In the course of the debate on the foreign policy of England which
opened on Thursday, March 25, on the third reading of the Finance
Bill, Mr. Asquith, speaking of the Turkish problem as leader of the
Opposition, urged that the Ottoman Government should no longer hold
in Europe the political power that belonged to it before the war. He
urged, however, that the Sultan should not be relegated to Asia Minor,
where he would quite escape European control. He proposed, therefore,
that the Sultan should be, as it were, “vaticanised”—that is to say, he
should remain in Constantinople, but should only retain his spiritual
power as Caliph, as the Pope does in Rome.
The Great Powers or the League of Nations would then be entrusted with
the political power in Constantinople, and if the Bosphorus or the
Dardanelles were neutralised or internationalised, the presence of the
Sultan in Constantinople would not be attended with any serious danger.
As to Mesopotamia, Mr. Asquith objected to the _status quo ante
bellum_. As the frontiers of that region were not quite definite,
sooner or later, he thought, if England remained there, she would be
driven to advance to the shores of the Black Sea, or even the Caspian
Sea, and she had not adequate means for the present to do so. So it was
better for her to confine her action within the Basra zone.
The Prime Minister, rising in response, first remarked that the cause
of the delays in the negotiations with Turkey and the settlement
of peace was that the Allies had thought it proper to wait for the
decision of America, as to the share she intended to take in the
negotiations. He recalled that the Allies had hoped the United States
would not only assume the protection of Armenia properly speaking,
but of Cilicia too, and also accept a mandate for the Straits of
Constantinople, and went on as follows:
“If we had not given time for America to make up her mind it
might have suspected the Allies wanted to take advantage of some
political difficulty to partition Turkey; and it is only when the
United States definitely stated she did not intend to take part in
the Conference that the Allies proceeded to take definite decisions
with regard to the Turkish peace. I think that it is due to the
Allies to make that explanation.”
Mr. Lloyd George went on to state that the Allies had contemplated
maintaining only the spiritual power of the Sultan, but unfortunately
this scheme did not seem likely to solve the difficulties of the
situation. For Constantinople had to be administered at the same
time, and it is easier to control the Sultan and his Ministers in
Constantinople than if they were relegated to Asia Minor.
Then, resorting to the policy of compromise which bore such bad fruits
in the course of the Peace Conference, Mr. Lloyd George, in order not
to shut out the possibility of reverting to the opposite opinion, added
that if it was proved that the Allies’ control weakened the power of
the Sultan in Asia Minor, it would always be possible to consider the
question afresh—but he hoped that would not be necessary.
As to the question of Asia Minor and the distribution of the mandates,
he declared:
“If America had accepted the responsibility for controlling
Armenia, the French, who, under what is called the Sykes scheme,
had Cilicia assigned to their control, were quite willing to hand
it over to American control. The British, French, and Italians are
quite agreed on the subject, but we have not yet seen a sign. We
have only received telegrams from America, asking us to protect the
Armenians; we have had no offers up to the present to undertake the
responsibility.... We are hoping that France will undertake that
responsibility, but it is a good deal to ask of her. We have also
got our responsibility, but we cannot take too much upon our own
shoulders....
“With regard to the Republic of Erivan, which is Armenia, it
depends entirely on the Armenians themselves whether they protect
their independence.... I am told that they could easily organise
an army of above 40,000 men. If they ask for equipment, we shall
be very happy to assist in equipping their army. If they want the
assistance of officers to train that army, I am perfectly certain
there is no Allied country in Europe that would not be willing to
assist in that respect.”[26]
Finally, with, respect to Mesopotamia, Mr. Lloyd George urged “it would
be a mistake to give up Baghdad and Mosul.”
“I say that, after incurring the enormous expenditure which we have
incurred in freeing this country from the withering despotism of
the Turk, to hand it back to anarchy and confusion, and to take
no responsibility for its development, would be an act of folly
quite indefensible.... They have been consulted about their wishes
in this respect, and I think, almost without exception, they are
anxious that we should stay here, though they are divided about the
kind of independent Government they would like....
“We have no right, however, to talk as if we were the mandatory of
Mesopotamia when the treaty with Turkey has not yet been signed.
It is only on the signing of that treaty that the question of
mandatories will be decided, but when that time comes we shall
certainly claim the right to be the mandatory power of Mesopotamia,
including Mosul.”
In its leading article, _The Times_, criticising the attitude Mr. Lloyd
George had taken in the debate on the Mesopotamian question, wrote on
March 27:
“The Prime Minister made statements, about the future of
Mesopotamia which require further elucidation. He said that when
the Treaty of Peace with Turkey has been finally decided, the
British Government would ‘claim the right’ to be the ‘mandatory
Power’ for Mesopotamia, including the vilayet of Mosul....
“Judging from some passages in his speech, even Mr. Lloyd George
himself has never grasped the full and dangerous significance of
the adventure he now advocates....
“The Prime Minister’s reply conveyed the impression that he has
only the very haziest idea about what he proposes to do in this
region, which has been the grave of empires ever since written
history began.”
After pointing out the dangers of a British mandate over Mesopotamia,
including the vilayet of Mosul, _The Times_ thought, as had been
suggested by Mr. Asquith, that England should confine her direct
obligations to the zone of Basra, and pointed out that it was only
incidentally and almost in spite of himself that Mr. Asquith had been
driven in 1915 to occupy the larger part of Mesopotamia.
“Mr. Asquith says—and he is entirely right—that if we hold a line
in the mountains of Northern Kurdistan we shall sooner or later
be driven to advance to the shores of the Black Sea, or even to
the Caspian. His view is in complete accord with every lesson to
be derived from our history as an Empire. We have never drawn one
of these vague, unsatisfactory frontiers without being eventually
compelled to move beyond it. We cannot incur such a risk in the
Middle East, and the cost in money and the strain upon our troops
are alike prohibitive factors.”[27]
The next day, in a similar debate in the French Chamber, M. Millerand,
being asked to give information about the leading principles of the
French Government in the negotiations that were being carried on in
regard to the Turkish treaty, made the following statement, which did
not throw much light on the question:
“First of all the Supreme Council deems it necessary to organise
a Turkey that can live, and for this purpose—this is the only
resolution that was made public and the only one that the British
Government disclosed in the House of Commons—for this purpose it
has seemed fit to maintain a Sultan in Constantinople.
“The same principle implies that Turkey will include, together with
the countries inhabited mainly by Moslems, the economic outlets
without which she could not thrive.
“In such a Turkey France, whose traditional prestige has been
enhanced by victory, will be able to exercise the influence she is
entitled to by the important moral and economic interests she owns
in Turkey.
“This idea is quite consistent with an indispensable clause—the
war has proved it—viz., the freedom of the Straits, which must
necessarily be safeguarded by an international organisation. It is
also consistent with the respect of nationalities, in conformity
with which some compact ethnic groups who could not possibly
develop under Turkish sovereignty will become independent, and
other guarantees will be given for the protection of minorities.
“We have in Turkey commercial and financial interests of the first
order. We do not intend that any of them should be belittled; we
want them to develop safely and fully in the future. We shall see
to it especially that the war expenditures of Turkey shall not
curtail the previous rights of French creditors.
“In the districts where France owns special interests, these
interests must be acknowledged and guaranteed. It goes without
saying that the Government intends to base its claims on the
agreements already concluded with the Allies.”
At the sitting of March 27, after a speech in which M. Bellet asked
that the Eastern question should be definitely settled by putting an
end to Turkish sovereignty in Europe and Asia Minor, M. P. Lenail
revealed that the Emir Feisal received two million francs a month from
the English Government and as much from the French Government; he
wondered why he was considered such an important man, and demanded the
execution of the 1916 agreements, which gave us a free hand in Cilicia,
Syria, and the Lebanon. Then M. Briand, who had concluded these
agreements, rose to say:
“It is time we should have a policy in Syria and Cilicia. If we are
not there, who will be there? The 1916 agreements were inspired,
not only by the wish of safeguarding the great interests of France
and maintaining her influence in the Mediterranean, but also
because the best qualified representatives of the peoples of those
countries, who groaned under the Turkish yoke, entreated us not
to forsake them. And it is under these circumstances that in the
middle of the war, urging that a long-sighted policy always proves
the best, we insisted on the settlement of these questions.
“Thus were Syria and Cilicia, with Mosul and Damascus, of course,
included in the French zone.
“Shall we always pursue a merely sentimental policy in those
countries?
“If we wanted Mosul, it is on account of its oil-bearing lands; and
who shall deny that we need our share of the petroleum of the world?
“As for Cilicia, a wonderfully rich land, if we are not there
to-morrow, who will take our place? Cilicia has cotton, and many
other kinds of wealth; when we shall see other States in our place,
then shall we realise what we have lost, but it will be too late!
“It has been said that it will be difficult for us to settle there.
As a matter of fact, the difficulties which are foreseen look
greater than they are really; and some of these difficulties may
have been put forward to dissuade us from going there.
“It remains that the 1916 agreements are signed; they are based on
our time-honoured rights, our efforts, our friendships, and the
summons of the peoples that hold out their arms to us. The question
is whether they shall be countersigned by facts.
“The name of the Emir Feisal has been put forward. It is in
our zone he has set up his dominion; why were we not among the
populations of that country at the time? If we had been there, the
Emir Feisal would have received his investiture from us by our
authority; instead of that, he was chosen by others. Who is to be
blamed for it?
“Britain knows the power of parliaments of free peoples; if our
Parliament makes it clear that it really wants written treaties to
be respected, they will be respected.”
Mr. Wilson had been asked by a note addressed to him on March 12,
1920, to state his opinion about the draft of the Turkish settlement
worked out in London, and at the same time to appoint a plenipotentiary
to play a part in the final settlement. His answer was handed to M.
Jusserand, French ambassador, on March 24; he came to the conclusion
finally that Turkey should come to an end as a European Power.
In this note President Wilson declared that though he fully valued the
arguments set forward for retaining the Turks in Constantinople, yet he
thought that the arguments against the Turks, based on unimpeachable
considerations, were far superior to the others. Moreover, he recalled
that the Allies had many a time declared that Turkish sovereignty in
Europe was an anomalous thing that should come to an end.
Concerning the southern frontiers to be assigned to Turkey, he
thought they should follow the ethnographic boundaries of the Arabian
populations, unless it were necessary to alter them slightly; in which
case the American Government would be pleased—though that did not
imply any criticism—to be told for what reasons new frontiers had been
proposed.
Mr. Wilson was pleased to see that Russia would one day be allowed
to be represented in the International Council that was going to be
instituted for the government of Constantinople and the Straits, as
he felt sure that any arrangement would be stillborn that did not
recognise what he thought was a vital interest to Russia. For the same
reason he was pleased that the condition of the Straits in wartime had
not yet been settled, and was still under discussion; he thought no
decision should be taken without Russia giving her consent.
Turning to the territorial question, he said:
“In regard to Thrace, it seems fair that the part of Eastern Thrace
that is beyond the Constantinople area should belong to Greece,
with the exception of the northern part of this province; for the
latter region has undoubtedly a Bulgarian population, and so, for
the sake of justice and equity, the towns of Adrianople and Kirk
Kilisse, together with their surrounding areas, must be given to
Bulgaria. Not only are the arguments set forth by Bulgaria quite
sound from an ethnic and historical point of view, but her claims
on this territory seem to deserve all the more consideration as
she had to cede some wholly Bulgarian territories inhabited by
thousands of Bulgarians on her western frontier merely that Serbia
might have a good strategic frontier.”
He was chiefly anxious about the future of Armenia. He demanded for her
an outlet to the sea, and the possession of Trebizond. He went on thus:
“With regard to the question whether Turkey should give up her
rights over Mesopotamia, Arabia, Palestine, Syria, and the Islands,
the American Government recommends the method resorted to in the
case of Austria—namely, that Turkey should place these provinces
in the hands of the Great Powers, who would decide on their fate.
“As to Smyrna, this Government does not feel qualified to express
an opinion, for the question is too important to be solved with the
limited information possessed by the Government.”
Finally, the President declared he did not think it necessary for his
ambassador to be present at the sittings of the Supreme Council; yet he
insisted on being informed of the resolutions that would be taken.
The _Philadelphia Ledger_, when this note was sent, commented on Mr.
Wilson’s opinion as to the Turkish problem, and especially the fate
of Constantinople, and did not disguise the fact that he favoured
the handing over of Constantinople to Russia, in accordance with the
inter-Allied agreements of 1915, 1916, and 1917.
“Mr. Wilson wants Turkey to be expelled from Europe, and the right
for democratic Russia to have an outlet to the Mediterranean to be
recognised. Thus, to a certain extent, Mr. Wilson will decide in
favour of the fulfilment of the secret promises made by the Allies
to Russia in the course of the war.
“Mr. Wilson’s opinion is that Bolshevism is about to fall, and
next autumn the new Russia that he has constantly longed for and
encouraged will come into being. It is calculated that if America
gives her support to Russia at this fateful juncture, Russia will
throw herself into the arms of America, and this understanding
between the two countries will be of immense importance.”
After the Allies had occupied Constantinople and addressed to the
Porte a new collective note requesting the Ministry officially to
disown the Nationalist movement, affairs were very difficult for some
time. As the Allies thought the Ottoman Cabinet’s answer to their note
was unsatisfactory, the first dragomans of the English, French, and
Italian commissioners on the afternoon of April 1 again called upon the
Ottoman Premier.
Owing to the unconciliatory attitude of the English, who made it
impossible for it to govern the country, the Ministry resigned. The
English required that the new Cabinet should be constituted by Damad
Ferid Pasha, on whom they knew they could rely.
Indeed, a secret agreement had already been concluded, on September
12, 1919, between Mr. Fraster, Mr. Nolan, and Mr. Churchill, on behalf
of Great Britain, and Damad Ferid Pasha on behalf of the Imperial
Ottoman Government. The existence of this agreement was questioned at
the time, and was even officially denied in the _Stambul Journal_,
April 8, 1920, but most likely there was an exchange of signatures
between them. According to this agreement,[28] the Sultan practically
acquiesced in the control of Great Britain over Turkey within the
limits fixed by Great Britain herself. Constantinople remained the seat
of the Caliphate, but the Straits were to be under British control. The
Sultan was to use his spiritual and moral power as Caliph on behalf of
Great Britain, to support British rule in Syria, Mesopotamia, and the
other zones of British influence, not to object to the creation of an
independent Kurdistan, and to renounce his rights over Egypt and Cyprus.
Damad Ferid agreed to do so, with the co-operation of the party of the
Liberal Entente. If the information given by the Press is reliable,
it seems that the composition of the new Cabinet was endangered at the
last moment through the opposition of one of the Allied Powers; yet it
was constituted at last.
The members of the new Cabinet, headed by Damad Ferid Pasha, who
was both Grand Vizier and Foreign Minister, were: Abdullah Effendi,
Sheik-ul-Islam; Reshid Bey, an energetic man, an opponent of the Union
and Progress Committee, who was Minister of the Interior; and Mehmed
Said Pasha, who became Minister of Marine and provisionally Minister of
War. The last-named Ministry had been offered to Mahmoud Mukhtar Pasha,
son of the famous Ghazi Mukhtar, who broke off with the Committee of
Union and Progress in 1912, was dismissed from the army in 1914 by
Enver, and was ambassador at Berlin during the first three years of the
war; but he refused this post, and also handed in his resignation as a
member of the Paris delegation; so the Grand Vizier became War Minister
too. The Minister for Public Education was Fakhr ed Din Bey, one of
the plenipotentiaries sent to Ouchy to negotiate the peace with Italy.
Dr. Jemil Pasha, who had once been prefect of Constantinople, became
Minister of Public Works, and Remze Pasha Minister of Commerce.
The investiture of the new Cabinet took place on Monday, April 5, in
the afternoon, with the usual ceremonies. The Imperial rescript ran as
follows:
“After the resignation of your predecessor, Salih Pasha,
considering your great abilities and worth, we hereby entrust
to you the Grand Vizierate, and appoint Duri Zade Abdullah Bey
Sheik-ul-Islam.
“The disturbances that have been lately fomented, under the name of
nationalism, are endangering our political situation, which ever
since the armistice had been gradually improving.
“The peaceful measures hitherto taken against this movement have
proved useless. Considering the recent events and the persistence
of this state of rebellion, which may give rise to the worst evils,
it is now our deliberate wish that all those who have organised
and still support these disturbances shall be dealt with according
to the rigour of the law; but, on the other hand, we want a free
pardon to be granted to all those who, having been led astray,
have joined and shared in the rebellion. Let quick and energetic
measures be taken in order to restore order and security throughout
our Empire, and strengthen the feelings of loyalty undoubtedly
prevailing among all our faithful subjects to the Khilafat and the
throne.
“It is also our earnest desire that you should endeavour to
establish trustful and sincere relations with the Great Allied
Powers, and to defend the interests of the State and the nation,
founding them on the principles of righteousness and justice. Do
your utmost to obtain more lenient conditions of peace, to bring
about a speedy conclusion of peace, and to alleviate the public
distress by resorting to all adequate financial and economic
measures.”
The Sheik-ul-Islam in a proclamation to the Turkish people denounced
the promoters and instigators of the Nationalist movement, and called
upon all Moslems to gather round the Sultan against the “rebels.”
The Grand Vizier issued an Imperial decree condemning the Nationalist
movement, pointing out to Mustafa Kemal the great dangers the country
ran on account of his conduct, wishing for the restoration of friendly
relations between Turkey and the Allies, and warning the leaders of
the movement that harsh measures would be taken against them. The
Ottoman Government, in a proclamation to the population—which had
no effect, for most of the Turks thought it was dictated by foreign
Powers—denounced all the leaders and supporters of the Nationalist
movement as guilty of high treason against the nation. The proclamation
stated:
“The Government, though eager to avoid bloodshed, is still more
eager to save the nation, which is running into great danger. So
it will not hesitate to resort to strict measures against those
who might refuse to go back to their duty according to the high
prescriptions of the Sherif, as is ordered by the Imperial rescript.
“With this view, the Government proclaims:
“First, anyone who, without realising the gravity of his act,
has allowed himself to be driven by the threats or misleading
instigations of the ringleaders, and has joined the insurrectionist
movement, gives tokens of repentance within a week and declares his
loyalty to the Sovereign, shall enjoy the benefit of the Imperial
pardon.
“Secondly, all the leaders and instigators of the movements,
together with whosoever shall continue to support them, shall be
punished according to the law and the Sherif’s orders.
“Lastly, the Government cannot in any way allow any act of cruelty
or misdemeanour to be committed in any part of the Empire either
by the Moslem population against other elements, or by non-Moslem
subjects against the Moslem population. So it proclaims that
whosoever shall commit such acts, or countenance them, or be party
to them, shall be severely punished individually.”
A Parliamentary commission set off to Anatolia in order to call upon
Mustafa Kemal to give up his hostility to the Entente and lay down arms
with the least delay.
Moreover, the Government decided to send some delegates in order to
make inquiries and point out to the leaders of the Nationalist movement
the dangerous consequences of their stubbornness and open rebellion.
The first delegation was to include an aide-de-camp of the War
Minister, and an Allied superior officer. Another delegation was to
consist of members of Parliament, among whom were Youssouf Kemal Bey,
member for Sivas; Vehbi Bey, member for Karassi; Abdulla Azmi Bey,
member for Kutahia; and Riza Nuri, member for Sinope, the very man
who had brought in a motion against the occupation of Constantinople
and the arrest of some members of the Ottoman Parliament, and who was
credited with having said: “Anatolia has a false conception of the
occupation of Constantinople. We are going to give clear explanations
of the seriousness of the situation in order to avoid disastrous
consequences. We are going to tell Anatolia the ideas of the Government
about the interests of the nation.”
An Imperial decree prescribed the dissolution of the Chamber, and the
members before whom it was read left the Chamber quietly.
But it was obvious that the Damad Ferid Pasha Cabinet no longer
represented the country, and that in the mind of most Turks it could
no longer express or uphold the free will of the Turkish people, whose
hidden or open sympathies, in view of the foreigner’s threat, were
given to the Nationalist movement.
* * * * *
It must be owned that the Turkish Nationalist movement had at the
outset co-operated with some questionable elements and had been mixed
up with the intrigues of the former members of the Committee of Union
and Progress. But it now became impossible, in order to belittle it,
to look down upon it as a mere plot or insurrectionary movement. In
consequence of the successive events that had taken place since the
armistice and of the attitude of the Allies, especially England, after
the occupation of Constantinople, carried out under British pressure
with the approbation of the French Government notwithstanding the
protest of the French Press, and in view of the provisions that were
likely to be included in the Peace Treaty, Turkish patriotism, which
could not allow Turkey to be destroyed and meant to maintain her
traditional rights, had tacitly joined that movement. Besides, Mustafa
Kemal, who, at the very outset, had been a member of the Committee of
Union and Progress, had soon disagreed with Enver, and it should be
borne in mind that he was his enemy during the greater part of the war,
as he was an opponent of the German Marshal Falkenhayn. Some people
have tried to make out there was only personal enmity between them, and
have denied the possibility of political opposition; but the very fact
that their enmity would have ruined any common political designs they
might have had proves there were no such designs.
So Mustafa Kemal did not seem greatly moved by the measures mentioned
in the manifesto issued by the Government under pressure of the foreign
occupation and amidst the perturbation caused by recent events.
At the end of March Mustafa Kemal warned the Sultan that, in
consequence of the occupation of Constantinople, he broke off all
connection with the central Government, which henceforth was quite
under foreign control. In a proclamation issued to the Mussulmans, he
declared it was necessary to form a new independent Ottoman State in
Anatolia and to appoint an assistant Sheik-ul-Islam. The reason he
gave was that the Sultan could no longer be looked upon as Caliph,
for it is a fundamental principle of Islam that the Caliph must
be an independent Sovereign, and, since the Allied occupation of
Constantinople, he no longer enjoyed his freedom of action. In that
appeal, which was not intended for the Mussulmans of Algeria, Tunis,
Morocco, and Tripoli, for it seemed to be aimed at Great Britain alone,
he regarded the occupation of Constantinople as a new crusade against
Islam.
According to news from Nationalist sources, Mustafa Kemal formed a
Cabinet, in which he was War Minister of the new Anatolian Government.
It was said at the time he had proclaimed Viceroy of Anatolia and
nahib—_i.e._, the Sultan’s representative in Anatolia—Prince Jemal ed
Din, a member of the Imperial Family, son of the late Prince Shevket
Effendi, and general inspector of the recruiting service; but the
official circles of Constantinople never believed that the prince had
allowed him to use his name.
At the same time he had a Constituent Assembly elected, which he
intended to convene at Angora. This assembly consisted of the members
of Parliament who had been able to escape from Constantinople and of
deputies chosen by delegated electors and met on April 23 at Angora,
where all sorts of people had come from quite different regions:
Constantinople, Marash, Beyrut, Baghdad, etc. The National Assembly of
Angora meant to be looked upon as a Constituent Assembly, and strove
to introduce wide reforms into the administrative and financial
organisation of the Empire. It elected a rather large committee, which
styled itself the Government Council, and it included General Mustafa
Kemal, Jemal ed Din Chelebi, from Konia, as first Vice-President, and
Jelal ed Din Arif Bey as second Vice-President, etc.
The members of the Government which was instituted at Angora when the
Great National Assembly met in this town were: General Mustafa Kemal
Pasha, President; Bekir Samy Bey, Foreign Affairs; Jamy Bey, Interior;
General Feizi Pasha, National Defence; General Ismail Fazil Pasha,
Public Works; Youssouf Kemal Bey, National Economy; Hakki Behij Bey,
Finance; Dr. Adnan Bey, Public Education; Colonel Ismet Bey, Chief of
Staff.
The Sheik of the Senussi, who had joined the National movement, and
owing to his prestige had influenced public opinion in favour of this
movement, was not appointed, as has been wrongly said, Sheik-ul-Islam;
religious affairs were entrusted to a member of a Muslim brotherhood
belonging to the National Assembly.
According to the information it was possible to obtain, the political
line of conduct adopted by the Nationalists was not only to organise
armed resistance, but also to carry on a strong political and religious
propaganda, both in Turkey and in foreign countries.
No official letter from Constantinople was to be opened by the
functionaries, who, if they obeyed the Constantinople Government,
were liable to capital punishment. The religious authorities in the
provinces and the heads of the great Muslim brotherhoods were called
upon to protest against the _fetva_ by which the Sheik-ul-Islam of
Constantinople had anathematised the Nationalists.
But the chief difficulty for the Nationalists was how to raise money.
On behalf of that National Assembly, Mustafa Kemal addressed to M.
Millerand the following letter, in which he vehemently protested
against the occupation of Constantinople and laid down the claims of
the Ottoman people:
“I beg to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency that, owing
to the unjustifiable occupation of Constantinople by the Allied
troops, the Ottoman people looks upon its Khalifa, together with
his Government, as prisoners. So general elections have been held,
and on April 23, 1920, the Grand National Assembly held its first
sitting, and solemnly declared it would preside over the present
and future destiny of Turkey, so long as her Khalifa Sultan and her
Eternal City should remain under the dominion and occupation of
foreigners.
“The Grand National Assembly has done me the honour to charge me to
bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency the earnest protest of
its members against that arbitrary deed, which violates the terms
of the armistice, and has once more confirmed the Ottoman people
in its pessimism as to the results of the Peace Conference. Not
long ago our Parliament—though a Parliament has always been looked
upon as a holy sanctuary by all civilised nations—was violated in
the course of a sitting; the representatives of the nation were
wrested from the bosom of the assembly by the English police like
evildoers, notwithstanding the energetic protest of the Parliament;
many a senator, deputy, general, or man of letters, was arrested at
his home, taken away handcuffed, and deported; lastly, our public
and private buildings were occupied by force of arms, for might had
become right.
“Now the Ottoman people, considering all its rights have been
violated and its sovereignty encroached upon, has, by order of its
representatives, assembled at Angora, and appointed an Executive
Council chosen among the members of the National Assembly, which
Council has taken in hand the government of the country.
“I have also the honour to let Your Excellency know the desiderata
of the nation, as expressed and adopted at the sitting of April 29,
1920.
“First, Constantinople, the seat of the Khilafat and Sultanry,
together with the Constantinople Government, are henceforth looked
upon by the Ottoman people as prisoners of the Allies; thus all
orders and _fetvas_ issued from Constantinople, so long as it
is occupied, cannot have any legal or religious value, and all
engagements entered upon by the would-be Constantinople Government
are looked upon by the nation as null and void.
“Secondly, the Ottoman people, though maintaining its calm and
composure, is bent upon defending its sacred, centuries-old rights
as a free, independent State. It expresses its wish to conclude a
fair, honourable peace, but declares only its own mandatories have
the right to take engagements in its name and on its account.
“Thirdly, the Christian Ottoman element, together with the foreign
elements settled in Turkey, remain under the safeguard of the
nation; yet they are forbidden to undertake anything against the
general security of the country.
“Hoping the righteous claims of the Ottoman nation will meet with a
favourable reception, I beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance
of the deep respect with which I have the honour to be Your
Excellency’s most humble, most obedient servant.”
On the eve of the San Remo Conference, which met on April 18, 1920,
Ahmed Riza Bey, ex-President of the Chamber and Senator of the Ottoman
Empire, who kept a keen lookout on the events that were about to seal
the fate of his country, though he had been exiled by the Damad Ferid
Ministry, addressed another letter to the President of the Conference,
in which he said;
“The Turks cannot in any way, in this age of liberty and
democracy, acknowledge a peace that would lower them to the level
of an inferior race and would treat them worse than the Hungarians
or Bulgarians, who have lost comparatively small territories,
whereas Turkey is to be utterly crippled. We want to be treated
as a vanquished people, not as an inferior people or a people
in tutelage. The victors may have a right to take from us the
territories they conquered by force of arms; they have no right to
intrude into our home affairs. The Turkish people will willingly
grant concessions of mines and public works to the foreigners who
offer it the most profitable conditions; but it will never allow
the arbitrary partition of the wealth of the nation. To get riches
at the expense of an unfortunate nation is immoral; it is all the
more unfair as the responsibility of Turkey in the world war is
comparatively slight as compared with that of Austria-Germany and
Bulgaria. In respect of the crimes and atrocities against Armenia
and Greece which the Turks are charged with, we deny them earnestly
and indignantly. Let a mixed international commission be formed,
and sent to hold an impartial inquiry on the spot, and we pledge
ourselves to submit to its decisions. Till such an inquiry has
proved anything to the contrary, we have a right to look upon all
charges brought against us as slanders or mere lies.
“The Sublime Porte had already, on February 12, 1919, addressed to
the High Commissioners an official note requesting that neutral
States should appoint delegates charged to inquire into facts and
establish responsibilities; but the request of the Ottoman Cabinet
has hitherto been in vain, as well as that of the League for
National Ottoman Unity made on March 17 of the same year.
“Yet the report of the international Commission of Inquiry
assembled at Smyrna, which proved the charges of cruelty brought
against the Turks were unfounded, should induce the Allies, in the
name of justice, to hold an inquiry into the massacres supposed to
have taken place in Cilicia and elsewhere.
“I hope Your Excellency will excuse me if this letter is not
couched in the usual diplomatic style, and will consider that when
the life and rights of his nation are so grievously endangered it
is most difficult for a patriot to keep his thoughts and feelings
under control.”
As early as April 19, the San Remo Conference, which seemed to have
come to an agreement about the main lines of the treaty to be submitted
to Turkey, but had not yet settled the terms of this treaty, decided to
summon the Ottoman plenipotentiaries to Paris on May 10.
In a note sent on April 20, 1920, to M. Nitti, as president of the
San Remo Conference, Ghalib Kemaly Bey, formerly Ottoman minister
plenipotentiary to Russia, now living in Rome, wrote:
“In order to justify the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire it has
been asserted that the Turks are not able to administer a large
country inhabited by various races, and they have been especially
charged with hating and oppressing the Christian element. But a
history extending over ten centuries at least plainly shows, by
innumerable facts and truths, the absurdity of such assertions.
“If the Ottoman Empire, in spite of its wonderful efforts for the
last 130 years, has not been able to reform and renovate itself
as the other States have done, that is because, in addition to a
thousand other difficulties, it has never had, for the last two
centuries, either the power or the peacefulness that would have
been necessary to bring such a protracted task to a successful end;
for every ten, fifteen, or twenty years, it has been attacked by
its neighbours, and the events of the last twelve years testify
still more forcibly than any others to the fact that any step taken
by the Turks on the way to progress—in the European sense of the
word—was not only resented, but even violently opposed by their
merciless enemies.
“As to the would-be oppression which the Christians are supposed to
have endured in the Empire, let us merely consider that, whereas in
Europe the Christians mutually slaughtered each other mercilessly
and unceasingly in the name of their sacred Faith, and the
unfortunate Jews were cruelly driven away and tortured in the name
of the same Faith, the Turks, on the contrary, after ruling for a
thousand years over Turkish Asia with many vicissitudes, not only
tolerated the presence of millions of Christians in their large,
powerful Empire, but even granted them without any restriction,
under the benefit of Turkish laws and customs, all possibilities
to subsist, develop, and become rich, often at the expense of the
ruling race; and they offered a wide paternal hospitality to many
wretched people banished from Christian Europe.
“To-day Greece, trampling upon justice and right, lays an
iniquitous claim to the noble, sacred land of Turkish Thrace and
Asia. Yet can she show the same example of tolerance, and give a
strict account of her home policy towards the non-Greek elements,
especially concerning the condition and fate of the 300,000 Turks
who, before 1883, peopled the wide, fertile plains of Thessaly,
of the hundreds of thousands of Moslem Albanians, subjects of
the Empire, of the 150,000 Moslems in Crete, and of the 800,000
Moslems in Macedonia, whose unfortunate fate it was to pass under
her dominion?
“I need not dwell at length on this painful subject, which will be
an eternal shame to modern civilisation, for the victorious Powers
know a great deal more—after the inter-Allied inquiry held four
months ago in Smyrna—about the ‘gentle and fatherly’ manner in
which thousands of Mussulmans were slaughtered and exterminated by
the descendants of the civilisation of ancient Greece, who invaded
that essentially Turkish province during the armistice under
pretence of restoring order.”
And after recalling the figures of the various elements of the
population of the Turkish Empire after the 1914 statistics, he
concluded:
“Such figures speak but too eloquently, and the painful events
that drenched with blood the unfortunate Ottoman land since the
armistice raise only too much horror. So the Turkish people most
proudly and serenely awaits the righteous, humane, and equitable
sanction of the victorious Powers that have assumed before history
the heavy responsibility of placing the whole world on a lasting
basis of justice, concord, and peace.
“God grant they may choose the best way, the only way, that will
lead them to respect, as they solemnly pledged themselves to do,
the ethnic, historical, and religious rights of the Ottoman nation
and its Sultan, who is, at the same time, the supreme head of the
350 million Mussulmans throughout the world.”
On the same date (April 20, 1920) the Indian Caliphate delegation
addressed a note to the president of the Allied Supreme Council at
San Remo, to the English, French, Italian Prime Ministers, and to the
Japanese ambassador. In this note they summed up their mandate with the
Allied and Associated Powers, and insisted again on the claims they had
previously laid before Mr. Lloyd George in the course of the interview
mentioned previously.
“Firstly, the Mussulmans of India, in common with the vast majority
of their co-religionists throughout the world, ask that, inasmuch
as independent temporal sovereignty, with its concomitants of
adequate military and economic resources, is of the essence of
the institution of the Khilafat, the Empire of the Khalifa shall
not be dismembered under any pretext. As the Sultan of Turkey is
recognised by the vast majority of Mussulmans as Khalifa, what
is desired is that the fabric of the Ottoman Empire shall be
maintained intact territorially on the basis of the _status quo
ante bellum_, but without prejudice to such political changes as
give all necessary guarantees consistent with the dignity and
independence of the sovereign State for the security of life and
property, and opportunities of full autonomous development for
all the non-Turkish communities, whether Muslim or non-Muslim,
comprised within the Turkish Empire. But on no account is a Muslim
majority to be placed under the rule of a non-Muslim minority
contrary to the principle of self-determination. In behalf of this
claim, the delegation draw the attention of the Supreme Council
to the declaration of the British Prime Minister, equally binding
on all the Allied and Associated Powers, when on January 5, 1918,
he said: ‘Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital,
or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which
are predominantly Turkish in race,’ and to President Wilson’s
twelfth point in his message to Congress, dated January 8, 1918,
on the basis of which the armistice with Turkey was concluded, and
which required ‘that the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman
Empire should be assured of secure sovereignty; that the other
nationalities now under Turkish rule should be assured security of
life and autonomous development.’ The delegation submit that any
departure from the pledges and principles set forth above would be
regarded by the people of India, and the Muslim world generally,
as a breach of faith. It was on the strength of these and similar
assurances that tens of thousands of India Mussulmans were induced
to lay down their lives in the late war in defence of the Allied
cause.
“Secondly, we have to submit that the most solemn religious
obligations of the Muslim Faith require that the area known as the
Jazirat-ul-Arab, or the ‘Island of Arabia,’ which includes, besides
the Peninsula of Arabia, Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, shall
continue to be, as heretofore for the last 1,300 years, under
exclusively Muslim control, and that the Khalifa shall similarly
continue to be the Warden and Custodian of the Holy Places and
Holy Shrines of Islam—namely, Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem, Nejef,
Kerbela, Samarra, Kazimain, and Baghdad, all situated within the
Jazirat-ul-Arab.
Any encroachment upon these sanctuaries of Islam by the
inauguration of non-Muslim control in whatever guise or form,
whether a protectorate or mandate, would be a direct violation of
the most binding religious injunctions of Islam and the deepest
sentiment of Muslims all the world over, and would, therefore, be
utterly unacceptable to the Mussulmans of India and the rest of
the Indian community. In this connection, apart from the religious
obligations to which we refer, the delegation would draw the
attention of the Supreme Council to the proclamation issued by
the Government of India, on behalf of His Britannic Majesty’s
Government, as also the Governments of France and Russia, on
November 2, 1914, in which it was specifically declared that ‘no
question of a religious character was involved’ in this war, and it
was further categorically promised that ‘the Holy Places of Arabia,
including the Holy Shrines of Mesopotamia and the port of Jedda,
will be immune from attack or molestation.’”
After pointing out that these were the lowest possible claims the
Mussulmans could set forth, the note went on as follows:
“But the Mussulmans of India have already submitted to the British
Government that a Turkish settlement made in disregard of their
religious obligations, on respect for which their loyalty has
always been strictly conditional, would be regarded by Indian
Mussulmans as incompatible with their allegiance to the British
Crown. This is a contingency which the Mussulmans of India, in
common with all their compatriots, constituting a population of
over three hundred millions, naturally view with the keenest
apprehension and anxiety, and are most earnestly desirous of
preventing by every means in their power. We believe that the
British Government, at any rate, is fully apprised of the range
and intensity of public feeling that has been aroused in India
on this question, and we content ourselves, therefore, by simply
stating here that the Khilafat movement represents an unprecedented
demonstration of national feeling and concern. Only on March 19
last, the day when the delegation was received by the British Prime
Minister, all business was suspended throughout the continent
of India by Mussulmans and Hindus alike, as a reminder and
reaffirmation of the Muslim case in respect of the future of the
Khilafat. This unprecedented yet peaceful demonstration involved a
loss of millions to the public at large, and was undertaken solely
with the object of impressing the authorities and others concerned
with the universality of Indian and Muslim sentiment on the
question. If, notwithstanding all constitutional and loyal
representations which the Mussulmans of India have put forward
on behalf of the obligation imposed upon them by their Faith, a
settlement is imposed upon Turkey which would be destructive of the
very essentials of the Khilafat, a situation would arise in which
it would be futile to expect peace and harmony to prevail in India
and the Muslim world.
“The delegation, therefore, feel it their duty most solemnly to
urge upon the Supreme Council the desirability of endeavouring to
achieve a peace settlement with the Ottoman Empire which would
be in consonance with the most binding religious obligations and
overwhelming sentiments of so large and important a section of the
world community.”
As a consequence of what has just been said:
“The delegation would beg, even at this late hour, that the Supreme
Council will defer taking any final decisions on this question
in order to afford to them an opportunity, such as they have
repeatedly applied for, of laying their case before the Council.
In answer to our request to be allowed to appear before the
Supreme Council, the British Secretary to the Council intimated to
us that only the accredited Governments of the territories with
whose future the Peace Conference is dealing are allowed to appear
before it, and that at the request of the British Government the
official delegation of India had already been heard. But we have
already represented that the Turkish settlement, involving as it
does the question on the Khilafat, in the preservation of which
the Mussulmans of the world are so vitally interested, does not
obviously seem to be a question on which the Peace Conference
should hear only the Governments of territories with whose future
they are dealing. In fact, the concern of the Muslim world for the
future of the Khilafat, which is the most essential institution
of Islam, transcends in importance the interests of the various
Governments that are being set up in different parts of the
Khilafat territories; and the delegation trusts that no technical
objection will be allowed to stand in the way of doing justice and
securing peace.”
And, finally, the note concluded:
“With reference to the official delegation of India, which the
Supreme Council has already heard, the Indian Khilafat delegation
would invite the attention of the Council to the fact that, so far
at least, the State and the nation are not one in India, and the
delegation submit that a nation numbering more than 315 millions of
people is entitled to a hearing before a final decision is taken
on a question that has incontestably acquired a national status.
The delegation hope that they may, without may disrespect to the
members comprising the official delegation of India, also refer to
the fact that no Indian Mussulman was represented on the delegation
in spite of Muslim protest.”
In a second telegram, dated April 24, 1920, the Indian Caliphate
delegation, after the reply made to them by the British secretary of
the Supreme Council at San Remo on April 20, expressed their deep
regret that—
“the Council, while giving a hearing to a number of delegations
representing at best microscopic populations inhabiting meagre
areas and permitting the Premier of Greece, which was not at war
with Turkey, to take part in the discussions relating to the
Turkish settlement, should have ignored the claims of a nation
numbering more than 315 millions of people inhabiting the vast
sub-continent of India even to a hearing, and should have denied
the right of several hundred millions more in the rest of the
world professing the Muslim Faith to express their views on the
question involving the disintegration of the Khilafat. In the name
of our compatriots and co-religionists, we deem it to be our duty
once more to point out to the Government of Great Britain and to
her Allies, that it would be perfectly futile to expect peace and
tranquillity if, to the humiliating disregard of the overwhelming
national sentiment of India, which would in any case lessen the
value of citizenship of the British Empire to the Indian people,
is added, as a result of the secret diplomacy of a few persons,
however exalted and eminent, who are now settling the fate of Islam
behind closed doors, a contemptuous disregard of the most binding
and solemn religious obligations imposed on the Muslims by their
Faith.”
The delegation did not conceal their disappointment at the way they had
been received by the Allied representatives and the little attention
paid to the objections they had set forth. Yet they had viewed the
Ottoman question from a lofty standpoint, and had brought forward
powerful arguments in favour of Turkey. While the Indian delegation
were setting forth the Turkish claims before the Peace Conference, the
Press, public opinion, and political circles which had been influenced
in some degree by the coming of the delegates evinced more sympathy for
Turkey, and the deliberations of the Conference seemed likely to assume
a more favourable attitude towards Turkey. Yet the Conference, in this
case as in many others, and in spite of the warnings it had received,
kept to its first resolutions, though everything seemed to invite it to
modify them.
On May 6 the Ottoman delegation arrived in Paris. It comprised the
former Grand Vizier Tewfik Pasha; Reshid Bey, Minister of the Interior;
Fakhr ed Din Bey, Minister of Public Education; and Dr. Jemil Pasha,
Minister of Public Works, accompanied by seventeen advisers and five
secretaries.
On the previous Thursday, before they left Constantinople, the Sultan
had received the delegates, and had a long conversation with each of
them.
The draft of the treaty was handed to the delegates on the expected
date, May 11.
We refer the reader to this document, which contains thirteen chapters;
some of the most important provisions are so laboriously worded that
they may give rise to various interpretations, and it is impossible to
sum them up accurately.
Several clauses of that draft called forth many objections, and we
shall only deal with the most important ones.
The treaty assigned to Greece all the Turkish vilayet of Adrianople
or Eastern Thrace—that is to say, the territory which includes
Adrianople, the second town and former capital of the Ottoman Empire,
and the burial-place of Selim the Conqueror. It only left to European
Turkey a mere strip of land near Constantinople up to the Chatalja
lines. Besides, this region is entirely included in the “Zone of the
Straits” to be controlled by a Commission of the Powers which includes
Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria, but excludes Turkey herself.
Now, according to the official census of March, 1914, the Adrianople
vilayet which includes Kirk Kilisse, Rodosto, and Gallipoli, had a
population of 360,400 Turks—_i.e._, 57 per cent. of the inhabitants—as
against 224,680 Greeks, or 35·5 per cent., and 19,888 Armenians.
In addition, though in Eastern Thrace the Moslem populations are
mingled with numerous Greek elements, the majority of the people are
Mussulmans. Out of the 673,000 inhabitants of Thrace, 455,000 are
Mussulmans.
It is noteworthy that after 1914 a good number of the Greeks in that
vilayet emigrated into Macedonia, where they were replaced by the
Mussulmans expelled by the Greek administration, and that out of the
162,000 Orthodox Greeks amenable to the Greek Patriarch, 88,000 are
Gagavous—that is to say, are of Turkish descent and speak Turkish.
Out of about 4,700,000 acres of land which make up the total area of
the Adrianople vilayet, 4,000,000 acres, or 84 per cent., are in Moslem
hands, and the Orthodox Greeks hardly possess 600,000 acres.
The Moslem population of Western Thrace, which is no longer under
Turkish sovereignty, rises to 362,000 souls, or 69 per cent., against
86,000 Greeks, or 16·5 per cent., and if the figures representing the
Moslem population in both parts of Thrace are counted, we get a total
number of 700,000 Mussulmans—_i.e._, 62·6 per cent.—against 310,000
Greeks, or 26 per cent.
Mr. Lloyd George had already guaranteed to Turkey the possession of
that region on January 5, 1918, when he had solemnly declared: “Nor
are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and
renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly
Turkish in race,” and he had repeated this pledge in his speech of
February 25, 1920.
Yet a month after he declared to the Indian Caliphate delegation, as
has been seen above, that the Turkish population in Thrace was in a
considerable minority, and so Thrace should be taken away from Turkish
rule. If such was the case, it would have been logical to take from
Turkey the whole of Thrace.
As the Indian delegation inquired at once on what figures the Prime
Minister based his Statements he answered:
“It is, of course, impossible to obtain absolutely accurate figures
at the present moment, partly because all censuses taken since
about the beginning of the century are open to suspicion from
racial prejudice, and partly because of the policy of expulsion
and deportation pursued by the Turkish Government both during
and before the war. For instance, apart from the Greeks who were
evicted during the Balkan wars, over 100,000 Greeks were deported
into Anatolia from Turkish Thrace in the course of these wars,
while about 100,000 were driven across the frontiers of Turkish
Thrace. These refugees are now returning in large numbers. But
after the study of all the evidence judged impartially, the best
estimate which the Foreign Office could make is that the
population of Turkish Thrace, in 1919, was 313,000 Greeks and
225,000 Turks.... This is confirmed by the study of the Turkish
official statistics in 1894, the last census taken before the
Greco-Turkish war, after which ... all censuses as to races
in these parts became open to suspicion. According to these
statistics, the population of Turkish Thrace and of the part of
Bulgarian Thrace ceded to the Allies by the treaty of Neuilly was:
Greeks, 304,500: Mussulmans, 265,300; Bulgarians, 72,500.”
On receipt of this communication, the delegation naturally asked to
what region the Greeks “who were evicted during the Balkan wars”
had migrated, and to what extent, according to the Foreign Office
estimates, “counter-migration of Turks had taken place into what is
the present Turkish Thrace,” when Macedonia was made, on the authority
of Englishmen themselves, “an empty egg-shell” and when the Greeks and
Bulgarians had decided to leave no Turks in the occupied territories,
to make a “Turkish question” within the newly extended boundaries of
Greece and Bulgaria. It was natural that part of the Turkish population
driven away from Macedonia should settle down in the Turkish territory
conterminous to Eastern Thrace, as it actually did.
With regard to the “100,000” Greeks “deported into Anatolia from
Turkish Thrace during the course of these wars,” and the “100,000
driven across the frontiers of Turkish Thrace,” the delegation asked
to what part of Anatolia the deportees had been taken, and to what
extent this deportation had affected the proportion of Turkish and
Greek populations in that part of Anatolia. It would certainly be
unfair to make Turkish Thrace preponderatingly Greek by including
in its Greek population figures of Greek deportees who had already
served to swell the figures of the Greek population in Anatolia.
Under such circumstances, as the figures which the Prime Minister
considered as reliable on January 5, 1918, had been discarded since
and as the figures of a quarter of a century ago were evidently open
to discussion, the delegation proposed that the Supreme Council should
be given a complete set of figures for every vilayet, and if possible
for every sanjak or kaza, of the Turkish Empire as it was in 1914. But
the Prime Minister’s secretary merely answered that it was impossible
to enter into a discussion “on the vexed question of the population
statistics in these areas.”
As to Smyrna, the statistics plainly show that, though there is an
important Greek colony at Smyrna, all the region nevertheless is
essentially Turkish. The figures provided by the Turkish Government,
those of the French Yellow Book, and those given by Vital Cuinet agree
on this point.
According to the French Yellow Book, the total population of the
vilayet included 78·05 per cent. Turks against 14·9 per cent. Greeks.
M. Vital Cuinet gives a total population of 1,254,417 inhabitants
(971,850 Turks and 197,257 Greeks), and for the town of Smyrna 96,250
Turks against 57,000 Greeks.
According to the last Ottoman statistics in 1914 the town of
Smyrna, where the Greek population had increased, had 111,486 Turks
against 87,497 Greeks; but in the whole vilayet there were 299,097
Greeks—_i.e._, 18 per cent.—against 1,249,067 Turks, or 77 per cent.,
and 20,766 Armenians.
From the 299,097 Greeks mentioned in the statistics we should deduct
the 60,000 or 80,000 Greeks who were expelled from the vilayet, by way
of reprisal after the events of Macedonia in January to June, 1914. The
latter, according to the agreement between Ghalib Kemaly Bey, Turkish
minister at Athens, and M. Venizelos (July, 1914), come under the same
head as the Greeks of Thrace and Smyrna who were to be exchanged for
the Mussulmans of Macedonia.
Mr. Lloyd George’s secretary, whom the Indian delegation also asked, in
reference to Smyrna, on what figures he based his statements, answered
on behalf of the Prime Minister:
“The pre-war figures for the sanjak of Smyrna, according to the
American estimates, which are the most up-to-date and impartial,
give the following result: Greeks, 375,000; Mussulmans, 325,000;
Jews, 40,000; and Armenians, 18,000. These figures only relate
to the sanjak of Smyrna, and there are other kazas in the
neighbourhood which also show a majority of Greeks.”
Now, according to the official Turkish figures, the sanjak of Smyrna
had, before the war, 377,000 Mussulmans as against 218,000 Greeks,
while during the war the Muslim figure rose to 407,000 and the
Greek figure was considerably reduced. Only in the kazas of Urla,
Shesmeh, Phocœa, and Kara-Burun in the sanjak of Smyrna, are there
Greek majorities; but in no other kaza, whether of Magnesia, Aidin,
or Denizli, is the Greek element in a majority. Moreover, the Greek
minority is important only in the kaza of Seuki in the sanjak of Aidin;
everywhere else it is, as a rule, less than 10 per cent., and only in
two kazas is it 15 or 16 per cent.
The treaty recognises Armenia as a free and independent State, and
the President of the United States is to arbitrate on the question of
the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of
Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis. Now, though everybody—including
the Turks—acknowledges that as a principle it is legitimate to form
an Armenian State, yet when we consider the nature of the population
of these vilayets, we cannot help feeling anxious at the condition of
things brought about by this decision.
As a matter of fact, in Erzerum there are 673,000 Mussulmans,
constituting 82·5 per cent. of the population, as against 136,000
Armenians, or 16·5 per cent. In Trebizond the Mussulmans number
921,000, or 82 per cent. of the population, as against 40,000
Armenians, or 23·5 per cent. In the vilayet of Van the Muslim
population is 179,000, or 69 per cent., and the Armenian population
67,000, or 26 per cent. In Bitlis the Mussulmans number 310,000, or
70·5 per cent., as against 119,000 Armenians, constituting 27 per cent.
Thus, in these four vilayets the Mussulmans number 2,083,000, and the
Armenians 362,000, the average being 80 per cent. against 13 per cent.
On the other hand, it is difficult to prove that Turkey has
persistently colonised these territories. The only fact that might
countenance such an assertion is that at various times, especially
after the Crimean war, many Tatars sought shelter in that part of the
Empire, and that in 1864, and again in 1878, Circassians, escaping from
the Russian yoke, took refuge there after defending their country.
The number of the families that immigrated is estimated about 70,000.
Turkey encouraged them to settle down there all the more willingly as
they were a safeguard to her against the constant threat of Russia. But
as early as 1514, at the time of the Turkish conquest, the Armenians
were inferior in number, owing to the Arabian and Persian pressure that
repeatedly brought about an exodus of the native population northwards
and westwards, and because some Persian, Arabian, Seljukian, Turkish,
and Byzantine elements slowly crept into the country. In 1643 Abas
Schah, after his victorious campaign against Turkey, drove away nearly
100,000 Armenians, and later on a huge number of Armenians emigrated
into Russia of their own free will after the treaty of Turkmen-Tchai in
1828.
It is noteworthy that an Armenian Power first came into existence in
the second century before Christ. It consisted of two independent
States, Armenia Major and Armenia Minor. After the downfall of Tigrane,
King of Armenia Major, defeated by the Romans, Rome and Persia fought
for the possession of those regions, and, finally, divided them.
Later on there were various Armenian States, which were more or less
independent, but none of them lasted long except the State of Armenia
Minor, which lasted from the twelfth century to the fourteenth, till
Selim II conquered that territory, where the Arabs, the Persians, the
Seljukian Turks, and the Byzantines had already brought the Armenian
dominion to an end.
Therefore the numerical majority of Mussulmans in Armenia has not
been obtained or maintained, as has been alleged, by the “Turkish
massacres”; it is the outcome of more complex causes—which, of course,
is no excuse for the tragic events that took place there. As the
Conference did not seem to pay any attention either to the figures of
M. Vital Cuinet (_Turquie d’Asie_, Paris, 1892), or to the figures
published by the French Government in the Yellow Book of 1897, based
upon the data furnished by the Christian Patriarchates, or to the
figures given by General Zeleny to the Caucasian Geographical Society
(_Zapiski_, vol. xviii., Tiflis, 1896), the Indian delegation asked
that a report should be drawn up by a mixed Moslem and non-Moslem
Commission, consisting of men whose integrity and ability were
recognised by their co-religionists; but this suggestion met with no
better success than the international inquiry already suggested by the
delegation in regard to the population of every vilayet in Thrace.
The chapter dealing with the protection of minorities plainly shows how
much influence the aforesaid Protestant Anglo-American movement had on
the wording of the treaty. In none of the four previous treaties are
included such stipulations as those contained in the Turkish treaty,
and there is a great difference in this respect between the Bulgarian
treaty and the Turkish treaty. The latter, under the term “minority,”
only considers the condition of the Christians, and ensures to them
privileges and power in every respect over the Mussulmans.
As the Permanent Committee of the Turkish Congress at Lausanne remarked
in its critical examination of the treaty:
“Whereas in the Bulgarian treaty freedom of conscience and religion
is guaranteed so far as is consistent with morality and order, this
clause does not occur in the Turkish treaty.
The Turkish treaty states that all interference with any religious
creed shall be punished in the same way; in the Bulgarian treaty
this clause is omitted, for here it would imply the protection of a
non-Christian religion.”
In regard to Article 139, that “Turkey renounces formally all right of
suzerainty or jurisdiction of any kind over Moslems who are subject
to the sovereignty or protectorate of any other State,” the Indian
Caliphate delegation raised an objection in a letter addressed to Mr.
Lloyd George, dated July 10, 1920:
“It is obvious that Turkey has, and could have, no ‘rights of
suzerainty or jurisdiction’ over Mussulmans who am not her
subjects; but it is equally obvious that the Sultan of Turkey, as
Khalifa, has, and must continue to have so long as he holds that
office, his very considerable ‘jurisdiction’ over Muslims who are
’subject to the sovereignty or protectorate of any other State.’
The law of Islam clearly prescribes the character and extent of the
‘jurisdiction’ pertaining to the office of Khalifa, and we cannot
but protest most emphatically against this indirect, but none the
less palpable, attempt on the part of Great Britain and her allies
to force on the Khalifa a surrender of such ‘jurisdiction,’ which
must involve the abdication of the Khalifa.”
The delegation also considered that Article 131, which lays down
that “Turkey definitely renounces all rights and privileges, which,
under the treaty of Lausanne of October 12, 1912, were left to the
Sultan in Libya,” infringes “rights pertaining to the Sultan as
Caliph, which had been specially safeguarded and reserved under the
said treaty of Lausanne.” It also expressed its surprise that “this
categorical and inalienable requirement of the Muslim Faith, supported
as it is by the unbroken practice of over thirteen hundred years, was
totally disregarded by Articles 94 to 97 of the Peace Treaty, read
in conjunction with Articles 22 and 132,” which cannot admit of any
non-Muslim sovereignty over the Jazirat-ul-Arab, including Syria,
Palestine, and Mesopotamia.
Referring again to the objection the British Prime Minister pretended
to base on the proclamation of the Emir Feisal, King of Syria, and
on the Arabs’ request to be freed from Turkish dominion, the Indian
Caliphate delegation in the same letter answered Mr. Lloyd George, who
had asked them in the course of his reception “whether they were to
remain under Turkish domination merely because they were Mohammedans”:
“We would take the liberty to remind you that if the Arabs, who are
an overwhelmingly large majority in these regions, have claimed
independence, they have clearly claimed it free from the incubus
of so-called mandates, and their claim to be freed from Turkish
dominion is not in any way a claim to be subjected to the ‘advice
and assistance’ of a mandatory of the principal Allied Powers.
If the principle of self-determination is to be applied at all,
it must be applied regardless of the wishes and interests of
foreign Powers covetously seeking to exploit regions and peoples
exposed to the danger of foreign domination on account of their
unprotected character. The Arab Congresses have unequivocally
declared that they want neither protectorates nor mandates nor any
other form of political or economic control; and the delegation,
while reiterating their view that an amicable adjustment of Arab
and Turkish claims by the Muslims themselves in accordance with
Islamic law is perfectly feasible, must support the Arab demand for
complete freedom from the control of mandatories appointed by the
Allies.
“With regard to the Hejaz, Article 98, which requires Turkey not
only to recognise it as a free and independent State, but to
renounce all rights and titles there, and Article 99, which makes
no mention of the rights and prerogatives of the Khalifa as Servant
of the Holy Places, are, and must ever be, equally unacceptable to
the Muslim world.”
On the other hand, as the Jewish question and the Eastern question are
closely connected and have assumed still more importance owing to the
Zionist movement, the treaty forced on Turkey concerns the Jews in the
highest degree.
It must be borne in mind that if Sephardic Judaism has been gradually
smothered by Turkish sovereignty, the Ottoman Empire has proved most
hospitable to the Jews driven away by Christian fanaticism, and that
for five centuries the Jews have enjoyed both tolerance and security,
and have even prospered in it. So the Jews naturally feel anxious, like
the Moslems in the provinces wrested from the old Ottoman Empire, when,
following the precedent of Salonika, they see Greece annex the region
of Adrianople and Smyrna; and they have a right to ask whether Greece,
carried away by a wild imperialism, will not yield to her nationalist
feeling and revive the fanaticism of religious struggles. So the
Allies, foreseeing this eventuality, have asked Greece to take no
action to make the Jews regret the past; but as the Greek anti-Semitic
feeling is rather economic than religious in character, it is to be
feared that the competition of the two races in the commercial struggle
will keep up that feeling. The annexation of Thrace would probably
concern 20,000 Jews—13,000 at Adrianople, 2,000 at Rodosto, 2,800 at
Gallipoli, 1,000 at Kirk Kilisse, 1,000 at Demotica, etc. Great Britain
having received a mandate for Palestine—that is to say, virtually a
protectorate—on the condition of establishing “a national home for the
Jews”—whatever the various opinions of the Jews with regard to Zionism
may be—a question is now opened and an experiment is to be tried which
concerns them deeply, as it is closely connected with Judaism.
In the course of the reception by Mr. Lloyd George of the Indian
Caliphate delegation, M. Mohammed Ali told the British Prime Minister
in regard to the Jewish claims in Palestine:
“The delegation have no desire to cause an injustice to the Jewish
community, and I think Islam can look back with justifiable pride
on its treatment of this community in the past. No aspiration of
the Jewish community which is reasonable can be incompatible with
Muslim control of the Holy Land, and it is hoped that the Ottoman
Government will easily accommodate the Jewish community in such
aspirations of theirs as are reasonable.
“Some responsible propagandists of the Zionist movement, with whom
I have had conversations, frankly admit: ‘We do not want political
sovereignty there; we want a home; the details can be arranged and
discussed.’ I asked them: ‘Do you mean that Great Britain herself
should be the sovereign Power there, or should be the mandatory?’
and they said: ‘No, what we want is an ordinary, humanly speaking
reasonable guarantee that opportunities of autonomous development
would be allowed to us.’ We, ourselves, who have been living in
India, are great believers in a sort of Federation of Faiths. I
think the Indian nationality, which is being built up to-day, will
probably be one of the first examples in the world of a Federation
of Faiths, and we cannot rule out the possibility of development
in Palestine on the lines of ‘cultural autonomy.’ The Jews are,
after all, a very small minority there, and I do not believe for
one moment that Jews could be attracted there in such large numbers
as the Zionist enthusiasts sometimes think. I would say the same
thing of an Armenian State, without desiring to say one word which
would be considered offensive to any class of people. Because we,
ourselves, have suffered so many humiliations, we do not like
ourselves to say anything about other people that they would
resent. If the Allied Powers brought all the Armenians together and
placed them all in a contiguous position, excluding the present
Kurdish community from them, no matter what large slice of land you
gave them, I think they would very much like to go back to the old
status....
“In the same way I would say of the Jewish community, that they are
people who prosper very much in other lands, and although they have
a great hankering after their home, and no community is so much
bound up with a particular territory as the Jewish community is,
still, I must say that we do not fear there will be any great
migration of such a character that it will form a majority over
the Muslim population. The Jewish community has said: ‘We have no
objection to Turkish sovereignty remaining in that part of the
world so long as we are allowed to remain and prosper there and
develop on our own lines, and have cultural autonomy.’”
M. Mohammed Ali, in his letter to Mr. Lloyd George, dated July 10,
1920, also observed that—
“With regard to Palestine in particular, the delegation desire to
state that Article 99, embodying the declaration of the British
Government of November 2, 1917, is extremely vague, and it is not
clear in what relation the so-called national home for the Jewish
people, which is proposed to be established in Palestine, would
stand to the State proposed to be established there. The Mussulmans
of the world are not ashamed of their dealings with their Jewish
neighbours, and can challenge a comparison with others in this
respect; and the delegation, in the course of the interview with
you, endeavoured to make it clear that there was every likelihood
of all reasonable claims of Jews in search of a home being accepted
by the Muslim Government of Palestine. But if the very small Jewish
minority in Palestine is intended to exercise over the Muslim, who
constitute four-fifths of the population, a dominance now, or in
the future, when its numbers have swelled after immigration, then
the delegation must categorically and emphatically oppose any such
designs.”
* * * * *
The telegram in which Tewfik Pasha informed Damad Ferid of the
conditions of the treaty, and which the latter communicated to the
Press, was printed by the _Peyam Sabah_, surrounded with black mourning
lines. Ali Kemal, though he was a supporter of the Government and could
not be accused of anglophobia, concluded his article as follows:
“Better die than live blind, deaf, and lame. We have not given up
all hope that the statesmen, who hold the fate of the world in
their hands and who have officially proclaimed their determination
to act equitably, will not allow this country, which has undergone
the direst misfortunes for years and has lost its most sacred
rights, to suffer a still more heinous injustice.”
All the Constantinople newspapers, dealing at full length with the
conditions, unanimously declared that the treaty was unacceptable. The
_Alemdar_, another pro-English newspaper, said:
“If the treaty is not altered it will be difficult to find a man
willing to sign it.”
Another newspaper, the _Ileri_, wrote:
“The anguish which depressed our hearts while we were anxiously
waiting seems a very light one compared to the pang we felt when we
read the treaty.”
The aforesaid _Peyam Sabah_, after a survey of the conditions, came to
this conclusion:
“Three lines of conduct are open to the Turkish people:
“To beg for mercy and make the Powers realise that the loss of
Smyrna will be a great blow to Turkey and will bring no advantage
to Greece, and that the Chatalja frontier will be a cause of
endless hostility between the various races.
“To sign the treaty and expect that the future will improve the
condition of Turkey; but who in Turkey could sign such a treaty?
“To oppose passive resistance to the execution of the conditions of
peace, since all hope of armed resistance must be given up.”
Public opinion unanimously protested against the provisions of the
treaty, but fluctuated and hesitated as to what concessions could be
made.
Damad Ferid, receiving a number of deputies who had stayed at
Constantinople and wanted to go back to the provinces, told them
that he saw no objection to their going away, and that orders to
that effect had been given to the police. Then he is said to have
declared that they might tell their mandatories that he would never
sign a treaty assigning Smyrna and Thrace to Greece and restricting
Turkish sovereignty to Constantinople, and that on this point there
was no difference of opinion between him and the Nationalists. He also
informed them that in due time he would hold fresh elections, and the
treaty would be submitted for approval to the new Chamber.
The Grand Vizier, who had asked Tewfik Pasha to let him see the note
which was being prepared by the Turkish delegation at Versailles, was,
on his side, elaborating the draft of another answer which was to be
compared with that of the delegation, before the wording of the Turkish
answer to the Peace Conference was definitely settled.
But the occupation of Lampsaki, opposite to Gallipoli, by the Turkish
Nationalists, together with the Bolshevist advance in Northern Persia
and Asia Minor, made things worse, and soon became a matter of anxiety
to England.
After the text of the Peace Treaty had been presented to the Turks,
and when the latter had the certainty that their fears were but too
well grounded, it appeared clear that the decisions taken by the Allies
would be certain to bring about a coalition of the various parties,
and that all Turks, without any distinction of opinion, would combine
to organise a resistance against any operation aiming at taking from
them Eastern Thrace—where the Bulgarian population was also averse to
the expulsion of the Turkish authorities—at assigning Smyrna and the
Islands to Greece, and at dismembering the Turkish Empire.
Colonel Jafer Tayar, who commanded the Adrianople army corps and had
openly declared against the Sultan’s Government since the latter was at
war with the Nationalists, had come to Constantinople at the beginning
of May, and it was easy to guess for what purpose. Of course, it had
been rumoured, after he left Constantinople, that the Government was
going to appoint a successor to him, but nothing of the kind had been
done, and he still kept his command. When he came back to Adrianople,
not only had no conflict broken out between him and the troops under
his command, but he had been given an enthusiastic greeting. As soon as
it was known that the San Remo Conference had decided to give Thrace to
Greece, up to the Chatalja lines, resistance against Greek occupation
was quickly organised. Jafer Tayar, an Albanian by birth—he was born at
Prishtina—became the leader of the movement. He hurriedly gathered some
contingents made up of regular soldiers and volunteers, and put in a
state of defence, as best he could, the ports of the western coast of
the Marmora. Jafer Tayar wondered why Thrace was not granted the right
of self-determination like Upper Silesia or Schleswig, or autonomy
under the protection of France, whose administration in Western Thrace
had proved equitable and had given satisfaction to that province.
In face of this denial of justice, he had resolved to fight for the
independence of Thrace.
It was soon known that the Moslem population of Adrianople had held a
meeting at the beginning of May, in which, after a speech by Jafer
Tayar, all the people present had pledged themselves to fight for the
liberty of Thrace. A similar demonstration took place at Gumuljina. A
congress including above two hundred representatives of the whole of
Western Thrace had been held about the same time at Adrianople.
In Bulgaria a movement of protest was also started, and on Sunday, May
9, numerous patriotic demonstrations were held in all the provincial
towns.
On May 16 the inhabitants of Philippopolis and refugees from Thrace,
Macedonia, and the Dobruja living at that time in the town, held a
meeting of several thousand people, and without any distinction of
religion, nationality, or political party carried the following motion
against the decision taken by the San Remo Conference to cede Thrace to
Greece:
“They enter an energetic protest against the resolution to cede
Thrace to Greece, for that would be a flagrant injustice and an
act of cruelty both to a people of the same blood as we, and to
the Bulgarian State itself; they declare that the Bulgarian people
cannot, of their own free will, accept such a decision of the San
Remo Conference, which would be a cause of everlasting discord
in the Balkans—whereas the victorious Powers of the Entente have
always professed to fight in order to restore peace to those
regions; and they entreat the Governments, which have come to
this decision, to cancel it and to raise Thrace to the rank of
an autonomous, independent State under the protection of all the
Powers of the Entente, or one of them.”
On May 25—that is to say, two days before the Greek occupation—a few
“Young Turk” and Bulgarian elements proclaimed the autonomy of Western
Thrace, and formed a provisional Government to oppose the occupation.
At the head of this Government were Tewfik Bey, a Young Turk, Vachel
Georgieff, and Dochkoff, Bulgarian komitadjis. But the latter were
expelled by General Charpy before the Greek troops and authorities
arrived, and the Greek Press did its best to misrepresent that protest
against Greek domination. They set off to Adrianople, taking with them
the treasury and seals of the Moslem community, and were greeted by
Jafer Tayar.
On the other hand, the resistance of the Turkish Nationalists was
becoming organised, and as soon as the conditions of peace were known
new recruits joined Mustafa Kemal’s forces.
The Nationalist elements, owing to the attitude of the Allies
towards Turkey, were now almost thrown into the arms of the Russian
Bolshevists, who carried on an energetic propaganda in Asia Minor and
offered to help them to save their independence, though they did so to
serve their own interests.
Damad Ferid, Mustafa Kemal’s personal enemy, who stood halfway between
the Allied Powers and the Nationalists, believed that if he did not
displease the Allies, he could pull his country out of its difficulties.
Before the draft of the treaty was handed to the Turks, the Ottoman
Government had already begun to raise troops to fight the Nationalists.
They were to be placed under command of Marshal Zeki, who had formerly
served under Abdul Hamid. It was soon known that this military
organisation had been entrusted by the Turkish War Minister to the care
of British officers at whose instigation the first contingents had been
sent to Ismid, which was to be the Turkish base.
It was soon announced that Damad Ferid Pasha’s troops, who had remained
loyal and were commanded by Ahmed Anzavour Pasha and Suleyman Shefik
Pasha, had had some hard fighting with the rebels in the Doghandkeui
and Geredi area, east of Adabazar, which they had occupied, and that
the Nationalists, whose casualties had been heavy, had evacuated Bolu.
The information was soon contradicted, and at the beginning of the
last week of April it became known that Anzavour and his troops had
just been utterly defeated near Panderma, and that this port on the
Marmora had fallen into the Nationalists’ hands. Ahmed Anzavour had had
to leave Panderma for Constantinople on board a Turkish gunboat, and
Mustafa Kemal now ruled over all the region round Brusa, Panderma, and
Balikesri. Moreover, in the Constantinople area, a great many officers
and soldiers were going over to the Nationalists in Anatolia.
It should be kept in mind that Ahmed Anzavour, though he was of
Circassian descent, was unknown in his own country. He had been made
pasha to command the Government forces against the Nationalists with
the help of the Circassians, who are numerous in the Adabazar region,
and to co-operate with the British against his fellow-countrymen, who
merely wished to be independent.
Suleyman Shefik Pasha resigned, and some defections took place among
the troops under his command.
About the same time, the emergency military court had sentenced
to death by default Mustafa Kemal, Colonel Kara Yassif Bey, Ali
Fuad Pasha, who commanded the 20th army corps, Ahmed Rustem Bey,
ex-ambassador at Washington, Bekir Sami Bey, Dr. Adnan Bey, ex-head of
the sanitary service, and his wife, Halidé Edib Hanoum, all impeached
for high treason as leaders of the Nationalist movement.
Yet, despite all the measures taken by Damad Ferid and the moral and
even material support given to him by the Allies, what could be the
outcome of a military action against the Nationalists? How could the
Ottoman Government compel the Turks to go and fight against their
Anatolian brethren in order to force on them a treaty of peace that
it seemed unwilling to accept itself, and that sanctioned the ruin of
Turkey?
In some Turkish circles it was wondered whether a slightly Nationalist
Cabinet co-operating with the Chamber would not have stood a better
chance to come to an understanding with Anatolia and induce her to
admit the acceptable parts of the treaty; for should Damad Ferid, who
was not in a good position to negotiate with the Nationalists, fail,
what would be the situation of the Government which remained in office
merely because the Allies occupied Constantinople?
Of course, the Foreign Office proclaimed that foreign troops would
be maintained in every zone, and that the treaty would be carried
out at any cost. Yet the real Ottoman Government was no longer at
Constantinople, where Damad Ferid, whose authority did not extend
beyond the Ismid-Black Sea line, was cut off from the rest of the
Empire; it was at Sivas. As no Government force or Allied army was
strong enough to bring the Nationalist party to terms, it was only
in Anatolia that the latter Government could be crushed by those who,
with Great Britain, had conspired to suppress 12 million Turks and were
ready to sacrifice enough soldiers to reach this end.
On the other hand, it soon became known that at Angora the question
of the Caliph-Sultan had been set aside, and even the Sultan’s name
was now being mentioned again in the _namaz_, or public prayer offered
every Friday—that is to say, all the parties had practically arrived at
an understanding.
Besides, as most likely Greece would have to face difficulties, if not
at once, at least in a comparatively short time, inspired information,
probably of Greek origin, already intimated that the Supreme Council
would decide whether France, England, and Italy would have to support
Greece—though one did not see why France and Italy should defray the
expenses of that new adventure by which England first, and Greece
afterwards, would benefit exclusively.
On Saturday, May 22, the very day on which a Crown Council met under
the Sultan’s presidency to examine the terms of the treaty, over
3,000 people held a meeting of protest at Stambul, in Sultan Ahmed
Square. Some journalists, who were well known for their pro-English
feelings—such as Ali Kemal, an ex-Minister, editor of the _Sabah_;
Refi Jevad, editor of the _Alemdar_; Mustafa Sabri, a former
Sheik-ul-Islam—and some politicians delivered speeches. The platform
was draped with black hangings; the Turkish flags and school banners
were adorned with crêpe. After the various speakers had explained
the clauses of the treaty and showed they were not acceptable, the
following motions were passed:
“First, in contradiction to the principle of nationalities, the
treaty cuts off from the Empire Thrace, Adrianople, Smyrna,
and its area. In case the Allied Powers should maintain their
decisions—which seems most unlikely—we want these regions to be
given local autonomy.
“Secondly, now the Arabian territories have been cut off from the
Ottoman Empire, the Turks, in accordance with the principle of
nationalities, should be freed from all fetters and bonds hindering
their economic development on the path to progress and peace. To
maintain the Capitulations and extend them to other nations is
tantamount to declaring the Turks are doomed to misery and slavery
for ever.
“Thirdly, the Turks, relying on the fair and equitable feelings of
the Allied Powers, require to be treated on the same footing as the
other vanquished nations.
“Fourthly, the Turkish people, feeling sure that the peace
conditions are tantamount to suppressing Turkey as a nation, ask
that the treaty should be modified so as to be made more consistent
with right and justice.
“Fifthly, the aforesaid resolutions shall be submitted to the
Allied High Commissioners and forwarded to the Peace Conference.”
These resolutions were handed after the meeting to M. Defrance, the
senior Allied High Commissioner, who was to forward them to the Peace
Conference.
As the difficulties increased, and more important and quicker
communications with the Ottoman delegation in Paris were becoming
necessary, the Cabinet thought of sending the Grand Vizier to Paris.
Upon the latter’s advice, and probably at the instigation of the
English, several members of the dissolved Chamber set off to Anatolia
in order to try and bring about an understanding between Damad
Ferid and the Nationalists, for the conditions of the treaty, as
was to be expected, had now nearly healed the rupture between the
Central Government and the Turkish Nationalists, especially as the
Anglo-Turkish Army was unable to carry out the treaty and Damad Ferid
and his supporters were neither willing nor able to enforce it. Even
the English had sent delegates to Mustafa Kemal, who had refused to
receive them.
The Grand Vizier, after reviewing the troops at Ismid, found they were
not strong enough, and requested the headquarters merely to stand on
the defensive. Indeed, after a slight success in the Gulf of Ismid, the
Government forces found themselves in a critical condition, for the
Anatolian troops had occupied Kum Kale, close to the Dardanelles, and
Mustafa Kemal had concentrated forces in that region.
The Chamber, which had been dissolved at Constantinople, resumed its
sittings at Angora. It criticised the Allies’ policy with regard
to Turkey, especially the policy of England, at whose instigation
Constantinople had been occupied and military measures had been taken
on the coasts of the Black Sea.
In the speech he delivered at the first sitting of the Chamber, Mustafa
Kemal showed that the English occupation of Constantinople had been a
severe blow at the prestige of the Caliph and Sultan. “We must do our
best,” he said, “to free the Sultan and his capital. If we do not obey
his orders just now, it is because we look upon them as null and void,
as he is not really free.”
The same state of mind showed itself in a telegram of congratulation
addressed to the Sultan on his birthday by the provisional vali of
Angora, who, though he did not acknowledge the power of the Central
Government, stated that the population of Angora were deeply concerned
at the condition to which the seat of the Caliphate and Sultanry was
reduced owing to the occupation of Constantinople. This telegram ran
thus:
“The people have made up their minds not to shrink from any
sacrifice to make the Empire free and independent. They feel
certain that their beloved Sovereign is with them at heart and that
their chief strength lies in a close union round the Khilafat.”
Similar dispatches were sent from the most active Nationalist centres
such as Erzerum and Amasia, and by Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, commanding
the 15th army corps at Erzerum.
It was plain that, through these demonstrations, Mustafa Kemal and the
Anatolian Nationalists aimed at nullifying the religious pretexts Damad
Ferid availed himself of to carry on the struggle against them. Mustafa
Kemal had even ordered all the ulemas in Anatolia to preach a series
of sermons with a view to strengthening the religious feeling among
the masses. He had also the same political purpose in view when he
sent a circular to the departments concerned to enjoin them to remind
all Mussulmans of the duty of keeping the Ramadhan strictly and of the
penalties they incurred if they publicly transgressed the Moslem fast.
Besides, the Nationalists strove to turn to account the movement that
had taken place among all classes after the terms of the treaty had
been made known, and their activity continued to increase. Sali Pasha,
who was Grand Vizier before Damad Ferid, had escaped to Anatolia in
order to put himself at the disposal of the Nationalists. So their
opposition to the Central Government was asserting itself more and more
strenuously, and the struggle that ensued assumed many forms.
An armistice, which came into force on May 30, and was to last twenty
days, was concluded at Angora by M. Robert de Caix, secretary of the
High Commissionership in Syria, between the French authorities and the
Turkish Nationalists. Though the terms of this agreement were not made
public, it was known that they dealt chiefly with Cilicia and allowed
France to use the railway as far as Aleppo. Meanwhile, conversations
were being held on the Cilician front, and finally at Angora, to extend
the armistice.
Indeed, it was difficult to understand why, after the Italians had
evacuated Konia, the French troops had not been withdrawn before the
treaty had been handed to Turkey, for it gave France no right to remain
in Cilicia; and now the situation of the French there was rather
difficult, and their retreat had, of course, become dangerous. It
seemed quite plain that the evacuation of Cilicia had become necessary,
and that henceforth only the coastlands of Syria properly so called
would be occupied.
So the French policy at this juncture had lacked coherency, for it
seemed difficult to go on with the war and carry on peace negotiations
at the same time.
This armistice was denounced on June 17 by Mustafa Kemal, who demanded
the evacuation of Adana, the withdrawal of the French detachments
from Heraclea and Zounguldak, and the surrender of the mines to the
Nationalists who lacked coal and wanted Constantinople not to have any.
Besides, some incidents had occurred in the course of the armistice:
some French soldiers who were being drilled near Adana had been fired
at, the railway track had been cut east of Toprak Kale, and telegraphic
communications interrupted repeatedly between Adana and Mersina.
An encounter occurred on June 11 between the Nationalists and a company
which had been detached at the beginning of the month from a battalion
of a rifle corps that guarded the port and mining works of Zounguldak.
On June 18, after an inquiry, the French commander withdrew from the
spot which had been occupied near Heraclea and the company of riflemen
was brought back to Zounguldak.
It was obvious that the staff of Cilicia did not seem to have approved
of the armistice which had been concluded by the French authorities
in order not to have anything to fear in this region, and to send all
their forces against the Arabs; and so the head of the Turkish staff,
Ismet Bey, naturally did not wish to renew it.
As we had entered into a parley with Mustafa Kemal openly and
officially and signed an armistice with him, it seemed likely we meant
to pursue a policy that might bring about a local and provisional
agreement with the Nationalists, and perhaps a definite agreement
later on. If such an armistice was not concluded, a rupture was to be
feared on either side later on, in which case the condition of things
would remain as intricate as before, or military operations would be
resumed in worse conditions than before for both parties. In short,
after treating with Mustafa Kemal it was difficult to ignore him in the
general settlement that was to ensue.
But no broad view had ever dominated the Allies’ policy since they had
signed the armistice with Turkey in October, 1918. Eastern affairs
had never been carefully sifted or clearly understood; so the Allies’
action had been badly started. Conflicting ambitions had led them in
a confused way. The policy of England especially, which had proved
harsh and grasping, and also highly dangerous, was at the bottom of
the difficulties the Allies had experienced in the East. So France,
where public opinion and popular feeling were opposed to any Eastern
adventure or any action against Turkey, could not be called upon to
maintain troops in the East or to fight there alone for the benefit of
others. The operations that were being contemplated in the East would
have necessarily required an important army, and if adequate credits
had been asked for them, a loud protest would have been raised—though
later on the French Chamber granted large sums of money for Syria,
after a superficial debate, not fully realising what would be the
consequence of the vote.
M. d’Estournelles de Constant, a member of the Senate, wrote to the
French Prime Minister on May 25 that, “after asking the Government
most guardedly—for months in the Foreign Affairs Committee and the day
before in the Senate—to give information about the mysterious military
operations that had been carried on for a year and a half in Asia Minor
and towards Mesopotamia,” he found it necessary to start a debate in
the Senate upon the following question: “What are our armies doing in
Cilicia?”[29]
Meanwhile the Supreme Council urged the Turkish delegation to sign
the treaty that had been submitted for its approval, and the Allies
were going to negotiate with the representatives of a Government
which, on the whole, was no longer acknowledged by the country. Of
what value might be the signature wrested by the Allies from these
representatives, and how could the stipulations of that treaty
be carried out by the Turks? Most of its clauses raised internal
difficulties in Turkey, and such a confusion ensued that the members of
the delegation did not seem to agree any longer with the members of the
Ottoman Cabinet, and at a certain time even the latter seemed unable
to accept the treaty, in spite of the pressure brought to bear on the
Ottoman Government by the English troops of occupation.
Mustafa Kemal’s Nationalist forces conquered not only the whole of Asia
Minor, but also all the Asiatic coast and the islands of the Marmora,
except Ismid, which was still held by British posts. The Turkish
Nationalists soon after captured Marmora Island, which commanded the
sea route between Gallipoli and Constantinople.
On June 16 the British forces engaged the Kemalist troops in the Ismid
area. About thirty Indian soldiers were wounded and an officer of the
Intelligence Department was taken prisoner by the Turks. The civilians
evacuated Ismid, and it was hinted that the garrison would do the same.
Mustafa Kemal’s aeroplanes dropped bombs on the town, and the railway
line between Ismid and Hereke was cut by the Nationalists. The British
forces on the southern coast of the Dardanelles withdrew towards
Shanak, whose fortifications were being hurriedly repaired.
Mustafa Kemal’s plan seemed to be to dispose his forces so as not to be
outflanked, and be able to threaten Smyrna later on. To this end, the
Nationalist forces advanced along the English sector toward the heights
of Shamlija, on the Asiatic coast of the Bosphorus, from which point
they could bombard Constantinople.
After a long interview with the Sultan, which lasted two hours, on
June 11, the Grand Vizier Damad Ferid Pasha, owing to the difficulty
of communicating between Paris and Constantinople, and the necessity
of co-ordinating the draft of the answer worked out by the Ottoman
Government and the reports drawn up by the various commissions with the
answer recommended by the delegation, set off to Paris the next day. So
it seemed likely that Turkey would ask for further time before giving
her answer.
It could already be foreseen that in her answer Turkey would protest
against the clauses of the treaty concerning Thrace and Smyrna,
against the blow struck at the sovereignty of the Sultan by the
internationalisation of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, as thus the
Sultan could no longer leave his capital and go freely to Asia Minor,
and, lastly, against the clauses restoring the privileges of the
Capitulations to the States that enjoyed them before the war.
Turkey also intended to ask that the Sultan should keep his religious
rights as Caliph over the Mussulmans detached from the Empire, and that
a clause should be embodied in the treaty maintaining the guarantee
in regard to the interior loan raised during the war, for otherwise
a great many subscribers would be ruined and the organisation of the
property of the orphans would be jeopardised.
At the beginning of the second week of June it was rumoured that the
treaty might be substantially amended in favour of Turkey.[30] Perhaps
Great Britain, seeing how things stood in the East, and that her policy
in Asia Minor raised serious difficulties, felt it necessary to alter
her attitude with regard to Turkish Nationalism which, supported by
the Bolshevists, was getting more and more dangerous in Persia. For
Mr. Lloyd George, who has always allowed himself to be led by the
trend of events, and whose policy had lately been strongly influenced
by the Bolshevists, had now altered his mind, as he often does, and
seemed now inclined, owing to the failure of his advances to the Soviet
Government, to modify his attitude towards Constantinople—after having
exasperated Turkish Nationalism. The debate that was to take place on
June 15 in the House of Lords as to what charges and responsibilities
England had assumed in Mesopotamia, was postponed—which meant much; and
the difficulties just met with by the British in the Upper Valley of
the Tigris and the Euphrates in their struggle with the Arabs convinced
them of the advisability of a revision of the British policy towards
both the Arabs and the Turks.
On the other hand, it did not seem unlikely that M. Venizelos, who
was being expected in London, might have seen the mistake the Supreme
Council had made when it had granted the Greek claims so fully, and
that the apprehension he was entitled to feel about the reality of the
huge advantages obtained by Greece might have a salutary influence on
him. Yet nothing of the kind happened, and in a long letter to the
_Daily Telegraph_ (June 18) he asserted not only the rights of Greece
to Smyrna, but his determination to have them respected and to prevent
the revision of the treaty.
M. Venizelos, “the great victor of the war in the East,” as he was
called in London, even supported his claims by drawing public attention
to the intrigues carried on by Constantine’s supporters to restore him
to the throne. He maintained that the revision of the treaty would
second the efforts which were then being made in Athens by the old
party of the Crown, which, he said, was bound to triumph if Greece
was deprived of the fruits of her victory and if the Allies did not
redeem their pledges towards her. But then it became obvious that the
Greeks did not despise Constantine so much after all, and their present
attitude could not in any way be looked upon as disinterested.
It might have been expected, on the other hand, that Count Sforza, who
had been High Commissioner in Constantinople, where he had won warm
sympathies, would maintain the friendly policy pursued by Italy since
the armistice towards Turkey—that is to say, he would urge that the
time had come to revise the treaty of peace with Turkey which, since
it had been drawn up at San Remo, had constantly been opposed by the
Italian Press. All the parties shared this view, even the clerical
party, and one of its members in the Chamber, M. Vassalo, who had just
come back from Turkey, energetically maintained it was impossible to
suppress the Ottoman Empire without setting on fire the whole of Asia.
The Congress of the Popular Party in Naples held the same opinion.
Recent events also induced Italy to preserve the cautious attitude she
had assumed in Eastern affairs since the armistice, and she naturally
aimed at counterbalancing the supremacy that England, if she once ruled
over Constantinople and controlled Greater Greece, would enjoy over not
only the western part, but the whole, of the Mediterranean Sea.
Henceforth it was obvious that the chief stipulations of the treaty
that was to be enforced on Turkey were doomed to failure, and it was
asked with no little anxiety whether the Powers would be wise enough
to take facts into account and reconsider their decisions accordingly,
or maintain them and thus pave the way to numerous conflicts and
fresh difficulties. Indeed, the outcome of the arrangements they had
laboriously elaborated was that things in the East had become more
intricate and critical than before. No State wished to assume the
task of organising the Armenian State: the American Senate flatly
refused; Mr. Bonar Law formally declared in the House of Commons that
England had already too many responsibilities; France did not see
why she should take charge of it; Italy accepted no mandate in Asia
Minor. Syria, on the other hand, protested against its dismemberment.
Mesopotamia was rising against the English at the very time when the
Ottoman Nationalists entered an indignant protest against the cession
of Smyrna and Thrace to Greece.
It was to be wished, therefore, from every point of view that not only
some articles of the treaty presented to the Turks, but the whole
document, should be remodelled, and more regard should be paid to the
lawful rights of the Ottoman Empire, a change which could only serve
French interests.
But though reason and her interest urged France to maintain the Ottoman
Empire—which she attempted to do to some extent—she allowed herself
to be driven in a contrary direction by England, who thought she
could take advantage of the perturbation caused by the war within the
Turkish Empire to dismember it—not realising that this undertaking
went against her own Asiatic interests, which were already seriously
endangered. Such a submission to the English policy was all the more
to be regretted as Mr. Lloyd George had but grudgingly supported
the French policy with regard to Germany, and after the San Remo
conversations it seemed that France would have to consent to heavy
sacrifices in the East in return for the semi-approbation he had
finally granted her. This policy of England well might surprise the
French—who have always reverenced the British parliamentary system;
for the so-styled imperialist policy of Queen Victoria or King Edward,
though it has been violently criticised, had really kept up the old
traditions of British Liberalism, and had nothing in common with the
greed and cool selfishness of such demagogues and would-be advanced
minds as Mr. Lloyd George, who stands forth before the masses as the
enemy of every imperialism and the champion of the freedom of peoples.
But the former leaders of English foreign policy were not constantly
influenced by their own political interests; they knew something of
men and countries; and they had long been thoroughly acquainted with
the ways of diplomacy. Both in England and France, everyone should now
acknowledge their fair-mindedness, and pay homage alike to their wisdom
and perspicacity.
Many people in France now wondered with some reason what the 80,000
French soldiers round Beyrut were doing—whether it was to carry out
the expedition that had long been contemplated against Damascus, or to
launch into an adventure in Cilicia.
M. d’Estournelles de Constant, who had first wished to start a debate
in the French Chamber on the military operations in Syria and Cilicia,
addressed the following letter, after the information given by M.
Millerand before the Commission of Foreign Affairs, to M. de Selves,
chairman of this Commission:
“I feel bound to let the Commission know for what reasons I have
determined not to give up, but merely postpone the debate I wanted
to start in the Chamber concerning our military operations in Syria
and Cilicia.
“The Premier has given as much consideration as he could to the
anxieties we had expressed before him. He has inherited a situation
he is not responsible for, and seems to do his best to prevent
France from falling into the dreadful chasm we had pointed out
to him. We must help him in his most intricate endeavours, for
France is not the only nation that has to grapple with the perilous
Eastern problem. She must work hand in hand with her allies to
avert this peril. The whole world is threatened by it. Our Allies
should understand that the interest of France is closely connected
with their interests. France guards the Rhine; she is practically
responsible for the execution of the treaty with Germany.
“How can she perform such a task, together with the administration
of Alsace and Lorraine and the restoration of her provinces
laid waste by the Germans, if she is to scatter her effort and
her reduced resources both in Europe and all her large colonial
empire and in Asia Minor among peoples who have long welcomed her
friendship, but abhor any domination?
“France would do the world an immense service by openly reverting
to the war aims proclaimed by herself and her allies. Far from
endangering, she would thus strengthen her traditional influence in
the East; she would thus do more than by risky military operations
to smother the ambitions and rebellions that might set on fire
again the Balkan States, Anatolia, and even Mesopotamia.
“After five years of sacrifices that have brought us victory, to
start on a would-be crusade against the Arabs and Turks in a remote
country, in the middle of summer, would imply for France as well as
for England, Italy, Greece, and Serbia, the beginning of a new war
that might last for ever, to the benefit of anarchy.
“At any rate I ask that the intended treaty of peace with Turkey,
which has not been signed yet, should not be presented to the
French Parliament as an irremediable fact.”
After a long debate on Eastern affairs and on the questions raised by
M. Millerand’s communications, the Commission for Foreign Affairs,
seeing things were taking a bad turn, and the situation of France in
Syria, Cilicia, and Constantinople was getting alarming, decided on
June 15 to send a delegation to the East to make an inquiry on the spot.
At the first sitting of the French Chamber on June 25, 1920, M. Briand,
who three months before had made a speech in favour of the 1916
agreements which were being threatened by English ambition, though he
considered the Turkish bands “went too far,” and our policy “played
too much into their hands,” felt it incumbent on him to say:
“When we leave a nation like Turkey, after a long war, for over a
year, under what might be called a Scotch douche, telling her now
‘Thou shalt live,’ now ‘Thou shalt not live,’ we strain its nerves
to the extreme, we create within it a patriotic excitement, a
patriotic exasperation, which now becomes manifest in the shape of
armed bands. We call them bands of robbers; in our own country we
should call them ‘bands of patriots.’”
In the course of the general discussion of the Budget, during a debate
which took place on July 28 in the Senate, an amendment was brought in
by M. Victor Bérard and some of his colleagues calling for a reduction
of 30 million francs on the sums asked for by the Government, which
already amounted, as a beginning, to 185 million francs.
M. d’Estournelles de Constant then expressed his fear that this Eastern
expedition might cause France to make sacrifices out of proportion to
her resources in men and money, and asked how the Government expected
to recuperate the expenditure incurred in Syria.