Insurgent "Coöperation"
I have previously [72] called attention to the minutes of a session
of the Hongkong junta held on May 4, 1898, from which it indirectly
appears that the Filipino leaders at that time hoped to secure arms
at the expense of the Americans and purposed to attack them later if
it seemed advisable.
The treacherous policy then outlined was never departed from by
Aguinaldo and his associates, who sailed for Manila with their eyes
wide open, knowing full well that they had been promised nothing;
prepared to match their wits against those of Admiral Dewey, and
intent on deceiving him and on securing from him arms to be used
first against the Spaniards and later against the Americans, after
they had been employed to help bring about the downfall of Spain.
There exists a significant circular signed "J.M.B." [73] believed
to have been an outright forgery, both from its tenor and from the
fact that the signature "J.M.B." is not in the handwriting of Basa's
letter hereinbefore quoted.
It contains the following statements:--
"The true patriots have organized a committee to which
I belong, naming Aguinaldo as President and Agoncillo as
Vice-President. The latter and three others have commenced
diplomatic negotiations with the Admiral and American Consul,
and we infer that they are trying to make colonies of us,
although they said they would give us independence. The
Committee deemed it advisable to simulate belief, at the same
time equipping ourselves with arms.
"We have accepted arms offered by the Admiral which will be
disembarked in the Philippines by the squadron.
"A part of our forces will aid the Americans by fighting with
them in order to conceal our real intentions, and part will
be held in reserve. If America triumphs and proposes a colony,
we shall reject such offer and rise in arms.
"A separate expedition will disembark at whatever point may
be considered suitable.
"José Alejandrino embarked with the American squadron in
order to give secret instructions to the Chiefs.
"Be very cautious about this exceedingly delicate point;
you will communicate with prudent and intelligent chiefs who
will recognize the gravity of the subject." [74]
Here, then, in a faked-up letter on which Basa's initials were forged
in order to gain the prestige of his name for this treacherous plan,
we have definitely set forth the purpose of the Filipinos to deceive
the Americans by allowing a part of the Insurgent force to fight with
them, and then to attack them.
Reference has already been made to Agoncillo's advice to Aguinaldo,
given under date of August 26, 1898, to the effect that friendly
relations should be maintained with the Americans until the diplomatic
negotiations at Paris should end; that an effort should be made
to find out the future status of the islands "by deceitful means,"
and that confidence should never be put in the Americans.
Aguinaldo put the whole matter in a nutshell in a postscript to this
letter, saying:--
"You should issue an order commanding that all our chiefs
should employ a policy of friendship toward the Americans until
our status is defined; but said order should be confidentially
given. Try to mislead them." [75]
Bray also very strongly advised awaiting the results of the Paris
conference. [76]
Blount claims that the Filipinos hoped that the Treaty of Paris
would leave their country to them as it left Cuba to the Cubans,
[77] and adds that having helped us take the city of Manila, they
"felt that they had been 'given the double cross,'" "believed that
the Americans had been guilty of a duplicity rankly Machiavellian,
and that was the cause of the war." [78]
The quotations already given from Insurgent records show plainly
that the principal thing for which the Filipinos were waiting was
the ousting of Spain from the Philippines by the United States; those
which follow show that war was by no means inevitable as a result of
a a decision at Paris adverse to Filipino hopes, for the question of
whether a United States protectorate, or even annexation to the United
States, might be considered, was left open to a very late date. [79]
It has been claimed not only that the Insurgents whipped the Spaniards
without our assistance, but whipped them so thoroughly that Spanish
sovereignty had practically disappeared from the islands at the time
Manila surrendered. It has further been alleged that "decrepit"
Spain "could not possibly have sent any reinforcements to the
Philippines. Besides, the Filipinos would have 'eaten them up.'" [80]
But the Filipinos had fought Spain before and were by no means
sanguine. Their more intelligent and reasonable men clearly foresaw
that they could not win unaided. Señor Antonio Regidor was at the
time residing in London. He was a Filipino of unusual intelligence and
exceptionally good education. He took a keen interest in the situation,
and on July 28, 1898, telegraphed Agoncillo as follows:--
"In the name of the Filipinos, you should immediately send
a telegraphic message to MacKinley, requesting him not to
abandon the islands, after having fought as brothers for a
common cause. Pledge him our unconditional adhesion, especially
of well-to-do people. To return to Spain, in whatever form,
would mean annihilation, perpetual anarchy. Filipinos en
masse should visit the consuls at Hongkong, Singapore. London
commerce support it. Influence Aguinaldo to accept American
flag, flying it everywhere, thus obliging them to remain." [81]
This leaves no room for doubt as to Regidor's views, but Agoncillo
did not share them. He replied on July 29:--
"Provisional government's aspiration is independence. Make
this campaign." [82]
Regidor was not to be persuaded. On July 30 he replied as follows,
addressing his communication to Basa:
"America vacillating as to remaining fears conflicts later with
natives international question other difficulties necessary to
encourage her all of you submit united unconditionally raising
American flag great demonstrations necessary to influence
outside opinion show islands resolved united America high
circles advise in view present circumstances only feasible
programme is protectorate." [83]
Obviously, Agoncillo was somewhat impressed by this cablegram, for
on August 1 in a letter to Aguinaldo he made the following statements
and inquiries:--
"If the American troops leave us alone there, the questions
which will arise are these: Have we sufficient arms to maintain
the war against Spain in order to secure our independence? If
the other nations are opposed to our independence and wish
that we should continue under the Spanish sovereignty,
have we sufficient strength to wage a war and obtain victory
over Spain and over them in the future? If you think that we
have not sufficient strength to fight against them, should
we accept independence under the American protectorate? And
if so, what conditions or advantages should we give to the
United States? You should carefully consider the preceding
questions, and I suggest that you should, in a confidential
manner, consult them with your cabinet-in-banc, as well as
with your private secretary and military chiefs of rank;
and your decision be notified to our representatives abroad
in order that they may know what they must do in their
negotiations. You will see from the telegram addressed to
me by Regidor that he suggests to me to send a message to
MacKinley requesting him not to abandon us, and to submit
to them [the U. S.] unconditionally. As I do not agree with
him and as I cannot take any action which is against the
instructions of the government, I replied to him that the
only desire of our government is independence. This may be
seen from the enclosed telegram. On account of this reply,
he was, I think, somewhat offended, as he afterwards sent a
telegram to Joviales [Basa] instead of to me. The latter,
upon receiving the telegram, convened all the boastful
patriots, and they adopted a resolution to send a message
to MacKinley requesting annexation. Fortunately, in the
meeting there was present Dr. Justo Lucban, who protested
against such measure. In view of this protest, they again
agreed that I should be present in the meeting, since I am
the representative of our government. At the meeting where
I was present, I pointed out the inadvisability of their
resolution, stating, as one of the reasons, that we should
await your instructions in regard to the matter before sending
any message of that character. So the message was not sent;
but I was later informed that Basa had, after all, sent it
yesterday, because he believed that it would not injure our
cause. Upon learning this, I was carried away by passion and
went so far as to say to Basa the following: 'Many of us,
especially myself, think ourselves to be wise, without being
so; politicians for what we hear from others; we claim to be
patriots, but we are only so in words; we wish to be chiefs,
but none of us act in a way worthy of a chief.' To this he
did not reply. Perhaps his conscience accused him of an act
of treachery, since we agreed in the meeting to await your
letter. What union can you expect from this people?" [84]
Note that the Basa here referred to is the man whose initials were
forged on the letter quoted on page 67.
In the course of the above-mentioned letter Agoncillo came back once
more to the question of independence under a protectorate and made
it very clear that at this late day he did not know whether this was
or was not what the Filipinos desired. [85]
On August 21, Apacible obviously did not think that it would be an
easy matter to escape from Spanish domination, much less that the
islands were already rid of it, for he wrote to Mabini that the United
States were likely again to deliver the Filipinos into the hands of
Spain. He said that "if events will be what their telegrams indicate,
we have a dark and bloody future before us. To be again in the hands
of Spain will mean a long and bloody war, and it is doubtful whether
the end will be favourable to us... Spain free from Cuba and her
other colonies will employ her energy to crush us and will send here
the 150,000 men she has in Cuba." [86] Apacible thought that the best
thing was independence under an American protectorate.
On August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo warned Agoncillo that in the United States
he should "not accept any contracts or give any promises respecting
protection or annexation, because we will see first if we can obtain
independence." [87]
Even annexation to the United States was not excluded by Aguinaldo
from the possible accepted solutions, for in outlining the policy of
the Philippine government to Sandico on August 10, 1898, he wrote:--
"The policy of the government is as follows: 1st. To struggle
for the independence of 'the Philippines' as far as our
strength and our means will permit. Protection or annexation
will be acceptable only when it can be clearly seen that the
recognition of our Independence, either by force of arms or
diplomacy, is impossible." [88]
On August 26, 1898, Aguinaldo was still ready to consider annexation
if necessary. [89] He was apparently not sanguine at this time as
to the result of a continued struggle with Spain. At all events,
he wanted the help of the Americans if such a struggle was to come,
and desired to know on what terms it could be had. [90]
Meanwhile the Filipinos in Hongkong who favoured annexation made
themselves heard.
On July 18, 1898, Consul-General Wildman wrote from that place:--
"I believe I know the sentiments of the political leaders
and of the moneyed men among the insurgents, and, in spite
of all statements to the contrary, I know that they are
fighting for annexation to the United States first, and
for independence secondly, if the United States decides to
decline the sovereignty of the Islands. In fact, I have had
the most prominent leaders call on me and say they would not
raise one finger unless I could assure them that the United
States intended to give them United States citizenship if
they wished it." [91]
We have already noted the action of Basa and the Cortez family who
insisted that the Islands must remain American, [92] and that of
Agoncillo, who cabled President McKinley in Aguinaldo's name and his
own, congratulating him on the outcome of the war, commending the
occupation of Manila, and assuring the people of the United States
of the allegiance and unquestioning support of the Filipinos, [93]
but it is to be feared that the sending of this cablegram was only
one more move in the Insurgent game of deceit.
There were annexationists in Manila as well as in Hongkong. [94]
Indeed we know that some of the strongest and best of the Filipinos
there were in favour of it.
Felipe Buencamino, writing in 1901, said:--
"In June of 1898, Don Cayetano Arellano [95] addressed to
Don Felipe Buencamino and Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista a
letter written from the town of Pagsanján, province of Laguna,
in reply to one addressed to him by those two gentlemen. In
this letter Don Cayetano outlined the idea of union with the
United States and said: 'Avoid all doing and undoing, and
when America has established a stable order of affairs, then
it will be time enough to make laws.' Mabini, whose influence
at that time was in the ascendant in Aguinaldo's government,
paid no heed to this wise advice. In October of 1898, while
the Philippine government was established in Malolos, and
before congress had promulgated a Philippine constitution,
Messrs. Arellano and Pardo [96] still more earnestly advocated
union with America, the first as secretary of foreign affairs
and the latter as chief diplomat. Their plan consisted in
asking the United States to acknowledge the independence
of the country under a protectorate through the mediation
of General Otis, and this plan was accepted at a cabinet
meeting by Don Emilio Aguinaldo. But on the following day
Sandico came and told Aguinaldo that he had had a conference
with the Japanese consul and had been told by him: 'that if
Aguinaldo would support absolute independence the Japanese
Government would help.' Aguinaldo believed Sandico's story
(which turned out to be absolutely false) and did not carry
out the resolution adopted by the cabinet. Messrs. Arellano
and Pardo, after this affront, separated themselves from
the Malolos government. Aguinaldo told me afterwards that
he had received a letter from Agoncillo, dated Washington,
assuring him that a majority of the American people were
inclined to acknowledge the independence of the Philippines
and of Cuba." [97]
But annexationists were not confined, in the Philippines, to the
vicinity of Manila.
As late as September 6 Consul Williams reported that a delegation from
four thousand Visayan soldiers, a delegation which also represented
southern business interests, had come to him and pledged loyalty to
annexation. [98]
Clearly, then, the situation early in September was as follows: All
were agreed that the assistance of the United States was necessary
in getting rid of Spanish sovereignty.
Under the plan of Aguinaldo and his followers friendly relations were
to be maintained with the United States, if possible, until Spain
was ousted from her Philippine territory, and then they were to "show
their teeth," and see "who was deceiving whom," resorting to "force of
arms" if necessary. Protection or annexation would be accepted only
when it could be clearly seen that the recognition of independence,
won either by force of arms or by diplomacy, was impossible.
Other influential and patriotic Filipinos favored annexation to the
United States or a United States protectorate, but their views were
in the end ignored by Aguinaldo and his following, and as the latter
had the guns their ideas prevailed.
The Treaty of Paris, which terminated Spanish sovereignty in the
Philippines, was signed on December 10, 1898. It is important to
bear this date in mind later, when considering the Insurgent records
relative to the preparations which were so carefully made for attacking
the American troops.
And now let us consider the actual facts as to the coöperation alleged
to have been asked by Americans and given by Filipinos. The following
points are not in dispute:--
Pratt asked Aguinaldo to coöperate with Dewey.
Aguinaldo was taken to Manila with the understanding that he would
do so.
Dewey assisted Aguinaldo by destroying the main Spanish fleet; by
bringing him and his associates back to the Philippines; by furnishing
them arms and ammunition; by blockading Manila and by keeping at a safe
distance the Spanish mosquito fleet, which would have made dangerous,
or impossible, the landing of the arms subsequently imported by
the Insurgents.
Aguinaldo successfully attacked the Spanish garrisons in the provinces
and used the arms and ammunition captured, or brought in by deserters,
to equip a force which surrounded and attacked Manila, drove large
numbers of people into the walled city, thus rendering the position
of the Spanish garrison very difficult in the face of a possible
bombardment, and prevented this garrison from betaking itself to the
provinces, as it might otherwise have done, leaving Manila to shift
for itself.
Aguinaldo was powerless to take the place by assault.
It lay at the mercy of Dewey's guns, and it would have been possible
for the Admiral to take it at any time, but he could not at first
have garrisoned it with United States forces, and never thought of
attempting to use Insurgent forces for this purpose.
Did Dewey really want or need Aguinaldo's help? Let us consider his
testimony on the subject:--
"_Senator Carmack_. You did want a man there who could organize
and rouse the people?
"_Admiral Dewey_. I didn't want anybody. I would like to say
now that Aguinaldo and his people were forced on me by Consul
Pratt and Consul Wildman; I didn't do anything--
"_Senator Carmack_. Did they have any power to force him
upon you?
"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; they had in a way. They had not the
official power, but one will yield after a while to constant
pressure. I did not expect anything of them; I did not
think they would do anything. I would not have taken them;
I did not want them; I did not believe in them; because,
when I left Hongkong, I was led to suppose that the country
was in a state of insurrection, and that at my first gun,
as Mr. Williams put it, there would be a general uprising,
and I thought these half dozen or dozen refugees at Hongkong
would play a very small part in it." [99]
The picture of the poor admiral, busy getting his fleet ready
for battle, pestered by officious consuls on the one hand and by
irresponsible Filipinos on the other, is pathetic; but it had its
humorous features, which were not lost on the Admiral himself. I
quote the following:--
"_Senator Patterson_. Was there any communication between
you and Pratt in which the matter of a written pledge or
agreement with Aguinaldo was discussed with reference to the
Philippine Islands?
"_Admiral Dewey_. No.
"_Senator Patterson_. What became of the correspondence,
Admiral, if you know?
"_Admiral Dewey_. It is all in the Navy Department. When I
turned over my command my official correspondence was all
sent to the Navy Department.
"_Senator Patterson_. You retained all of your letters from
any United States officials?
"_Admiral Dewey_. No; they went to the Department.
"_Senator Patterson_. I mean you did not destroy them.
"_Admiral Dewey_. No; I did not destroy them.
"_Senator Patterson_. And you turned them over to the Navy
Department?
"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; our regulations require that. I may say
that for my own information I kept copies of certain telegrams
and cablegrams. I don't think I kept copies of Mr. Pratt's
letters, as I did not consider them of much value. He seemed to
be a sort of busybody there and interfering in other people's
business and I don't think his letters impressed me.
"_Senator Patterson_. He was the consul-general?
"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; but he had nothing to do with the
attack on Manila, you know.
"_Senator Patterson_. I understand that.
"_Admiral Dewey_. I received lots of advice, you understand,
from many irresponsible people.
"_Senator Patterson_. But Pratt was the consul-general of
the Government there?
"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; he was consul-general.
"_Senator Patterson_. And he communicated with you, giving you
such information as he thought you might be interested in,
and among other information he gave you was this concerning
Aguinaldo?
"_Admiral Dewey_. I don't remember; no, I really don't
remember his telling me anything about Aguinaldo more than
that cablegram there, and I said he might come. And you see
how much importance I attached to him; I did not wait for him.
"_Senator Patterson_. What you said was: 'Tell Aguinaldo to
come as soon as possible.'
"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; but I did not wait a moment for him.
"_Senator Patterson_. Yes; but there was a reason for that.
"_Admiral Dewey_. I think more to get rid of him than
anything else.
"_Senator Carmack_. Rid of whom?
"_Admiral Dewey_. Of Aguinaldo and the Filipinos. They were
bothering me. I was very busy getting my squadron ready for
battle, and these little men were coming on board my ship at
Hongkong and taking a good deal of my time, and I did not
attach the slightest importance to anything they could do,
and they did nothing; that is, none of them went with me
when I went to Mirs Bay. There had been a good deal of talk,
but when the time came they did not go. One of them didn't
go because he didn't have any toothbrush.
"_Senator Burrows_. Did he give that as a reason?
"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; he said, 'I have no toothbrush.'" [100]
However, Dewey ultimately yielded to the pressure exercised on him by
Pratt and Wildman, and allowed Aguinaldo and some of his associates to
be brought to Manila. Having them there he proposed to get assistance
from them, not as allies, but as a friendly force attacking a common
enemy, in its own way.
Let us continue with his testimony as to cooperation between Aguinaldo
and the naval forces of the United States:--
"_Senator Patterson_. Then, Admiral, until you knew that
they were going to send land forces to your assistance you
thought there was a necessity to organize the Filipinos into
land forces, did you?
"_Admiral Dewey_. No; not a necessity.
"_Senator Patterson_. You thought it might prove of value
to you?
"_Admiral Dewey_. I testified here, I think, in a way that
answers that. I said to Aguinaldo, 'There is our enemy;
now, you go your way and I will go mine; we had better act
independently.' That was the wisest thing I ever said.
"_Senator Patterson_. But you stated that you were using
these people and they were permitted to organize, that you
might use them.
"_Admiral Dewey_. They were assisting us.
"_Senator Patterson_. Very well, they were to assist you. Did
you not either permit them or encourage them--I do not care
which term you use--to organize into an army, such as it was,
that they might render you such assistance as you needed?
"_Admiral Dewey_. They were assisting us, but incidentally
they were fighting their enemy; they were fighting an enemy
which had been their enemy for three hundred years.
"_Senator Patterson_. I understand that, Admiral.
"_Admiral Dewey_. While assisting us they were fighting their
own battles, too.
"_The Chairman_. You were encouraging insurrection against
a common enemy with which you were at war?
"_Admiral Dewey_. I think so. I had in my mind an illustration
furnished by the civil war. I was in the South in the civil
war, and the only friends we had in the South were the negroes,
and we made use of them; they assisted us on many occasions. I
had that in mind; I said these people were our friends, and
'we have come here and they will help us just exactly as the
negroes helped us in the civil war.'
"_Senator Patterson_. The negroes were expecting their
freedom--
"_Admiral Dewey_. The Filipinos were slaves, too.
"_Senator Patterson_. What were the Filipinos expecting?
"_Admiral Dewey_. They wanted to get rid of the Spaniards;
I do not think they looked much beyond that. I cannot recall
but I have in mind that the one thing they had in their minds
was to get rid of the Spaniards and then to accept us, and
that would have occurred--I have thought that many times--if
we had had troops to occupy Manila on the 1st day of May
before the insurrection got started; these people would have
accepted us as their friends, and they would have been our
loyal friends--I don't know for how long, but they would have
been our friends then.
"_Senator Patterson_. You learned from Pratt, or Wildman,
or Williams, very early, did you not, that the Filipinos
wanted their own country and to rule their own country;
that that is what they were expecting?
"_Admiral Dewey_. I heard from Williams that there was an
insurrection there against the Spaniards. The Spaniards were
very cruel to them, and I think they did not look much beyond
getting rid of them. There was one, Dr. Rizal, who had the
idea of independence, but I don't think that Aguinaldo had
much idea of it.
"_Senator Carmack_. Then what useful purpose did the Filipino
army serve; why did you want the Filipino army at all?
"_Admiral Dewey_. I did not want them.
"_Senator Carmack_. Did you not want the Filipino forces?
"_Admiral Dewey_. No, not really. It was their own idea coming
over there. We could have taken the city at any moment we
had the troops to occupy it."
Admiral Dewey has made the following statements relative to the
importance of Aguinaldo's military operations:--
"Then he began operations toward Manila, and he did wonderfully
well. He whipped the Spaniards battle after battle, and finally
put one of those old smoothbore guns on a barge, and he wanted
to take this up--wanted me to tow it up so he could attack the
city with it. I said, 'Oh, no, no; we can do nothing until
our troops come.' I knew he could not take the city without
the assistance of the navy, without my assistance, and I knew
that what he was doing--driving the Spaniards in--was saving
our own troops, because our own men perhaps would have had to
do that same thing. He and I were always on the most friendly
terms; we had never had any differences. He considered me
as his liberator, as his friend. I think he had the highest
admiration for us because we had whipped the Spaniards who
had been riding them down for three hundred years.
* * * * *
"_Senator Patterson_ (continuing). You sent this short dispatch
to the Secretary of the Navy:--
"'Aguinaldo, the revolutionary leader, visited the _Olympia_
yesterday. He expects to make general attack on May 31. Doubt
his ability to succeed. Situation remains unchanged.'
"Do you recall that visit?
"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes.
"_Senator Patterson_. He came to tell you, did he, that he
was going to make a general attack, and you--
"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes.
"_Senator Patterson_. And you doubted his ability to succeed?
"_Admiral Dewey_. And he wanted me to assist him. He wanted
me to tow one of his guns up into position. I knew he could
not take the city; of course he could not.
"_Senator Patterson_. Did you urge that he should not make
the attack?
"_Admiral Dewey_. I do not remember that; very likely I did.
"_Senator Patterson_. And was he not persuaded or restrained
by you from doing so?
"_Admiral Dewey_. I do not remember; but it is very likely. I
did not want to see a lot of them killed unnecessarily,
because I knew they could not take that walled city. They had
no artillery, and they could not take it, I knew very well,
and I wanted the situation to remain as it was until our
troops came to occupy it.
"_Senator Patterson_. But you found that whenever you expressed
a strong objection to anything being done at that time that
Aguinaldo yielded to your request?
"_Admiral Dewey_. Up to the time the army came he did
everything I requested. I had not much to do with him after
the army came." [101]
But Dewey's influence over Aguinaldo was not sufficient to prevent
his looting, as the following extracts from his testimony show:--
"_Senator Patterson_. Is that what you mean when you say he
looted--that he made reprisals for his army, took provisions
and whatever was necessary? That is what you meant?
"_Admiral Dewey_. That is one part of it.
"_Senator Carmack_. This was taking provisions for the use
of the army?
"_Admiral Dewey_. That is one thing he did.
"_Senator Carmack_. You said you did not object to that at
the time?
"_Admiral Dewey_. No. It would have been useless; he got
beyond me very soon--he got out of my hands very soon. [102]
"_Senator Carmack_. You said yesterday you suspected that
Aguinaldo took the lion's share of the provisions that were
gathered for the army. What was the ground upon which you
made that accusation?
"_Admiral Dewey_. Because he was living in Malolos like a
prince, like a king, in a way that could only have come about
by his taking the lion's share. Then, in regard to his looting,
I repeat what I said yesterday. He began within forty-eight
hours after he landed in Cavite to capture and take everything
he wanted. I know these things of my own knowledge, because
I saw the loot brought in; and I know that every dollar that
was taken from the workingmen at the navy-yard was taken at
the threat of death. [103]
* * * * *
"_Senator Patterson_. Do you believe in this proclamation he
was uttering falsehoods to the Filipino people?
"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; I do absolutely. I think he was there
for gain--for money--that independence had never up to that
time entered his head. He was there for loot and money. That
is what I believe, since you ask me my belief; I believe that
implicitly. [104]
* * * * *
"_Senator Patterson_. And you found nothing to cause any
doubt as to his loyalty up to the time until after Manila
surrendered?
"_Admiral Dewey_. His loyalty to whom?
"_Senator Patterson_. To you and to the cause for which he
was fighting?
"_Admiral Dewey_. I began to suspect he was not loyal to us
about the time our troops arrived, when he demurred at moving
out of Cavite to make room for our troops.
"_Senator Patterson_. Do you mean by that that you feared
that he was commencing to think more of independence than
the success of the American cause?
"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes." [105]
We have seen to what extent Aguinaldo coöperated with the marine
forces of the United States. Now let us examine the claim that he
cooperated with the land forces after their arrival.
One of the things which the Insurgents are said to have accomplished
was the maintenance of an effective land blockade which prevented the
entrance of provisions, and produced a very serious food shortage. Both
Otis and Dewey have stated that they did this, but we learn from the
Insurgent records how erroneous was this conclusion. [106]
The landing of the American troops for the attack on Manila was
not actively opposed by the Filipinos, but it was narrowly and
distrustfully watched.
Necessary transportation requested by General Anderson was ultimately
furnished by Aguinaldo, but only grudgingly after a three weeks'
delay, and as a result of threats that it would be seized if not
voluntarily supplied.
The necessary positions in the trenches around Manila from which to
make the attack on that city were, in part at least, yielded to the
Americans by the Filipinos upon the request of the former.
The Insurgents twice informed the Spaniards in advance of projected
American attacks.
They carried out their own attack on the city without regard to the
plans, or the requests, of the Americans. They secretly treated with
the Spaniards in the endeavour to secure the surrender of the city
to themselves.
After the capitulation to the Americans had been agreed upon, and
on the very morning of the day of the surrender, they endeavoured
to push home an attack. Disregarding the request that they keep out
of the final assault, they crowded into the city with, and after,
the American troops. They fired on Spanish soldiers on the city wall
while a flag of truce was flying, provoking a return fire which killed
and wounded American soldiers.
They demanded for themselves Malacañang palace and other buildings
and a share in "the war booty." They promptly looted the parts of the
city which they occupied, and ultimately retired from their positions
within the city limits on the evening of their last day of grace
after being warned by General Otis that if they did not do so they
would be driven out.
I will now quote from the records in support of these statements.
The following is the programme of "coöperation" outlined to Aguinaldo
by Bray in a letter dated June 30, 1898:--
"I am very anxious to receive the news of the capitulation of
Manila and I hope that General Augustín will be obliged to turn
over his sword to you in person and not to the Americans. You
are by right entitled to it and I should like to see it so from
a political standpoint, as I am of the opinion that you should
declare the independence of the Philippines before the arrival
of General Merritt, appointed by the President to be Governor
with full powers to establish a provisional government.
* * * * *
Any attempt on the part of the Americans to garrison the
interior towns with their troops or any other act which might
be construed as a conquest, should meet with resistance.
* * * * *
"After having written these lines, I had another conference
with Mr. St. Clair of the Free Press, who sent for me regarding
the question of independence. He has had a consultation with
the Supreme Judge of this place, and he is of opinion that you
should proclaim independence at once, notwithstanding what
Admiral Dewey and Consul Williams say against it, and this
should be done before General Merritt can arrive. A Government
having been thus constituted in due form, the Americans would
have no right to invade the Philippines without committing a
violation of international law. They are no longer fighting
against the Spaniards against whom they declared war. The
advice of Consul Williams to delay this, is a diplomatic play
to gain time until the arrival of General Merritt, because he
is well aware of the false position said General would find
himself in. The key to the situation is now in your hands;
do not permit any one to take it away from you. The Americans
have done nothing but bombard and destroy the Spanish fleet
on the high seas; they have not conquered any land, but in
the meantime the control of the Philippines has passed by
conquest from the hands of the Spaniards and the Americans
have no right to enter further. Under certain conditions and
guarantees, permit the landing of American troops; but be
very careful, they must not be permitted to land until they
execute an agreement with the duly constituted government of
the Philippines, respecting all its institutions, and they must
under no pretext whatever be permitted to garrison any place
except the municipal limits of Manila, Cebú, and Iloílo, and
even therein care should be observed ... You must not permit a
single soldier to land without having these guarantees." [107]
When General Anderson, with the first United States troops of
occupation, arrived at Manila Bay, Aguinaldo did not call on him,
as an "ally" might have been expected to do. Later, however, Admiral
Dewey and General Anderson went to see Aguinaldo, but without any
of the ceremony of an official military call, the Admiral saying to
General Anderson:--
"Do not take your sword or put on your uniform, but just put
on your blouse. Do not go with any ceremony." [108]
And they went in that way.
On July 4, 1898, General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo definitely requesting
his coöperation in the following words:--
"For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations
with you, and to have you and your force coöperate with us
in the military operations against the Spanish forces." [109]
On July 5 Aguinaldo replied, thanking General Anderson for the
"amicable sentiments which the natives of these islands
inspire in the Great North American nation," [110]
and also for his desire to have friendly relations with the Filipinos
and treat them with justice, courtesy and kindness. There is,
however, not a word relative to coöperation in his reply, and
Anderson apparently never renewed his request for coöperation in
military operations.
On July 6 he wrote to Aguinaldo again, saying:--
"I am encouraged by the friendly sentiment expressed by
Your Excellency in your welcome letter received on the 5th
instant, to endeavour to come to a definite understanding,
which I hope will be advantageous to both. Very soon we expect
large additional land forces, and it must be apparent to you
as a military officer that we will require much more room to
camp our soldiers and also store room for our supplies. For
this I would like to have Your Excellency's advice and
coöperation, as you are best acquainted with the resources
of the country." [111]
To this letter there was no reply. However, in a letter dated July
9, 1898, to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army, General
Anderson says of Aguinaldo:--
"When we first landed he seemed very suspicious, and not at
all friendly, but I have now come to a better understanding
with him and he is much more friendly and seems willing to
coöperate. But he has declared himself Dictator and President,
and is trying to take Manila without our assistance. This
is not probable, but if he can effect his purpose he will,
I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our part to establish
a provisional government." [112]
Evidently, however, coöperation, even in the matter of getting
necessary transportation, did not materialize, for on July 17
S. R. Jones, Chief Quartermaster, wrote Aguinaldo as follows:--
"We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for
transportation, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For
all this we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We
find so far that the native population are not willing to give
us this assistance as promptly as required. But we must have
it, and if it becomes necessary we will be compelled to send
out parties to seize what we may need. We would regret very
much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our
nation has spent millions in money to send forces here to
expel the Spaniards and to give good government to the whole
people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight.
"General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are
here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor
and material at the current market prices. We are prepared
to purchase five hundred horses at a fair price, but cannot
undertake to bargain for horses with each individual owner."
Aguinaldo sent this letter by a staff officer to General Anderson
inquiring whether it was sent by authority of the latter, who then
indorsed on it in a statement that it was. Nevertheless, Major Jones
reported on July 20 that it was impossible to secure transportation
except upon Aguinaldo's order and that the natives had removed their
cart wheels and hidden them, from which it is to be inferred that
the transportation requested had not been furnished.
Obviously General Anderson was informed that Aguinaldo had given
orders against furnishing the transportation desired, for on July 21
he wrote the Adjutant-General of the Army as follows:--
"Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an
elaborate system of military government, under his assumed
authority as Dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being
given us, except by his order. As Go this last, I have written
to him that our requisitions on the country for horses, ox
carts, fuel, and bamboo (to make scaling ladders) must be
filled, and that he must aid in having them filled."
On July 23 General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo as follows:--
"_General_: When I came here three weeks ago I requested Your
Excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means
of transportation for the American Army, as it was to fight
the cause of your people. So far we have received no response.
"As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make
requisition on you for five hundred horses and fifty oxen and
ox carts. If you cannot secure these I will have to pass you
and make requisition directly on the people.
"I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience.
"I remain with great respect, etc." [113]
To this letter, Aguinaldo replied as follows:--
"Replying to your letter of yesterday, I have the honor to
manifest to Your Excellency that I am surprised beyond measure
at that which you say to me in it, lamenting the non-receipt
of any response relative to the assistance that you have asked
of me in the way of horses, carabaos, and carts, because I
did reply through the bearer that I was disposed to issue
proper orders whenever you advised me of the number of these,
giving me notice in advance.
"I have sent orders to the nearest provinces in order that
within the shortest time possible horses be brought for sale,
but I cannot assure Your Excellency that we will have the
number of 500 that you need, because there are not many horses
in this vicinity, owing to deaths from epizoötic diseases in
January, February, and March last.
"Whenever we have them collected, I shall have the pleasure
to advise Your Excellency.
"I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50 carts that
I shall place at your disposition when you need them, provided
you give me previous notice four days in advance." [114]
General Anderson replied:--
"Your favour of the 26th ultimo in relation to requisitions
for cattle, horses, etc., is satisfactory I regret that
there should have been any misunderstanding about it. The
people to whom we applied even for the hiring of carromatas,
etc., told our people that they had orders to supply nothing
except by your orders. I am pleased to think that this was
a misapprehension on their part." [115]
From this series of communications it appears that it took three
weeks, and a very direct threat to seize transportation, to bring
about Aguinaldo's promise of assistance in securing it. What help
had he given, meanwhile, in other matters?
On July 14, 1899, General Anderson wrote asking him to assist American
officers in making reconnaissance of the approaches to Manila, and
to favor them with his advice. [116]
On July 19, 1899, he again wrote Aguinaldo asking him to allow Major
J. F. Bell, [117] who was gathering information for General Merritt,
to see maps, and further requesting him to place at Bell's disposal any
available information about the force of the enemy and the topography
of the country. [118]
On July 21 he wrote again asking for passes for a Lieutenant
E. I. Bryan and party, who were making a reconnaissance. [119]
Such records as I have been able to find do not show what response,
if any, Aguinaldo made to these several requests, but General
Anderson's original views as to the willingness of the Insurgents to
coöperate with him underwent an early change, for on July 18, 1898,
in a letter to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army he
makes the following statement:--
"The Insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has declared himself Dictator
and self-appointed President. He has declared martial law
and promulgated a minute method of rule and administration
under it.
"We have observed all official military courtesies, and he
and his followers express great admiration and gratitude to
the great American republic of the north, yet in many ways
they obstruct our purposes and are using every effort to take
Manila without us.
"I suspect also that Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with
the Spanish authorities, as his confidential aide is in
Manila." [120]
This suspicion was entirely justified, as we shall see later.
On July 24 Aguinaldo wrote a letter to General Anderson in effect
warning him not to disembark American troops in places conquered by
the Filipinos from the Spaniards without first communicating in writing
the places to be occupied and the object of the occupation. [121]
Aguinaldo's assumption of civil authority on July 15, 1899, did not
pass unnoticed. On July 21 General Anderson wrote the Adjutant-General
of the army concerning it:--
"His assumption of civil authority I have ignored, and let
him know verbally that I could, and would, not recognize it,
while I did not recognize him as a military leader. It may
seem strange that I have made no formal protest against
his proclamation as Dictator, his declaration of martial
law, and publication and execution of a despotic form of
government. I wrote such a protest, but did not publish it,
at Admiral Dewey's request, and also for fear of wounding
the susceptibilities of Major-General Merritt, but I have let
it be known in every other way that we do not recognize the
Dictatorship. These people only respect force and firmness. I
submit, with all deference, that we have heretofore underrated
the natives. They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have
a civilization of their own; and although insignificant in
appearance, are fierce fighters, and for a tropical people
they are industrious. A small detail of natives will do more
work in a given time than a regiment of volunteers."
Because he was invited as general rather than as president, Aguinaldo
refused to attend a parade and review on the 4th of July. This fact
is, in itself, an answer to his claim that the Americans were tacitly
recognizing his pretensions.
After referring to this incident, Blount says:--
"On subsequent anniversaries of the day in the Philippines
it was deemed wise simply to prohibit the reading of our
declaration before gatherings of the Filipino people. It
saved discussion." [122]
This statement is incorrect. I myself was present the following
year when the declaration was read on the Luneta to a considerable
gathering of Filipinos among whom were many school children, and it
has often been read since.
The landing of American troops at Parañaque and their going into
camp near that town on July 15 caused much excitement, and a lively
interchange of telegrams between Insurgent officers followed. [123]
They were suspicious of the intentions of the Americans, [124] and
trouble soon began.
On July 16 General Noriel telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--
"An American has come here who says that he is a Colonel of
the Army whom we should obey; and that it is your desire. We
did not listen to him, awaiting your order."
On the back of the telegram is written the following:--
"Reply.--You should not obey. What this American Colonel says
is a lie. Be cautious so as not to be deceived. You should
require from him proof. Be always vigilant, but upright,
also all of the officers and soldiers must be strict and not
timid." [125]
Obviously there was no real coöperation between American and Filipino
troops at this time. General Anderson ignored General Aguinaldo's
request for information as to places where American troops were to
land in Filipino territory and the objects of disembarking them.
The Americans proceeded with their plans for the attack upon Manila,
and it became desirable to occupy some of the Insurgent trenches. On
July 29 Arévalo telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--
"In conference with General Greene I asked for an official
letter, a copy of which I send you: 'Headquarters 2nd Brigade,
U. S. Expeditionary Forces, Camp Dewey, near Manila, July 29th,
1898. _El Señor Noriel, General de Brigade_. Sir: In pursuance
of our conversation of yesterday and the message which Captain
Arévalo brought to me during the night, I beg to inform you
that my troops will occupy the intrenchments between the Camino
Real and the beach, leaving camp for that purpose at 8.00
o'clock this morning. I will be obliged if you will give the
necessary orders for the withdrawal of your men. Thanking you
for your courtesy, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient
servant, _F. V. Greene, Brigadier General_, commanding.'" [126]
This clear direct declaration of intention by General Greene is the
actual transaction referred to by Blount as "Jockeying the Insurgents
out of their trenches." He bases his statements concerning the matter
on a newspaper report.
The attitude of the army officers in the matter of obtaining permission
to occupy the trenches needed in preparing for the assault on the
city could not have been more correct.
On August 10 General Merritt gave the following emphatic instructions
relative to the matter:--
"No rupture with Insurgents. This is imperative. Can ask
Insurgent generals or Aguinaldo for permission to occupy
their trenches, but if refused not to use force."
On the same day General Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo, asking
permission to occupy a trench facing blockhouse No. 14, in order
to place artillery to destroy it. The permission was granted on the
following day.
During the early part of August, Aguinaldo seems to have avoided
conferences with American officers. On the second of the month Mabini
wrote him how he had put off Admiral Dewey's aid with a false statement
that he did not know Aguinaldo's whereabouts. [127]
The landing of American troops at Parañaque for the assault on Manila
led to the concentration of Insurgent troops at the neighbouring town
of Bacoor. [128]
On August 8 Fernando Acevedo [129] wrote to General Pío del Pilar
that the Americans were going to attack the next day and that,--
"It is requisite and necessary before their attack takes place
to-morrow, that you to-morrow or to-night annihilate them,
sparing none, for the way they have deceived us, and will
again without fail, in the contract signed by Sr. Emilio;
and convince yourself, my friend, that it is necessary to do
this; and when it is done the whole world will wonder and say
that we have done well, and will not be able to give out that
the people here are fools spending the time sucking their
fingers." [130]
Worse yet, information was sent to the Spaniards of the proposed
American attack on the 13th instant, as is shown by the following
letter:--
"(Battalion of Cazadores, No. 2. Expeditionary. Office of
the Lieutenant-Colonel. Private.)
"_Señor Don Artemio Ricarte_: [131]
"My Dear Sir: I have received to-day your kind letter giving
warning of the attack on Manila, and I thank you for your
personal interest in me, which, on my part, I reciprocate. I
assure you that I am yours, most truly and sincerely,
"_Luis Martinez Alcobendas_.
"_Singalon_, August 10, 1898." [132]
According to Taylor, this was not the first occurrence of this
sort. He says:--
"The officers of the United States Army who believed that
the insurgents were informing the Spaniards of the American
movements were right. Sastrón has printed a letter from Pío
del Pilar, dated July 30, to the Spanish officer commanding
at Santa Ana, in which Pilar said that Aguinaldo had told him
that the Americans would attack the Spanish lines on August 2
and advised that the Spaniards should not give way, but hold
their positions. Pilar added, however, that if the Spaniards
should fall back on the walled city and surrender Santa Ana
to himself, he would hold it with his own men. Aguinaldo's
information was correct, and on August 2 eight American
soldiers were killed or wounded by the Spanish fire." [133]
Taylor continues:--
"And yet Aguinaldo claimed to be an ally of the Americans. It
is not probable that these were the only two such letters
written. Aguinaldo had by this time found out that although he
could defeat the scattered Spanish detachments, he could not
defeat the Spanish force holding the lines of Manila. He did
not want the Americans in the Philippines. They were in his
way, and he had already made up his mind that if they did not
give him what he wanted, he would drive them out by force. He
saw very early that it was extremely improbable that he should
obtain from them what he wanted; accordingly all losses both
among Spaniards and Americans would, from Aguinaldo's point
of view, inure to his benefit. The best possible thing for
him would be to hold his own force intact while they wore
each other out. The Spanish losses, small as they were,
occurred in front of the American lines, not in front of the
Filipinos. There is no reason, accordingly, for believing
that the Filipinos suffered heavily. To arrange that the
Spaniards should inflict losses upon the Americans, while he
saved his own men, showed ingenuity on the part of Aguinaldo;
but it was decidedly not the conduct of an ally." [134]
The feeling toward the American troops at this time is further shown
by a telegram from General Pío del Pilar, sent from San Pedro Macati
on August 10, 1898:--
"Commandant Acebedo writes that the Spaniards are about
to surrender because they want to turn over the place; the
Americans want them to leave only the batteries and say that
they will station themselves in said batteries. It appears
that they want to deceive us; they do not want to give us
arms, and if they do not give us arms, we shall attack them
and drive them out. I await your reply." [135]
This is perhaps not quite the kind of coöperation that Admiral Dewey
and Generals Anderson and Merritt had expected.
The truth is that the Insurgents were determined to capture Manila for
themselves, not only because of the "war booty," for which they were
hungry, but because of the status which they felt that the taking of
the capital of the Philippines would assure them. The great importance
which they attached to this plan is shown in communications written
by Agoncillo, Aguinaldo and others. [136]
Of conditions at this time, Taylor says:--
"On July 7, Aguinaldo appointed Artemio Ricarte and Pantaleón
García to negotiate the surrender of Manila by the Spaniards
to him (Exhibit 155). On July 5 Pantaleón García was planning
to enter Manila by way of Tondo or of Santa Cruz (P.I.R.,
243.7). On the 9th Aguinaldo ordered that rice should be
gathered from the towns of Manila Province for the use of his
troops in the decisive attack upon Manila which he intended
making in a few days (P.I.R., 1087. 5).
"Aguinaldo, finding that his chance of obtaining Manila for himself was
growing steadily less, now determined to force himself into the city
with the Americans and demand a consideration for the assistance he
had rendered them during the siege. It is true he had assisted them,
but his assistance had not been intentional. It was the result of
the operations he was carrying on for his own ends. The operations of
the Filipinos and the Americans were against Spain as a common enemy
of both; but the operations were not joint operations, and although
their purpose was a common purpose, it was not a mutual one. On August
8 Aguinaldo appointed General Ricarte commander in the operations
about Manila, ordered him to respect the property of all foreigners,
and told him that in case his troops succeeded in entering Manila they
were to carry their flag and plant it there (P.I.R., 703. 2). Judging
from an unsigned draft of a letter, he must have warned the foreign
consuls in Manila about the same time to gather under the protection
of their flags all of their fellow-citizens who had not taken refuge
on the vessels in the bay, so that when his troops entered the city
no foreign lives would be taken, and no foreign property would be
injured. The earnestness with which he urged that all foreigners not
Spaniards should take steps to identify themselves and their property
shows that he considered the persons and property of Spanish civilians
as fair booty of war." [137]
There was certainly no need of Insurgent assistance in the assault
on Manila.
The reports which reached Aguinaldo that the surrender of Manila had
been agreed upon in advance were correct, as is shown by the following
testimony of Admiral Dewey:
"_Senator Patterson_. When did you reach an understanding
with the Spanish commander upon the subject, [138]--how long
before the 12th or 13th of August?
"_Admiral Dewey_. Several days before.
"_Senator Patterson_. To whom did you communicate the
arrangement that you had?
"_Admiral Dewey_. General Merritt and, of course, all of my own
captains--General Merritt, and I think a council of officers on
board of one of the steamers. I think there were several army
officers present when I told the General that; and I may say
here that I do not think General Merritt took much stock in it.
"_Senator Patterson_. What statement did you make to them,
Admiral, in substance?
"_Admiral Dewey_. That the Spaniards were ready to surrender,
but before doing so I must engage one of the outlying forts. I
selected one at Malate, away from the city. [139] They said I
must engage that and fire for a while, and then I was to make
a signal by the international code, 'Do you surrender?' Then
they were to hoist a white flag at a certain bastion; and I
may say now that I was the first one to discover the white
flag. We had 50 people looking for that white flag, but I
happened to be the first one who saw it. I fired for a while,
and then made the signal according to the programme. We could
not see the white flag--it was rather a thick day--but finally
I discovered it on the south bastion; I don't know how long
it had been flying there when I first saw it." [140]
On August 12, the day before Manila surrendered, Buencamino telegraphed
Aguinaldo, urging him in the strongest terms to attack that night so
that Americans might be obliged to ask him to stop, with the result
that the Insurgents would be included in the official negotiations. He
further advised Aguinaldo that he must not suspend his attack because
the Americans suspended theirs. [141]
General Anderson tells us that, on the evening of August 12,
he received an order from General Merritt to notify Aguinaldo to
forbid the Insurgents under his command from entering Manila. This
notification was delivered to Aguinaldo that night, and was received
by him with anger. [142]
On the following morning the Insurgents actually made an independent
attack of their own, as planned. [143] It promptly led to trouble
with the Americans, and at 8 A.M. Aguinaldo received a telegram from
General Anderson sternly warning him not to let his troops enter
Manila without the consent of the American commander on the south
side of the Pasig River. [144]
Aguinaldo apparently took no action in response to this request,
except to direct General Riego de Dios, who was at Cavite, to go
with Buencamino without losing a moment and ask for an explanation,
in writing if possible. [145]
At 10.50 A.M. he telegraphed General Anderson saying that his troops
were being forced, by threats of violence, to retire from positions
which they had taken, and asking Anderson to order his troops to
avoid difficulty with the Insurgent forces. Aguinaldo said that he
had directed his men to aid the American forces if the latter are
attacked by a common enemy, but was discreetly silent on the subject
of their entering Manila. [146]
Fifteen minutes later, at 11.05, he received a reply to his telegram
to General Riego de Dios, in which that officer communicated the
views of Araneta [147] and Buencamino, who had been unable to find
General Anderson. This important communication follows:--
"Most urgent. Araneta and Buencamino having been consulted in
regard to your telegram of to-day, they confirm capitulation,
and in regard to the telegraphic note of General Anderson
they are of the opinion, first that we should continue
hostilities while we ask for an explanation; second, that
explanation should be in the following terms: Inquire reason
for note and ask why our troops are not to enter Manila without
permission of the American commander; third, in case the (terms
of?) capitulation is given as the reason, to answer that we
do not suspend our attempt to enter Manila. Its capitulation
is not favourable to our independence. General Anderson is not
here. General Merritt is probably in Manila. Only Admiral Dewey
is in the Bay. We ask authorization to express our explanation
in the proposed terms and to have a conference with Admiral
Dewey in order to have our claims reach General Merritt." [148]
An endorsement written by Mabini and signed by Aguinaldo on the above
paper reads:--
"I authorize every assertion of right, but state that we
believe that we have the right to enter Manila without
permission as we have a part in the surrender of the
Spaniards. They would not have surrendered if our troops had
not cut off their retreat to the interior. Besides but for us
the landing of troops would have cost them much blood. Obtain
an answer as soon as possible in order to lay a protest before
the consuls in case it is necessary." [149]
Naturally, trouble followed. At 1.30 P.M. General Ricarte telegraphed
to Aguinaldo:--
"Americans wish to put us out. Give directions." [150]
Apparently about the same hour he wired more at length, as follows:--
"Most urgent. American troops rearguard our trenches. Mabolo
and San José warn us that they will fire on us when the time
comes. Impossible to remain there without disagreeing with
them. Since 5 o'clock this morning we have been furiously
attacking. Americans firing incessantly, Spaniards silent. No
losses yet." [151]
At 3.52 he wired again:--
"General Pío del Pilar informs me of the following: 'Come here,
if possible, as our soldiers at the barrio of Concepción
are not allowed to go out and we are prohibited to move
on any farther. We it was who succeeded in capturing that
place. Come here or there will be trouble, since they are
driving me away, and refusing to listen to what I say.' I am
at this very moment going to aforesaid place." [152]
At 5 P.M. another was sent by Ricarte to Aguinaldo as follows:--
"Colonel San Miguel arrived here from Ermita. Regional
Exposition, Agricultural College and other buildings are
ours. Our flag flies already at Ermita. Colonel Agapito Donzón
with his troops is in the Pérez building, Paco. Colonels Julian
Ocampo and Isidoro Tolentino are in the convent of Ermita. All
houses without flag are guarded by our soldiers." [153]
At 6.15 P.M. he telegraphed as follows:--
"I inform you that the chiefs of our troops have reported to
me that our flag at Singalong church (_visita_) was removed by
the Americans and they hoisted theirs instead, not allowing
us to approach thereto. General Pío del Pilar is at present
at the barrio of Concepción. Americans prohibited him to move
on any farther. How can he enter Manila?" [154]
No attention was paid to General Anderson's request that the Insurgent
troops should not enter Manila without permission. They crowded forward
with and after the American forces. Coming out on Bagumbayan drive,
they found American and Spanish troops confronting each other but not
firing, the former on the drive, the latter on the neighbouring city
wall. A flag of truce was waving from the south bastion, nevertheless
the Insurgents fired on the Spanish forces, provoking a return fire
which killed and wounded American soldiers. Of this incident General
Greene has said:--
"At this point the California regiment a short time before
had met some insurgents who had fired at the Spaniards on the
walls, and the latter, in returning the fire, had caused a loss
in the California regiment of 1 killed and 2 wounded." [155]
Some of these matters must have come to the attention of General
Anderson, for he sent Aguinaldo a telegram, received by the latter
at 6.35 P.M., as follows:--
"Dated Ermita Headquarters 2nd Division 13 to
Gen. Aguinaldo. Commanding Filipino Forces.--Manila,
taken. Serious trouble threatened between our forces. Try
and prevent it. Your troops should not force themselves in
the city until we have received the full surrender then we
will negotiate with you.
"_Anderson_, commanding." [156]
It appears that the Insurgent troops took the suburb of Santa Ana,
and captured Spanish and Filipino officers and men. [157]
In view of the known facts, how absurd becomes the following contention
of Aguinaldo, advanced in his "Reseña Verídica:--
"Our own forces could see the American forces land on the beach
of the Luneta and of the Paseo de Santa Lucía. The Spanish
soldiers, who were on the walls of the city, drew the attention
of every one because they did not fire on the former, a mystery
which was explained at nightfall of that day, by the news of
the capitulation of the place by General Señor Jáudenes [158]
to the American General, Mr. Merritt, a capitulation which
the American Generals claimed for themselves, an infraction of
what had been agreed upon with Admiral Dewey, in regard to the
formation of plans for the attack and taking of Manila by the
two armies, American and Filipino, together and in combination.
"This inexplicable line of conduct on the part of the American
officers was made clearer by the telegrams, which General
Anderson addressed to me, from Maytubig on the said 13th day,
requesting that I should order our troops not to enter Manila,
which request was refused, inasmuch as it was contrary to what
was agreed upon, and to the high ends of the Revolutionary
Government, which, on taking upon itself the immense work of
besieging Manila, during the two months and a half, sacrificing
thousands of lives and millions in material interests, could
not surely have done so with any object other than that of
capturing Manila and the Spanish garrison which with firmness
and tenacity defended that place." [159]
On August 14 Aguinaldo telegraphed General Anderson as follows:--
"My troops, who have been for so long besieging Manila,
have always been promised that they could appear in it,
as you know and cannot deny, and for this reason, and on
account of the many sacrifices made of money, and lives, I
do not consider it prudent to issue orders to the contrary,
as they might be disobeyed against my authority. Besides, I
hope that you will allow the troops to enter because we have
given proofs many times of our friendship, ceding our positions
at Parañaque, Pasay, Singálon and Maytubig. Nevertheless,
if it seems best to you, and in order to enter into a frank
and friendly understanding and avoid any disagreeable conflict
before the eyes of the Spaniards, I will commission Don Felipe
Buencamino and others, who will to-day go out from our lines
and hold a conference with you, and that they will be safe
during the conference." [160]
Aguinaldo and his associates pressed the demand for joint
occupation. On August 13 Admiral Dewey and General Merritt informed
the government that since the occupation of Manila and its suburbs
the Insurgents outside had been insisting on this, and asked how far
they might proceed in enforcing obedience in the matter.
They were informed by a telegram dated August 17 that the President
of the United States had directed:--
"That there must be no joint occupation with the
Insurgents. The United States in the possession of Manila city,
Manila bay and harbor must preserve the peace and protect
persons and property within the territory occupied by their
military and naval forces. The insurgents and all others
must recognize the military occupation and authority of the
United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed
by the President. Use whatever means in your judgment are
necessary to this end." [161]
This left the military and naval commanders no option in the premises,
and in any event dual occupation was out of the question because of
the lawlessness of the Insurgent troops.
At this very time they were looting the portions of the city which
they occupied, and as is abundantly shown by their own records were
not confining their attacks to Spaniards, but were assaulting their
own people and raiding the property of foreigners as well. [162] The
continuation of such a condition of affairs was manifestly impossible.
The Insurgents promptly demanded their share in the "war booty,"
and asked certain other extraordinary concessions as follows:--
"(4) Our sacrifices in coöperating in the siege and taking
of Manila being well known, it is just that we should share
in the war booty.
"(5) We demand for our use the palace of Malacañang and the
Convents of Malate, Ermita and Paco or San Fernando de Dilao.
"(6) We demand that the civil offices of Manila be filled
by North Americans and never by Spaniards; but if General
Merritt should require some Filipinos we should be pleased if
he will grant our President, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, the favour
of recommending select and skilled Filipinos. The jurisdiction
of the authorities of Manila shall not be recognized beyond
the municipal radius.
"(7) The American forces shall not approach nor penetrate
our military positions without permission of the respective
commanders thereof and shall evacuate all the positions
which they occupy at the present time beyond the municipal
radius; Spaniards who pass our lines without permission of
the commander will be considered as spies.
* * * * *
"(10) Lastly we state clearly that our concessions and
petitions do not signify on our part that we recognize the
sovereignty of North America in these islands, as they are
made necessary by the present war." [163]
Under the instructions of the President these demands could not be
acceded to. Nor could they have been acceded to had there been no
such instructions. In this connection the following extract from
General Jáudenes's cablegram for June 8th to his home government is
highly significant:--
"Population of suburbs have taken refuge in walled city from
fear of outrages of insurgents, preferring to run risks of
bombardment, which has not yet begun." [164]
It would seem that the population of the suburbs did not have a high
idea of Insurgent discipline.
That their apprehensions were not groundless is shown by a passage
in a letter sent the following day to Governor-General Augustin
by Buencamino:--
"Manila being surrounded by land and by sea, without hope of
assistance from anywhere, and Señor Aguinaldo being disposed to
make use of the fleet in order to bombard, if Your Excellency
should prolong the struggle with tenacity, I do not know,
frankly, what else to do other than to succumb dying, but
Your Excellency knows that the entrance of 100,000 Indians,
[165] inflamed with battle, drunk with triumph and with
blood, will produce the hecatomb from which there will not
be allowed to escape either women, children, or Peninsular
friars,--especially the friars; and, I believe that the rights
of humanity, imperilled in such a serious way, should be well
considered by Your Excellency, for however dear glory and
military duty may be, although worth as much or more than
existence itself there is no right by which they should be
won at the cost of the rights of humanity, and the latter
outweigh every consideration and all duty." [166]
Don Felipe knew his own people. He also knew, none better, what they
had in mind at this time.
As it was the Insurgent forces made the most of such opportunity as
they had, and their own records show it.
In the suburbs of Manila they sacked and committed outrages,
threatening people with their arms, and this was still going on a
week after the fall of Manila. [167]
General Pío del Pilar was believed to be responsible for much of this
misconduct, and Mabini proposed that as it was necessary for him to
leave the vicinity of Manila, and they could not remove him by force,
he be promoted. [168]
Some time during this month Sandico wrote Aguinaldo as follows:--
"The Americans have already heard of the frequent cases
of kidnapping (_dukut_) occurring in Tondo, San Sebastián
and San Miguel. Last night some of ours were surprised in
the act of kidnapping a person. I have also heard that many
persons are asking for contributions of war. I tell them [169]
that you know nothing of all this and that if some persons
are kidnapped it is due to the hate of the natives for the
Spanish spies and secret police, which is great." [170]
Evidently Sandico continued to interest himself in the matter of
preventing disorder, for on September 24, 1898, he wrote Aguinaldo
from Manila as follows:--
"By authority of General Don Pío del Pilar and accompanied
by the War Auditor, Señor Urbano, we entered a prison where
the individuals Mariano de la Cruz and Mariano Crisóstomo
were kept. They were almost prostrated. They had lately
been released from Bilibid where they had been confined
for political crimes. On being asked the reason for their
imprisonment they began by showing us their bodies from which
blood still issued as the result of the barbarous treatment
received from Major Carmona who, by the way, is the same
person of whom I spoke to you in one of my previous letters;
I declared to you then that he had assaulted, revolver in hand,
a man in the middle of one of the most frequented streets of
the suburb of Paco on pure suspicion.
"The prisoners in question stated that if they admitted the
accusations made against them it was for fear of greater
punishments promised by said Major. The officer of the guard
took the liberty of striking with his fist the one who dared
to express himself so.
"Before such a spectacle Major Bell found himself forced to
tell them that brutal acts are not precisely a recommendation
for a country that wished to be free and that they, the
Americans, do not arrest any one without just cause. [171]
"I take the liberty of calling your attention to the matter
in question and other abuses in order that the measures you
may think fit be adopted to remedy this evil. In fact, we are
making a target of ourselves in the sight of all nations,
especially so in that of the Americans who note any act of
ours and judge us secretly now in order to do so later in
public. To make light of this is to plant a seed of future
injury to us, because many will desire to place themselves
under the protection of the American flag, seeing that ours
refuses to defend the citizens' individual rights.
"I, for my part, ask that Major Carmona be arrested together
with his accomplices in the matter so that it may serve as
a lesson not only for him but also for those who think like
him." [172]
Obviously Sandico's protest of September 24 did not produce the
desired result, for on September 28 he wrote Aguinaldo a long letter
complaining that in Manila personal security did not exist, people
were being tortured and murdered, kidnapping and theft were very
frequent, and these abuses were being committed by Filipino officers
and men. Some of the things which had come to his knowledge were of
such a nature that he preferred to speak to Aguinaldo privately about
them. [173]
Murder, pillaging, torture of prisoners, kidnapping, theft--these
are not pleasant things, but they continued to occur, and Aguinaldo,
who apparently desired to prevent them, was powerless to do so. He
did not dare discipline General Pío del Pilar, nor remove him from
the vicinity of Manila, and the soldiers of that officer continued
to work their will on their own unfortunate and helpless people.
Aguinaldo at first flatly refused to direct the disorderly Insurgent
forces to leave Manila. The American commander showed great forbearance
and negotiations continued.
On August 16, 1898, the Diplomatic Commission (Buencamino and Gregorio
Araneta) telegraphed Aguinaldo that a clause in a proposed agreement
requiring prior permission of Insurgent officers before American
troops could pass or approach their lines had greatly displeased
General Anderson who declined to treat until after the withdrawal of
Noriel's troops from Manila. [174]
Aguinaldo's reply, sent on August 17, 1898, shows that he had already
made up his mind to fight the Americans, for it contains the following
significant words: "The conflict is coming sooner or later and we
shall gain nothing by asking as favours of them what are really our
rights." [175]
While negotiations were pending General Merritt sent Major J. F. Bell
to Aguinaldo with a letter and also with a memorandum in which were
the words:--
"In case you find Aguinaldo inclined to be generous in his
arrangements with us, you may communicate to him as follows:
..."
There follow six paragraphs, of which the third is of special
importance. It reads as follows:--
"(3) That I have every disposition to represent liberally
the Government at Washington, which I know is inclined to
deal fairly with him and his people; but not knowing what the
policy of that Government will be, I am not prepared to make
any promises, except that in the event of the United States
withdrawing from these islands care will be taken to leave
him _in as good condition as he was found by the forces of
the Government_. [176]
Relative to the italicized portion of this statement Major Bell says:--
"I was pressed to explain further just what meaning General
M. meant to convey by the underscored portion of this remark,
but I replied that I had repeated the language General M. had
used to me, and I preferred they should seek any further
explanation from him, lest I might unwittingly fall into error
if I undertook to explain his meaning myself. Their lack of
definiteness and my unwillingness to comment upon the language
seemed to arouse their apprehensions and suspicions. They
have been trying ever since to obtain in writing some definite
promise on this subject." [177]
Aguinaldo ordered that the machinery of the water works be started up
at once, a thing which was very necessary as Manila was suffering from
lack of water. I should be glad if I could leave this matter here,
but I cannot, for Major Bell elsewhere makes the further statement:--
"Attention is invited to General Merritt's promise made known
to Aguinaldo by me verbally, namely, that in the event of the
United States withdrawing from these islands, care would be
taken to leave Aguinaldo in as good condition as he was found
by the forces of the Government. From a remark the General
made to me I inferred he intended to interpret the expression
'forces of the Government' to mean the naval forces, should
future contingencies necessitate such an interpretation." [178]
Let us hope that Major Bell misunderstood General Merritt's
intention. If this is not the case, I must say in all frankness that
in my opinion it was General Merritt's intention to indulge in sharp
practice.
Obviously, the American naval forces did not find Aguinaldo in any
"condition," in the sense in which General Merritt uses the term. On
the contrary, they brought him from Hongkong and assisted him in
starting a revolution. The negotiations in question were relative
to the positions held by the Insurgents at the time the negotiations
took place, and General Merritt's promise could not legitimately be
interpreted to refer to anything else.
Had Aguinaldo accepted his offer, a most embarrassing situation would
have resulted. General Merritt was obviously not authorized to make
such a proposition in the first instance, and the only honourable
course left open to him would have been to advise Washington of his
improper action and beg the Government to support him in it and thus
save the honour of the country.
Fortunately, Aguinaldo did not act upon the promise nor accept the
offer. On the contrary, he promptly and indignantly denied that he
was committed to anything, and sought to impose new conditions which
were not acceded to.
Meanwhile some one doubtless got hold of General Merritt and called
his attention to the fact that in making this offer he had grossly
exceeded his authority, for in his reply to Aguinaldo's protest
General Merritt says:--
"So far as any promises as to what should be done in the event
of a conclusion of a treaty between the United States and Spain
are concerned, it is utterly impossible for me as the military
representative only of the United States to make any promises
such as you request. As you have already been informed, you
may depend upon the good will of the Americans out here and
the Government, of which you already know the beneficence,
to determine these matters in the future." [179]
Coming, as this statement did, after the offer made in the memorandum
hereinbefore referred to, it must have aroused the suspicions of
Aguinaldo and his associates, and in my opinion Merritt's conduct in
making such a proposal in the first instance was inexcusable.
Before he could terminate the negotiations which followed he was called
away, and turned this matter, together with other unfinished business,
over to his successor, General E. S. Otis.
On August 31, 1898, the latter official wrote to Aguinaldo as
follows:--
"_General Aguinaldo, Bacoor_:
"Referring to promise made by General Merritt to reply to
your letter of August 27 within four days, I desire to state
that he was unexpectedly ordered away and had not opportunity
to reply. Being unacquainted with the situation, I must take
time to inform myself before answering, which I will do at
the earliest opportunity.
"_Otis_."
On September 8 General Otis wrote Aguinaldo a long letter fully
discussing the whole situation in the light of the complete information
which he had meanwhile obtained. Since so much has been made of this
incident by Blount and others, I invite attention to the following
extracts from General Otis's letter, which embody a fair and judicial
statement of the conditions which existed:--
"You designate certain lines within the suburbs of the
city of Manila, to which you promise to retire your troops,
and name as conditions precedent: First, protection to your
shipping by the United States Navy, and the free navigation of
your vessels within the waters in United States occupation;
second, restitution to your forces of all positions which
are now occupied by your troops, in the event that treaty
stipulations between the United States and Spain surrender to
the last-named government the territory occupied by the former;
and thirdly, that United States troops now occupying positions
beyond the lines you name shall retire within the same.
"A discussion of your proposition to hold, jointly, with
the United States Government, the city of Manila, involves
consideration of some of the other concessions you desire to
be made, and to that I will at once refer. I wish to present
the matter, in the first instance, in its legal aspect,
although, from remarks contained in former correspondence,
I am of the opinion that you are fully aware how untenable
the proposition is. The United States and Spain were and
are belligerent parties to a war, and were so recognized
by the civilized world. In the course of events the entire
city of Manila, then in full possession of Spanish forces,
was surrendered to the first-named belligerent power. The
articles of agreement and capitulation gave the United States
Government full occupancy of the city and defences of Manila,
and that Government obligated itself to insure the safety
of the lives and property of the inhabitants of the city
to the best of its ability. By all the laws of war and all
international precedents the United States authority over
Manila and its defences is full and supreme, and it cannot
escape the obligations which it has assumed.
* * * * *
"But conceding, as you do, the strictly legal right of my
Government to hold and administer the affairs of the city
of Manila and its suburbs (I thus conclude from expressions
contained in former correspondence and from my appreciation of
your intellectual attainments), you base your proposition--a
joint occupation--upon supposed equitable grounds, referring
to the sacrifices your troops have made and the assistance they
have rendered the American forces in the capture of Manila. It
is well known they have made personal sacrifices, endured
great hardships, and have rendered aid. But is it forgotten
that my Government has swept the Spanish navy from the seas
of both hemispheres; sent back to Spain the Spanish army and
navy forces, recently embarked for your destruction, and the
secure holding of the Philippine possessions; that since May
1 last its navy has held the city of Manila at its mercy,
but out of consideration of humanity refused to bombard it,
preferring to send troops to demand surrender, and thereby
preserve the lives and property of the inhabitants? Is it
forgotten that the destruction of the Spanish navy and the
retention of Spanish armed men in its European possessions
has opened up to you the ports of the Island of Luzon and
held Spain helpless to meet its refractory subjects?
* * * * *
"Apart from all legal and equitable considerations, and
those having their origin in personally conceived ideas of
justice, I wish respectfully to call your attention to the
impracticability of maintaining a joint occupation of Manila
and its suburbs, and in this I know that I shall have the
approval of your excellent judgment. It would be extremely
difficult to prevent friction between our respective forces,
which might result in unfortunate consequences, labor as we may
for continued harmonious relations. Located in close proximity,
irresponsible members of our organizations, by careless or
impertinent action, might be the means of inciting grave
disturbances; and in this connection I call to your attention
the recent shooting affair at Cavite, which still requires
investigation. There might also arise conflict of authority
between our subordinate officers. Even now, within precincts
in entire actual possession of our troops, I find that permits
are given to citizens, who are styled local presidents, to make
arrests, to carry arms, etc., in violation of our instructions
and authority, and that several cases of kidnapping have
taken place. In pursuance of our obligations to maintain,
in so far as we can, domestic tranquillity, our officers have
arrested suspected parties, and they have asserted (with what
element of truth I know not) that the insurgent forces are the
offenders. I have declined to accept their statements, as I
prefer to believe the contrary, although it would appear that
officers connected with those forces have issued the permits
to which I allude. Such interference with our administration
of civil affairs must eventually result in conflict.
"... And here permit me to remark upon a view of the subject
you have advocated in support of the plea for dual occupation
of the city's suburbs. Your forces, you say in substance,
should have a share in the booty resulting from the conquest
of the city, on account of hardships endured and assistance
rendered. The facts on which you base your conclusion granted,
your conclusion, under the rules of war which are binding on my
Government, does not follow, for it has never recognized the
existence of spoils of war, denominated 'booty,' as have many
European governments. No enemy's property of any kind, public
or private, can be seized, claimed by, or awarded to, any of
its officers or men, and should they attempt to appropriate
any of it for their individual benefit, they would be very
severely punished through military tribunals, on which have
been conferred by law very sweeping jurisdiction. The enemy's
money and property (all that is not necessary to be expended in
administering local affairs in the enemy's territory) must be
preserved for final arbitrament or settlement by and between
the supreme authorities of the nations concerned. My troops
cannot acquire booty nor any individual benefit by reason of
the capture of an enemy's territory. I make this comment,
believing that you hold erroneous opinions in respect to
individual advantages which occupation bestows.
"I request your indulgence while I briefly consider the
concessions you ask us to make as conditions precedent to the
retirement of your forces to the lines indicated by your note
of the 27th ultimo.
"The first is: Protection to your shipping and free navigation
to your vessels. Neither the extent of protection nor the limit
of free navigation you request is understood. Certainly you
could not mean protection on the high seas, or in the ports
not in the rightful possession of the United States. That,
as you are fully aware, could only be effected by treaty,
or guarantee, following international recognition of
the belligerent rights of the Philippine revolutionary
government. While the existing armistice continues, the
United States are in rightful possession, in so far as the
navigable waters of the Philippine Islands are concerned, only
of the bay of Manila and its navigable tributaries. Within the
same all vessels of trade and commerce and the war vessels
of recognized national powers sail freely as long as the
sovereignty of my Government is not assailed nor the peace of
the locality threatened. In this respect, whatever concessions
are extended by way of relaxation of trade restrictions,
incident to war, to the citizens of these islands will be
extended to all alike, and discrimination in this regard
is neither intended nor permitted. Admiral Dewey exercises
supervision over all naval matters, and they are in no way
related to the duties conferred upon me by law. Nor would
it avail should I seek his consent for greater latitude of
action, for even if disposed to grant special concessions he
could not do so, and I doubt if the supreme authority of my
Government could now, under the prevailing truce with Spain,
invest him with the requisite powers to do so and at the same
time preserve its international obligations.
"The second concession named by you is restitution of positions
in the city of Manila to your forces, in case the treaty
of peace remands to Spain the territory surrendered under
the late capitulatory articles; and the third and last is a
promise to retire our troops within the lines indicated by
you, as the lines on which you desire your troops to remain
permanently. These propositions, having a kindred nature,
may be considered together, and, indeed, have already been
impliedly answered. From previous statements of facts and
logical conclusions made and stated in this communication,
concerning the nature of the obligations resting on the United
States with regard to the territory to which they have the
legal right of possession under contracting articles with
Spain, it is evident that neither in law or morals can the
concessions be made. I would be powerless to grant them in any
aspect of the case, being nothing more than an agent to carry
out the instructions of the executive head of my Government and
not being vested with discretionary power to determine matters
of such moment. In the present instance I am not only powerless
to accede to your request, but have been strictly enjoined
by my Government, mindful of its international promises and
national honour, which it has never broken nor sacrificed,
not to accede joint occupation of the city and suburbs of
Manila and am directed specially to preserve the peace and
protect persons and property within the territory surrendered
under the terms of the Spanish capitulation. These mandates
must be obeyed.
"Thus have I endeavoured with all candor and sincerity,
holding nothing in reserve, to place before you the situation
as understood by me, and I doubt not by the Republic
which I represent. I have not been instructed as to what
policy the United States intends to pursue in regard to its
legitimate holdings here, and hence I am unable to give you
any information on the subject. That it will have a care
and labor conscientiously for the welfare of your people I
sincerely believe. It remains for you, beneficiaries of its
sacrifices, to adopt a course of action which will manifest
your good intentions and show to the world the principles
which actuate your proceedings.
* * * * *
"It only remains for me to respectfully notify you that I am
compelled by my instructions to direct that your armed forces
evacuate the entire city of Manila, including its suburbs
and defences, and that I shall be obliged to take action with
that end in view within a very short space of time should you
decline to comply with my Government's demands; and I hereby
serve notice on you that unless your troops are withdrawn
beyond the line of the city's defences before Thursday,
the 15th instant, I shall be obliged to resort to forcible
action, and that my Government will hold you responsible for
any unfortunate consequences which may ensue.
* * * * *
"In conclusion, I beg to inform you that I have conferred
freely with Admiral Dewey upon the contents of this
communication and am delegated by him to state that he fully
approves of the same in all respects; that the commands of
our Government compel us to act as herein indicated, and
that between our respective forces there will be unanimity
and complete concert of action."
This calm and temperate discussion of the situation, coupled with
the firm statement of intention with which it closed, produced a
decided effect on Aguinaldo. Concerning the events to which it led,
General Otis has made this statement:--
"On September 13, a commission sent by Aguinaldo and consisting
of three members, one of whom was the treasurer and another
the attorney-general of the insurgent government, called
for the purpose of discussing the subject of my letter of
the 8th. They asked me to withdraw it and simply request
in writing that the insurgent troops retire to the line
designated by General Merritt, which I refused to do, stating
that unless they withdrew as directed we would be obliged to
resort to force. They then asked that I withdraw the letter
and issue a request unaccompanied by any threat to use force,
as Aguinaldo was fearful that he would be unable to remove
his troops upon a demand. To which I replied that the letter
of the 8th instant would stand. They then said that as the
demands of that letter must remain unchanged, the insurgents
would withdraw as directed therein, but that if I would express
in writing a simple request to Aguinaldo to withdraw to the
lines which I designated--something which he could show to the
troops and induce them to think that he was simply acting upon
a request from these headquarters--he would probably be able to
retire his men without much difficulty; that, of course, they
themselves understood the direction to withdraw, which would
be obeyed, and thereupon repeated their desire to obtain a note
of request, whereupon I furnished them with the following:--
"'_Office U. S. Military Governor in the_
"'_Philippine Islands_,
"'_Manila_, P. I., September 13, 1898.
"'_The Commanding General of the Philippine Forces_:
"'_Sir_: Referring to my communication of September
8, I have the honour to inform you that I have had a
most agreeable conversation with certain gentlemen who
are in the interests of your revolutionary government
upon the matters therein contained. We have discussed
at length the complications now existing, which will
exist, and will doubtless increase, while our troops
continue to occupy jointly certain districts of the
city of Manila. I have urged upon them the necessity
of the withdrawal of your troops in order that the
friendly relations which have always been maintained
by and between them and the forces of the United
States Government may be perpetuated. I am sure that
the gentlemen fully appreciate my sentiments and
will clearly report them to you. May I ask you to
patiently listen to their report of our conversation?
"'It is my desire that our friendly intercourse and
mutual amicable relations be continued; that they be
not jeopardized if we can by consistent action avoid
it, and such, I am certain, is the desire of yourself
and associates.
"'May I ask, therefore, that you withdraw your troops
from Manila?
"'Permit me to add in conclusion that I have that
confidence in your ability and patriotism which will
lead you to accede to this request.
"'I am, with great respect, your most obedient servant,
(Signed) "'_E. S. Otis_,
"'Major-General, U. S. V.,
"'United States Military Governor in the Philippines.'
"In reply to which, on the 16th, the following was received:--
"'_Malolos, Bulacan_, September 16, 1898.
"'_The Commanding General of the American Forces_:
"'_My Dear Sir_: Referring to your esteemed
communication, dated the 13th instant, I have the
honour to inform you that I have given appropriate
orders that my troops should abandon their most
advanced positions within some of the suburbs, and
that they should retire to points where contact with
yours would be more difficult, in order to avoid all
occasion for conflict.
"'I hope that by these presents you will be fully
convinced of my constant desire to preserve amicable
relations with the American forces, even at the risk
of sacrificing a part of the confidence placed in my
government by the Philippine people.
"'A consideration of my many occupations will serve to
excuse me for not having answered with the promptness
desired.
"'Your very respectful servant,
(Signed) "'_Emilio Aguinaldo_.'
"On the evening of the 15th the armed insurgent organizations
withdrew from the city and all of its suburbs, as
acknowledged by their leaders, excepting from one small
outlying district. This certain agents of Aguinaldo asked
on the previous day to be permitted to retain for a short
time, on the plea that the general officer in command [180]
would not obey instructions, and they proposed to remove his
men gradually by organizations and thereafter to punish him
for his disobedience. The withdrawal was effected adroitly,
as the insurgents marched out in excellent spirits, cheering
the American troops." [181]
I have given the facts thus fully for the reason that this is the one
instance I have found in which a promise was made, fortunately in the
form of an offer which was not accepted, and then withdrawn. It has
seemed to me that the reasons why General Merritt should never have
made it, and why General Otis could not possibly have renewed it,
should be fully set forth.
On September 7, 1898, General Otis had cabled to Washington that
Admiral Dewey and he considered conditions critical, and that
the number of armed Insurgents in the city was large and rapidly
increasing. He stated that on the 8th he would send a notification
to Aguinaldo that unless the latter's troops were withdrawn beyond
the line of the suburbs of the cry before September 15 he would be
obliged to resort to forcible action and that the United States would
hold Aguinaldo responsible for any unfortunate consequences which
might ensue.
Aguinaldo still hoped to obtain recognition of his government by the
United States, but did not consider such recognition probable, and
pushed preparations to attack if a favorable opportunity should offer.
Before occupying ourselves with these preparations, let us briefly
review the results of our investigations as to Insurgent coöperation
with the American forces up to this time.
Taylor has made the following excellent summary of the case:--
"Up to this time Aguinaldo had continued a desultory
warfare with the Spanish troops in Manila. That none of his
attacks were very serious is shown from the Spanish reports
of casualties; but although he had failed to secure the
surrender of the city to himself, he had kept its garrison
occupied and within their works. The American force on land
was now strong enough to begin offensive operations. So
far the relations between the Americans and Aguinaldo had
not been really friendly. They were in his way, and yet he
could not break with them, for he hoped to use them for the
attainment of the designs which he had by this time frankly
declared. The Americans had listened to these declarations,
and had not answered them, nor was it possible to answer
them. The American forces were there under the instructions
of the President to make war on Spain and to establish a
military government in the Philippines. Aguinaldo had declared
himself a dictator and the Philippines independent. To have
recognized him in his civil capacity, to have dealt with him
in his civil capacity, would have meant a recognition of his
government by the military commander in the field--a thing
impossible and unlawful. Officers of the United States forces
are not empowered to recognize governments; that function is
reserved to the President of the United States; and in this
case he, in his orders to the Secretary of War, dated May 19,
copies of which were forwarded to General Merritt for his
guidance, informed him that the army of occupation was sent
to the Philippines 'for the twofold purpose of completing the
reduction of the Spanish power in that quarter and of giving
order and security to the islands while in the possession
of the United States.' These instructions contemplated the
establishment of a military government in the archipelago by
military officials of the United States.
* * * * *
"it is true that in spite of the date of these instructions
General Merritt in San Francisco had received no copy of
them on August 28, three days after the departure of General
Anderson, and what that officer knew of them could only have
been what General Merritt remembered of the contents of an
unsigned copy of them shown him at the White House, but they
were in accordance with the practice of the United States
Government in occupying conquered territory, that practice
General Anderson well knew, and his relations with Aguinaldo
were guided by it.
* * * * *
"It has been claimed that Aguinaldo and his followers received
the impression at this time from their conversation with
American officers that the United States would undoubtedly
recognize the independence of the Philippines, and that the
cooperation of the insurgents was due to this impression. There
was no cooperation. That he attempted in vain to secure the
surrender of Manila to himself was not cooperation. That
he refrained from attacking the Americans and occasionally
permitted them to be furnished supplies, for which they paid,
was not cooperation. The fact that for a time their plans and
his plans were parallel does not mean cooperation. Aguinaldo
was forced by the exigencies of the situation, by the necessity
of strengthening his hold upon the people, by the necessities
of his operations against the Spaniards, to make Spaniards
and natives alike believe that all that he did was with
the aid of the Americans by whom he would be supported in
all his acts. He needed their support, and if he could not
obtain that he needed the appearance of their support for the
attainment of his ends; and this he was forced to purchase by
compliance, or apparent compliance, with their demands. But
his compliance with them, as all American officers serving
there well knew, was never willing, was never complete,
and was never given except under pressure. It is true that
writers upon the subject, speaking with the confidence which is
born of insufficient and incomplete information, assure their
readers that any government but that of the United States, any
colonial administrators but Americans, would have been able to
obtain the hearty cooperation of Aguinaldo and his followers by
judicious concessions to them at this time. The only concession
which would have obtained that hearty cooperation would have
been the recognition of the independence of the Philippines
under a United States protectorate, of Aguinaldo clothed with
the plenitude of the powers of the Katipúnan as dictator, and
a promise to promptly withdraw from the islands. This promise
the Government of the United States could not make. Until the
ratification of a treaty of peace with Spain the insurgents of
the Philippine Islands were rebellious subjects of Spain, and
with them, except as fighting men, no relations could be had.
* * * * *
"No report of operations or returns of strength were rendered
by Aguinaldo at this or any other time to any American
commander, and no American commander ever rendered such
returns to him. At the time of General Merritt's arrival, and
until Manila was occupied by the Americans, the insurgents and
United States troops were united solely by the fact that they
had Manila as a common objective. Conditions were such that
the Americans, in order to obtain its surrender, had to avoid
doing anything which might cause the insurgents to attack them
and perhaps make terms with Spain; while Aguinaldo and his
followers, in order to accomplish the surrender of Manila to
themselves, had to maintain such relations with the Americans
as would induce the Spaniards to believe that their fleet
was at his disposal, [182] and also such apparent harmony
and cooperation with them in the execution of their plans
that the recalcitrant among the Filipinos would be forced to
believe that the Americans would in all ways use their forces
to support Aguinaldo in the attainment of his desires.
"General Merritt saw this and the necessity for immediately
taking such steps as would lead to his occupation of
Manila. With the arrival of the third expedition he was able
to pass through the insurgent lines between Camp Dewey and
Manila, for he had sufficient force to accept no refusal
from Aguinaldo.
"In his report he said that the insurgents had obtained
positions of investment opposite the Spanish lines along
their full extent, and that on the bay front their lines ran
within 800 yards of San Antonio Abad. The approaches to the
beach and village of Pasay were in their possession.
"'This anomalous state of affairs, namely, having a line
of quasi-hostile native troops between our forces and the
Spanish position, was, of course, very objectionable, but it
was difficult to deal with owing to the peculiar conditions
of our relations with the insurgents.... As General Aguinaldo
did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services as a
subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the
President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by
the American land forces, and stated that "the powers of the
military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately
operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants,"
I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication
with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession
of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until
then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce
my authority in the event that his pretensions should clash
with my designs. For these reasons the preparations for the
attack on the city were pressed and the military operations
conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent
forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently fully
established by the fact that when the troops at my command
carried the Spanish entrenchments, extending from the sea to
the Pasay road on the extreme Spanish right, we were under
no obligation, by prearranged plans of the mutual attack,
to turn to the right and clear the front still held by the
insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy
the city and the suburbs.'" [183]
All that the Insurgents and the Americans ever had in common was an
enemy. They each fought that enemy in their own way. There was no
coöperation. On the part of the Insurgents there was treachery. I
will submit further evidence of this fact.