“We are not opposed to the independence of Arabia. We are opposed
to Emir Feisal’s declaration of independence only for this
reason—that Arabia, throughout the history of Islam, has up till
now remained under the direct control of the Khalifa. This is the
first time in the history of Islam that anyone who is not the
Khalifa has set up any claim over Arabia. That is why there is,
from the Muslim point of view, a conflict of religious obligations
with actual facts. We are not opposed to Arabian independence.
On the contrary, we wish very much for complete autonomy in that
region, but we want it to be in harmony and not in conflict with
the Khilafat and its claims. The idea is not unrealisable, as both
Arabs and Turks are Muslims.”
Naturally the concentration of the French troops, during the Cilician
troubles, had made the action of the Syrian Nationalists popular among
the Moslem masses. On the other hand, an anti-Zionist agitation had
gained ground in Palestine and quickly developed into a propaganda in
favour of the union of Palestine and Syria under one sovereign. All
these facts, which point to the existence in Syria of a movement in
favour of an independent State, explain how it turned out that the Emir
Feisal, who favoured the scheme of a confederate Arabian Empire, was
proclaimed King.
General Noury Pasha, sent by the Emir Feisal to London at the beginning
of April, handed to the Foreign Office and to the representative of the
French Foreign Office who happened to be in that city, three letters
written in the Emir’s own hand in which he is said to have asked both
Governments to recognise and support the independence of his country,
and informed them that the measures taken by the Damascus Congress
concerning Mesopotamia merely aimed at putting an end to Turkish
anarchy and the riots of Mosul.
The proclamation of the Emir Feisal as King of Syria brought about much
discontent in Lebanon.
A meeting was held on March 22 at Baabda, where the General Government
of Lebanon resided, to protest against the decision of the Damascus
Congress. About a thousand people were present, and the following
motions were passed unanimously:
“1. The meeting enters a protest against the right the Syrian
Congress has assumed of disposing of Lebanon, of laying down its
frontiers, of restricting its independence, and of forbidding it to
collaborate with France.
“2. The Congress asserts the independence of Lebanon. In the
demarcation of its frontiers, allowance should be made for its
vital necessities and the claims repeatedly expressed by the
populations.
“3. The Congress considers as null and void the decisions taken by
the Damascus Congress concerning Syria, as the latter Congress was
never regularly constituted.
“4. The Congress confirms the mandate given to the delegates sent
by Lebanon who are now in Paris.
“5. The Congress confirms the independence of Greater Lebanon with
the collaboration of France.
“6. The Congress expresses the wish that a Commission consisting
of inhabitants of Lebanon will lay the foundation of the future
constitution of Lebanon, which is to replace the protocol of 1860.
“7. The Congress asserts the Union of Lebanon and France; the
national emblem shall be the tricolour with a cedar on the white
part.”
This opposition was supported by the Maronite archbishops of the sanjak
of Tripolis, Latakia, Hama, and Homs, who sent a telegram of protest
from Tripolis to Syria on March 13. Thus the Arabian movement also met
with Christian opposition.
Khyatin Saffita Tabez Abbas, chief of the Alawite tribe, sent the
following protest from Tartus to the Peace Conference:
“Without the consent of the Alawite tribes, the Emir Feisal has
had himself proclaimed King of Syria. We protest energetically
against such illegal proceedings. We want an Alawite Confederation
established under the direct and exclusive protectorate of France.”
Of course, it was urged that the Assembly of the Syrian Congress at
Damascus included only extremists who worked hand in hand with the
Turkish Nationalists; it seems, nevertheless, that it represented the
opinions of most Syrians, who wanted to restore the unity of Syria; and
their wish was no doubt connected with the wish that was gaining ground
to restore the unity of Arabia.
On the other hand, the Anglo-French treaty, which aimed at a partition
of Ottoman Arabia so as to balance French and English interests, but
disregarded the wishes of the peoples, could not but rouse a feeling
of discontent. Moreover, some Anglo-Egyptian agents and some British
officers had foolishly supported this movement in order to cripple
French influence, feeling quite confident they could check this
movement later on and put Syria under their own suzerainty. But they
were soon thrust aside by the movement, which had been fostered by them
in India and now logically was turning against them.
The Arabs of the interior of Arabia also addressed a proclamation to
General Gouraud stating they welcomed the French as friends, but did
not want them as masters and conquerors.
The Arabian opposition to France which made itself felt far beyond the
boundaries of independent Syria, the difficulties raised by the Emir
Feisal in the coast area, and the agitation stirred up by the Damascus
Government in Syria since the French troops had relieved the English
in those parts in October, 1919, induced General Gouraud to occupy
the railway stations of Maalhakah and Rayak, the latter being at the
junction of the railway line from Aleppo with the Beyrut-Damascus line
leading to the Hejaz. At the same time, by way of reprisal for the
capture of Mejel-Anjar in the plain of Bukaa lying between Libanus and
Anti-Libanus by the Sherifian troops, he gathered his forces in the
rear of that town at Zahleh and decided to occupy all this area, which
was within the zone put under French control by the 1916 treaty.
On July 20 the Emir Feisal held a war council at Damascus and issued a
decree of general mobilisation.
According to the Memoirs of Liman von Sanders, who commanded the
Turkish troops in Syria-Palestine, doubts may be raised as to the Emir
Feisal’s straightforwardness in his dealings first with the Turks
during the war, and later with both the English and the French after
the cessation of hostilities.
“The commander of the fourth army, Jemal Pasha, informed me in
the second half of August that the Sherif Feisal was willing to
hold the front occupied by the fourth army along the Jordan on
his own account and with his own troops, if guarantees were given
him by the Turkish Government as to the creation of an Arabian
State. According to the Sherif Feisal an important British attack
was being prepared in the coast zone, and in this way it would be
possible to reinforce the front between the sea and the Jordan with
the troops of the fourth army. Through my Turkish brigadier-general
I instructed General Jemal Pasha to enter into negotiations with
the Sherif Feisal on this point, and I urged Enver to give the
guarantees that were demanded.
“I never had any answer from either Enver or Jemal on this point.
So I cannot say to what extent Feisal’s offer could be relied upon.
According to what I heard from my brigadier-general, I fancy the
Turks mistrusted his offer, which they considered as a mere decoy
to put our positions along the Jordan in the hands of the Arabs,
while the main English attack was to take place in the coast zone
or between the sea and the Jordan.”[42]
As was pointed out by the _Journal des Débats_, which quoted the
preceding lines on July 21, 1920, the opinion of Liman von Sanders was
quite plausible; yet the recent events on the French front may also
have had an influence on the Emir Feisal. Most likely, if we bear in
mind the intrigues he carried on afterwards, his first proposal was a
consequence of the German advance on the Western front in spring, 1918,
but the Allies’ victorious offensive on the Somme on August 8, 1918,
caused him to alter his plans. It is noteworthy that in his proposals
he disclosed where the first English attack was to take place. At any
rate, both suppositions, which corroborate each other, increase the
suspicions that might already be entertained about his sincerity; and,
since then he has obviously taken advantage of every opportunity to
play a double game, or at least to turn all the differences between the
Powers to the advantage of Arabian independence.
We criticise him the more severely, as we fully understand the Arabs’
aspirations. We disapprove of his policy and blame his attitude,
because we believe Arabian aspirations cannot be lawfully fulfilled at
the Turks’ expense, and the Arabs cannot expect they will safeguard
their liberty by supporting the English policy in the East in every
particular, especially with regard to the Turks, at a time when India
and Egypt are seeking to shake off that policy.
Let us add that the Pan-Arabian movement owes the development it
has now taken to Colonel Lawrence’s manœuvres, who diverted it from
its original aim to make use of it, and became the Emir Feisal’s
counsellor in order to influence him in favour of England. Miss Bell,
too, played an influential part in that movement.
Though the Emir was the leader of a movement which, on the whole, was
hostile to Turkey, and though he asked for English support, he had no
objection to co-operating with the Nationalists, who, being threatened
by the Allies, offered their support in order to conciliate him. Thus
things had come to a more and more confused state. According to the
information given by _Le Temps_ on July 20, 1920, it appeared that as
early as January, 1919—
“The Sherifian agents, Noury Shalaan, Mohammed Bey, and the
Emir Mahmoud Faour, are working hand in hand with the Turkish
Nationalists. The Turkish Colonel Selfi Bey has several times
travelled from Anatolia to Damascus and _vice versa_ to carry
instructions.
“At the beginning of February, Mustafa Kemal sent an appeal to the
population of Anatolia in which he said: ‘The Arabian Government
relies or will rely on us.’
“The Sherifian authorities are constantly raising difficulties
to prevent the French from sending reinforcements or supplies to
Cilicia by rail.”
In view of the exactions of all sorts the Emir Feisal indulged in, such
as the capture of revenue lawfully belonging to the administration
of the Ottoman debt and the proscription of French currency, to say
nothing of such acts of aggression as attacks on French outposts and
the closing of the railways, General Gouraud on Wednesday, July 14,
addressed to the Arabian chief the following ultimatum, which expired
on the 18th:
“Recognition of the French mandate for Syria.
“Liberty to make use of the Rayak-Aleppo railway.
“The occupation of Aleppo and the stations lying between Aleppo and
Rayak.
“The immediate abolition of forced recruiting.
“Reduction of the Sherifian army to its effectives of December,
1919.
“Free circulation for the French-Syrian currency.
“Punishment of the authors of crimes against French soldiers.
“Acceptance of the above-mentioned conditions within four days. If
these conditions are not complied with, they shall be enforced by
arms.”
Syria, too, was in quite a perturbed state, owing to the discontent
prevailing among the population and the differences between the various
factions which were striving to get the upper hand in the country. Two
towns, Hasbeiya and Rashaya, situated on the slopes of Mount Hermon,
had rebelled against the Sherifian Government and wanted to become
parts of Lebanon.
An important debate began on July 19 in the House of Commons about the
condition of affairs in Asia Minor and the possible consequences the
French ultimatum addressed to the Emir Feisal might have for British
interests in that region.
Mr. Ormsby-Gore (Stafford, C.U.) asked the Prime Minister whether he
could give any information regarding the new military action of France
in Syria; whether the twenty-four hours’ ultimatum issued by the French
to the Arab Government in Damascus was submitted to and approved by the
Supreme Council; whether the terms of the mandate for Syria had yet
been submitted to the Allied and Associated Powers; and whether His
Majesty’s Government would use their influence with the French and Arab
Governments to secure the suspension of further hostilities pending the
decision of the Council of the League of Nations on the terms of the
Syrian mandate. To this Mr. Bonar Law answered:
“The ultimatum had not been submitted to the Supreme Council. The
terms of the mandate for Syria have not yet been submitted to
the Allied Powers. As regards the last part of the question, His
Majesty’s Government, who had for some time, but unsuccessfully,
been urging the Emir Feisal to come to Europe to discuss the
outstanding questions with the Supreme Council, do not consider
that they can usefully act upon the information at present at their
disposal, but they are in communication with the French Government
on the matter.”
Then Mr. Ormsby-Gore asked again:
“Is it a fact that severe casualties have already resulted from
this, and that the French have advanced over the line agreed upon
between the British and French Governments last year, and that they
have advanced from Jerablus to Jisir-Shugr and from the junction at
Rayak; and has he any information with regard to the progress of
hostilities in another part of the Arab area on the Euphrates?”
Mr. Bonar Law having replied that he had not received the information,
Lord Robert Cecil intervened in the discussion, and asked in his turn:
“Have the Government considered the very serious effect of these
proceedings on the whole situation in Asia Minor, particularly
with reference to Moslem feeling, and whether, in view of the fact
that these proceedings were apparently in absolute contravention
of Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles, he would cause
representations to be made to our French Allies on the subject?”
Of course, Mr. Bonar Law could only reply:
“We are in communication with the French Government, but I do not
accept the statement of my noble friend that what has happened is
against the Treaty of Versailles. It is very difficult for us here
to judge action which is taken on the responsibility of the French
Government.”
Finally, to Lord Hugh Cecil’s inquiry whether the British Government
was bound by promises made to the Emir Feisal, Mr. Bonar Law answered:
“The Government are certainly bound by their pledge. In my opinion
the fact that the mandate was given to France to cover that area
was not inconsistent with that pledge.”
Later on, Mr. Ormsby-Gore obtained leave to move the adjournment
of the House in order to call attention to the immediate danger to
British interests in the Middle East arising from the threatened new
hostilities in Syria. He said that first—
“He wished to criticise vigorously the sins of omission and
commission committed by the British Government, and more
particularly by the British Foreign Office. Only by a frank
and full statement by the British Government would bloodshed
be prevented. The responsibility of this country was deeply
involved in view of the pledges which had been given to the Arabs
before they came into the war, while they were our allies, and
above all since the armistice.... It was essential that both the
French Government and the Arab Government in Damascus should know
exactly what the demands of the British Government were, and how
far we were committed and how far we intended to stand by those
commitments. The British taxpayer, too, wanted to know how far
we were committed. Our pledges to the French were less specific
than those to the Arabs. We pledged ourselves to recognise the
independence of the Arabs. The British Government were bound by
their undertaking to Hussein to recognise the establishment of an
independent Arab State comprising within its borders Damascus,
Hama, Homs, and Aleppo. Did the British Government communicate
these pledges frankly to the French Government? We were responsible
for encouraging the Arabs to believe that we were going to stand
by them. Were we going to stand by that pledge or not? If not, we
ought to tell the Arabs so frankly. It was quite impossible for
us to secure the pacification of Arabia, including Mesopotamia,
unless Damascus was at peace. French, Arab, and British areas had
been agreed upon to last until the permanent settlement was come
to, and if there had been a breach of that agreement those who were
responsible for the breach ought to be held responsible. Until the
mandate for Syria had been approved by the Council of the League
of Nations and the new Arab Government in Syria was established
there should be no disturbance of the _status quo_ without the
willing agreement of all parties. For years the Arabs had been our
greatest friends in the East and France our dearest ally in Europe.
The outbreak of hostilities between them revealed the bankruptcy of
British diplomacy.”
Earl Winterton, like Mr. Ormsby-Gore, took up the defence of the Emir
and suggested that Great Britain should act as mediator between France
and the Arabs:
“As one who had fought with the Arabs during the war, he resented
the idea contained in the suggestion that while it was all very
well to use the Arabs during the war, it was not worth while now
that the war was over having a row with France for their sake....
Prince Feisal had put his case before the Peace Conference, but
the Government, following its usual practice of secrecy, had never
allowed the House to hear a word of it or of the considered answer
of the Supreme Council. He submitted that the claims that France
had to the mandate in Syria were based, and could only be based,
on the law of the League of Nations. He was amazed to see in a
Northcliffe newspaper that day a reference to ‘the great historical
traditions of France in Syria.’ If that suggested that France
had any rights in Syria over and above those given by the League
of Nations they were coming to a very dangerous argument. It was
absurd to treat a people like the Arabs as an upstart people, to
be treated in a condescending way by the Allies. The duty of the
Government was to make representations at once to both the French
and Arab Governments, asking that this matter should be submitted
to arbitration, and that the whole case should be made public.”
Finally, General Seely, a former Minister, rose, and owned that under
the terms of the treaty with Turkey, France had got a force in Syria,
but the whole difficulty lay in the French issuing an ultimatum without
consulting Great Britain. According to the three speakers, England was
interested in the question, owing to her engagements with the Emir
Feisal, and the after-effects which French action might have in Syria
and the neighbouring regions.
Mr. Bonar Law, feeling obliged to take into account both the section
of public opinion on behalf of which the three speakers had spoken,
and the feelings of an Allied country, reminded his opponents, who
hardly concealed their unwillingness to approve the arrangements which
had just been concluded, that France had the same mandate for Syria
as Great Britain had for Mesopotamia, and endeavoured to prove that
the situation of England in Mesopotamia was very much the same as the
situation of France in Syria. He expressly said:
“The real question before the House was whether the British
Government had a right to interfere in a country over which France
had duly received a mandate. It was true that, in October, 1915,
the British Government had declared they were prepared to recognise
and support the independence of the Arabs within those portions
of the territories claimed by the Emir Feisal in which Great
Britain was free to act, but it was added, without detriment to the
interests of her ally France.’ ...
“It was said that the independence of the Arab people was
incompatible with the mandate. If so, this part of the Treaty of
the Covenant of the League of Nations ought not to have been in,
and France ought not to have been allowed to obtain a mandate
in Syria. It was also said that what the French were doing was
uncalled for; that all that was necessary was to have the _status
quo_. But British troops were in occupation of all the territories,
and the British Government came to the conclusion that it was
not fair that we should be called upon to bear the burdens of
occupation of territories in which later we should have no
interest. We gave notice that we intended to withdraw the British
troops. The country had therefore to be occupied, and at the San
Remo Conference the mandate for Syria was given definitely to the
French Government. That was not done behind the back of the Emir
Feisal. It was done with his knowledge, and when he was in Paris
he himself agreed that there should be a French mandate for that
territory.
“We had accepted a mandate in Mesopotamia. Supposing the French
Government said to us, ‘You are using force in Mesopotamia, and
you are doing it without consulting the French Government. You are
breaking the conditions of the proper homogeneity of the Allies,
and you should not take steps to repulse the troops attacking
you in Mesopotamia until you have come to an arrangement with
the French Government.’ The analogy was complete. We were in
Mesopotamia for the purpose of setting up not a colony, but an
independent Arab State, and, in spite of that, we were attacked by
Arabs all through Mesopotamia. Our answer to the French would be
that the mandate for Mesopotamia had been entrusted to us, and we
claimed to deal with the country in the way we thought right. It
was said that this action of the French Government was contrary
to the whole spirit of the mandate and an independent Arab State.
That was not so. In the ultimatum to which reference had been made
a passage occurred which he would quote. Acceptance of the French
mandate was one of the conditions. ‘The mandate,’ it is stated,
‘will respect the independence of Syria and will remain wholly
compatible with the principle of government by Syrian authorities
properly invested with powers by the popular will. It will only
entail on the part of the mandatory Power co-operation in the form
of collaboration and assistance, but it will in no case assume the
colonial form of annexation or direct administration.’ The French
Government told us they were acting on that principle, and was the
House of Commons really going to ask the British Government to say,
‘We do not accept your assurance, but we ask you to allow us to
interfere with you in the exercise of your authority’?
“The mandate having been given, it was clearly no business of ours
to interfere unless some action had been taken so outrageous that
we had a right to say that it was not in accordance with the Peace
Treaty and would not be accepted by the League of Nations or any
other independent body....
“Had we that justification? He thought we had a right at least
to assume that the French Government had something of a case for
the action they were taking. He had the actual words in which
the French described the necessity of their taking this action.
They pointed out that a large number of French soldiers had been
massacred by Arabs. They did not say that the Emir Feisal was
responsible for that—he did not think the Emir was—but that whether
it was due to his responsibility or want of power to prevent it the
situation was one which the French Government could not allow
to continue. With regard to the railway, on which they said they
depended absolutely under present conditions for the support of
their forces in dealing with the rebellion of Mustafa Kemal in
Cilicia, they complained that they had tried over and over again to
get from the Emir the use of that railway for the purpose of the
supply of their troops, but had failed. They said that that was a
condition of things which they could not allow to continue if they
were to be responsible for the mandate. He thought that was a very
good case.”
On Lord Winterton exclaiming: “Then the French have a mandate for
Damascus! But neither the Arabs nor the Supreme Council have ever
admitted such a mandate,” Mr. Bonar Law, on behalf of the Government,
answered:
“They had been in communication with the French Government on that
point, and their reply was to this effect: ‘There is no intention
of permanent military occupation. As soon as the mandate has been
accepted and order has been restored the troops will be withdrawn.’
“A great deal had been said about the claims of Emir Feisal. No one
would recognise them more readily than His Majesty’s Government.
They knew that he and his tribesmen did gallant service in the war,
but he asked the House to remember that but for the sacrifices both
of the French and ourselves, there would have been no possibility
of King Hussein having any authority in his country....
“They met him over and over again in London and Paris, and when the
question came of giving the mandate, on two occasions the British
and French Governments sent a joint invitation to the Emir Feisal
to come to Europe and discuss the question with them. The Emir
Feisal was not able to come for one reason or another on either
occasion; but he did say that no case of any ally or anyone in
connection with the Peace Treaty was considered more thoroughly
than his, or with more inclination to meet his wishes. The House
must be under no misapprehension. There was great trouble in the
Middle East. Arab fighting would add to that trouble, and what
happened in Syria must have reflex action in Mesopotamia. If it
was assumed, as some hon. members were ready to assume, that we in
Mesopotamia were pursuing solely selfish aims with no other object,
and if they assumed that the French were pursuing imperialistic
aims in Syria with no other object, then, of course, the case was
hopeless. There was no Frenchman who had shown a broader mind
and a greater readiness to grasp the position of other people
than General Gouraud. In any degree to reflect upon the French
Government in this matter was a very serious thing.”
The time seemed very badly chosen indeed for such a debate in the
English Parliament, as Mr. Winston Churchill, War Secretary, had just
informed the Commons that important reinforcements coming from India
had recently been dispatched to Mesopotamia, and the Commander-in-Chief
had been given full powers to take any measures the situation might
require.
It was the policy of England in the East which stood responsible for
such a state of things. Though the bulk of public opinion in France
was averse to any military action in the East, either in Syria or in
Turkey, yet France was driven to fight, as it were, by England—though
both Governments were supposed to act jointly in the East—in order to
prevent her ally from undermining her influence. Such was the outcome
of England’s ill-omened policy, who first had supported the Arabian
movement and now seemed to forsake it, and thus had roused all the East
against Europe through the resentment caused by her attitude towards
Turkey and Persia. Perhaps England was not very sorry, after all, that
France should divert against herself part of the Arabian forces from
the Mesopotamian front, where the British effectives were insufficient
in number.
M. Millerand corroborated Mr. Bonar Law’s statements before the French
Chamber, disclosed some of the agreements made with England, and
apologised for being unable to say more; he also declared England had
officially recognised she had no right to meddle with Syrian affairs;
and finally declared that whoever should feel tempted—he meant the Emir
who had just submitted to General Gouraud’s ultimatum—to oppose France
to Great Britain in Asia Minor would now know it would have France
alone in front of him. And yet if one day Great Britain rules over
Mesopotamia, she is not likely to give France a free hand in Syria.
Just at the same time—on July 20—the Cairo correspondent of _The Times_
wrote that he understood the King of the Hejaz had telegraphed to Mr.
Lloyd George how surprised and disappointed he was at the French policy
in Syria, and asked him to interfere. King Hussein also declared he
could not exert his influence on the Emir Feisal’s brothers or prevent
them from coming to his help.
The English Government circles, on the other hand, seemed at last
inclined to favour a scheme that would put Syria and Mesopotamia,
respectively under the sovereignty of the Emir Feisal and the Emir
Abdullah, under a French mandate in Syria and a British one in
Mesopotamia. But the _Daily Express_ of July 17 seemed apprehensive
lest the French expedition aimed at overthrowing the Emir Feisal and
replacing him by the Emir Said, who had been expelled from Syria during
the British occupation. Let it be said, incidentally, that the Arabs of
the Emir Feisal possessed 100,000 rifles, the very arms taken from the
Turks by the English and left by the latter in the hands of the Arabian
leader.
General Gouraud’s ultimatum had naturally been accepted by the Emir
Feisal, but a few days after its expiration, and so military action
had been started. General Gouraud, according to his communiqué, had,
on July 22, at the Emir’s request, stopped the column that was on its
way from Zaleh to Damascus. Feisal had alleged that his answer had been
sent in due time, but untoward circumstances had prevented it from
coming to hand the appointed day.
The French General had consented to give him the benefit of the
doubt and halt his troops on certain conditions, one of which was
that his soldiers should not be attacked. Now the French column that
guarded the country between Homs and Tripolis, some distance to the
east of the post of Tel-Kelah, was attacked by Sherifian regulars.
Under these circumstances, and to prevent another attack which seemed
to be preparing between Damascus and Beyrut, the southern French
column that guarded the railway in case of an attack coming from
Damascus, dislodged the Sherifian troops whose headquarters were at
Khan-Meiseloun, in the mountain range which divides the plain of the
Bukaa from the plain of Damascus, and thus the way was open to the
latter town.
France, who otherwise would not have been obliged to fight in order
to maintain her influence in Syria, was compelled to do so by the
policy in which she was involved. But this policy, which drove her
to inaugurate a Syrian campaign at the very time when by the side of
England she enforced on Turkey a treaty that no Turk could accept,
might have brought about, as Pierre Loti said in an article of the
_Œuvre_, July 22, “the death of France in the East.”
Even the Christians[43]—the Armenians excepted—wished the French to
leave Antioch in order to be able to come to an understanding with the
Moslems who maintained order in the four great towns of Aleppo, Hama,
Homs, and Damascus, occupied by the Sherifian troops. A delegation
of eight members representing the Christian element wanted to go to
France, but the Patriarch of Lebanon handed General Gouraud a protest
to be forwarded to the French Government; he inveighed against what
he called “the shameful conduct of some members of the administrative
Council of Lebanon,” and charged them, just as they were about to leave
for Europe, with receiving important sums of money from the Emir Feisal
to carry on an anti-French propaganda. After this protest, they were
imprisoned by the French authorities: all of which shows the state of
deep unrest then prevailing in Lebanon and our utter lack of reliable
information from the East.
On July 23 a French column entered Aleppo, after a skirmish north of
Muslemieh, and a reconnoitring body of cavalry which had pushed on as
far as Homs bridge was greeted by some Sherifian officers, who informed
them that the Sherifian troops had left the town. On the 25th, in the
afternoon, the French troops entered Damascus without encountering
any resistance. A new Government was formed after the downfall of
the Sherifian Government, and General Gobet formally notified them
on behalf of General Gouraud that the Emir Feisal was no longer King
of the country. He demanded a war contribution of 10 million francs
on account of the damage done by the war bands in the western zone;
general disarmament should be proceeded with at once; the army should
be reduced and converted into a body of police; all war material should
be handed over to the French authorities, and the chief war criminals
tried by military courts. All these conditions were, of course,
assented to by the new Government, who expressed their sincere wish to
collaborate with the French.
The Emir Feisal, who had come back to Damascus, was requested to leave
the country with his family. He set off to England soon after and
sought to meet Mr. Lloyd George at Lucerne.
Without considering the future relations between Lebanon and Syria
or turning its attention to the future mode of government of Syria
and its four great towns Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo, the French
Government decided to restore Greater Lebanon. M. Millerand informed
Mgr. Abdallah Kouri, Maronite Archbishop of Arca, president of the
delegation of Lebanon, of this by a letter dated August 24, 1920. The
new State was to extend from the Nahr-el-Litani, which flows along
the frontier of Palestine, to another State, called “Territoire des
Alaonites,” or, in Arabic, Alawiya, coming between the Lebanon and
Antioch, and to the crests of Anti-Libanus, including the Bukaa area,
with the towns of Rayak and Baalbek. The ports of Beyrut and Tripolis
in Syria were to enjoy local autonomy, but to keep in close connection
with the new State. Beyrut was to be the seat of the new Government;
Tripolis and its suburbs were to be grouped into a municipality.
In this way Greater Lebanon would have recovered all its former
territories, as it was before 1860, in conformity with the promises
made by M. Clémenceau and confirmed by M. Millerand, and with the
claims set forth in 1919 at the Peace Conference by the delegates of
Lebanon.
Was it not a mistake in Syria, a country over which France had a
mandate and where the proportion of Moslems is three to one, to start
with a policy that favoured Lebanon and consequently the Christians?
The question was all the more important as the discontent brought
about by the Powers’ decisions was far from subsiding in these and the
neighbouring regions.
Indeed, the Ansarieh tribes, living in the mountainous regions to the
east of Antioch and Alexandretta, and in the Jebel Ansarieh between
Latakia and Tartus, which had persistently kept aloof from us in the
past, made their submission after the downfall of the Emir Feisal,
and several Ansarieh chiefs—Ismail Pasha, Inad, and Ismail Bey
Yaouah—accepted the conditions imposed on them. Yet dissatisfaction
was still rampant in the Hauran area, and the train in which ed Rubi
Pasha, the Syrian Premier, and other Ministers were going to Deraa was
attacked on Friday, August 20, at Kerbet-Ghazeleh by Arabian bands. Ed
Rubi Pasha and Abdurrahman Youssef Pasha were murdered. The railway line
was recaptured later on, but the contingents sent to Deraa had to fight
with Arabian bands at Mosmieh.
Farther north, in the part of Cilicia entirely occupied by Kemalist
troops, Colonel Brémond, commanding a group of 3,000 to 4,000 men
consisting of French troops and native recruits, after being blockaded
at Adana for six weeks, had to sign a truce in August because he was
short of water, and the provisioning of Adana could only be ensured
by establishing a base in the former Roman port of Karatash. Mersina,
where the French had enlisted all the Armenian and Greek manhood, was
also besieged and blockaded, except along the coast where a French
warship overawed the rebels. Lastly, Tarsus, the third place occupied
by French troops, was in the same predicament, and was cut off from the
other two towns. Under these circumstances whoever could flee sailed to
Cyprus, and the few boats which called at Mersina took away crowds of
fugitives.
In Mesopotamia the situation was quite as bad, and everywhere the Arabs
evinced much discontent. In the zone of the lower Euphrates and Lake
Hamar, as well as in the Muntefik area, many disturbances occurred.
The _Sunday Times_ of August 21, 1920, in an article in which the
attitude of the British Government was severely criticised, wondered
whether it was not too late to atone for the mistakes of England, even
by expending large sums of money, and concluded thus:
“Would it not be wiser to confess our failure and give up meddling
with the affairs of three million Arabs who want but one thing, to
be allowed to decide their own fate? After all, Rome was not ruined
when Hadrian gave up the conquests made by Trajan.”
The _Observer_ too asked whether a heavy expenditure of men and money
could restore the situation, and added:
“The situation is serious; yet it is somewhat ludicrous too, when
we realise that so much blood and money has been wasted for a
lot of deserts and marshes which we wanted ‘to pacify,’ and when
we remember that our ultimate aim is to impose our sovereignty on
people who plainly show they do not want it.”
* * * * *
The diversity of creeds among the various Moslem sects had also, from
the beginning, imperilled the unity of the Arabian world within the
Ottoman Empire by endangering its religious unity. By the side of the
Sunnis, or Orthodox Moslems, the Shia—viz., the rebels or heretics,
belonging to a schism which is almost as old as Islam itself—recognise
nobody but Ali as the lawful successor of Mohammed. According to them,
the title of Caliph should not go outside the Prophet’s family, and his
spiritual powers can only be conferred upon his descendants; so, from a
religious point of view, they do not recognise the power of the other
dynasties of Caliphs—for instance, that of the Ottoman Sultans. As Ali,
the Prophet’s son-in-law, was killed at Kufa in Mesopotamia, and as
Ali’s sons, Hassan and Hossein, were also massacred at Kerbela, near
the ruins of Babylon, together with some of their descendants who had
a lawful right to the title of Imam, Mesopotamia is looked upon by the
Shia as their Holy Places.
Many wealthy Persians, to whom the worship of the members of Ali’s
family has become a symbol and who consider their death as a religious
sacrifice, have their own coffins carried to Mesopotamia that their
bodies may lie in the holy necropolis of Kerbela or of Nejef, to
the north-east of Mecca and Medina; and as a great many Arabs of
Mesopotamia are still Shia, this schism practically divides the
Persian world from the Turkish world.
But though the Persians, who have never recognised any Caliph, and for
the last thirteen hundred years have been waiting till the Khilafat
should revert to the lineal descent of Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law,
to acknowledge a Caliph’s authority, do not recognise the Ottoman
Caliphate, yet their monarchs do not seek to deprive the Sultan of his
title of Caliph to assume it themselves.
So their case is entirely different from that of the people of
Morocco, who do not recognise the Ottoman Caliphate because their
own sovereigns, as descendants of the Prophet, profess they have an
hereditary right to hold the office of Caliph within the frontiers of
their State.
The Shia faith has even spread as far as India and the Sunda Isles; and
so the opposition between Shia and Sunnis may play an important part in
freeing Mesopotamia from the Turkish influence of Constantinople.
Yet the English occupation has been so bitterly resented in Mesopotamia
that the Shia Mujtahids, or imams of Nejef and Kerbela, have lately
asked for the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over these towns,
where are the two famous holy shrines of Islam. Moreover, the
controversy on the question whether the Sultans of Turkey have a right
to the Caliphate, because they do not belong to the tribe of Koreish,
in which the Prophet was born, seems to have come to an end among the
Moslems, or at least to have been laid aside in view of the present
events.
Moreover, the Prophet, when he advised the Faithful to choose his
successor in the tribe of Koreish, does not seem at all, according
to the best Moslem authorities, to have wished to confer the supreme
spiritual power for ever upon a particular section of the community
related to him by ties of blood, and to have reserved the Caliphate to
this tribe. It seems more likely that, as Islam at that time had not
yet given birth to powerful States, he chose this tribe because it was
the best organised and the strongest, and thus considered it as the
fittest to maintain the independence of the Caliphate and defend the
interests of Islam. Besides, within half a century after the Prophet’s
death the Caliphate passed from Mohammed’s four immediate successors
to the Omayyids for the reason indicated above, and in contradiction
to the theory of lineal descent. It is obvious that, had Mohammed been
guided by family considerations, he would not have merely given the
Faithful some directions about the election of his successor, but he
would have chosen one of his relations himself to inherit his office,
and would have made it hereditary in the latter’s family.
The Wahhabis, who are connected with the Shia, are likewise a political
and religious sect which was founded in the eighteenth century in
Nejed, a region of Central Arabia conterminous with the north of
Syria. The Wahhabi doctrine aims at turning Islam into a kind of
deism, a rational creed, looking upon all the traditions of Islam as
superstitions, and discarding all religious observances. Since the
assassination of Ibn el Rashid in May, 1920, the present leaders of the
Wahhabis are Abdullah ibn Mitah and Ibn Saud, over whom the Ottomans
have a merely nominal power.
When King Hussein planned to join the Hejaz and Nejd to Syria, Ibn
Saud refused to let Nejd fall under the suzerainty of the King of the
Hejaz, who was powerful merely because he was supported by Europe and
because Syria is a rich country. Most likely the religious question
had something to do with this conflict. In August, 1919, the Wahhabis,
who had asked the Emir Ibn Saud for his support, suddenly attacked the
troops of the sons of the King of the Hejaz which were in the Taif
area, and defeated them at Tarabad. The Wahhabi Emir gained a few more
victories, and was about to threaten the Holy Cities when the rising of
the Orthodox Moslem tribes compelled him to retreat.
So the hostility of the Wahhabis, whose independence was threatened
by the Sunnis of the Hejaz, whom they look upon as heretics, still
embittered the dissensions in the Arab world.
It has been asserted that this Wahhabi movement was at first started
by the Turks, which would not have been unlikely at a time when it was
Turkey’s interest to divide Arabia in order to raise difficulties to
the Allies after the Sherif’s treason; but now it was no longer her
interest—and it was beyond her power—to stir up an agitation.
The Ishmaelites, who laid waste Persia and Syria in the eighth century,
and played an important part in the East till the twelfth century, have
also broken off with the Shia.
Lastly, the Druses, who inhabit the slopes of Lebanon and the greater
part of Anti-Lebanon between Jebeil and Saida along the Mediterranean,
profess the creed of the Caliph Al-Hakem, who lived at the beginning
of the eleventh century. They had withdrawn to Lebanon and long
repelled the attacks of the Turks, whose suzerainty they acknowledged
only in 1588. In 1842 the Porte gave them a chief, but practically
they have remained almost independent. They have often fought with the
Maronite Christians living to the north, especially in 1860, and there
is still much hostility between them.
Moreover, all Moslem communities, without exception—whether the
communities governed by independent national sovereigns such as
Afghanistan; or by sovereigns owing allegiance to non-Moslem Powers
such as Egypt, India, Tunis, Khiva, Bokhara; or the communities living
under a non-Moslem rule, as is the case with those of Algeria, Russia,
and also India and China—give their allegiance to the Sultan as Caliph,
though they are always at liberty to refuse it. Even the Moslem
communities of Algeria and Tunis, which are connected with those of
Morocco by their common origin and language, and live close by them,
do not deem it a sufficient reason to recognise the Emir of Morocco as
Caliph that he is a descendant of the Prophet.
An even more striking argument is that the community of the Hejaz,
which rebelled against Turkish sovereignty during the war and has
made itself politically independent, still maintains its religious
allegiance to the Sultan; and the present King, Hussein, who is the
most authentic descendant of the Prophet, and who rules over the two
holiest towns of Islam, Mecca and Medina, soon after the armistice
addressed the Sultan a telegram of religious allegiance drawn up
in the most deferential terms. The possession of Mecca and Medina
being one of the attributes of the Caliph, and these towns having a
great religious and political importance owing to the great annual
pilgrimage, King Hussein might have taken advantage of this to dispute
with the Sultan the title of Caliph. England had strongly urged him
to do so, but King Hussein obstinately refused. Then the British
Government, giving up all hope of bringing about the transference of
the Caliphate from the Ottoman dynasty to another sovereign, concluded
a secret alliance with Vahid ed Din.
Considering the intricate situation in the East due to the variety
of races and religions, and the movements of all sorts by which the
populations of those countries are swayed, it seems most unwise
to increase the general restlessness by a vain intervention of
the Powers, and to dismember what remains of Turkey in Europe and
Aria Minor, a dismemberment which would necessarily have violent
repercussions throughout the deeply perturbed Moslem world. Though
the recent movements of emancipation in the East to a certain extent
meet the legitimate wishes of the peoples and have somewhat cleared
the situation in Asia Minor, yet it is obviously most perilous to
infringe upon the Sultan’s sovereignty, to endeavour to drive away the
Turks into Asia, and to set up a kind of fictitious official Islam by
compelling the Moslem peoples of the East to give up their cherished
independence and submit to an Arab imperialism which would soon become
British imperialism. At the present moment all the Moslem elements are
determined to unite together against any enemy of their liberty; and
all Moslems, without any distinction of creed or race, might very well
one day flock to the standard of a bold leader who should take up arms
in the name of Islam, in order to safeguard their independence.
* * * * *
These movements, and many other similar ones, were encouraged and
strengthened by the development of the principle of nationalities and
the support given to it by Mr. Wilson, who was bent upon carrying it
out to its strictly logical consequences, without paying heed to the
limitations imposed by the present material and political conditions.
But we do not think it is true to say, as has been urged, that the
assertion of the right of self-determination of peoples was the initial
cause of these movements. The movement in favour of the rights of
nationalities originated long before Mr. Wilson’s declarations, which
merely hurried on this powerful movement, and also caused it to swerve
somewhat from its original direction.
This movement, on the whole, seems chiefly to proceed—though other
factors have intervened in it—from a kind of reaction against the
standardising tendency, from a material and moral point of view, of
modern Western civilisation, especially the Anglo-Saxon civilisation,
and also from a reaction against the extreme unification aimed at by
russifying the numerous peoples living within the Russian Empire.
Modern civilisation, having reached its present climax, has aimed—and
its political and social repercussions have had the same influence—at
doing away with all differences between human minds and making the
world homogeneous; thus all men would have been brought to live in the
same way, to have the same manners, and their requirements would have
been met in the same way—to the very great advantage of its enormous
industrial development. Of course, all this proved an idle dream; human
nature soon asserted itself, amidst the commotions and perturbations
experienced by the States, and a reaction set in among those who
hitherto only aimed at enslaving various human groups, or linked them
together politically in a most artificial way. Then the same feeling
spread among all those peoples.
All this enables us to see to what extent this movement is legitimate,
and to know exactly what proportions of good and evil it contains.
It rightly asserts that various peoples have different natures, and
by protecting their freedom, it aims at ensuring the development of
their peculiar abilities. For let us not forget that the characters of
peoples depend on physical conditions, that even the features we may
not like in some peoples are due to the race, and that if, by blending
and mixing populations nowadays these features are modified, they are
generally altered only from bad to worse.
But this principle is true only so far as it frees and enables to shape
their own destinies peoples who have distinctive qualities of their
own and are able to provide for themselves. It cannot be extended—as
has been attempted in some cases—to States within which men descending
from various races or having belonged in the course of centuries to
different nationalities have long been united, and through a long
common history and a centuries-old co-operation have formed one nation.
This is one of the erroneous aspects of Mr. Wilson’s conception, and
one of the bad consequences it has entailed.
The eviction of the Turks from Constantinople, which the British
wished for but which they dared not carry into effect, does not thwart
the scheme of the Turkish Nationalists; it can only bring about a
reaction of the Moslem populations against foreign intervention, and
thus strengthen the Pan-Turanian movement. Though this movement cannot
carry out all its aims, the eviction of the Turks obviously must urge
those populations to constitute a State based both on the community
of religion and the community of race of its various elements, and
from which all alien ethnic elements would be expelled—viz., Slavs,
Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs, who were all an inherent source of
weakness to the Turkish Empire. This new State would include Anatolia,
Russian Azerbaïjan, and Persian Azerbaïjan, the Russian territories
in Central Asia—viz., Russian Turkistan, Khiva, Bokhara—the whole of
the region of the Steppes; and towards it the Tatar populations of
the Volga, Afghanistan, and Chinese Turkistan would necessarily be
attracted.
As to the Arabs, the Turks have never been able to gain their
friendship, though they have done their best to do so, and have drawn
but little profit from the money squandered plentifully in their
vast deserts. And the Russians have always stood in the way of an
understanding between Turkey and the Arabian territories, because
it would have benefited the cause of Islam and therefore would have
hindered both their own designs on the territories of Asia Minor and
the ambitions of the Orthodox Church. Yet to the Turks as well as the
Arabs—and even to the Europeans—it would be a great advantage not to
injure the understanding and goodwill that Islam engenders among these
peoples, since its creed has both a religious and a political aspect.
The maintenance of this Islamic union has been wrongly called—in the
disparaging sense of the word—Pan-Islamism. Yet its ideal has nothing
in common with such doctrines as those of Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism,
Pan-Americanism, Pan-Polism, Pan-Hellenism, etc., which are all
imperialistic doctrines aiming at territorial conquests by military
or economic means, and also by the diffusion of their own religious
creeds and the extension of the influence of their Churches. While
Pan-Germanism aims at the hegemony of the world; while Pan-Americanism
wants to control the whole of America; while Pan-Slavism wishes to
gather together all the Slavonic elements—which is defensible—but also
means to supplant the old civilisation of Western Europe, which it
considers as “rotten,” and to renovate the world; while Pan-Polism,
which has not such ambitious aims, merely seeks, like Pan-Hellenism,
to conquer wider territories in order to restore Greater Poland or
Greater Greece—Islam, which does not try to make any proselytes, has
no other ambition than to group all Moslem elements according to the
commandments of the Koran. Yet, Islam having both a political and a
religious purpose, a Pan-Islamic concept might be defensible, and would
be legitimate from the Moslem point of view, whereas it cannot be so
from the Christian point of view. Pan-Catholicism, on the contrary, is
an impossible thing, because Christianity does not imply a political
doctrine, and is distinct from temporal power—though such a doctrine
has sometimes been advocated. For in the doctrine of monarchy,
especially in France, religion has always been held merely as a help,
a support, and the monarch, though he has often been a defender of the
Faith, has never looked upon his power as dependent on the Papacy or
bound up with it. Islam, however, does not want to assert itself in,
and give birth to, a huge political movement—a Pan-Islamic movement
in the imperialistic sense of the word—aiming at constituting a huge
theocratic State, including all the 300 million Moslems who are now
living. But there is between all Moslems a deep moral solidarity, a
mighty religious bond which accounts for their sympathetic feeling
towards Turkey, and owing to which even the Moslem inhabitants of
countries which have lost their independence still earnestly defend and
jealously maintain the privileges and dignity of the Caliph.
So it is a mistake to speak of the ambitious designs of Islam, and the
mistake has been made wilfully. Those who profess such an opinion are
Pan-Slavic Russians who want to deceive public opinion in the world as
to their true intent, and thus prepare for territorial annexations,
because Pan-Slavism is the enemy of Islamism. As this Pan-Slavism has
always been, and is still more than ever, a danger to Europe, it is
the interest of the latter, in order to defend its civilisation, not
to fight against Islamism, but even to support it. This necessity has
been understood by many Catholics who have always been favourable to
Turkey and by the Mussulmans, which accounts for the long friendly
intercourse between Moslems and Catholics, and the Moslems’ tolerance
toward the devotees of a religion which, on the whole, is in complete
contradiction to their own faith. On the other hand, Islam appears as
counterbalancing Protestantism in the East, and it seems the future
of thought and morality and of any culture would be endangered if the
60 million Indian Moslems and the 220 million Indian Brahminists,
Buddhists, and the members of other sects ever listened to Mr. Lloyd
George and were connected with Protestantism.
Moreover, King Hussein, in the course of the audience that he granted
in July, 1920, to Prince Ruffo, the leader of the Italian mission
to Arabia, before his departure, after saying that the Moslem world
resented the hostile attitude of the Powers towards the Sultan of
Constantinople, declared that the Moslems are not actuated by any
feeling of conquest or proselytism, but simply claim the right to
preserve their independence.
Footnotes:
36: _Hayassdan_, July 6, 1915; No. 25.
37: We are the more anxious to correct these figures as in 1916,
at a time when it was difficult to control them, we gave about
the same figures in a note to the Société d’Anthropologie as to
the demographic consequences of the war. We then relied upon the
documents that had just been published and on the statements of the
Rev. Harold Buxton.
38: _Le Mouvement pan-russe et les Allogènes_ (Paris, 1919).
39: _The Times_, March 15, 1920.
40: H. Vambéry. _Cagataische Sprachstudien_ (Leipzig, 1867);
_Etymologisches Wörterbuch der Turko-Tatarischen Sprachen_
(Leipzig, 1875); _Das Turkenvolk_ (1885).
41: Léon Cahun, _Introduction à l’histoire de l’Asie, Turcs et
Mongols, des origines à 1405_ (Paris, 1896).
42: Liman von Sanders, _Fünf Jahre Türkei_, pp. 330-331.
43: _Le Temps_, July 21, 1920.