M. Bompard, too, expressed his fears concerning our Syrian policy, and
M. Doumergue asked the Government to consent to a reduction of the
credits “to show it intended to act cautiously in Syria.”
But after M. Millerand’s energetic answer, and after M. Doumer,
chairman of the Commission, had called upon the Senate to accept the
figures proposed by the Government and the Commission, these figures
were adopted by 205 votes against 84.
M. Romanos, interviewed by the _Matin_,[31] and soon after M.
Venizelos, at the Lympne Conference, maintained that the treaty could
be fully carried out, and the Greeks felt quite able to enforce it
themselves.
As the Allied troops were not sufficient to take decisive action, and
as a large part of the Ottoman Empire had been assigned to Greece,
England herself soon asked why the latter should not be called upon to
pay for the operation if she insisted upon carrying it out.
About June 20 the situation of the British troops became rather
serious, as General Milne did not seem to have foreseen the events and
was certainly unable to control them.
The Nationalist troops, which met with but little resistance, continued
to gain ground, and after marching past Ismid occupied Guebze. The
Government forces were retreating towards Alemdagh.
By this time the Nationalists occupied the whole of Anatolia, and
the English held but a few square miles near the Dardanelles. The
Nationalists, who had easy access to both coasts of the Gulf of Ismid,
attempted to blow up the bridges on the Haïdar-Pasha-Ismid railway
line. Though the English were on the lookout, four Turkish aeroplanes
started from the park of Maltepe, bound for Anatolia. One of them was
piloted by the famous Fazil Bey, who had attacked English aeroplanes
during their last flight over Constantinople a few days before the
armistice in October, 1918.
Indeed, the Government forces only consisted of 15,000 specialised
soldiers, artillerymen or engineers, with 6 light batteries of 77 guns
and 2 Skoda batteries; in addition to which 20,000 rifles had been
given to local recruits. The Nationalists, on the contrary, opposed
them with 35,000 well-equipped men commanded by trained officers.
Besides, there was but little unity of command among the Government
forces. Anzavour Pasha, who had been sent with some cavalry, had
refused to submit to headquarters, and at the last moment, when ordered
to outflank the enemy and thus protect the retreat of the Government
forces, he had flatly refused to do so, declaring he was not going to
be ordered about by anybody.
So, considering how critical the situation of the British troops was
in the zone of the Straits, England immediately made preparations
to remedy it and dispatched reinforcements. The 2nd battalion of
the Essex Regiment was held in readiness at Malta, and the light
cruiser _Carlisle_ kept ready to set off at a few minutes’ notice.
All available destroyers had already left Malta for the Eastern
Mediterranean, where the first and fourth squadrons had already
repaired. Besides, the cruiser _Ceres_, which had left Marseilles for
Malta, received orders on the way to steam straight on to the Ægean
Sea. All the Mediterranean fleet was concentrated in the East, while
in the Gulf of Ismid the English warships, which were already there,
carefully watched the movements of the Turkish Nationalist forces.
Such a state of things naturally brought about some anxiety in London,
which somewhat influenced Mr. Lloyd George’s decisions.
During the Hythe Conference, after some conversations on the previous
days with Mr. Lloyd George, Lord Curzon, and Mr. Philip Kerr, in which
he had offered to put the Greek Army at the disposal of the Allies, M.
Venizelos, accompanied by Sir John Stavridi, a rich Greek merchant of
London, who had been his intimate adviser for several years, went on
Saturday evening, June 18, to the Imperial Hotel at Hythe, where were
met all the representatives and experts whom Sir Philip Sassoon had not
been able to accommodate at his mansion at Belcair, to plead the cause
of Greek intervention with them.
M. Venizelos, on the other hand, in order to win over the British
Government to his views, had secured the most valuable help of Sir
Basil Zaharoff, who owns most of the shares in the shipbuilding yards
of Vickers and Co. and who, thanks to the huge fortune he made in
business, subsidises several organs of the British Press. He, too, has
been a confidential adviser of M. Venizelos, and has a great influence
over Mr. Lloyd George, owing to services rendered to him in election
time. So it has been said with reason that M. Venizelos’ eloquence
and Sir Basil Zaharoff’s wealth have done Turkey the greatest harm,
for they have influenced Mr. Lloyd George and English public opinion
against her.
According to M. Venizelos’ scheme, which he meant to expound before
the Conference, the Turkish Nationalist army, concentrated in the
Smyrna area, could be routed by a quick advance of the Greek forces,
numbering 90,000 fully equipped and well-trained men, who would capture
the railway station of Afium-Karahissar. This station, being at the
junction of the railway line from Smyrna and the Adana-Ismid line, via
Konia, the only line of lateral communication Mustafa Kemal disposed
of, would thus be cut off, and the Nationalist leader would have to
withdraw towards the interior. His resistance would thus break down,
and the British forces on the southern coast of the Sea of Marmora that
M. Venizelos offered to reinforce by sending a Greek division would be
at once freed from the pressure brought to bear on them, which, at the
present moment, they could hardly resist.
The next day the Allies decided to accept M. Venizelos’ offer, as the
Greek troops were on the spot and no other force could arrive soon
enough to relieve the British forces, which were seriously threatened.
Mr. Lloyd George declared that the British Government was sending to
the spot all the ships it had at its disposal, but that this naval
intervention could not affect the situation much without the help of
the Greek Army.
“Without the Greek help,” he said, “we may be driven to an
ignominious evacuation of that region of Asia Minor before Kemal’s
forces, which would certainly have a terrible repercussion
throughout the East and would pave the way to endless
possibilities.”
This was also the view held by Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial
General Staff.
Marshal Foch, too, was asked his advice about the Greek co-operation.
He had already declared at San Remo, in agreement with Marshal Wilson,
that an army of 300,000 or 400,000 well-equipped men would be needed to
conquer Asia Minor. Now, after making full reserves in regard to the
political side of the question, he merely remarked that from a strictly
military point of view, Greek co-operation might be a decisive element
of success; moreover, in a report he had drawn up a few months before,
he had pointed out the advantage that an active co-operation of the
Greek Army was sure to bring, from a military point of view.
M. Millerand, while admitting these advantages, is said to have raised
some serious objections to the scheme.
Finally, as the question could not be solved definitely without Italy’s
consent, it was adjourned till the Boulogne Conference met.
Mr. Lloyd George accepted this solution the more readily as he only
seemed to look upon M. Venizelos’ scheme as an experiment; and he
wanted to gain time, in order to know whether he was to pursue it,
till facts had proved that M. Venizelos was right and the Turkish
Nationalists’ resistance could be overcome in a short time. If after
some time things did not turn out as he expected, he would merely
resort to another policy, as is usual with him. But England, meanwhile,
was in an awkward situation, since, while accepting the help of an
ally, she hinted at the same time that she would not stand by the
latter if things turned out wrong. On the other hand, it was surprising
that the Supreme Council should take such decisions before receiving
Turkey’s answer and knowing whether she would sign the treaty.
When the decisions taken at Hythe in regard to the part to be entrusted
to Greece were made known on June 21 at the Boulogne Conference, they
brought forth some remarks on the part of Count Sforza, who refused to
engage Italy’s responsibility in the policy that was being recommended.
He thought it his duty to make reservations in regard to the
timeliness of these decisions and the consequences that might ensue,
referring to the technical advice given at San Remo by Marshal Foch and
Marshal Wilson as to the huge forces they thought would be needed to
enforce the treaty against the Nationalists’ wish.
Soon after—on July 13—M. Scialoja, in the long speech he delivered
before the Senate to defend the attitude of Italy in the Peace
Congress, declared that Italy could not be held responsible for the
serious condition of things now prevailing in Asia Minor and the East,
for she had attempted, but in vain, to secure a more lenient treatment
for Turkey. Finally, in spite of all the objections raised against
the treaty, and the difficulties that would probably ensue, it was
decided at the few sittings of the Boulogne Conference that the Ottoman
delegation should be refused any further delay in giving their answer,
which averted any possibility of revision of the treaty. The Powers
represented in the Conference gave a free hand to Greece in Asia Minor,
because they had not enough soldiers there themselves—let us add that
none of them, not even England probably, cared to rush into a new
Eastern adventure. The Greeks had none but themselves to blame; their
landing at Smyrna had started the Nationalist movement, and now they
bore the brunt of the fight.
This new decision implied the giving up of the policy of conciliation
which might have been expected after the three weeks’ armistice
concluded on May 30 between the French Staff and the Nationalists,
which seemed to imply that the French military authorities intended to
evacuate the whole of Cilicia, left by the treaty to Turkey. Owing
to the serious consequences and infinite repercussions it might have
through the Moslem world, the new decision heralded a period of endless
difficulties.
Even the Catholic Press did not much appreciate the treaty, and had
been badly impressed by recent events. The Vatican, which has always
sought to prevent Constantinople from falling into the hands of an
Orthodox Power, might well dread the treaty would give the Phanar a
paramount influence in the East, if Greece became the ruling Power both
at Stambul and Jerusalem. In the first days of the war, when at the
time of the Gallipoli expedition Constantinople seemed doomed to fall,
the Holy See saw with some anxiety that the Allies intended to assign
Constantinople to Russia, and it then asked that at least Saint Sophia,
turned into a mosque by the Turks, should be given back to the Catholic
creed. This fear may even have been one of the reasons which then
induced the Holy See to favour the Central States. M. René Johannet,
who was carrying on a campaign in the newspaper _La Croix_[32] for the
revision of the treaty, wrote as follows:
“But then, if Asia Minor is deprived of Smyrna and thus loses at
least half her resources, we ask with anxiety where France, the
chief creditor of Turkey, will find adequate financial guarantees?
To give Smyrna to Greece is to rob France. If the Turks are
stripped of everything, they will give us nothing.
“Lastly, the fate of our innumerable religious missions, of
which Smyrna is the nucleus, is to us a cause of great anxiety.
After the precedents of Salonika and Uskub, we have everything to
fear. The Orthodox Governments hate Catholicism. Our religious
schools—that is to say, the best, the soundest part of our national
influence—will soon come to nothing if they are constantly worried
by the new lords of the land. How can we allow this?”
According to the account given by the Anatolian newspapers of the
sittings of the Parliament summoned by Mustafa Kemal to discuss the
conditions of peace, very bitter speeches had been delivered. The
Assembly had passed motions denouncing the whole of the treaty, and
declaring the Nationalists were determined to oppose its being carried
out, supposing it were signed by Damad Ferid Pasha, or any venal slave
of the foreigner, and to fight to the bitter end.
Mustafa Kemal was said to have declared, in a conversation, that he had
not enough soldiers to make war, but he would manage to prevent any
European Power establishing dominion in Asia Minor. And he is reported
to have added: “I don’t care much if the Supreme Council ejects the
Turks from Europe, but in this case the Asiatic territories must remain
Turkish.”
The Greek Army, which, according to the decisions of the Conference,
had started an offensive on the Smyrna front, after driving back the
Nationalists concentrated at Akhissar, occupied the offices of the
captainship of the port of Smyrna and the Ottoman post-office.
On June 20, at Chekmeje, west of Constantinople on the European coast
of the Marmora, a steamer had landed a detachment of Kemalist troops,
which the British warships had immediately bombarded at a range of
eight miles.
On June 21 and 22 two battalions, one English and the other Indian,
landed on the Asiatic coast and blew up the eighty guns scattered all
along the Straits, on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles.
On June 23 the 13th Greek division attacked Salikili and occupied it. A
column of cavalry advanced towards Kula.
On June 24 the Greek troops carried on their advance in four directions
and the Nationalists withdrew, fighting stoutly all the time.
On June 25 the Greeks overcame their resistance and captured Alashehr,
formerly called Philadelphia, an important town on the Smyrna-Konia
line, about 100 miles from Smyrna, took some prisoners and captured
material.
On July 1 the Greeks occupied Balikesri, an important station on the
Smyrna-Panderma line, nearly fifty miles to the north of Soma, in spite
of the Nationalists’ energetic resistance.
On July 3 a landing of Greek troops hastened the fall of Panderma. Some
detachments which had landed under the protection of the fleet marched
southwards, and met the enemy outposts at Omerkeui, fifteen miles to
the north-west of Balikesri.
Then on July 7 M. Venizelos stated at the Spa Conference that
the Greek offensive against Mustafa Kemal’s forces which had
begun on June 22 and whose chief objective was the capture of the
Magnesia-Akhissar-Soma-Balikesri-Panderma line, had ended victoriously
on July 2, when the forces coming from the south and those landed at
Panderma had effected a junction, and that the scheme of military
operations drawn up at Boulogne, which was to be carried out in two
weeks, according to General Paraskevopoulos’ forecast, had been
brought to a successful end in eleven days.
On July 8 Brusa was occupied by the Greek army, and Mudania and
Geumlek by British naval forces. Before the Greek advance began every
wealthy Turk had fled to the interior with what remained of the 56th
Turkish division, which had evacuated Brusa on July 2. Brusa had been
occupied by the Greeks without any bloodshed. A good number of railway
carriages and a few steam-engines belonging to a French company had
been left undamaged by the Turks on the Mudania line. The British naval
authorities, under the pretext that some shots had been fired from the
railway station, had had it shelled, together with the French manager’s
house, and all that was in these two buildings had been looted by
British sailors and the Greek population of Mudania.
Some misleading articles in the Greek and English Press, which were
clearly unreliable, extolled the correct attitude of the Greek troops
towards the inhabitants during their advance in Asia Minor. According
to the Greek communiqué of July 17, “the Nationalists, now deprived
of any prestige, were being disarmed by the Moslem population which
earnestly asked to be protected by the Greek posts,” and “the Turks,
tired of the vexatious measures and the crushing taxes enforced by the
Kemalists, everywhere expressed their confidence and gratitude towards
the Greek soldiers, whom they welcomed as friends and protectors.”
At the same time political circles in Athens openly declared that
the Greek operations in Asia Minor had now come to an end, and that
Adrianople and Eastern Thrace would soon be occupied—this occupation
being quite urgent as the Turks already evinced signs of resistance,
and the Bulgarians were assuming a threatening attitude. Moreover,
as might have been foreseen, the Greeks already began to speak of
territorial compensations after their operations in Asia Minor and of
setting up a new State.
General Milne, whose forces had been reinforced by Greek elements, also
undertook to clear all the area lying between Constantinople and Ismid
from the irregular Turkish troops that had made their way into it.
On July 7 it was officially notified by the British Headquarters that
“military movements were going to take place in the direction of
Ismid, and so the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus was considered as a
war zone.” Accordingly troops quartered in that district, and soldiers
employed in the various services, were to be recalled to the European
shore at once, and the next day any Turkish soldier found within that
zone would be treated as an enemy.
The great Selimie barracks, at Skutari, were therefore evacuated by the
Turks, who thus had no troops left on the Asiatic shore of the Straits.
At Pasha Bagtche Chiboukli, on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus,
Greek soldiers helped to disarm the population, and searched everybody
who landed at that village.
At Stambul, on the great bridge of Karakeui, British agents halted all
officers and soldiers wearing the Turkish uniform, and directed them to
the buildings of the English gendarmerie to be examined.
The Alemdagh district was occupied, and General Milne had all the
Government troops disarmed, on the pretext of their questionable
attitude and the weakness of the Turkish Government. Yet the latter
had, of its own accord, broken up the Constantinople army corps, and
replaced it by one division that was to be dissolved, in its turn,
after the signature of the Peace Treaty, as according to the terms of
peace only 700 Turkish soldiers had a right to reside in Constantinople
as the Sultan’s guard.
In an article of _Le Matin_, July 7, 1920, under the title, “A New
Phase of the Eclipse of French Influence in the East,” M. André
Fribourg pointed out the encroachment of the British Commander in
Constantinople.
* * * * *
The decision taken by the Allies at Boulogne not to grant any further
delay had placed the Turks in a difficult situation. The Grand Vizier,
who had come to Paris in the hope of negotiating, handed his answer on
the 25th, in order to keep within the appointed time.
The Supreme Council examined this answer on Wednesday, July 7, at Spa.
After hearing the English experts, who advised that any modification
should be rejected, the Council refused to make any concessions on all
the chief points mentioned in the Turkish answer, and only admitted a
few subsidiary requests as open to discussion. It deputed a Commission
of political experts to draw up an answer in collaboration with the
military experts.
Meanwhile the Minister of the Interior, Reshid Bey, chairman of the
Ottoman delegation, who had left Constantinople on the 25th, and had
arrived in Paris with Jemil Pasha only at the beginning of July, sent
a note to the Secretary of the Peace Conference to be forwarded to M.
Millerand at Spa. This note, which came to hand on July 11, completed
the first answer. It included the decisions taken in Constantinople
during Damad Ferid’s stay at Versailles.
The remarks offered by the Ottoman delegation about the peace
conditions presented by the Allies made up a little book of forty pages
with some appendices, which was handed to the Conference on the 25th.
The answer, which had been revised in Constantinople, and consisted
of forty-seven pages, was delivered a few days after; it differed but
little from the first.
This document began with the following protest against the conditions
enforced on Turkey:
“It was only fair—and it was also a right recognised by all nations
nowadays—that Turkey should be set on an equal footing with her
former allies. The flagrant inequality proffered by the draft of
the treaty will be bitterly resented not only by 12 million Turks,
but throughout the Moslem world.
“Nothing, indeed, can equal the rigour of the draft of the Turkish
treaty. As a matter of fact, it is a dismemberment.
“Not only do the Allies, in the name of the principle of
nationalities, detach important provinces from the Ottoman Empire
which they erect to the rank of free, independent States (Armenia
and the Hejaz), or independent States under the protection of a
mandatory Power (Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Syria); not only do
they wrench from it Egypt, Suez, and Cyprus, which are to be ceded
to Great Britain; not only do they require Turkey to give up all
her rights and titles to Libya and the States of the Ægean Sea:
they even mean to strip her, notwithstanding the said principle
of nationalities, of Eastern Thrace and the zone of Smyrna, which
countries, in a most iniquitous way, would be handed over to
Greece, who wants to be set on an equal footing with the victors,
though she has not even been at war with Turkey.
“Further, they are preparing to take Kurdistan and in an indirect
way to slice the rest of the country into zones of influence.
“In this way more than two-thirds of the extent of the Ottoman
Empire would already be taken from it. With regard to the number
of inhabitants, it would be at least two-thirds. If we consider
the economic wealth and natural resources of the country, the
proportion would be greater still.
“But that is not all. To this spoliation, the draft of the treaty
adds a notorious infringement on the sovereignty of the Ottoman
State. Even at Constantinople Turkey would not be her own mistress.
Side by side with His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the Turkish
Government—or even above them in some cases—a ‘Commission of the
Straits’ would rule over the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and
the Dardanelles. Turkey would not even be represented in this
Commission, whereas Bulgaria would send a representative to it.
“In addition to these two powers, there would be a third one—the
military power exercised by the troops of occupation of three
States, whose headquarters would have the upper hand even of the
Ottoman gendarmerie.
“Any possibility of mere defence against an attack would thus be
taken away from Turkey, whose capital would henceforth be within
the range of her enemies’ guns.
“The sovereignty of the State would also be deeply infringed upon
in all matters relating to legislation, international treaties,
finance, administration, jurisdiction, trade, etc., so that finally
the crippled Ottoman Empire would be stripped of every attribute of
sovereignty both at home and abroad, but would be held responsible
all the same for the execution of the Peace Treaty and the
international obligations pertaining to every State.
“Such a situation, which would be an utter denial of justice, would
constitute both a logical impossibility and a judicial anomaly.
For, on the one hand, it is impossible to maintain a State and
at the same time divest it of all that is an essential judicial
condition of its existence; and, on the other hand, there cannot be
any responsibility where there is no liberty.
“Either the Allied Powers are of opinion that Turkey should
continue to exist, in which case they should make it possible for
her to live and fulfil her engagements by paying due regard to her
rights as a free, responsible State.
“Or the Allied Powers want Turkey to die. They should then execute
their own sentence themselves, without asking the culprit—to whom
they did not even give a hearing—to append his signature to it and
bring them his co-operation.”
After these general considerations and some remarks as to the
responsibility of Turkey, the fundamental rights of the State, and
the right of free disposal of peoples, the Ottoman Government made
counter-proposals which were quite legitimate, and at the same time
bore witness to its goodwill.
This document, to which we refer the reader for further particulars,
may be summed up as follows: The Turkish Government recognises the new
States of Poland, Serbia-Croatia-Slovenia, and Czecho-Slovakia. It
confirms the recognition made by Turkey in 1918 of Armenia as a free,
independent State. It also recognises the Hejaz as a free, independent
State. It recognises the French protectorate over Tunis. It accepts all
economic, commercial, and other consequences of the French protectorate
over Morocco, which was not a Turkish province. It renounces all rights
and privileges over Libya and the isles and islets of the Ægean Sea.
It recognises Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, as independent States. It
recognises the British protectorate over Egypt, the free passage of
the Suez Canal, the Anglo-Egyptian administration of the Soudan, the
annexation of Cyprus by Great Britain.
In regard to Constantinople and the régime of the zone of the Straits,
the Ottoman delegation remarked that according to the terms of the
treaty there would be together in that town—
“First, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the Turkish Government,
whose rights and titles shall be maintained.
“Secondly, the Commission of the Straits.
“Thirdly, the military powers of occupation.
“Fourthly, the diplomatic representatives of France, Britain, and
Italy, deliberating in a kind of council with the military and
naval commanders of the Franco-Anglo-Italian forces.”