.
Though the Arabian movement cannot be looked upon merely as the outcome
of the arrangements concluded in regard to Syria between the Allies
during the war, the latter seem at least to have brought about a state
of things which reinforced the Syrian aspirations and encouraged them
to assert themselves.
The Syrians had once more taken advantage of the events which had
convulsed Europe, and had had their after-effects in Asia Minor, to
assert their determination to be freed from Ottoman sovereignty; and
now they hoped to bring the Peace Conference to recognise a mode of
government consistent with their political and economic aspirations.
The suppression of the autonomy of Lebanon, the requisitions, the
administrative measures and prosecutions ordered in 1916 by Jemal Pasha
against the Syrians, who wanted Syria to be erected into an independent
State, had not succeeded in modifying the tendency which for a long
time had aimed at detaching Syria from the Ottoman Empire, and at
taking advantage of the influence France exercised in the country to
further this aim.
In 1912 M. R. Poincaré, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, clearly
stated before the French Chamber that the French and British
Governments shared exactly the same views concerning the Syrian
question. Yet later facts soon proved that the English policy would
necessarily conflict with French influence and try to destroy it after
turning it to her own advantage. Simultaneously the Turks saw that the
time had come to modify the existing régime.
M. Defrance, who is now French High Commissioner in Turkey, but was
then French Consul-General at Cairo, informed the French Government
that the Ottoman Committee of decentralisation was of opinion that
Syria should become an autonomous country, governed by a Moslem prince
chosen by the people, and placed under the protection of France.
On March 11, 1914, M. Georges Leygues again raised the Syrian question
before the French Parliament. He maintained that the axis of French
policy lay in the Mediterranean—with Algeria, Tunis, and Morocco on
one side and on the other side Syria and Lebanon, the latter being the
best spheres open to French action on account of the economic interests
and moral influence France already exercised there. And the French
Parliament granted the sums of money which were needed for developing
French establishments in the East.
About the same time the Central Syrian Committee expressed the wish
that the various regions of Syria should be grouped into one State,
under French control. Fifteen Lebano-Syrian committees established
in various foreign countries expressed the same wish; the Manchester
committee merely asked that Syria should not be partitioned. A Syrian
congress, held at Marseilles at the end of 1918 under the presidency of
M. Franklin Bouillon, declared that for various economic and judicial
reasons France could be of great use to Syria, in case the direction of
the country should be entrusted to her.
But the establishment of a Syrian State, whether enjoying the same
autonomy as Lebanon has had since 1864 under the guarantee of France,
England, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and later on Italy, or being
governed in another way, was in contradiction to the arrangements
made by France and England in 1916. Though the agreement between
these two Powers has never been made public, yet it is well known
that it had been decided—contrary to the teaching of both history and
geography—that Syria should be divided into several regions. Now, the
centre of Syria, which stretches from the Euphrates to the sea, happens
to be Damascus, and this very town, according to the British scheme,
was to be included in an Arabian Confederation headed by the Hejaz.
At the beginning of 1916, the Emir Feisal came to Paris, and, after the
conversations held in France, a satisfactory agreement seemed to have
been reached.
The Emir Feisal was solemnly received in January, 1919, at the Hôtel
de Ville in Paris, and in the course of a reception at the Hôtel
Continental, the Croix de Guerre of the first class was presented to
the Arab chief on February 4, with the following “citation”:
“As early as 1916, he resolutely seconded the efforts of his
father, the King of the Hejaz, to shake off the Turkish yoke and
support the Allied cause.
“He proved a remarkable, energetic commander, a friend to his
soldiers.
“He planned and carried out personally several important operations
against the Damascus-Medina railway, and captured El-Ouedjy and
Akaba.
“From August, 1917, till September, 1918, he led numerous attacks
north and south of Maan, capturing several railway stations and
taking a great number of prisoners.
“He helped to destroy the 4th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Turkish armies by
cutting off their communications to the north, south, and west of
Deraa, and after a very bold raid he entered Damascus on October 1,
and Aleppo on the 26th with the Allied troops.”
On February 6, 1919, he asked the Committee of the Ten on behalf of his
father, Hussein ibn Ali, to recognise the independence of the Arabian
peninsula, and declared he aimed at grouping the various regions of
Arabian Asia under one sovereignty. He did not hesitate to remind the
members of the Conference that he was speaking in the name of a people
who had already reached a high degree of civilisation at a time when
the Powers they represented did not even exist; and at the end of the
sitting in the course of which the scheme of a League of Nations was
adopted, he asked that all the secret treaties about the partition of
the Asiatic dominion of the Ottoman Empire between the Great Powers
should be definitely cancelled.
In March, 1919, the Emir went back to Syria, under the pretext of using
his influence in favour of a French collaboration. He was given an
enthusiastic greeting; but the supporters of the Arabian movement,
which was partly his own work, declared their hostility to any policy
that would bring about a mandate for Syria.
On March 7 it was announced that a National Syrian Congress, sitting
at Damascus, had just proclaimed Syria an independent country, and the
Emir Feisal, son of the Grand Sherif of Mecca, King of Syria.
It was reported that a declaration, issued by a second congress that
was held in the same town and styled itself Congress of Mesopotamia,
had been read at the same sitting, through which the latter congress
solemnly proclaimed the independence of Irak—Mesopotamia—with the Emir
Abdullah, the Emir Feisal’s brother, as King under the regency of
another brother of his, the Emir Zeid.
All this, of course, caused a good deal of surprise in London, though
something of the kind ought to have been expected.
In the above-mentioned document, after recalling the part played by
the Arabs in the war and the declarations made by the Allies about the
right of self-determination of peoples, the Congress declared the time
had come to proclaim the complete independence and unity of Syria, and
concluded as follows:
“We, therefore, the true representatives of the Arabian nation in
every part of Syria, speaking in her name and declaring her will,
have to-day unanimously proclaimed the independence of our country,
Syria, within her natural boundaries, including Palestine, which
independence shall be complete, without any restriction whatsoever,
on the basis of a civil representative government.
“We will take into account every patriotic wish of all the
inhabitants of Lebanon concerning the administration of their
country and maintain her pre-war limits, on condition Lebanon shall
stand aloof from any foreign influence.
“We reject the Zionists’ claim to turn Palestine into a national
home for the Jews or a place of immigration for them.
“We have chosen His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal, who has always
fought for the liberation of the country, and whom the nation looks
upon as the greatest man in Syria, as constitutional King of Syria
under the name of H.M. Feisal I.
“We hereby proclaim the military governments of occupation hitherto
established in the three districts have now come to an end; they
shall be replaced by a civil representative government, responsible
to this Council for anything relating to the principle of the
complete independence of the country, till it is possible for
the government to convene a Parliament that shall administer the
provinces according to the principles of decentralisation.”
The Congress then asked the Allies to withdraw their troops from Syria,
and stated that the national police and administration would be fully
able to maintain order.
To some extent the Emir Feisal resisted the suggestions, or at least
refused to comply with the extreme demands, of the Nationalists of
Damascus and Palestine—whose club, the Nadi El Arabi, played in these
regions the same part as the Committee of Union and Progress—for after
forming a Government of concentration, he had merely summoned one class
of soldiers, whereas the Nationalists in his absence had decreed the
mobilisation of several classes, and in agreement with General Gouraud
he had appointed administrator of the disputed region of Bukaa his
cousin, the Emir Jemil, who was a moderate man. Yet, whether he wished
to do so or not, whether he was an accomplice of the leaders or not,
the fact is that, after being the agent of England, he became the agent
of the Nationalists, who had succeeded in having the independence of
the Arabian countries of Asia Minor proclaimed under the leadership of
the Hejaz.
Thus it turned out that the foundation of an Arabian State assumed a
capital importance at the very time when the future condition of the
Ottoman Empire was under discussion.
In the course of the interview between M. Mohammed Ali and Mr. Lloyd
George, as the Prime Minister asked him whether he was averse to the
action of the Syrian Moslems, who had acknowledged the Emir Feisal as
King of Arabia and proclaimed an independent Moslem State unconnected
with the Caliphate, the leader of the Indian delegation, after hinting
that “this matter can well be left for settlement amongst Muslims,”
made the following statement:
“Just as we have certain religious obligations with regard to
the Khilafat that have brought us here, we have other religious
obligations, equally solemn and binding, that require us to
approach the Turks and Arabs. ‘All Muslims are brothers, wherefore
make peace between your brethren,’ is a Quranic injunction. We have
come here in the interests of peace and reconciliation, and propose
going to the Arabs and Turks for the same purpose.
“Quite apart from the main claim for preservation of the Khilafat
with adequate temporal power, the Muslims claim that the local
centre of their Faith—namely, the ‘Island of Arabia’—should remain
inviolate and entirely under Muslim control. This is based on the
dying injunction of the Prophet himself. The Jazirat-ul-Arab, as
its name indicates, is the ‘Island of Arabia,’ the fourth boundary
being the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. It therefore includes
Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, as well as the region commonly
known to European geographers as the Arabian peninsula. Muslims can
acquiesce in no form of non-Muslim control, whether in the shape of
mandates or otherwise, over any portion of this region. Religious
obligations, which are absolutely binding on us, require that there
at least there shall be exclusively Muslim control. It does not
specify that it should be the Khalifa’s own control. In order to
make it perfectly clear, I may say the religious requirements,
sir, will be satisfied even if the Emir Feisal exercises
independent control there.
“But, since we have to provide sufficient territories and resources
and naval and military forces for the Khalifa, the necessity for
the utmost economy which has to rule and govern all our claims in
these matters suggests that both these requirements may easily be
satisfied if the Jazirat-ul-Arab remains, as before the war, under
the direct sovereignty of the Khalifa. We have great hopes that
if we have opportunities of meeting our co-religionists we shall
bring about a reconciliation between them and the Turks. After all,
it cannot be said that Turkish rule in Arabia has been of such a
character that other Powers are bound to interfere.”
Moreover, he added:
“With regard to the Arabs, about whom you asked me a little while
ago, the delegation are not apprehensive with regard to the
feasibility of an adjustment between the Khalifa and the Arabs. As
I have already pointed out, there is the Quranic injunction: ‘All
Muslims are brothers, wherefore make peace between your brethren.’
That is a duty laid upon us, and recently, at the Bombay Session,
the All-India Khilafat Conference passed a resolution authorising
a delegation to proceed to the Hejaz and other parts of Arabia to
reconcile the Arabs and the Turks. Our interest is in the Khilafat
as Mussulmans. No population and no territory could be so dear to
the Muslim as the Arabs and Arabia. The Turks could not win such
affection from us as the Arabs do. This is the land that we want
to keep purely under Muslim control. Even if the Arabs themselves
want a mandate in that country we will not consent. We are bound by
our religious obligations to that extent. Therefore, it cannot be
through antipathy against the Arabs or because of any particular
sympathy for the Turks that we desire the Khalifa’s sovereignty
over the Island of Arabia. The Turks are much farther removed from
us. Very few of us know anything of the Turkish language; very few
of us have travelled in the Turkish Empire. But we do go in large
numbers to Mecca and Medina. So many of us want to die there. So
many Mussulmans settle down and marry in Arabia; one of my own
aunts is an Arab lady. Wherever we have met Arabs on our journey—we
have had no opportunity, of course, of discussing the subject with
well-educated people, but—we have asked the class of people we have
met what they thought of the action of the King of the Hejaz—‘King’
in a land where God alone is recognised as a king: nobody can ever
claim kingship there. They said his was an act that they condemned,
it was an act they did not in the least like. They considered it
to be wrong; the Arabs spoke disparagingly of it. I do not know to
what extent it may be true, but there are a number of people who
now come forward as apologists for the Arabs. They say that what
Emir Feisal and the Sherif did was to save something for Islam;
it was not that they were against the Turks, but they were for
Islam. Whether this was or was not the fact, it is very significant
that such apologies should be made now. Honestly, we have no
apprehensions that we could not reconcile the Arabs and the Turks.
This is a question which I think the Allied Council, the Peace
Conference, could very well leave the Mussulmans to settle amongst
themselves. We do not want British bayonets to force the Arabs into
a position of subservience to the Turks.”
Resuming the idea he had already expressed, he concluded his speech
thus:
“That can be very easily arranged, and if such a Federation as we
dream of becomes a reality—and I do not see why it should not—the
Arabs would have all the independence they require. They may
claim national independence, but they cannot forget that Islam is
something other than national, that it is supernational, and the
Khilafat must be as dear to them as it is to us. Even now the King
of the Hejaz does not claim to be the Khalifa. When people began
to address him as such, he rebuked them, and he published in his
official organ, _Al-Qibla_, that he wanted to be called King of
the Hejaz, and not Amir-ul-Mumineen, a title reserved only for the
Khalifa.”