Was Independence Promised?
It has long been the fashion in certain quarters to allege, or to
insinuate, that American consuls and naval officers promised the
Insurgent leaders that the independence of the Philippines would be
recognized by the United States. It has been claimed by some that
the coöperation of the Insurgents in the military operations against
Manila was sought for and secured. Others say that they were at least
_de facto_ allies of the United States, and that they were in the
end shamelessly betrayed and wantonly attacked.
These are very serious charges. I shall prove, chiefly by the Insurgent
records, that each of them is false. I ask the forbearance of my
readers if, in the three chapters which I devote to these matters,
I quote documentary evidence at length. When original documents
or extracts from them tell a clear and reasonably concise story,
I sometimes insert them bodily in the text. In other cases I give my
own version of the facts which they set forth, but give the full text
in foot-notes. In nearly all instances references are given to sources
of documentary information. I greatly regret that Taylor's narrative,
with its very numerous supporting documents, is not readily accessible
to the student of history. It ought to have been published, but never
got beyond the galley-proof stage. In referring to it, I am therefore
obliged to use the word Taylor followed by the letters and figures
designating the page of this galley proof on which the passage referred
to is found. Whenever possible I give the War Department numbers [6]
of Insurgent documents, but in a few cases can give only the exhibit
numbers assigned by Taylor in printing the documents.
As his exhibits are serially arranged it is easy to find any one of
them. Copies of his work may be found in the War Department and in
the office of the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary.
Referring to the charge that the Insurgents were deceived, even had
deceit been practised as claimed, Aguinaldo would have had no just
ground for complaint, for he himself not only frankly advocated its
use, but deliberately employed it in his dealings with the Americans,
as clearly appears in records hereinafter cited. [7] However, most
Americans hold to a standard very different from his. Was it departed
from in this instance?
Aguinaldo has specifically and repeatedly charged that Pratt and Dewey
promised him the recognition of the independence of the Philippines
by the United States. [8]
Judge Blount has referred to the "_de facto_ alliance between the
Americans and Aguinaldo," and has dwelt at length on "promises,
both expressed and implied," which were subsequently repudiated
by Consul Pratt, Admiral Dewey and Generals Anderson and Merritt,
constantly suggesting, even when he does not specifically charge,
bad faith on the part of these officers of the United States. [9]
On analyzing his statements we find that he is discreetly non-committal
as to exactly what were the expressed promises, nor does he make it so
plain as might be desired what legitimate inferences were deducible
from the acts of the Americans in question. He quotes an alleged
statement of General Anderson to the effect that:--
"Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman, [10] and
Williams [11] did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a
Philippino government would be recognized, the Phillippinos
certainly thought so, judging from their acts rather than
from their words. Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition,
as I did subsequently at his request." [12]
Before discussing these charges I will briefly review certain
historical facts, knowledge of which will be useful in considering
them.
In August, 1896, an insurrection against Spain had broken out in the
Philippines under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, a resident of
Cavite Viejo, who had been a school teacher, and was, at that time,
_gobernadorcillo_ [13] of his town.
It had been terminated by the so-called "Treaty of Biacnabató,"
signed in Manila on December 15, 1897.
This document provided for the surrender of "Don Emilio Aguinaldo,
Supreme Chief of the Insurgents in arms," and Don Marciano Llanera
and Don Baldomero Aguinaldo, his subordinates, together with their
soldiers and arms.
"The Excellent Señor General in Chief" of the Spanish forces was to
"provide the necessary means for supporting the lives" of those who
surrendered before a certain fixed date.
In actual practice what was done was to agree to pay them $800,000
[14] in three instalments, the first of $400,000, the second and
third of $200,000 each.
Aguinaldo and certain other leaders were to take up their residence
outside the islands. Their deportation was duly provided for, and
Aguinaldo and twenty-six of his companions were taken to Hongkong,
on the Spanish steamer _Uranus_; arriving there on December 31, 1897.
On January 2, 1898, $400,000 were deposited in the Hongkong Bank,
to the credit of Aguinaldo and Co.
The Insurgent leaders remaining at Biacnabató had a meeting under the
presidency of Isabelo Artacho, an Ilocano [15] who was the ranking
officer in the absence of Aguinaldo, and requested that the second
instalment, of $200,000, be paid to them. The Spanish governor-general,
Primo de Rivera, acceded to their request, and they divided the money,
although Aguinaldo denied their right to do so, claiming that it
should have been sent to Hongkong.
The third payment of $200,000 was apparently never made. Primo de
Rivera says that he turned over a check for $200,000 to his successor,
General Augustin, in April, 1898; giving as his reason for refusing to
pay it to the Insurgents that there seemed to him to be no prospect of
its being equitably divided among those who were entitled to receive
it under the agreement.
Aguinaldo and his associates claimed that certain reforms were promised
by the Spanish government at the time the treaty of Biacnabató
was negotiated, and as these measures were not put into effect,
they organized a junta or revolutionary committee at Hongkong. It
included in its membership a number of Filipino political exiles,
then residing at that place.
The men who composed this organization soon fell to quarrelling and
it became necessary to come to a definite understanding as to its
aims. Under the arrangement finally reached, the junta, as a whole,
was charged with the work of propaganda outside of the archipelago;
with all diplomatic negotiations with foreign governments; and
with the preparation and shipment of such articles as were needed
to carry on the revolution in the Philippines. It was to be allowed
voice by Aguinaldo's government in any serious question which might
arise abroad, and would aid that government in bringing the civil
administration of the Philippines to the level of that of the most
advanced nations.
Trouble soon arose among the former Insurgent leaders over the division
of the funds deposited at Hongkong.
Taylor gives a trustworthy and concise account of the events of this
period, and as it is of historic interest, and makes clear just
how Aguinaldo came to go to Singapore, meet Pratt, and enter into
negotiations with him, I quote extensive extracts from it. [16]
"From January 4 to April 4, Aguinaldo withdrew from the
banks 5786.46 pesos in part interest on the money he had
deposited. This was used to pay the expenses of himself and his
companions in Hongkong. These expenses were kept at a minimum;
the money was drawn and spent by him. If one of the men with
him needed a new pair of shoes, Aguinaldo paid for them;
if another wanted a new coat, Aguinaldo bought it. Minute
accounts were kept, which are on file among his papers,
and it is seen from them that his expenses were exceeding
his income, which could only be 12,000 pesos a year, while he
was living at the rate of 22,000, with constant demands being
made upon him by men who came from the Philippines. Life was
not easy under these conditions. Aguinaldo's companions were
entirely dependent upon him. Their most trivial expenses had
to be approved by him, and he held them down with a strong
hand. They were men living in a strange land, among a people
whose language they did not speak, having nothing to do but
quarrel among themselves, exiles waiting for a chance to
return to their own country, which they watched with weary
eyes while they guarded the embers by which they hoped to
light the fires of a new insurrection.
"The men who had accompanied Aguinaldo to Hongkong were
not the only Filipinos domiciled there; a number of men had
taken refuge in that British colony after the events of 1872,
and some of them at least had prospered. Some of them, like
the members of the Cortes family, seem to have had almost
no relations with the followers of Aguinaldo; some, like
J. M. Basa, knew them and took part in some of the meetings of
the governing groups, but were probably not admitted to their
full confidence, as Aguinaldo and his immediate following
wanted and were working for independence and independence
alone, while the Filipinos who had long lived in Hongkong
wanted to see the archipelago lost to Spain, but had no
confidence in the ability of the country to stand alone or
in the fitness of Aguinaldo and his following to direct the
councils of a state. The character of the new refugees did
not inspire confidence in these older men, who hoped for a
protectorate by or annexation to the United States.
"On May 6, 1898, the consul-general of the United States there
informed the State Department that D. Cortés, M. Cortés,
A. Rosario, Gracio Gonzaga, and José Maria Basa (50), all
very wealthy land-owners, bankers, and lawyers of Manila,
desired to tender their allegiance and the allegiance of
their powerful families in Manila to the United States,
and that they had instructed all their connections to render
every aid to the United States forces in Manila. On May 14 he
forwarded statements of other Filipinos domiciled in Hongkong,
not members of the junta, that they desired to submit their
allegiance and the allegiance of their families in the
Philippine Islands to the United States. One of Aguinaldo's
followers, writing somewhat later, spoke with bitterness
of the rich old men who went about calling their companions
'beggarly rebels,' but these men were rich, and their names and
their apparent adhesion to the cause represented by Aguinaldo
would inspire confidence in him among men of property in
the Philippines. They were, accordingly, not to be lightly
alienated; therefore, at first, at least, no open break took
place with them, but their attitude toward the leaders of
the insurrection is shown by the fact that after the early
summer of 1898 they took no, or very little, part in the
insurgent movement, although they were living in Hongkong,
the seat of the junta, which conducted the propaganda for
the insurgent government of the Philippines.
* * * * *
"But, in fact, Aguinaldo had no just conception of the
conditions and of the opportunities which were about to open
before the Hongkong junta, for although war between Spain and
the United States was imminent and a United States squadron
was in Hongkong threatening Manila, Aguinaldo was chiefly
concerned in finding how to avoid losing the money which
had been received from the Spanish government as the price
of his surrender. The importance of his presence near the
Philippines in case of war did not occur to him, or if it did
occur to him anything which he could obtain there from the
aid of the United States probably seemed for the moment of
little consequence compared with escaping from his wrangling
companions with enough money to live on in Paris.
"Artacho, who had received 5000 pesos as his share of the
second payment, arrived in Hongkong and on April 5 demanded
200,000 pesos of the insurgent funds, probably under the
agreement that he should establish a company in Hongkong
for the benefit of the former leaders and not merely of
those who had accompanied Aguinaldo. But the leaders in
Hongkong had denounced that agreement, and refused to pay. He
then entered suit before the supreme court of Hongkong,
calling upon Aguinaldo for an accounting of the trust funds
deposited in his hands for the benefit of Artacho and others,
and asked for an injunction restraining Aguinaldo or any
member of the junta from handling or disposing of any part
of said funds. He filed as evidence copies of the Biacnabató
agreement and of the agreement made by the leaders on December
19. This suit was brought not merely in the name of Artacho,
but in that of all the exiles who were described as living
in exile in Hongkong in accordance with an agreement made
with the Spanish Government. Artacho probably had adherents
among these men, some at least of whom were utterly weary
of waiting in Hongkong and of living upon what was doled out
to them. Some at least saw no chance of any other fate than
indefinite exile spent in dependence upon the inner group
for even the means of existence.
"The suit was in equity, and called for an accounting for the
trust funds which the complainant recognized were legally
in the hands of Aguinaldo. It could be carried on only
with great difficulty without his presence and without his
account books. Meetings were held, and Artacho was denounced
as attempting to extort blackmail, but he refused to yield,
and Aguinaldo, rather than explain the inner workings of the
Hongkong junta before a British court, prepared for flight. A
summons was issued for his appearance before the supreme court
of Hongkong on April 13, 1898, but he was by that time beyond
its jurisdiction.
"He drew out the 50,000 pesos from the Chartered Bank,
which had become due according to the terms of the deposit,
and perhaps such other sums as could be drawn upon by check,
engaged passage for Europe by way of Singapore for G. H. del
Pilar, J. M. Leyba, and himself under assumed names, appointed
V. Belarmino to succeed to his functions, and gave him checks
signed in blank to draw the interest of the sums on deposit to
provide for the support of the exiles. He gave as his reason
for departure that he was going to remain under cover until
Artacho could be bought off, but he intended to go far afield
for this purpose, as he gave his destination as Europe and
the United States.
"Aguinaldo and his companions probably sailed from Hongkong
on April 8, 1898, and arrived in Singapore on April 21, after
stopping in Saigon. War between the United States and Spain
had been rendered inevitable by the resolution of Congress
demanding that Spain should withdraw her forces from Cuba,
and was declared on April 21. Although Aguinaldo and his
followers did not appreciate the influence which conditions on
the other side of the world might have upon the future of the
Philippines, it happened that in Singapore at that time there
was an Englishman named Bray who did. He had been a member of
the civil service in India, and had lived for some years in the
Philippines, but he had fallen upon evil days and was engaged
in writing letters to the Singapore _Free Press_ upon the
Philippines, and in retailing such information as was in his
possession concerning them to the United States consul-general
in Singapore, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, for transmittal to
Commodore Dewey. Bray heard of the arrival of Aguinaldo and
realized what could be done with him, and that if the matter
were well handled it might be to his own advantage. He went
at once to see Aguinaldo and informed him that the United
States consul-general was anxious to see him. He went to the
consul-general and informed him of the importance of Aguinaldo,
and that he was in Singapore. Aguinaldo had to be persuaded
to agree to a meeting. The consul-general was anxious for it,
and it took place, according to Aguinaldo, on the night of
April 22 (according to Pratt, on the morning of April 24). The
statement made by Aguinaldo is probably correct. According
to his account book, he paid $11 on April 23, 1898, for a
telegram to the Hongkong junta concerning the negotiations
'with America.'
"Aguinaldo knew but little English, Pratt knew no Spanish, so
in their interview Bray acted as interpreter. An interpreter
who is interested in the subject of the discussion may
be a dangerous man. It is impossible to say what he told
Aguinaldo. Certainly Pratt did not know; but whatever was
said during these conversations it is within the limits
of possibility that Pratt may have been made to say by the
interpreter more than he intended, and that his statements of
what would probably be granted by the United States Government
and his expression of good wishes for the cause of Filipino
independence may have been translated as assurances and as
promises. Bray, who, according to his Filipino former friends,
was apt to talk too much, may have talked too much on this
occasion, and so the myth of the formal agreement between
Aguinaldo on behalf of the Filipino insurgents and Pratt on
behalf of the United States grew up, a fiction which Bray
himself, with a natural desire to add to his own importance,
did his best to circulate.
"Bray did not ask for his reward at the time, but probably
reckoned upon making himself indispensable as an adviser,
so that later he could make his own terms. For a time he
wrote letters of advice to Aguinaldo, which may have had
some influence upon the line of conduct which he adopted, and
later was employed in furnishing from Hongkong news to various
newspapers of events and conditions in the Philippines. His
cablegrams shortly before the outbreak of hostilities between
the United States and the insurgents were more picturesque
than veracious, but they were apparently considered effective,
as Aguinaldo ordered that he should be given $5000. He wanted
more, but the Hongkong junta did not trust him, and he ceased
to be in their employment." [17]
As we shall see, Bray did not do all of the interpreting at Singapore,
and we shall be able to determine with some accuracy what actually
transpired there.
We can now consider understandingly the charges made against Pratt
and Dewey.
It has been claimed over and over again, that Pratt promised Aguinaldo
recognition of tile independence of the Philippines if he and his
people would cooperate with the United States forces against Spain.
Aguinaldo himself made the charge in his "Reseña Verídica" [18]
in the following words:--
"In this interview Consul Pratt told me that because the
Spaniards had not complied with the agreement of Biac-na-bató,
the Filipinos had a right to renew their interrupted revolution
and advised me to take up arms anew against Spain, assuring me
that America would give the Filipinos the greatest advantages
(mayores ventajas). Then I asked the Consul what advantages the
United States would concede to the Philippines, suggesting,
when I had the proper opening, the propriety of making an
agreement in writing, to which the Consul answered that he
would report, by telegraph, on the subject to Mr. Dewey,
who was the chief of the expedition against the Philippines,
and who had ample powers from President McKinley.
"On the following day, between 10 and 12 in the morning, we
again took up the matter, Consul Pratt saying that the admiral
had answered my inquiry by saying that the United States
would at least recognize the independence of the Philippine
government under a naval protectorate, but that there was no
necessity to put it in writing, as the words of the admiral
and the American consul were sacred and would be fulfilled,
not being like those of the Spaniards, and finally, that the
Government of North America was a very honourable Government,
a very just and very powerful one." [19]
On April 27, 1908, Pratt telegraphed the Secretary of State as
follows: --
"General Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange with
Dewey coöperation insurgents Manila.
"_Pratt_."
On the 28th he wrote the Secretary, explaining how he had come to
meet Aguinaldo, and stating just what he had done. He said:--
"At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo
the state of an object sought to be obtained by the present
insurrectionary movement, which, though absent from the
Philippines, he was still directing, I took it upon myself,
whilst explaining that I had no authority to speak for the
Government, to point out the danger of continuing independent
action at this stage; and, having convinced him of the
expediency of cooperating with our fleet, then at Hongkong,
and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed
thither and confer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should
the latter so desire, I telegraphed the Commodore the same
day as follows, through our consul-general at Hongkong:--
"'Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong
arrange with Commodore for general cooperation insurgents
Manila if desired. Telegraph.
"'_Pratt_.'"
The Commodore's reply read thus:--
"'Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible.
"'_Dewey_.'"
Pratt adds:--
"I received it late at night, and at once communicated to
General Aguinaldo, who, with his aide-de-camp and private
secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting
off by the British Steamer _Malacca_, which left here on
Tuesday the 26th.
"Just previous to his departure, I had a second and last
interview with General Aguinaldo, the particulars of which
I shall give you by next mail.
"The general impressed me as a man of intelligence, ability,
and courage, and worthy the confidence that had been placed
in him.
"I think that in arranging for his direct cooperation with the
commander of our forces, I have prevented possible conflict of
action and facilitated the work of occupying and administering
the Philippines.
"If this course of mine meets with the Government's approval,
as I trust it may, I shall be fully satisfied; to Mr. Bray,
however, I consider there is due some special recognition
for most valuable services rendered.
"How that recognition can best be made I leave to you to
decide.
"I have, etc." [20]
It will be noted that Pratt explained to Aguinaldo that he had no
authority to speak for the government; that there was no mention in
the cablegrams between Pratt and Dewey of independence or indeed of
any conditions on which Aguinaldo was to coöperate, these details
being left for future arrangement with Dewey; and that Pratt thought
that he had prevented possible conflict of action and facilitated
the work of occupying and administering the Philippines.
The particulars as to the second and last interview between Aguinaldo
and Pratt were embodied in the following letter:--
"No. 213. _Consulate-General of the United States._
"_Singapore_, April 30, 1898.
"_Sir_: Referring to my dispatch No. 212, of the 28th instant,
I have the honor to report that in the second and last
interview I had with Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo on the eve of his
departure for Hongkong, I enjoined upon him the necessity,
under Commodore Dewey's direction, of exerting absolute
control over his forces in the Philippines, as no excesses
on their part would be tolerated by the American Government,
the President having declared that the present hostilities
with Spain were to be carried on in strict accord with modern
principles of civilized warfare.
"To this General Aguinaldo fully assented, assuring me that
he intended and was perfectly able, once on the field, to
hold his followers, the insurgents, in check and lead them
as our commander should direct.
"The general stated that he hoped the United States would
assume protection of the Philippines for at least long enough
to allow the inhabitants to establish a government of their
own, in the organization of which he would desire American
advice and assistance.
"These questions I told him I had no authority to discuss.
"I have, etc.,
"_E. Spencer Pratt_,
"_United States Consul-General_."
In a subsequent communication written on July 28, 1898, Pratt made
the following statement:--
"I declined even to discuss with General Aguinaldo the
question of the future policy of the United States with
regard to the Philippines, that I held out no hopes to him
of any kind, committed the government in no way whatever,
and, in the course of our confidences, never acted upon
the assumption that the Government would cooperate with
him--General Aguinaldo--for the furtherance of any plans
of his own, nor that, in accepting his said cooperation,
it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political
claims which he might put forward." [21]
What reason if any is there for denying the truth of this allegation?
I will give in full Blount's statement as to what occurred at a
meeting held at Singapore, to celebrate the early successes of Dewey
and Aguinaldo, as it constitutes his nearest approach to a direct
claim, that any one at any time promised independence:--
"First there was music by the band. Then followed the formal
reading and presentation of the address by a Dr. Santos,
representing the Filipino community of Singapore. The address
pledged the 'eternal gratitude' of the Filipino people to
Admiral Dewey and the honored addressee; alluded to the glories
of independence, and to how Aguinaldo had been enabled; by the
arrangement so happily effected with Admiral Dewey by Consul
Pratt, to arouse eight millions of Filipinos to take up arms
'in defence of those principles of justice and liberty of
which your country is the foremost champion' and trusted
'that the United States... will efficaciously second the
programme arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo
in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independence
under the protection of the United States.'
"Mr. Pratt arose and 'proceeded, speaking in French,'
says the newspaper--it does not say Alabama French, but
that is doubtless what it was--'to state his belief that the
Filipinos would prove and were now proving themselves fit for
self-government.' The gentleman from Alabama then went on to
review the mighty events and developments of the preceding six
weeks, Dewey's victory of May 1st, 'the brilliant achievements
of your own distinguished leader, General Emilio Aguinaldo,
_cooperating on land with the Americans at sea_,' etc. 'You
have just reason to be proud of what has been and is being
accomplished by General Aguinaldo and your fellow-countrymen
under his command. When, six weeks ago, I learned that General
Aguinaldo had arrived _incognito_ in Singapore, I immediately
_sought him out_. An hour's interview convinced me that he
_was the man for the occasion_; and, having communicated
with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged for him to join
the latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest you know.'" [22]
Now, it happens that Dr. Santos himself forwarded his speech, and
his version of Pratt's reply thereto, in a letter to Aguinaldo, dated
Singapore, June 9, 1898. As he served as interpreter, he, if any one,
should know what Pratt said. After describing the change in tone of
the Singapore _Free Press_, with which strained relations had formerly
existed, and the subsequent friendliness of the editor of this paper
and that of the _Straits Times_, he says that on the previous afternoon
he went with the other Filipinos to greet Pratt. He continues:--
"This occasion was unusually opportune by reason of ours having
been victorious and immediately after the cry of our worthy
chief which found an echo in this colony. For this purpose 30
or more Filipinos--9 of the higher class, 15 musicians and the
remainder of the middle class--went to greet Consul A., here,
and on the invitation of Mr. Bray we ascended. He received us
in his private office, and it was imposing to see that the only
decoration was the American flag which covered the desk, and in
its centre, a carved wooden frame holding the portrait of our
worthy chief. He shook hands with all of us, and I introduced
them all. We found there also, and were introduced to, the
Editor of the _Straits Times_ and the _Free Press_ of here,
and after being thus assembled, after a musical selection,
I read the following speech in French:--
"'_His Excellency, The Consul General of the United
States of America in Singapore_:
"'_Your Excellency_: The Filipinos of all social
classes residing in this port, have come to greet
Your Excellency as the genuine representative of
the great and powerful American Republic in order to
express to you our eternal gratitude for the moral
and material support given by Admiral Dewey to our
General Aguinaldo in his campaign for the liberty of
eight million Filipinos. The latter and we ourselves
hope that the United States, your nation, persevering
in its humanitarian policy, will without cessation and
(with) decided energy continue to support the programme
agreed upon in Singapore between Your Excellency and
General Aguinaldo, that is to say, the Independence
of the Philippine Islands, under an American
protectorate. Accept our cordial acknowledgments and
congratulations on being the first one in accepting
and supporting this idea which time and events have
well developed to the great satisfaction of our
nation. Finally, we request you, Most Excellent Sir,
to express to your worthy President and the American
Republic, our sincere acknowledgments and our fervent
wishes for their prosperity. I have concluded.'
"The Consul replied hereto in French, in more or less the
following terms:--
"'You have nothing to thank me for, because I have only
faithfully followed the instructions received from my
Government; the fact of the sudden departure of your General
will permit you to infer that I have done so. I shall in any
case inform my Government of your good wishes and I thank you
in its name. You know that your wishes are mine also, and for
this reason at the last interview I had with Mr. Aguinaldo,
I repeated to him that he should observe the greatest humanity
possible in the war, in order that our army, our soldiers,
our nation and all the other nations may see that you are
humane and not savages, as has erroneously been believed.'
"After this there was enthusiastic applause for the Consul;
he offered us all cigars, glasses of very fine sherry, and
lemonade for the musicians and the majority. The toasts were
offered with the sherry by your humble servant, Sres. Cannon,
Enríquez, Celio, Reyes, the Consul, the editors of the _Free
Press_, _Straits Times_ and Mr. Bray. We drank to America
and her humanitarian work of redemption; to the Philippines
with America; we gave thanks to the Consul, to Mr. Bray as an
important defender; we drank to the _Free Press_ for taking
such an interest in our affairs, and to the _Straits Times_
(sarcastically); but I was very careful not to propose a toast
to our general, which was done at the proper time by 'Flaco'
[23] when we gave three cheers; for the sake of courtesy we
cheered for England, which had been so hospitable to us, and
when everybody had become quiet, the Editor of the _Straits
Times_ took his glass in his hand and cried in a loud voice,
'The Philippine Republic,' to which we all responded. 'Flaco'
disappeared a moment, and when he returned he brought with
him the American flag, and formally presented it to us in
French, which I interpreted to all in Spanish, as follows:
'Gentlemen: The American Consul, with his deep affection for
us, presents us this flag as the greatest and most expressive
remembrance which he can give us. The red stripes stand for
the generous blood of her sons, shed to obtain her liberty;
the white stripes stand for her virginity and purity as our
country; the blue background indicates the sky and each star
represents a free and independent State; this is America, and
the Consul is desirous that we also should have so glorious
a history as hers and that it may be as brilliant as could
be wished, securing peace with respect, and may God be our
help and guide in securing liberty. Viva and with it our
most sincere thanks for so signal a courtesy.' Hereupon, to
the surprise of everybody as no one expected it, the Consul
requested that some Filipino airs be played which seemed to
please him very much. Finally, about 6.15, we left, very well
satisfied with the reception accorded us and the kindness
of the Consul. Mr. Bray asked me for the text of my speech,
which I insert above and I secured from the Consul his French
text, which I enclose in my letter to Naning. Without anything
further for the present, awaiting your reply and your opinion
as to the above, as also orders and instructions for the
future, I am,
"Yours, etc.
(Signed) "_Isidoro de los Santos_."
To this letter Major Taylor has appended the following note:--
"(_Note by Compiler._--In a letter written in Tagalog to
Aguinaldo on June 6 by Santos he describes the American consul
general as having cried out 'Hurrah for General Aguinaldo,
hurrah for the Republic of the Philippines' and then, having
apparently taken several drinks, he passed up and down the
room waving the American flag before giving it to the assembled
Filipinos (P.I.R., 406.7).)" [24]
This final statement does not present the representative of the United
States government at Singapore in a very favourable light, but I take
the facts as I find them. If now we compare the speech actually made
by Dr. Santos with Blount's version of it, we shall find that with
the exception of the words "eternal gratitude" the passages which
he encloses in quotation marks are not in the original at all. The
glories of independence are not alluded to, nor is there so much as
a suggestion that Aguinaldo had been enabled to arouse eight millions
of Filipinos to take up arms, which he certainly had not done.
Dr. Santos in his speech did resort to a stereotyped Filipino procedure
so very commonly employed that those of us who have dealt much with
his people have learned to meet it almost automatically. It consists
in referring to one's having said just exactly what one did not say,
and then if one fails to note the trap and avoid it, in claiming that
because one did not deny the allegation one has admitted its truth.
Aguinaldo himself later repeatedly resorted to this procedure in his
dealings with Dewey and others.
In the present instance Santos employed it rather cleverly when he
expressed the hope that the United States would "continue to support
the programme agreed upon in Singapore, between your Excellency and
General Aguinaldo, that is to say, the independence of the Philippine
Islands under an American protectorate."
Now if this was agreed to, Aguinaldo later constantly violated his
part of the agreement, for we shall see that he stated over and
over again, in correspondence with members of the junta and others,
that a protectorate would be considered only if absolute independence
finally proved unattainable, but there is no reason to believe that
any such agreement was made.
Dr. Santos read his speech to Mr. Pratt in French. Blount implies,
whether rightly or wrongly I do not know, that Pratt's knowledge
of French was poor. At all events Pratt in his reply made not the
slightest reference to the hope expressed by Santos that the United
States would continue to support the programme which Santos said
had been agreed upon between Pratt and Aguinaldo, and claim of a
promise of independence based on these speeches must obviously be
abandoned. There is no doubt that Pratt personally sympathized with
the ambitions of the Filipino leaders, and openly expressed his
sympathy on this and other occasions, but to do this was one thing
and to have attempted to compromise his government would have been
another and very different one. The shrewd Filipinos with whom he
was dealing understood this difference perfectly well.
It is a regrettable fact that there exists some reason to believe that
his sympathy was not purely disinterested. Aguinaldo claims that Pratt
wished to be appointed "representative of the Philippines in the United
States to promptly secure the official recognition of our independence"
and that he promised him "a high post in the customs service." [25]
It will be noted that several sentences and phrases in Blount's
statement are enclosed in quotation marks. From what were they
quoted? The next paragraph in his book tells us:--
"Says the newspaper clipping which has preserved the Pratt
oration: At the conclusion of Mr. Pratt's speech, refreshments
were served, and as the Filipinos, _being Christians,
drink alcohol_, there was no difficulty in arranging as to
refreshments." [26]
The use of this clipping from the Singapore _Free Press_ illustrates
admirably Blount's methods. The _Free Press_ had at first displayed
a marked coldness toward the insurgent cause, but its editor,
Mr. St. Clair, was opportunely "seen" by Bray, who reported that as a
result of his visit, both the editor and the paper would thereafter be
friendly, and they were. In other words, the _Free Press_ became the
Singapore organ of the insurrection, and its editor, according to Bray,
"a true and loyal friend" of Aguinaldo.
Blount claims to have made "an exhaustive examination of the records
of that period." [27] Why then did he use as evidence a newspaper
clipping from an Insurgent organ, instead of Santos's letter?
Blount endeavours to make capital out of the fact that Pratt forwarded
to the State Department a proclamation which he says was gotten up
by the Insurgent leaders at Hongkong and sent to the Philippines in
advance of Aguinaldo's coming. He says that it was headed "America's
Allies" and quotes from it as follows:--
"Compatriots: Divine Providence is about to place independence
within our reach.... The Americans, not from mercenary
motives, but for the sake of humanity and the lamentations
of so many persecuted people, have considered it opportune,
etc. [Here follows a reference to Cuba.] At the present
moment an American squadron is preparing to sail for the
Philippines.... The Americans will attack by sea and prevent
any reënforcements coming from Spain; ... we insurgents must
attack by land. Probably you will have more than sufficient
arms, because the Americans have arms and will find means
to assist us. _There where you see the American flag flying,
assemble in numbers; they are our redeemers!_" [28]
The translation that he used is that given in Senate Document No. 62,
L. 60, and is none too accurate. He allows it to be inferred that
this proclamation was actually issued. It was not. Its history is
as follows:--
On May 16, 1898, J. M. Basa, a Filipino, who had lived in Hongkong
since 1872, on account of his connection with the troubles of that
year, wrote letters [29] to a number of friends recommending the
widest possible circulation of a proclamation enclosed therewith, as
an aid to the American policy in the Philippines "in the war against
the tyrannical friars and the Spaniards."
With these letters there were sent two different proclamations,
each beginning with the words "Fellow Countrymen." The first, which
is the one referred to by Blount, continues:--
"Divine Providence places us in a position to secure our
independence, and this under the freest form to which all
individuals, all people, all countries, may aspire.
"The Americans, more for humanity than for self-interest,
attentive to the complaints of so many persecuted Filipinos,
find it opportune to extend to our Philippines their protective
mantle, now that they find themselves obliged to break their
friendship with the Spanish people, because of the tyranny
they have exercised in Cuba, causing all Americans, with whom
they have great commercial relations, enormous damages.
"At this moment an American fleet is prepared to go to the
Philippines.
"We, your fellow-countrymen, fear that you will make use of
your arms to fire upon the Americans. No, brothers; do not
make such a mistake; rather (shoot) kill yourselves than
treat our liberators as enemies.
"Do not pay attention to the decree of Primo de Rivera,
calling on you to enlist for the war, for that will cost
you your lives: rather die than act as ingrates toward our
redeemers, the Americans.
* * * * *
"Note well that the Americans have to attack by sea, at the
same time avoiding reinforcements which may come from Spain;
therefore the insurrection must attack by land. Perhaps you
will have more than sufficient arms, as the Americans have
arms, and will find the means to aid you.
"Whenever you see the American flag, bear in mind that they
are our redeemers." [30]
On the margin is written: "Viva, for America with the Philippines!"
Apparently what Basa here means by independence is independence from
Spain, for it is known that he was in favour of annexation to the
United States, and in the second proclamation we find the following:--
"This is the best opportunity which we have ever had for
contriving that our country (all the Philippine Archipelago)
may be counted as another Star in the Great Republic of
the United States, great because of its wisdom, its wealth,
and its constitutional laws.
"Now is the time to offer ourselves to that great nation. With
America we shall have development in the broadest sense
(of advancement) in civilization.
"With America we shall be rich, civilized and happy.
"Fellow patriots, add your signatures to those which have
already been given. Explain to all our fellow countrymen the
benefits of this change, which will be blessed by Heaven,
by men and by our children.
"Viva America with the Philippines!!!" [31]
The letters were undoubtedly given to Aguinaldo for delivery on his
arrival. They were never delivered, and it is reasonable to suppose,
especially as Basa, who was a man of importance and means, was a
member of the group who desired annexation to the United States, that
Aguinaldo took the letters along in order to avoid a rupture with him
and then quietly suppressed them. Obviously, however, he sent or gave
a copy of the first one to Pratt, presumably without the written words:
"Viva, for America with the Philippines!"
And now comes a bit of evidence as to what occurred at Singapore
which I consider incontrovertible.
Aguinaldo returned promptly to Hongkong and on May 4, 1898, a meeting
of the junta was held. The minutes of this meeting, [32] signed by
each of the several Filipinos present, form a part of the Insurgent
records which have come into the possession of the United States
Government. They state among other things that:--
"The temporary Secretary read the minutes of the preceding
meeting, which were approved. The temporary President reported
that D. Emilio Aguinaldo had just arrived from Singapore and
it became necessary for him to take possession of the office
to which he has been elected."
After the transaction of some further business Aguinaldo was summoned,
appeared at the meeting, and was duly installed as President. Then:--
"The President described the negotiations which took place
during his absence in Singapore with the American Consul of
that English colony. Both agreed that the President should
confer with the Admiral commanding the American squadron in
Mirs Bay, and if the latter should accept his propositions,
advantageous, in his judgment, to the Philippines, he would go
to said country in one of the cruisers which form the fleet
for the purpose of taking part in the present events. And
as he did not find the Admiral, he thought it well to have
an interview with the American Consul of this colony on the
day of his arrival, but was not satisfied with such interview.
"Considering the critical conditions in the Philippines at
present, he begged the committee to discuss the advisability of
his going to said islands with all the leaders of prominence
in the last rebellion residing in this colony, in case the
Admiral gave them an opportunity to do so."
Note that there is here absolutely not one word of any promise
of independence made to Aguinaldo by Pratt or any one else. Is it
conceivable that Aguinaldo in describing "the negotiations which
took place during his absence in Singapore with the American Consul
of the English Colony" would, by any chance, have failed to inform
his associates in Hongkong of such an extraordinary and fortunate
occurrence as the promising by Mr. Pratt and Admiral Dewey that the
United States would recognize Philippine independence?
Sandico [33] thought that Aguinaldo ought to go, for--
"From conferences which he had with the Admiral of the
American fleet and with the American Consul in this colony,
he believed that under present conditions it was absolutely
necessary for the President to go to the Philippines, since,
according to the American Consul, Manila had been taken by
said fleet, and a provisional government was now being formed
in that capital. The intervention of the President in the
formation of that government is undoubtedly essential, since
his prestige, which everybody recognizes, would evidently
prevent dissensions among the sons of the country, and it
would be possible thereby to obtain a perfect organization
both for the military and civil evolution of that country.
"Srs. Garchitorena [34] and Apacible [35] expressed themselves
in similar terms. Notwithstanding the previous remarks,
the President insisted that he considered it reckless for
him to go to the Philippines without first making a written
agreement with the Admiral, as it might happen, if he placed
himself at his orders, that he might make him subscribe to
or sign a document containing proposals highly prejudicial
to the interests of the country, from which might arise the
following two very grave contingencies:
"1st. If he should accept them, he would undoubtedly commit
an unpatriotic act, and his name would justly be eternally
cursed by the Filipinos.
"2d. If he should refuse, then the break between the two
would be evident.
"And to avoid this sad dilemma, he proposed to the committee
that the four parties (?) of the insurgents now here, under
charge of the competent chiefs authorized in writing by him,
should go to the Philippines to intervene, after a conference
with the Admiral, in these important questions; such means,
in his opinion, should be first employed to ascertain in an
authentic manner what the intentions of the United States
in regard to that country are; and if his intervention is
absolutely necessary, he would not object to go at once to
the Philippines, endeavouring by all the means in his power
to remedy the critical condition of the country, to which he
had offered, and always would willingly offer, to sacrifice
his life."
Why adopt means to learn from the admiral what the intentions of the
United States were in regard to the Philippines if both he and Pratt
had already promised recognition of independence?
"Srs. Sandico, Garchitorena, Gonzaga [36] and Apacible
replied that they were fully convinced the Admiral of the
American squadron would furnish the President all the arms
which he might desire, since the former was convinced that
the fleet could do nothing in the Philippines unless it were
used in conjunction with the insurgents in the development
of their plans of war against the Spanish government.... The
authority to treat which the President desired to give to the
other chiefs, without reflecting at all upon their personal
qualifications, they did not believe would be as efficacious
as his personal intervention which is necessary in grave
affairs, such as those the subject of discussion; there would
be no better occasion than that afforded them to insure the
landing of the expeditionary forces on those islands and to
arm themselves at the expense of the Americans and to assure
the situation of the Philippines in regard to our legitimate
aspirations against those very people. The Filipino people,
unprovided with arms, would be the victims of the demands
and exactions of the United States; but, provided with arms,
would be able to oppose themselves to them, struggling for
independence, in which consists the true happiness of the
Philippines. And they finished by saying that it made no
difference if the Spanish government did demand the return
of the P400,000, and if the demand were allowed in an action,
since the object of the sum would be obtained by the Admiral
furnishing the Filipinos the arms which they required for
the struggle for their legitimate aspirations."
Here, then, was a definite plan to obtain arms from the Americans to
be used if necessary "against those very people" later.
"The President, with his prestige in the Philippines, would be
able to arouse those masses to combat the demands of the United
States, if they colonized that country, and would drive them,
if circumstances rendered it necessary, to a Titanic struggle
for their independence, even if they should succumb in shaking
off the yoke of a new oppressor. If Washington proposed to
carry out the fundamental principles of its constitution,
there was no doubt that it would not attempt to colonize the
Philippines, or even to annex them. It was probable then that
it would give them independence and guarantee it; in such
case the presence of the President was necessary, as he would
prevent dissensions among the sons of the country who sought
office, who might cause the intervention of European powers, an
intervention which there was no reason to doubt would be highly
prejudicial to the interests of the country.... What injury
could come to the Philippines, even if we admitted that the
Admiral would not give arms to the President on account of his
refusal to sign a document prejudicial to the country, after
he had taken all means to provide for her defence? None. Such
an act of the President could not be censured, but, on the
other hand, would be most meritorious, because it would be
one proof more of his undoubted patriotism."
Not one word of any promise of independence do we find in this
remarkable document. On the contrary it furnishes conclusive proof
that no such promise had been made and that the future relations
between Filipinos and Americans were still completely uncertain.
And now comes some direct evidence. Bray and St. Clair, the latter
the editor of the Insurgent organ in Singapore, were present on
the occasion when independence was said to have been promised by
Pratt. Bray subsequently declared in the most positive terms that it
was promised. St. Clair wrote him a letter taking him roundly to task
for this claim, in the following very interesting terms:--
"I felt it to be my duty to let Pratt know that you still hold
that you and Santos have evidence that will controvert his,
(and) he was, of course, extremely disappointed, because he
(is) quite aware of what took place in Spanish, and as to
turning of his conversation into a pretense of agreement
he knows nothing. He says very truly: 'My own party, the
Democrats, will say if they read this book--If this man takes
it upon himself to be a Plenipotentiary without authority, we
had better not employ him any more--I frankly cannot understand
your action, as to its unwisdom I have no doubt at all.'
"Admiral Dewey goes home, it is believed, to advise the
President on Naval and Colonial Affairs, he knows exactly
what did take place and what did not, and I should know if
he had any ground to think that the slightest promise was
made by Pratt to Aguinaldo he would declare it unauthorized
and decline to sanction it. I am certain Pratt reported what
he supposed took place accurately; he had no surety on what
you might have said, naturally.
"And, curiously, you never mentioned to me anything of
the agreement as having taken place then, nor in the paper
you communicated to me was there any mention of one, nor
did Pratt know of any. It is only more recently that the
fiction took shape. 'The wish father to the thought,' or
the statement repeated till it has become believed by the--,
[37] this is common.
"Now I would like to urge you, from the practical point
of view, to drop any such foolishness. The vital thing,
and nothing else counts, is what Dewey said and did when
he at last met Aguinaldo. That, that, that, is the thing,
all else is empty wind.
"Supposing that Pratt and Wildman had covered inches of
paper with 'Clauses' and put on a ton of sealing wax as
consular seals, what, pray, to any common sense mind would
all that have been worth? Nothing!! Nothing!! And yet,
where is the agreement, where is the seal? Where are there
any signatures? And if you had them--waste paper--believe
me, that all this potter about Pratt and Wildman is energy
misdirected. The sole thing to have impressed upon the
public in America would be the chaining of Dewey and
Aguinaldo together as participants in common action; you
surely comprehend this means! Think and think again; it
means success as far as it is possible. The other work is
not only lost, but does not gain much sympathy, especially
this criticism of the conduct of American troops; things may
be true that are not expedient to say. Sink everything into
Dewey-Aguinaldo coöperation, that was on both sides honest
even if it did not imply any actual arrangement, which, of
course, Dewey himself could not make. That here you have the
facts,--undenied--incontrovertible." [38]
The following letter of Bray to Aguinaldo, dated January 12, 1899,
seems to me to throw much light on the question of how these claims
relative to the promised recognition of Filipino independence sometimes
originated and were bolstered up:--
"With regard to your proclamation, there is still a trump card
to be played. Did you not say that the basis of any negotiation
in Singapore was the Independence of the Philippines under an
American protectorate? This is what Consul Pratt telegraphed
and to which Dewey and Washington agreed; as I figured up
the 'price' of the telegram, I know very well what occurred,
and I am ready to state it and to swear to it when the proper
time comes. There are five of us against one in the event of
Consul Pratt receiving instructions to deny it. Furthermore,
Mr. St. Clair knows what happened and I am certain that he
also would testify. St. Clair still has the rough draft as
an historical relic, and St. Clair is a true and loyal friend
of yours, as is your humble servant." [39]
The utter unscrupulousness of Bray is shown by his claim that St. Clair
would confirm his false statements, made as it was after receiving
St. Clair's letter above quoted.
But Bray did not wait for Aguinaldo to play this trump card. He tried
to play it himself by cabling Senator Hoar, on the same day, that as
the man who introduced General Aguinaldo to the American government
through the consul at Singapore he was prepared to swear that the
conditions under which Aguinaldo promised to cooperate with Dewey
were independence under a protectorate. [40]
Let us now trace Aguinaldo's subsequent movements, and see what
promises, if any, were made to him by Wildman and Dewey. He had
returned to Hongkong with two companions, all travelling under assumed
names. Only his most trusted friends among the members of the junta
were at first allowed to know where he was living.
His situation was a difficult one. It was necessary for him to come
to some sort of a temporary arrangement with Artacho, if he was to
avoid legal difficulties, and to reëstablish himself with some of
his companions, who had accused him of deserting with the intention
of going to Europe to live on money which belonged to them. When
harmony had been temporarily restored through the good offices of
Sandico, Aguinaldo had an interview with Consul General Wildman. He
has since claimed that Wildman, too, promised him independence, but
the truth seems to be that he himself said he was anxious to become
an American citizen. This being impossible, he wanted to return to
the Philippines and place himself under Dewey's orders. He wanted to
help throw off the yoke of Spain, and this done, would abide by the
decision of the United States as to the fate of the Philippines. [41]
Any claim that Aguinaldo had been promised independence by Wildman, or,
indeed, that the latter had been allowed to know that the Filipinos
desired it, seems to me to be negatived, not only by Wildman's own
statements, but by a letter from Agoncillo to Aguinaldo written on
August 5, 1908, in which he says:--
"The American consul left my house to-day at 3 o'clock, as I
had requested an interview with him before his departure, and
I was unable to go to the Consulate on account of the swelling
of my feet. From our conversation I infer that independence
will be given to us. I did not, however, disclose to him
our true desires.... Said consul approved my telegram to
McKinley, which has been sent to-day through him, a copy of
which is herewith enclosed. If they accept our representative
in the commission, we may arrive at a friendly understanding,
and it will enable us to prepare for the fight in case they
refuse to listen to our request. On the other hand, if at
the very beginning they refuse to admit our representative,
we will at once be in a position to know what should be done,
_i.e._ to prepare for war." [42]
On May 4, 1898, the Hongkong junta voted that Aguinaldo ought to go
to the Philippines, and go he did. It would seem that he at first gave
up the idea of joining Dewey, for on May 11 he wrote a cipher letter,
giving minute directions for the preparation of signals to assist
his ship in making land, by day or by night, at Dingalan Bay on the
east coast of Luzon; directing the capture of the town of San Antonio,
just back of Capones Islands, in Zambales, and ending with the words:
"We will surely arrive at one of the two places above mentioned,
so you must be prepared."
Something led him again to change his mind, and he finally sailed on
the _McCulloch_.
In his "Reseña Verídica" written later for political purposes,
Aguinaldo has definitely claimed that Dewey promised him that
the United States would recognize the independence of the Filipino
people. I will let him tell his own story, confronting his statements
with those of the admiral.
"May 19, 1898.
"The _McCulloch_ started at eleven o'clock on the morning of
the 17th of May for the Philippines; we anchored, between
twelve and one o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th, in
the waters of Cavite, and immediately the launch of the
Admiral--with his aid and private secretary--came to convey
me to the _Olympia_, where I was received, with my aid,
Sr. Leyva, with the honors of a general, by a section of
marine guards." [43]
Relative to this matter, Admiral Dewey has testified: [44]
"_The Chairman_. You, of course, never saluted the flag?
_Admiral Dewey_. Certainly not; and I do not think I ever
called Aguinaldo anything but Don Emilio; I don't think I
ever called him 'General.'
_The Chairman_. And when he came on board ship was he received
with any special honors at the side?
_Admiral Dewey_. Never."
The "Reseña Verídica" continues:--
"The Admiral received me in a salon, and after greetings of
courtesy I asked him 'if all the telegrams relative to myself
which he had addressed to the Consul at Singapore, Mr. Pratt,
were true.' He replied in the affirmative, and added, 'that
the United States had come to the Philippines to protect its
natives and free them from the yoke of Spain.'
He said, moreover, that 'America was rich in territory and
money, and needed no colonies,' concluding by assuring me,
'to have no doubt whatever about the recognition of Philippine
independence by the United States.' Thereupon he asked me
if I could get the people to arise against the Spaniards and
carry on a rapid campaign." [45]
As we have seen, Dewey sent only one telegram to Pratt about
Aguinaldo. It merely directed that the latter be sent.
"I then expressed to him my profound acknowledgment for the
generous help which the United States was giving the Filipino
people, as well as my admiration for the magnificence and
goodness of the American people. I also stated to him that
'before leaving Hongkong, the Filipino Colony had held a
meeting, at which was discussed and considered the possibility
that--after defeating the Spaniards--the Filipinos might have a
war with the Americans, if they should refuse to recognize our
independence, who were sure to defeat us because they should
find us tired out, poor in ammunitions and worn out in the war
against the Spaniards,' requesting that he pardon my frankness.
"The Admiral replied that he 'was delighted at my sincerity,
and believed that both Filipinos and Americans should treat
each other as allies and friends, clearly explaining all
doubts for the better understanding between both parties,' and
added that, 'so he had been informed, the United States would
recognize the independence of the Filipino people, guaranteed
by the word of honor of the Americans,--more binding than
documents which may remain unfulfilled when it is desired
to fail in them as happened with the compacts signed by the
Spaniards, advising me to form at once a Filipino national
flag, offering in virtue thereof to recognize and protect
it before the other nations, which were represented by the
various squadrons then in the Bay; although he said we should
conquer the power from the Spaniards before floating said
flag, so that the act should be more honourable in the sight
of the whole world, and, above all, before the United States,
in order that when the Filipino ships with their national
flag would pass before the foreign squadrons they should
inspire respect and esteem.'
"Again I thanked the Admiral for his good advice and generous
offers, informing him that if the sacrifice of my life was
necessary to honor the Admiral before the United States,
I was then ready to sacrifice it.
"I added that under such conditions I could assure him that
all the Filipino people would unite in the revolution to
shake off the yoke of Spain; that it was not strange that
some few were not yet on his side on account of lack of arms
or because of personal expediency.
"Thus ended this first conference with Admiral Dewey, to whom
I announced that I would take up my residence at the Naval
Headquarters in the Cavite Arsenal." [46]
Further on, in the same document, Aguinaldo advances the claim that
on the occasion of the visit of General Anderson and Admiral Dewey
the latter again promised him independence.
He says:--
"In the same month of July, the Admiral, accompanied by General
Anderson, presented himself, and after greetings of courtesy
said to me: 'You have seen confirmed all of what I promised
and said to you. How pretty your flag is. It has a triangle,
and it looks like Cuba's. Will you give me one as a reminder
when I return to America?'
"I replied to him that I was convinced of his word of
honour and that there was no necessity whatever to draw up
in documentary form his agreements, and as for the flag,
that he could count on it, even at that very moment.
"Dewey continued: 'Documents are not complied with when
there is no honour, as has happened with your agreement
with the Spaniards, who have failed in what was written
and signed. Trust in my word for I hold myself responsible
that the United States will recognize the independence of
the country. But I recommend to you [plural.--TR.] to keep
everything which we have talked about and agreed upon with
a great deal of secrecy for the present. And, moreover,
I entreat you [plural.--TR.] to be patient if our soldiers
should insult some Filipino, because, as volunteers, they
are yet lacking in discipline.'" [47]
Admiral Dewey has testified as follows, concerning the recognition
of Philippine independence by him:--
"_The Chairman_. You remember the question of your recognizing
his republic was a good deal discussed and you wrote me a
letter, which I read in the senate. Of course, I am only
asking now about what you said in the letter. There was no
recognition of the republic?
"_Admiral Dewey_. Never. I did not think I had any authority to
do it and it never occurred to me to do it. There was a sort
of a reign of terror; there was no government. These people
had got power for the first time in their lives and they
were riding roughshod over the community. The acts of cruelty
which were brought to my notice were hardly credible. I sent
word to Aguinaldo that he must treat his prisoners kindly,
and he said he would."
He has further testified that he never as much as heard of independence
until the appearance of Aguinaldo's proclamation of June 15, 1898:--
"_Admiral Dewey_.... Then when I heard that our troops were
coming I asked him to withdraw his troops from Cavite and make
room for our men. He demurred at this, but finally withdrew
and established headquarters across the bay at a place called
Bacoor, from which place on the 15th of June he sent me a
proclamation declaring the independence of the Philippines.
"_The Chairman_. Was that the first?
"_Admiral Dewey_. That was the first intimation; the first
I had ever heard of independence of the Philippines.
"_The Chairman_. He had said something to you--
"_Admiral Dewey_. Not a word. He had done what I told him. He
was most obedient; whatever I told him to do he did. I attached
so little importance to this proclamation that I did not even
cable its contents to Washington, but forwarded it through
the mails. I never dreamed that they wanted independence."
Remembering that Admiral Dewey was not being interrogated as to the
statements of the "Reseña Veridica," it will be seen that he has,
nevertheless, covered them fully.
It was my good fortune to be long and intimately associated with
Admiral Dewey while serving on the first Philippine commission. He
always grew indignant when the subject of any promises relative to
independence said to have been made by him was so much as mentioned,
and gave to the commission in writing the following:--
"The statement of Emilio Aguinaldo, under date of Sept. 23,
published in the _Springfield Republican_, so far as it
relates to reported conversations with me, or actions of mine,
is a tissue of falsehood. I never, directly or indirectly,
promised the Filipinos independence. I never received Aguinaldo
with military honors, or recognized or saluted the so-called
Filipino flag. I never considered him as an ally, although
I did make use of him and the natives to assist me in my
operations against the Spaniards." [48]
As Dewey's allegations flatly contradict those of Aguinaldo, we
must choose between the two. While I have no doubt as to where
the choice will fall, I will now submit some additional matter of
interest. Let us first consider the history of the "Reseña Verídica"
in which Aguinaldo makes the charges above quoted. On September 12,
1899, Buencamino wrote of it to Apacible in Hongkong, saying:--
"This work is entitled 'Reseña Verídica de la Revolución
Filipina' in which Don Emilio relates in detail his acts with
Admiral Dewey. It has been distributed to the Consuls and
you are ordered to reprint it there translated into English
and send some copies to the United States, even though only
a thousand, if you deem it advisable. Send copies also to
Europe, Señor Agoncillo taking charge of the publication. If
the Agent you may have selected for the United States should
still be there, it would be advisable for him to take a copy
of the pamphlet with him for its publication.
"This is an order of the Government which I take pleasure in
transmitting to you for due execution." [49]
But there was a change of heart about giving the pamphlet to the
consuls, for under date of September 30 Buencamino wrote:--
"We have not distributed them here in order that Otis may
not counteract the effects that we desire to produce with
this publication, through his usual machinations. Nor do we
believe it advisable to make this pamphlet public in those
colonies before your arrival in the United States." [50]
To this letter he added in cipher the following postscript to Pablo
Ocampo, in charge of Aguinaldo's correspondence in Manila:--
"At last moment--Nota bene:
"Don't deliver any copy of the 'Reseña Verídica' to the
Consuls, even though it was so directed in the beginning of
the letter. All except one, which is for you, will be sent
to Hong-kong, Don Pedro de la Viña being bearer of the same,
as also of the other documents. The copy intended for you
is neither to be divulged nor published, for strict reserve
is required until those which are being sent arrive at their
destination." [51]
The reason for preserving such secrecy relative to this document
until it could reach its destination and work its harm is of course
obvious. Its statements were so outrageously false that they would
have been instantly and authoritatively contradicted had it been
issued seasonably at Manila.
The truth is that Aguinaldo's claim that he had been promised
independence was a gradual growth. Let us trace it.
On May 21, he wrote a circular letter to "My dear brother," inviting
the recipients and their companions to meet him at once, and arrange
the best way to entrap all the enemy in their homes.
In this he says that he has promised the American admiral that they
will "carry on modern war" and adds: "Even if a Spaniard surrenders,
he must be pardoned and treated well, and then you will see that
our reputation will be very good in all Europe, which will declare
for our independence; but if we do not conduct ourselves thus, the
Americans will decide to sell us or else divide up our territory. As
they will hold us incapable of governing our land, we shall not secure
our liberty, rather the contrary; our own soil will be delivered over
to other hands." [52]
In this letter, written on the very day of the interview at which he
subsequently claimed that Admiral Dewey had promised independence,
does he make any claim that this had occurred? No, he very distinctly
implies the contrary. Is it believable that if he could truly have
said "The United States, through its representatives Dewey and Pratt,
has promised to recognize our independence" he would have failed to
do so when this would instantly have secured him the vigorous support
which he was then uncertain of obtaining? I think not.
In this letter Aguinaldo specifically directs that deceit be employed
and that Spanish officers be treacherously attacked. The practising of
deceit was a carefully considered part of the insurgent policy. In a
letter from Hongkong dated July 21, 1898, Agoncillo writes as follows
to Mabini: [53]--
"the time will come when disguises must be set aside and
we will see who is deceiving whom. The statements made by
some of the commanders of the fleet here to Don Emilio and
myself were to the effect that the exclusive purpose of the
Government at Washington with regard to the Filipinos, is to
grant this country independence, without any conditions,
although I said to myself that such a purpose was too
philanthropical. Don Emilio knew what I thought then, and
I still think the same; that is to say that we are the ones
who must secure the independence of our country by means of
unheard of sacrifices and thus work out its happiness." [54]
Aguinaldo himself frankly advocated the use of deceit. He practised
what he preached. Simeon Villa, one of his companions on his
subsequent flight through Northern Luzon, before he finally took
refuge at Palanan, kept a diary, which constitutes an official record
of this long journey. In it he has inserted some bits of history of
other days, of which none is more interesting than his account of the
beginning of hostilities against the Spaniards, in August, 1896. From
it we learn that Aguinaldo, who was known to the friar of his town to
be both a mason and a chief of the Katipúnan, was in danger during
August, and on the night of the 29th of that month called a meeting
of all the compromised persons of the place, who agreed that on the
following day he should "make representations to the governor of the
province." Villa says that he was greatly beloved by the governor and
his wife. Early on the following morning, he "presented himself to the
governor, and in the name of the people of Cavite Viejo, offered him
their respects and their loyalty to Spain," at the same time asking
a garrison of a hundred men for his town, which the governor promised
to send at once if the captain-general approved.
That afternoon he reported the results of his efforts to his
fellow-conspirators, "and told them that then was the opportune moment
for rising against the Spaniards." He initiated the uprising himself
the next morning. [55]
Could deceit be more deliberately practised or treachery more frankly
employed?
I have indulged in this digression to show that Aguinaldo could
hardly have complained had the methods which he used against others
been employed against him. He was never deceived by the Americans,
but his claims relative to independence grew rapidly, and he was soon
deceiving his own people.
On May 24th, he issued no less than four proclamations. One of
these, doubtless intended to be seen by Americans, made no mention
of Independence, but said: [56]--
"The great powerful North American nation has offered its disinterested
protection to secure the liberty of this country."
In another proclamation, doubtless intended for a different use,
he made the statement that the great North American nation had come
to give decisive and disinterested protection, "considering us as
sufficiently civilized and capable of governing ourselves." [57]
On June 5, having practically gained control of Cavite Province, he
felt strong enough to announce that independence would be proclaimed
on June 12, and on that date he did proclaim it in a decree.
The Admiral of the American Squadron, with the commanders and officers
of his command, was invited to the ceremonies, but none of them
went. As it was important for Aguinaldo to have some one there to
pose as a representative of the United States, he utilized for this
purpose a certain "Colonel" Johnson, an ex-hotel keeper of Shanghai,
who was running a cinematograph show. He appeared as Aguinaldo's chief
of artillery and the representative of the North American nation. [58]
* * * * *
Even as late as October 3, 1898, Agoncillo in a memorandum addressed to
President McKinley did not claim that independence had been promised,
but said:--
"As soon as the Spanish-American war began, the American
representatives and officials in Singapore, Hongkong and
Manila, invited the natives of the Philippines to assist
the American arms, which they did gladly and loyally, as
allies, with the conviction that their personality would
be recognized, as well as their political, autonomous and
sovereign rights." [59]
In it he does, however, claim that the organization of a government
independent of America and Spain was accomplished with the tacit
consent of the admiral commanding the fleet and with that of the
general and military and political commanders of the United States
of North America in the Philippines.
"Who, knowing these facts, not only did not object but accepted
them as a consummated legal act, and maintained official
relations with the new organization, making use thereof in
its subsequent actions and for the subsequent development of
the campaign, which was consequently brought to such a happy
end." [60]
This is a second illustration of the stereotyped insurgent procedure
of announcing a policy and then claiming that failure to attack it
meant acquiescence in it. Admiral Dewey says that he did not even read
this proclamation. There was no reason why he should have done so,
as it did not deal with matters which he was authorized to settle. He
had no instructions relative to the recognition of new governments,
and he sent this document to Washington without comment, as he should
have done. [61]
Apropos of this claim that American officers tacitly recognized
the Insurgent government, certain passages from an unsigned
document in the handwriting of Mabini, prepared about July 15,
1898, are of interest. Mabini, speaking of the attitude of the
Americans, says, "Notwithstanding all this and in spite of their
protestations of friendship, they have always refused to recognize
that government." Also, "If they persist in refusing to recognize our
government, we shall see ourselves compelled to come to an agreement
with any other government that will consent to recognize us on friendly
terms." [62]
This statement is certainly sufficiently specific as to whether
Americans had recognized the Insurgent government on or before the
date when it was written.
Let us now consider the relations between Aguinaldo and General
Anderson.
Blount attempts to make much of a cablegram, sent by the latter, in
which, after describing the Filipinos, he adds, "The people expect
independence." Blount says:--
"That cablegram of July 22nd, above quoted, in which the
commanding general of our forces in the Philippines advises
the Washington Government, 'The people expect independence'
is the hardest thing in the public archives of our government
covering that momentous period for those who love the memory of
Mr. McKinley to get around. After the war with the Filipinos
broke out, McKinley said repeatedly in public speeches,
'I never dreamed they would turn against us.'" [63]
If there is nothing harder than this to get around the memory of
President McKinley will not suffer, as the important thing is not
what Aguinaldo had led his people to expect, but what the American
officials had promised him. The President was certainly not bound to
believe that the Filipinos would turn against us even if they did
then expect independence. Blount has seen fit to leave unmentioned
certain other facts which are very pertinent in this connection.
Apparently sometime during September, 1898, Sandico made the following
statement in a letter to Aguinaldo:--
"I also have to inform you that Señores Basa, Cortés and
Co. have congratulated the Government of the United States
upon the capture of Manila, stating at the same time that now
that Filipino soil had been soaked with American blood, the
Islands must remain American. I believe that a telegram should
be sent immediately, to counteract that sent by them." [64]
Probably Sandico did not know that on August 15, 1898, Agoncillo
had transmitted another telegram to President McKinley through
Consul-General Wildman, reading as follows:--
"Agoncillo, my Commissioner and Ambassador-Extraordinary,
representing the provisional government of the Philippine
Islands, in its name and the name of its President, Emilio
Aguinaldo, congratulates you on the successful termination of
the war, and commends the occupancy of Manila. I assure the
United States of the allegiance and unquestioning support
of our people, and petition that we be granted one or more
representatives on the commission that is to decide the future
of our Islands." [65]
It would appear, therefore, that the President had more information
on this subject than was transmitted by General Anderson!
Not only did the latter passively refrain from recognizing Aguinaldo's
pretensions, but on July 22, 1898, he wrote to him as follows:--
"I observe that your Excellency has announced yourself
Dictator and proclaimed martial law. As I am here simply in
a military capacity, I have no authority to recognize such
an assumption. I have no orders from my government on the
subject." [66]
The effort to keep Americans in ignorance of the true state of affairs
was kept up until further deception was useless. Consul Williams,
for instance, wrote on June 16, 1898:--
"For future advantage, I am maintaining cordial relations
with General Aguinaldo, having stipulated submissiveness to
our forces when treating for their return here. Last Sunday,
12th, they held a council to form provisional government. I
was urged to attend, but thought best to decline. A form of
government was adopted, but General Aguinaldo told me today
that his friends all hoped that the Philippines would be held
as a colony of the United States of America." [67]
Yet on Sunday, June 12, Aguinaldo had in reality proclaimed the
independence of the Philippines. Few Americans at this time knew any
Spanish and none understood Tagalog, so that it was comparatively
easy to deceive them. What Consul Williams reported was what Aguinaldo
considered it expedient to have him believe.
The following undated letter from Aguinaldo to Mabini, supposed to have
been sent at this time, is of especial interest in this connection:--
"My dear Brother: I do not want to go there [where the
addressee is] until after the visit of the American Consul,
because I do not wish the negotiations to end in an ultimatum,
and in order that you may tell him all that is favourable for
the cause of our Nation. I charge you with the task of giving
him a reply, and if he should ask about me tell him that
since the time of his last visit there I have not recovered
from my illness. If anything important should happen we can
communicate with each other by telegraph, using a code in
matters that require secrecy." [68]
In a letter supposed to have been written during November, 1898,
prepared for Aguinaldo's signature and addressed to Señor McKinley,
President of the Republic of the United States of North America, but
apparently never sent, Aguinaldo renews the charge [69] previously
made in his "Reseñia Verídica," that Pratt and Dewey promised
independence. It need not be further discussed.
The climax was finally reached in an official protest against the
Paris Treaty written by Agoncillo in Paris on the 12th of December,
1898, in which occurs the following:--
"The United States of America, on their part, cannot allege
a better right to constitute themselves as arbitrators as to
the future of the Philippines.
"On the contrary, the demands of honour and good faith impose
on them the explicit recognition of the political status of
the people, who, loyal to their conventions, were a devoted
ally of their forces in the moments of danger and strife. The
noble general Emilio Aguinaldo and the other Filipino chiefs
were solicited to place themselves at the head of the suffering
and heroic sons of that country, to fight against Spain and
to second the action of the brave and skilful Admiral Dewey.
"At the time of employing their armed coöperation, both the
Commander of the _Petrel_ and Captain Wood in Hongkong, before
the declaration of war, the American Consuls-General Mr. Pratt
in Singapore, Mr. Wildman, in Hongkong, and Mr. Williams in
Cavite, acting as international agents of the great American
nation, at a moment of great anxiety offered to recognize
the independence of the Filipino nation, as soon as triumph
was obtained.
"Under the faith of such promises, an American man-of-war,
the _McCulloch_ was placed at the disposal of the said leaders
and which took them to their native shores; and Admiral Dewey
himself, by sending the man-of-war; by not denying to General
Aguinaldo and his companions the exacting of his promises,
when they were presented to him on board his flag-ship in
the Bay of Manila; by receiving the said General Aguinaldo
before and after his victories and notable deeds of arms,
with the honours due the Commander-in-Chief of an allied
army, and chief of an independent state; by accepting the
efficacious coöperation of that Army and of those Generals;
by recognizing the Filipino flag, and permitting it to be
hoisted on sea and land, consenting that their ships should
sail with the said flag within the places which were blockaded;
by receiving a solemn notification of the formal proclamation
of the Philippine nation, without protesting against it,
nor opposing in any way its existence; by entering into
relations with those Generals and with the national Filipino
authorities recently established, recognized without question
the corporated body and autonomous sovereignty of the people
who had just succeeded in breaking their fetters and freeing
themselves by the impulse of their own force." [70]
It will be noted that the claim constantly grows. The commander of
the _Petrel_ Captain Wood, Consul Wildman and Consul Williams are
now included among those alleged to have promised independence, and
it is claimed that Aguinaldo was received with the honours due the
chief of an independent state when he visited Admiral Dewey, whereas
his own original claim was that he was received with the honours due
a general, which is quite a different matter.
As a matter of fact, American officers usually addressed and treated
Aguinaldo as a general. The extent to which they were able to use
his organization to further the ends of their government will be set
forth later.
In a letter to Wildman, dated August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo admits that
there is no agreement, but says that he cannot tell the peoples that
it does not exist, "fearing that I may not be able to restrain the
popular excitement." [71] He begs Wildman to use his influence on his
government so that it will realize the inadvisability of deciding the
fate of the people "without considering their will duly represented by
my government." Is it conceivable that, if there had been any ground
for claiming a promise of independence, Aguinaldo would have failed
to mention it at this time?
We may summarize the well-established facts as follows:--
Consul-General Pratt was, or professed to be, in hearty sympathy
with the ambition of the Filipino leaders to obtain independence, and
would personally have profited from such a result, but he refrained
from compromising his government and made no promises in its behalf.
Admiral Dewey never even discussed with Aguinaldo the possibility
of independence.
There is no reason to believe that any subordinate of the Admiral
ever discussed independence with any Filipino, much less made any
promise concerning it.
Neither Consul Wildman nor Consul Williams promised it, and both
were kept in ignorance of the fact that it was desired up to the last
possible moment.
It is not claimed that either General Anderson or General Merritt
made any promise concerning it.
The conclusion that no such promise was ever made by any of these
men is fully justified by well-established facts.
Aguinaldo himself carefully refrained at the outset from saying,
in any document which Americans could read, that independence
had been promised, and advanced this claim only when the growing
strength of his land force had given him confidence. He repeated it,
with increasing emphasis, as his army increased in size, ultimately
openly threatening war if his pretensions were not recognized. In
doing this, he was merely carrying out a carefully prearranged plan,
agreed upon by the Hongkong junta.
And now let us examine the claim that the insurgents were our "faithful
allies" and "coöperated" with us in the taking of Manila. We shall
find that this subject richly repays investigation.