“Fifthly, the Inter-Allied Commissioners of Control and Military
Organisation.
“Sixthly, the Commission of Finance.
“Seventhly, the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt.
“Eighthly, the consuls’ jurisdictions.”
After going over all the objections raised by the coexistence of these
various bodies, whose powers would encroach upon each other or would be
exactly similar, and the impossibility that foreign agents accredited
to the Sultan should hold such functions, the memorandum opposed the
following reasons to the decisions of the Conference:
“First, the draft of the treaty does not in any way institute _an
international judicial and political organisation_ of the Straits.
“Secondly, it institutes a political and military power on behalf
of _some_ States, attended with all the international risks
pertaining to it.
“Thirdly, with regard to Turkey it would constitute _a direct and
deep infringement on her rights of sovereignty, preservation, and
security, which infringements are not necessary to safeguard the
freedom of passage_ of the Straits.
“Fourthly, from an international point of view the intended régime
would create a kind of _international moral person by the side of
the States, which would not represent the League of Nations_.
“Fifthly, the new international condition of Turkey would in some
respects be inferior to that of the new States consisting of
territories detached from Turkey, for these new States would be
placed under the mandate of a Power _appointed by the League of
Nations_ mainly in accordance with _the wishes of the populations
concerned_, and bound to give a periodical account to the League of
Nations of the exercise of its mandate.
“Sixthly, far from ensuring the internationalisation of the
Straits, which was aimed at by the Powers, the régime instituted
by the draft of the treaty would _favour their nationalisation by
another State_.
“The internationalisation of the Straits could only be realised
by means of an international organisation—viz., _a judicial
organisation representing all the Powers_.”
Therefore, the Government allows the free passage of the Straits, but
asks that they should be controlled only by the League of Nations, and
that the Straits zones mentioned in the scheme of internationalisation
“should be reduced territorially to what is necessary to guarantee the
free passage of the Straits.” Turkey declares herself ready to accept
“this scheme, if restricted to the Straits zone, whose frontiers were
fixed as follows”:
“(_a_) In Europe the Sharkeui-Karachali line, thus including all
the Gallipoli Peninsula.
“(_b_) In Asia a line passing through Kara-Bigha (on the Sea of
Marmora), Bigha, Ezine, and Behramkeui.”
She thus agrees to “all restrictions to her sovereignty over the
Straits that are necessary to control the navigation and ensure their
opening to all flags on a footing of complete equality between the
States.”
Further,
“As regards all matters concerning the region of the Straits and
the Sea of Marmora, the Ottoman Government is willing to discuss a
convention instituting for these waters a régime of the same kind
as the one established for the Suez Canal by the Constantinople
treaty of October 29, 1888, the very régime advocated by Great
Britain (Art. 109).”
The Ottoman Government—this article, together with the one concerning
the Hejaz that will be mentioned later on, was the most important
addition in the revised answer drawn up at Constantinople—wishes the
islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos, lying before the entrance to the
Dardanelles, to be included in the zone of the Straits—that is to
say, to remain Ottoman territories under inter-Allied occupation.
The Allies intended to give these islands to Greece, and it was
feared in Constantinople the latter might hand them over to another
Power—England, for instance—that would cede her Cyprus in exchange.
Among a great many measures intended for ensuring the security of
Constantinople, the Ottoman Government chiefly asks for the limitation
of the number of foreign warships allowed to stay in Turkish waters.
It wants to maintain, under Ottoman sovereignty, Eastern Thrace within
its pre-war boundaries, and Smyrna with the surrounding area, which
shall be evacuated by Hellenic troops, and may be occupied for three
years at the utmost by troops of the chief Allied Powers.
The Ottoman Government asks for an international inquiry to fix the
frontiers of Kurdistan according to the principle of nationalities, in
case the Kurds—who, it firmly believes, are “indissolubly attached to
His Majesty the Sultan,” and who “have never wished, and will never
have the least desire, to be completely independent or even to relax
the bonds that link them with the Turkish people”—should express the
wish to enjoy local autonomy. The intended frontier between Syria
and Mesopotamia should also be altered, for otherwise it would cut
off from the Ottoman Empire a predominantly Turkish population; “an
international commission should make a thorough inquiry with a view to
ascertain facts from an ethnic point of view.”
It also wants the King of the Hejaz to pledge himself to respect the
titles and prerogatives of the Sultan as Caliph over the holy cities
and places of Mecca and Medina.
Lastly, it declares itself ready to accept, without asking for
reciprocity, the clauses concerning the protection of minorities.
Meanwhile the Greeks seemed eager to carry on their campaign in Asia
Minor, without even waiting for the definite settlement of the treaty.
According to information sent from Greece,[33] the Hellenic army,
having reached all its objectives, was waiting for the decisions of the
Spa Conference, and if the latter wished her to carry on her operations
in Asia Minor, her fourth objective would probably be Eskishehr, the
nucleus of the Anatolian railways, which commands all the traffic and
revictualling of Asia Minor, and whose fall would perhaps bring the war
to an end.
The Allied answer to the Turkish request for further delays and to the
Turkish remarks was handed to the Ottoman delegation on July 17.
In this answer, the main lines or perhaps even the very words of which
had been settled at Spa, the Allies only repeated their previous
arguments—some of which were ineffective and others unfounded; and both
the letter and the spirit of the answer were most unconciliatory.
The assertion that “Turkey entered into the war without the shadow of
an excuse or provocation,” recurred again in it and was fully enlarged
upon. The events that had taken place lately and the character they
had assumed since the end of hostilities did not seem to have taught
the writers or instigators of the answer anything at all. We do not
wish here to mitigate in any way the responsibilities of Turkey or her
wrongs to the Allies; yet we should not overlook the most legitimate
reasons that drove her to act thus, and we must own she had a right
to mistrust the promises made to her. For the policy that the Allies
pursued at that time and that they have not wholly repudiated obviously
proved that they would give a free hand to Russia to carry out her
ambitious schemes on Constantinople and Turkey-in-Asia, as a reward for
her energetic share in the war.
Besides, a fact helps us to understand how Turkey was driven to enter
into the war and accounts for her apprehension of England and the
Anglo-Hellenic policy pursued by England in relation with her later on,
both in the working out of the Sèvres treaty and after the signature of
this treaty; it is the proposition made by England to Greece to attack
Turkey. According to the letter that M. Venizelos addressed to King
Constantine on September 7, 1914, sending in his resignation, which was
not accepted by the King, Admiral Kerr, the very man whom later on,
in 1920, the British Government was to entrust with a mission to the
Hellenic King while he was at Lucerne, formally waited upon the latter
to urge him to attack Turkey. The King is said to have laid down as a
necessary condition to his consent that Britain should guarantee the
neutrality of Bulgaria and should contrive to bring Turkey to afford
him a pretext for opening hostilities. Admiral Kerr, speaking on
behalf of the British Government, is reported to have given him full
guarantee on the first point; but with reference to the second point he
hinted that he thought it unnecessary to seek for a pretext or wait for
a provocation as the Hellenic policy constantly evinced a feeling of
hostility towards Turkey.[34]
In this answer the Allies again reproached the Turks with their
atrocities—without mentioning the atrocities committed by the Armenians
against the Turks; and yet at that time Mr. Lloyd George seemed to
have wholly forgotten the German atrocities, for he did not say a
word about the punishment of the war criminals, and seemed ready to
make concessions as to the reparations stipulated in the treaty with
Germany. Why should the Turks be chastised—as was said at the time—if
the other criminals were not punished? Was it merely because they were
weaker and less guilty than the Germans?
Though it was a palpable falsehood, it was asserted again in this
document that in Thrace the Moslems were not in a majority.
The Powers also gravely affirmed they contemplated for Smyrna “about
the same régime as for Dantzig,” which could not greatly please either
the Greeks or the Turks, judging from the condition of the Poles in the
Baltic port; but they did not add that perhaps in this case too England
would finally control the port.
“With regard to the control of the Straits,” said the document, “the
Powers must unhesitatingly take adequate measures to prevent the
Turkish Government from treacherously trampling upon the cause of
civilisation.” It seemed to be forgotten that Turkey insisted upon
keeping them in order to prevent Russia from seizing them; and at the
very time when the note was drawn up some newspapers declared—which
might have sufficed to justify the Turkish claim—that the passage of
the Straits must be free in order to allow the Allies to send munitions
to Wrangel’s army.
The Allies, however, decided to grant to “Turkey, as a riparian Power
and in the same manner and on the same conditions as to Bulgaria, the
right to appoint a delegate to the Commission and the suppression
of the clause through which Turkey was to surrender to the Allied
Governments all steamers of 1,600 tons upwards.” These were the only
two concessions made to Turkey.
The Allies’ answer laid great stress upon the advantages offered by
the organisation of a financial control of Turkey, which, to quote the
document itself, “was introduced for no other purpose than to protect
Turkey against the corruption and speculation which had ruined her in
the past.” As a matter of fact, that corruption and speculation had
been let loose in Turkey by the Great Powers themselves, under cover of
the privileges given by the Capitulations.
Judging from the very words of the clause which left Constantinople in
the hands of the Turks, the Allies seemed to allow this merely out of
condescension, and even alleged that the territory left to Turkey as a
sovereign State was “a large and productive territory.”
Finally, the note concluded with the following threat:
“If the Turkish Government refuses to sign the peace, still more if
it finds itself unable to re-establish its sovereignty in Anatolia
or to give effect to the treaty, the Allies, in accordance with the
terms of the treaty, may be driven to reconsider the arrangement by
ejecting the Turks from Europe once and for all.”
These lines plainly show that some Powers had not given up the idea of
ejecting the Turks from Europe, and were only awaiting an opportunity
that might warrant another European intervention to carry out their
plans and satisfy their ambition; and yet this policy, as will be seen
later on, went against their own interests and those of Old Europe.
The idea that the British Premier entertained of the important
strategic and commercial consequences that would ensue if the Near East
were taken away from Turkish sovereignty was obviously contradictory
to the historical part played by Turkey; and by disregarding the
influence of Turkey in European affairs in the past and the present, he
made a grievous political mistake. If one day Germany, having become a
strong nation again, should offer her support to Turkey, cut to pieces
by England, all the Turks in Asia might remember Mr. Lloyd George’s
policy, especially as M. Venizelos might then have been replaced by
Constantine or the like.
Turkey was granted a period of ten days, expiring on July 27 at 12
midnight, to let the Allies definitely know whether she accepted the
clauses of the treaty and intended to sign it.
This comminatory answer did not come as a surprise. Mr. Lloyd George
openly said he was convinced the Greeks would be as successful in
Thrace as they had been in Asia Minor, which was easy to foresee but
did not mean much for the future; and he thought he was justified in
declaring with some self-satisfaction before the Commons on July 21,
1920—
“The Great Powers had kept the Turk together not because of any
particular confidence they had in him, but because they were afraid
of what might happen if he disappeared.
“The late war has completely put an end to that state of things.
Turkey is broken beyond repair, and from our point of view we have
no reason to regret it.”
The Greek troops, supported by an Anglo-Hellenic naval group, including
two British dreadnoughts, effected a landing in the ports of Erekli,
Sultan Keui (where they met with no resistance), and Rodosto, which was
occupied in the afternoon.
The Hellenic forces landed on the coasts of the Marmora reached the
Chorlu-Muradli line on the railway, and their immediate objective was
the occupation of the Adrianople-Constantinople railway in order to cut
off all communications between Jafer Tayar’s troops and the Nationalist
elements of the capital, and capture Lule Burgas. From this position
they would be able to threaten Jafer Tayar and Huhi ed Din on their
flanks and rear in order to compel them to withdraw their troops from
the Maritza, or run the risk of being encircled if they did not cross
the Bulgarian frontier.
The Greek operations against Adrianople began on July 20. The Turkish
Nationalists had dug a network of trenches on the right bank of the
Tunja, which flows by Adrianople; they offered some resistance, and
bombarded the bridgeheads of Kuleli Burgas and of the suburbs of
Karagatch, three miles from Adrianople, where the Greeks had taken
their stand for over a month. But on Saturday, July 24, the confident
spirit of the Turkish civilians and officers suddenly broke down when
it was known that the Greeks had landed on the shores of the Marmora,
had reached Lule Burgas, and threatened to encircle the troops that
defended Adrianople. In the absence of Jafer Tayar, who had repaired
to the front, the officers suddenly left the town without letting it
be known whether they were going to Northern Thrace or withdrawing
to Bulgaria, and the soldiers, leaving the trenches in their turn,
scattered all over Adrianople. The white flag was hoisted during the
night, and the next day at daybreak a delegation, including Shevket
Bey, mayor of the town, the mufti, the heads of the Orthodox and Jewish
religious communities, repaired to the Hellenic outposts, at Karagatch,
to ask the Greeks to occupy the town at once. At 10 o’clock the troops
marched into the town, and by 12 they occupied the Konak, the prefect’s
mansion, where the Turks had left everything—archives, furniture,
carpets, and so on.
Meanwhile, it was reported that 12,000 Turks who had refused to
surrender and accept Greek domination crossed the Bulgarian frontier.
As soon as the Grand Vizier came back to Constantinople a conflict
arose between the latter, who maintained Turkey was compelled to sign
the treaty, and some members of the Cabinet. As the Grand Vizier,
who was in favour of the ratification, hesitated to summon the Crown
Council, the Minister of Public Works, Fakhr ed Din, Minister of Public
Education, Reshid, Minister of Finance and provisional Minister of
the Interior, and the Sheik-ul-Islam, who all wanted the Council to be
summoned, are said to have offered their resignation, which was not
accepted by the Sultan—or at any rate was no more heard of.
On July 20 the Sultan summoned a Council of the Imperial Family,
including the Sultanas, and on July 22 the Crown Council, consisting
of fifty-five of the most prominent men in Turkey, among whom were
five generals, a few senators, the members of the Cabinet, and some
members of the former Government. The Grand Vizier spoke first, and
declared Turkey could not do otherwise than sign the treaty. All the
members of the Council supported the Government’s decision, with the
exception of Marshal Fuad, who had already used his influence with the
Sultan in favour of the Nationalists and who said the Turks should die
rather than sign such a peace, and of Riza Pasha, who had commanded
the artillery before the war, who said Turkey did not deserve such a
grievous punishment and refused to vote. Turkey had been at war for
ten years, which partly accounts for the decision taken. Therefore
the order to sign the treaty of peace was officially given, and, as
had already been announced, General Hadi Pasha, of Arabian descent,
Dr. Riza Tewfik Bey, and Reshad Halis Bey, ambassador at Berne, were
appointed Turkish plenipotentiaries.
The Grand Vizier in an appeal to Jafer Tayar, the Nationalist leader
in Thrace, begged of him “to surrender at once and leave Thrace to
the Greek army.” He concluded with these words: “We fully recognise
your patriotism, but protracting the war would be detrimental to the
interests of the nation. You must submit.”
Then the question arose how the treaty—which now admitted of no
discussion—after being enforced and carried out by arms, before the
delay for acceptance granted to the Ottoman Government had come to an
end, against all rules of international law and diplomatic precedents,
could solve the Eastern question.
Of course it was alleged that the Greek offensive in Anatolia had
nothing to do with the treaty of peace presented to Turkey, that it
only constituted a preventive measure in support of the treaty and it
was not directed against the Stambul Government, but against Mustafa
Kemal’s troops, which had broken the armistice by attacking the British
troops on the Ismid line. Yet this was but a poor reason, and how was
it possible to justify the Greek attack in Thrace, which took place
immediately after? The fact was that England and Greece, being afraid
of losing their prey, were in a hurry to take hold of it, and neither
Mr. Lloyd George nor M. Venizelos shrank from shedding more blood to
enforce a treaty which could not bring about peace.
Now that the Allies had driven a Government which no longer represented
Turkey to accept the treaty, and the latter had been signed, under
English compulsion, by some aged politicians, while the Greeks and
the British partitioned the Ottoman Empire between themselves, was
it possible to say that all the difficulties were settled? The
signature of the treaty could but weaken the tottering power of the
Sultan. Moreover, England, eager to derive the utmost benefit from
the weakness of Turkey, raised the question of the Caliphate; it was
learned from an English source that the title of Caliph had been
offered to the Emir of Afghanistan, but the latter had declined the
offer. On the other hand, how could Mustafa Kemal be expected to
adhere to the decisions taken in Constantinople? It was to be feared,
therefore, the agitation would be protracted, for an Anatolian campaign
would offer far greater difficulties than those the Greek army had had
to overcome on the low plains along the sea; and at Balikesri, standing
at an altitude of 400 feet, begin the first slopes of the Anatolian
uplands. As a matter of fact, Turkey was not dead, as Mr. Lloyd
George believed, but the policy of the British Premier was doomed to
failure—the same policy which the Soviets were trifling with, which was
paving the way to the secession of Ireland, and may one day cost Great
Britain the loss of India and Egypt.
It has even been said the Bolshevists themselves advised Turkey to sign
the treaty in order to gain time, and thus organise a campaign in which
the Bolshevist forces and the Nationalist forces in Turkey and Asia
Minor would fight side by side.
The Ottoman delegation, consisting of General Hadi Pasha, Riza Tewfik
Bey, a senator, and the Turkish ambassador at Berne, Reshad Halis Bey,
arrived in Paris on Friday, July 30. The signature of the treaty, which
was first to take place on July 27 and had been put off till the next
Thursday or Saturday because the delegates could not arrive in time,
was at the last moment postponed indefinitely.
Some difficulties had arisen between Italy and Greece concerning
the “Twelve Islands,” or Dodecanese, and this Italo-Greek incident
prevented the signature of the treaty. For it was stipulated in Article
122 of the treaty:
“Turkey cedes to Italy all her rights and titles to the islands of
the Ægean Sea—viz., Stampalia, Rhodes, Calki, Scarpanto, Casos,
Piscopis, Nisyros, Calimnos, Leros, Patmos, Lipsos, Symi, and
Cos, now occupied by Italy, and the islets pertaining thereunto,
together with the Island of Castellorizzo.”
The thirteen islands mentioned here constitute what is called the
Dodecanese, and Italy had taken possession of them in 1912, during the
war with the Ottoman Empire. But in July, 1919, an agreement, which
has already been mentioned, had been concluded between the Italian
Government, represented by M. Tittoni, and the Greek Government,
represented by M. Venizelos, according to which Italy ceded to Greece
the Dodecanese, except Rhodes, which was to share the fate of Cyprus,
and pledged herself not to object to Greece setting foot in Southern
Albania. Of course, Italy in return was to have advantages in Asia
Minor and the Adriatic Sea.
At the meeting of the Supreme Council held in London before the San
Remo Conference to draw up the Turkish treaty, M. Venizelos had stated
that Greece could not accept Article 122, if the Italo-Greek agreement
did not compel Italy to cede the Dodecanese to Greece. M. Scialoja,
the Italian delegate, had answered that on the day of the signature
of the Turkish treaty an agreement would be signed between Italy and
Greece, through which Italy transferred to Greece the sovereignty of
the aforesaid islands.
Now Italy, in 1920, considered that the agreement which was binding
on both parties had become null and void, as she had not obtained any
of the compensations stipulated in it, and so she thought she had a
right now not to cede the islands—Castellorizzo, though inhabited by
12,000 Greeks, not being included in the agreement. As to Rhodes, that
was to share the fate of Cyprus: England did not seem willing now to
cede it to Greece; so that was out of the question for the moment.
Moreover, the Italian Government insisted upon keeping the Island of
Halki, or Karki, lying near Rhodes. Lastly, as Italy, after the solemn
proclamation of the autonomy and independence of Albania, had been
obliged to evacuate nearly the whole of Albania, the cession to Greece
of part of Southern Albania could not be tolerated by Italian public
opinion and had now become an utter impossibility.
Under such circumstances the Greek Government had stated it was no
longer willing to sign the Turkish treaty, which, if the previous
agreement alone is taken into account, assigns the Dodecanese to
Italy. This incident at the last moment prevented the signature of the
treaty which had been so laboriously drawn up, and put the Powers in
an awkward situation since the regions occupied by the Greek armies
in Asia Minor were five times as large as the Smyrna area assigned to
Greece, and obviously could not be evacuated by the Greeks before a
state of peace was restored between them and Turkey.
The signature of the treaty, which had been put off at first, as
has just been mentioned, till the end of July, was, after various
delays, arranged for Thursday, August 5, then postponed till the next
Saturday, and finally took place only three days later.
Meanwhile, the Armenian delegation raised another objection, and
informed the Allies that as their president, Nubar Pasha, had been
admitted by the Allied Governments to the signature of the Peace
Treaty, as representing the Armenians of Turkey and the Armenian
colonies, they thought it unfair not to let him sign the Turkish treaty
too, merely because he represented the Turkish Armenians. The Allies
advised the Armenians for their own sake not to insist, in order to
avoid an official protest of Turkey against the treaty after its
signature, under the pretext that it had not been signed regularly.
In the House of Lords the treaty was sharply criticised by Lord Wemyss,
especially in regard to the condition of Smyrna and the cession of
Eastern Thrace to Greece.
In the speech he delivered on Friday, August 6, at Montecitorio,
Count Sforza, coming to the question of the Dodecanese, summed up the
Tittoni-Venizelos agreement of July 29, 1919, as follows:
“Italy pledged herself to support at the Conference the Greek
claims on Eastern and Western Thrace; she even pledged herself to
support the Greek demand of annexing Southern Albania. Greece, in
return for this, pledged herself to give Italy a free zone in the
port of Santi Quaranta, and to give Italian industry a right of
preference for the eventual building of a railway line beginning at
this port.
“Greece pledged herself to support at the Conference the Italian
mandate over Albania, to recognise Italian sovereignty over
Valona, and confirm the neutralisation of the Corfu Canal already
prescribed by the London Conference in 1913-14, when Greece had
promised not to build any military works on the coast between Cape
Stilo and Aspriruga.
“Greece pledged herself, in case she should have satisfaction in
Thrace and Southern Albania, to give up, in favour of Italy,
all her territorial claims in Asia Minor which hindered Italian
interests.
“The Italian and Greek Governments promised to support each other
at the Conference concerning their claims in Asia Minor.
“Italy had already pledged herself to cede to Greece the
sovereignty of the isles of the Ægean Sea, except Rhodes, to which
the Italian Government promised to grant a liberal administrative
autonomy.
“Italy also pledged herself to respect the religious liberty of the
Greeks who were going to be more under her rule in Asia Minor, and
Greece took a similar engagement with respect to the Italians.
“Article 7 dealt with what would happen if the two countries wished
to resume their full liberty of action.
“Italy pledged herself to insert a clause in the treaty, in which
she promised to let the people of Rhodes freely decide their own
fate, on condition that the plebiscite should not be taken before
five years after the signature of the Peace Treaty.”
Count Sforza proceeded to say that on July 22, after coming back from
Spa, he had addressed M. Venizelos a note to let him know that the
Allies’ decisions concerning Asia Minor and the aspirations of the
Albanian people compelled the Italian Government to alter their policy
in order to safeguard the Italian interests in those regions:
“Under the circumstances, the situation based on the agreement of
July 29, 1919, as to the line of conduct to be followed at the
Conference was substantially modified.
“Therefore Italy, in conformity with Article 7 of the agreement,
now resumes her full liberty of action. Yet the Italian Government,
urged by a conciliatory spirit, intends to consider the situation
afresh, as it earnestly wishes to arrive at a satisfactory and
complete understanding.
“The desire to maintain friendly relations with Greece is most
deeply felt in Italy. Greece is a vital force to the East. When
I tried to get better conditions of peace for Turkey, I felt
convinced I was safeguarding the independence and the territorial
integrity which the Turkish people is entitled to, and at the same
time I was serving the true interests of Hellenism.”
In an interview published by the _Stampa_, M. Tittoni on his side
declared, concerning the Dodecanese and the arrangement he had
negotiated with M. Venizelos, that, as circumstances had changed, the
clauses of the agreement had become null and void.
Alluding to the note handed by him on coming to Paris to M. Clémenceau
and Mr. Lloyd George and recently read to the Senate by M. Scialoja, he
complained that the Allies supported the Greek claims in Asia Minor,
and overlooked the Italian interests in the same region. As Greece had
got all she wanted and Italy’s hopes in Asia Minor had been frustrated,
the agreement with M. Venizelos was no longer valid, according to him,
and he concluded thus: “The agreement became null and void on the day
when at San Remo the draft of the Turkish treaty was definitely drawn
up.” Finally, on August 9 Greece and Italy came to an agreement, and a
protocol was signed. The Dodecanese, according to the Tittoni-Venizelos
agreement, were given up to Greece, with the exception of Rhodes,
which, for the present, remained in the hands of Italy. In case England
should cede Cyprus to Greece, a plebiscite was to be taken at Rhodes
within fifteen years, instead of five years as had been settled before.
There was no reason why Italy should give up Rhodes if England, which
had ruled over Cyprus since 1878, did not hand it over to Greece. The
League of Nations was to decide in what manner this plebiscite was to
be taken; meanwhile Italy would grant Rhodes a wide autonomy. According
to the account given of the Italo-Greek agreement, it includes some
stipulations concerning Smyrna, and at the request of the Italian
Government the Italian schools, museums, and subjects enjoy a special
treatment. Italy keeps her privilege for the archæological excavations
at Kos.
Not a word was said of Albania, though there had been some clauses
about it in the 1919 agreement. Italy and Greece were to make separate
arrangements with the Albanians.
Yugo-Slavia in its turn protested in regard to the share of the Turkish
debt that was assigned to her and complained that the charges inherent
in the Turkish territories she had received in 1913 were too heavy.
King Hussein too was dissatisfied with the Syrian events and the
attitude of France. So he refused to adhere to the treaty, though
it indirectly acknowledged the independence of his States and his
own sovereignty. He thus showed he really aimed at setting up a huge
Arabian Kingdom where his sons would have only been his lieutenants
in Syria and Mesopotamia. Besides, King Hussein earnestly begged that
the Kingdom of Mesopotamia, which had hitherto been promised to his
son Abdullah, should be given to the Emir Feisal as a compensation for
Syria, and a hint was given that England would not object to this.
Then the Turkish delegates, seeing the Allies at variance, raised
objections to the treaty, and on the morning of August 10 Hadi Pasha
informed the Conference he could not sign the treaty if the Allies
could not agree together. However, at the earnest request of a high
official of the Foreign Office and after he had been repeatedly urged
to do so, he consented to sign the treaty in the afternoon at Sèvres.
Together with the Turkish treaty seven treaties or agreements were also
signed—namely:
“A treaty in regard to Thrace; sanctioning the cession to Greece
of some territories given up by Bulgaria in accordance with the
Versailles treaty, and giving Bulgaria a free outlet to the sea at
the port of Dedeagatch.
“A tripartite convention between England, France, and Italy,
settling the zones of economic influence of France and Italy in the
Ottoman territory of Asia Minor.
“A Greco-Italian convention assigning the ‘Twelve Islands’ to
Greece—a plebiscite was to be taken in regard to the sovereignty
over Rhodes.
“A treaty between Armenia and the Great Powers, settling the
question of the minorities in the future Armenian State.
“A treaty in regard to the Greek minorities, ensuring them
protection in the territories that had newly been occupied by
Greece.
“A treaty concerning the New States, settling administrative
questions between Italy and the States which occupied territories
formerly belonging to Austria-Hungary.
“A treaty fixing various frontiers in Central Europe at some places
where they had not yet been definitely laid down.”
According to the terms of the agreement concerning the protection
of minorities, Greece pledged herself to grant to Greek subjects
belonging to minorities in language, race, or religion the same civil
and political rights, the same consideration and protection as to
the other Greek subjects, on the strength of which France and Great
Britain gave up their rights of control over Greece, established by the
London treaty of 1832, their right of control over the Ionian Islands
established by the London treaty of 1864, and their right of protection
of religious freedom conferred by the London Conference of 1830.
Greece pledged herself also to present for the approval of the League
of Nations within a year a scheme of organisation of Adrianople,
including a municipal council in which the various races should be
represented. All the clauses of the treaty for the protection of
minorities were under the guarantee of the League of Nations. Greece
also pledged herself to give the Allies the benefit of the “most
favoured nation” clause till a general commercial agreement had been
concluded, within five years, under the patronage of the League of
Nations.
All these delays and incidents bore witness to the difficulty of
arriving at a solution of the Eastern question in the way the Allies
had set to work, and to the frailty of the stipulations inserted in the
treaty.
They also testified to the lack of skill and political acuteness
of Mr. Lloyd George. Of course, the British Premier, owing to the
large concessions he had made to Greece, had managed to ensure the
preponderance of British influence in Constantinople and the zone of
the Straits, and by seeking to set up a large Arabian Empire he had
secured to his country the chief trunk of the Baghdad Railway.
But the laborious negotiations which had painfully arrived at the
settlement proposed by the Conference did not seem likely to solve the
Eastern question definitely. It still remained a burning question, and
the treaty signed by the Ottoman delegates was still most precarious.
Accordingly Count Sforza, in the Chamber of Deputies in Rome, made the
following statement with regard to Anatolia:
“Everybody asserts the war has created a new world; but practically
everybody thinks and feels as if nothing had occurred. The Moslem
East wants to live and develop. It, too, wants to have an influence
of its own in to-morrow’s world. To the Anatolian Turks it has been
our wish to offer a hearty and earnest collaboration on economic
and moral grounds by respecting the independence and sovereignty of
Turkey.”
The signatures of plenipotentiaries sent by a Government which remained
in office merely because its head, Damad Ferid, was a tool in the hands
of England, were no guarantee for the future, and the failure of the
revolutionary movement indefinitely postponed the settlement of the
Eastern question which for half a century has been disturbing European
policy.
Islam remains, notwithstanding, a spiritual force that will survive
all measures taken against the Sublime Porte, and the dismemberment of
the Ottoman Empire does not solve any of the numerous questions raised
by the intercourse of the various races that were formerly under the
Sultan’s rule. Russia has not given up her ambitious designs on the
Straits, and one day or another she will try to carry them out; and it
is to be feared that German influence may benefit by the resentment of
the Turkish people. These are some of the numerous sources of future
conflicts.
On the day that followed the signature of the treaty all the Turkish
newspapers in Constantinople were in mourning and announced it as a day
of mourning for the Turkish nation.
At Stambul all public entertainments were prohibited, all shops and
public buildings were closed. Many Turks went to the mosques to pray
for the welfare of the country, the people who seek nothing but peace
and quietude looked weary and downcast.
A few organs of the Turkish Press violently attacked the delegates who
had signed “the death-warrant of Turkey and laid the foundations of a
necessary policy of revenge.”
[Illustration: TURKEY UNDER THE TREATY OF SÈVRES.]
[Illustration: SCHEMATIC MAP OF THE TERRITORIES LOST BY TURKEY
SINCE 1699, AND OF THE TERRITORIES LEFT TO TURKEY BY THE SÈVRES
TREATY.]
Others hoped the Great Powers would take into account the goodwill of
Turkey, and would gradually give up some of their intolerable demands.
Others, finally, bewailing the direful downfall of the Turkish Empire
and insisting upon the lesson taught by this historical event for the
future, hoped that the future would forcibly bring on a revision of
that “iniquitous and impracticable” treaty of peace.
In France, M. Pierre Loti devoted one of his last articles to the
treaty, which he called “the silliest of all the silly blunders of our
Eastern policy.”[35]
The map on p. 269 shows the area left to the Turks in Europe and in
Asia Minor by the Treaty of Sèvres. There will be seen the territories
of Mesopotamia under English mandate, those of Syria under French
mandate, and those which have been added to Palestine and are
practically under English control. There will also be seen the regions
on which France and Italy, in virtue of the tripartite agreement
signed on August 10, 1920, enjoy preferential claims to supply the
staff required for the assistance of the Porte in organising the local
administration and the police. The contracting Powers in that agreement
have undertaken not to apply, nor to make or support applications, on
behalf of their nationals, for industrial concessions in areas allotted
to another Power.
The map on p. 270 is a scheme of the territories lost by Turkey from
1699 down to the Sèvres Treaty; it shows that, by completing the
dismemberment of Turkey, the treaty aimed at her annihilation.
Footnotes:
26: _The Times_, March 26, 1920.
27: _The Times_, March 27, 1920: “Mesopotamia and the Mandate.”
28: The very words of this agreement were given by M. Pierre Loti
in his book, _La Mort de notre chère France en Orient_, p. 153.
29: _Journal des Débats_, May 26, 1920.
30: _Daily Telegraph_, June 12, 1920.
31: _Matin_, June 12, 1920.
32: _La Croix_, July 14, 1920.
33: _Le Temps_, July 17, 1920.
34: Cf. _Ex-King Constantine and the War_, by Major J. M. Melas,
p. 239.
35: The _Œuvre_, August 20, 1920.