The Premeditated Insurgent Attack
It will be remembered that the minutes of the session of the Hong
Kong junta at which Aguinaldo reported the result of his negotiations
with Pratt and received his instructions relative to the trip to
Manila, recorded the fact that there would be no better occasion for
the expeditionary forces "to arm themselves at the expense of the
Americans," and that provided with arms the Filipino people would
be able to oppose themselves to the United States and combat their
demands if they attempted to colonize the country. [184]
The possible, if not the probable, desirability of attacking the
United States troops was, it is evident, clearly foreseen from the
beginning. Active preparations for doing this now soon began.
Although Insurgent officers in full uniform freely visited Manila at
all times, Aguinaldo wrote on October 1 to his commander in Laguna
Province that he must not permit Americans there without passes. He
was to get rid of them civilly, but he was to keep them out and inform
all authorities there of his instructions.
On August 24 an American soldier was killed and others were wounded in
Cavite by Insurgent troops who fired from behind. An Insurgent officer
in Cavite at the time reported on his record of services that he--
"took part in the movement against the Americans on the
afternoon of the 24th of August, under the orders of the
commander of the troops and the adjutant of the post."
This shows that the movement was ordered, but the Insurgents promptly
realized that it was ill advised.
On August 28 General Llanera was reported to be preparing for
operations against the Americans. He was ordered to suspend his
preparations. The same day General P. Mercado Rizal, commanding in
Laguna Province, wrote Mabini asking whether they were to consider
the Americans as their allies or their enemies. He wanted to know
whether the war was to stop or continue becoming more furious. This
not because he desired to ask questions about the secrets of the
government, but because he wished to prepare the minds of the people
for the future. Mabini's answer has not been found.
We have already noted that on August 8 Fernando Acevedo wrote General
Pío del Pilar recommending that he attack and annihilate the American
troops; that on August 10 Pilar wrote Aguinaldo suggesting that
the Americans be attacked, and that on August 17 Aguinaldo stated"
"The conflict is coming sooner or later." [185]
At this time Sandico entered the service of the Americans as an
interpreter and acted as a spy, endeavouring to keep his people fully
informed relative to the plans and acts of his employers. Incidentally
he endeavoured to convince the latter that the barbarities really
committed by Insurgent officers and troops in Manila were perpetrated
by enemies of the Insurgent cause who wished to discredit it.
In a letter dated September 21, 1898, Apacible says that the conflict
will come sooner or later and asks Aguinaldo if it would not be
better for them to provoke it before the Americans concentrate their
troops. [186]
On September 10 General Garcia reported to Aguinaldo that on the
previous night the Americans had attempted to push back his line
at San Lazaro, and that morning had concentrated and penetrated the
Insurgent territory, making a reconnaissance through the fields about
Sampaloc. Aguinaldo put an endorsement on this communication saying
that he had long since ordered that the Insurgent line should not
be passed. He instructed Garcia to throw troops in front of the
Americans at Sampaloc, and order them to leave, and to warn the
bolo men. Obviously, little more was needed to provoke an Insurgent
attack. [187]
An unsigned draft of an order in Aguinaldo's handwriting dated Malolos,
September 13 (?), 1898, [188] shows how tense was the situation
while the question of withdrawal of the Insurgent forces from the
city of Manila was under consideration. It contains instructions
for General Pío del Pilar, General P. Garcia and General Noriel or
Colonel Cailles. Their purpose is hardly open to doubt.
General Pío del Pilar was directed:--
"To have a detachment posted in the interval from the branch
of the river of Paco in a northerly direction to the bridge
and so on up to the Pasig river in the direction of Pandacan,
the river serving as a line until the suburb of Panque is
reached which will be under our jurisdiction. Proceed to
execute this order on its receipt, posting detachments where
they are necessary and trenches will be made without loss
of time working day and night. Do not rest for by doing so
we may lose the opportunity; beg of the troops to assist in
the formation of intrenchments. Matters have a bad aspect,
we especially expect something Wednesday and Thursday, the
15th and 16th of this month. The danger is imminent on the
mentioned days, also in the time that follows.
"Keep strict vigilance at all hours. In case you receive orders
to leave that place, do not do so on any account without my
orders, happen what may....
"Concentrate all your forces in Santa Ana before the day
arrives.
"Warn your soldiers against firing at random as the Spaniards
did, if possible have them calculate the number of their
antagonists and how much ammunition there is in comparison
with the number of the attacking force, in fact, there are
occasions when each shot fired kills as many as four men.
"I hope you will see to the execution of these instructions
and that you will maintain the honour of the Philippines by
your courage and in no way permit your rights to be trampled
underfoot." [189]
General Garcia was instructed as follows:--
"On Wednesday, the 14th of this month, you will post
detachments in the points indicated by lines on the enclosed
plan. On receipt of this and as soon as you learn its contents,
proceed secretly to determine the most suitable places to
post detachments and immediately post our troops and have
intrenchments made employing day and night in this work. Beg
this of our soldiers." [190]
The instructions to Noriel or Cailles read as follows:--
"At eight o'clock in the morning of Wednesday, the 14th,
withdraw your command from the town of Malate as indicated
on the enclosed plan, from the bridge in Singalong and in a
straight line from there to the branch of the river in Paco
will be the line of our jurisdiction even though we may not
be of one mind in the matter. On receipt of this proceed to
determine the most suitable places to post our troops even
if they are not supplied with batteries; on posting the
detachments give instructions to have intrenchments made
immediately without resting, especially on the days of the
15th and 16th. Since affairs have a serious aspect, do not
lose vigilance and be on the alert at all times....
"Concentrate all the forces and have a call to arms in Cavite
so that all the troops may be in Pasay on Wednesday night.
"In case the Americans attempt to order you out do not leave
your posts, happen what may, but exercise prudence and be
prepared leaving them to give the provocation. Answer them
that you have no instructions given you with regard to what
they ask." [191]
Obviously the maintenance of peace at this time hung by a very slender
thread. On September 14 the governor of Cavite telegraphed Aguinaldo
as follows:--
"Most urgent. I desire to know from you the result of the
ultimatum. Advise me if we must prepare our troops for action
to-morrow. I await a reply." [192]
But war was not to begin at this time. On September 23 Bray wrote
to Aguinaldo advising him to maintain a defensive attitude until
the result of the negotiations at Paris should become known, giving
way to the Americans and not showing his teeth. He could take the
offensive later if advisable and should have little difficulty in
settling accounts with the American soldiers. [193]
Bray suggested the possibility of an alliance between the American and
the Spanish soldiers if a conflict should arise before the departure
of the latter. [194]
Meanwhile preparations for the attack progressed. During September,
Sandico wrote Aguinaldo suggesting the urgent necessity of reorganizing
the "masons" and the Katipúnan, [195] and that all be furnished with
knives, to be kept hidden so that they might be "ready for any event."
In spite of efforts to keep the Insurgent soldiers in hand, feeling
among them ran high, and they wanted to fight. [196] On November 30,
1898, General Mascardo telegraphed from San Fernando to Aguinaldo
asking if he might begin firing in order to prevent the American
troops from disembarking, and Aguinaldo promptly answered in the
affirmative. [197]
On December 5 Malvar telegraphed from Lipa that according to a despatch
from Batangas, American divers were working unceasingly and that a
subordinate had ordered that they be fired on if they attempted to
land. Aguinaldo replied that he did not mind their working at sea, but
that they must not be allowed to land under any circumstances. [198]
On December 6 Sandico telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--
"The difficulty of last night at the San Juan picket with
the American troops has been adjusted without prejudice. Our
preparations ought to continue. Awaiting orders." [199]
San Juan was where the firing commenced on February 4, 1899.
On December 9 Cailles wired Aguinaldo as follows:--
"Report to you that there are 3000 Americans in front of
our position at Singalong. I do not know what they wish;
if they enter Pineda I open fire." [200]
By this time the Insurgents had made up their minds that the
Americans, who had been bearing their insults in silence, were
cowards. Aguinaldo's indorsement on this telegram reads:--
"Answered: Nevertheless the 3000 American soldiers are few
against my Colonel and his 300 soldiers, and I believe you
have more than that number. E.A., Dec. 12, 1898." [201]
Relative to the insults which were at this time showered upon
Americans, Taylor has made the following statement: [202]--
"Fortune had been good to Aguinaldo and his associates in the
eight months during which the United States had prevented Spain
from relieving her beleaguered garrisons in the Philippines,
and she might still be kind. The men about Aguinaldo who had
risen farthest and fastest could not endure the thought of
having to accept subordinate positions in a government not
directed by themselves. The halberdiers at the door of the
palace of the president saluted them as the halberdiers at
the doorway of his lordship the governor-general in Manila
had struck the marble steps with their halberds at the
coming of the Spanish generals. They swaggered down the
streets of Malolos, clashing their swords behind them,
and they knew that if they won, the Philippines would
be divided into fiefs which they, as dukes and marquises,
would hold in feudal tenure from a Malay potentate. They were
confident. They held Luzón. They held the people. They had
no intention of returning to office stools or to the life of
outlaws and hunted men. The United States force in Manila
was small and America was far. It was true that they might
have to fight for the prize which they had seized, but the
military leaders about Aguinaldo were confident of winning in
case they fought. They believed the Americans were afraid of
them and would be easily beaten. American soldiers had been
seized and had been insulted by the followers of Aguinaldo
and no resort had been made to force. The Americans had been
ordered to avoid bringing on an engagement and had obeyed. It
is also probable that many of the insults to which they had
been subjected were not appreciated by them. A tall soldier
from western America paid no attention to the insults hurled
at him in a language which he did not understand. And yet
the small excited Filipinos might retire feeling that the
American had tamely submitted to insult worse than a blow."
By the middle of December, Aguinaldo had placed in position in the
vicinity of Manila all of the field guns in his possession.
The Treaty of Paris was signed on December 10. It provided for the
termination of Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines. This was what
the Insurgents had been waiting for, and thereafter things moved
rapidly. It is obvious that an attack was definitely planned for
at this time, for on December 21, Commandant F. E. Rey telegraphed
Aguinaldo that the second chief of the second zone of Manila had
directed him to assist by entering that city as soon as they opened
fire against the American troops. [203]
On the following day Cailles reported that he had occupied blockhouse
No. 12, which was within the American lines, and added the following
significant statement:--
"The order of yesterday was, on hearing the first shots
from Santa Ana, for my whole force to hurl themselves on
the American line of trenches, and to follow the living to
Manila. The dead can lie with the dead. Yesterday we were
content waiting for the arming of the San Quintin." [204]
San Quintin's Day was the anniversary of the Sicilian vespers, the
massacre of the French in Sicily in 1268. Obviously the Insurgents
were planning something similar for Manila.
For some reason the attack was not made as planned, but there was
no intention of abandoning it. Within fifteen days of January 1 some
40,000 Filipinos left Manila. Why? On January 7, Aguinaldo wrote to
Señor Benito Legarda at Manila, saying:--
"I beg you to leave Manila with your family and come here to
Malolos, but not because I wish to frighten you--I merely
wish to warn you for your satisfaction, although it is not
yet the day or the week." [205]
Many details of the plan of attack have come into our
possession. Doctor Manuel Xeres Burgos wrote Aguinaldo during January
relative to a plan for an uprising of the prisoners in Bilibid Prison,
saying that it should by all means come "before the movement is begun
anywhere else," and calling attention to the necessity of stationing
men to prevent the American soldiers near by in the Zorilla theatre
from coming to the rescue. On the back of this letter there is a
sketch plan showing where bolo men were to be stationed, ready to
attack these soldiers. [206]
In his message to Congress dated January 1, 1899, Aguinaldo said:--
"I consider arguments unnecessary in support of the proposed
amendments, every one knows that our newborn Republic now has
to fight for its existence against giants in ambition and in
power." [207]
An unsigned letter addressed to Apacible on January 4, 1899, contains
the following statement:--
"It appears that conflict with the Americans is imminent
and inevitable. Several of their vessels with thousands of
soldiers commanded by General Miller were sent to Iloilo on
December 20th last to take that port together with the whole
of Visayas and Mindanao." [208]
On January 4 the following significant telegram was sent out:--
"Circular Telegram from the Secretary of the Interior to
Provincial Presidents, wherever there may be Telegraphic
Service, to be communicated to the Local Chiefs of each Town.
"_Malolos_, January 4, 1899, 9.35 A.M.
"To the Provincial President of the Province of Pangasinán:
"Hasten the preparation of all the towns in order to oppose the
American invasion. See that all the inhabitants prepare their
bolos and daggers; also that in each street and barrio national
militia is organized, each six of whom should be commanded by
a corporal, each thirteen by a sergeant, each twenty-six by
a second lieutenant, each fifty-two by a first lieutenant,
and each one hundred and four by a captain, directing that
the soldiers of the national militia elect their own officers,
informing all that upon our attitude depends our salvation.
_Lingayen_, January 4, 1899."
There is a note thereon which reads:--
"Communicate this to all of the local chiefs, and to the
commanding general."
(Signed by initials which are illegible, but evidently those
of the Provincial President.) [209]
On January 5, 1899, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation which contains
the following statement:--
"The said generals accepted my concessions in favor of
peace and friendship as indications of weakness. Thus it is,
that with rising ambition, they ordered forces to Iloilo on
December 26, with the purpose of acquiring for themselves
the title of conquerors of that portion of the Philippine
Islands occupied by my govermnent.
* * * * *
"My government cannot remain indifferent in view of such a
violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by
a nation which has arrogated to itself the title, 'champion
of oppressed nations.' Thus it is that my government is
ready to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to
take forcible possession of the Visayan Islands. I announce
these rights before the world, in order that the conscience of
mankind may pronounce its infallible verdict as to who are the
true oppressors of nations and the tormentors of human kind.
"Upon their heads be all the blood which may be shed." [210]
Three days later this proclamation, which was rather dangerously like
a declaration of war, was reissued with a significant change in the
last one of the passages quoted, the words "attempt to take forcible
possession of any part of the territory submitted to its jurisdiction"
being substituted for the words "attempt to take forcible possession
of the Visayan Islands."
On January 8, 1899, at 9.40 P.M., Sandico telegraphed Aguinaldo
as follows:--
"_Note_.--In consequence of the orders of General Rios to his
officers, as soon as the Filipino attack begins the Americans
should be driven into the Intramuros district and the Walled
city should be set on fire." [211]
Preparations for the attack, which was to begin inside the city
of Manila, were now rapidly pushed to conclusion. I quote Taylor's
excellent summary of them:--
"After Aguinaldo's proclamation of January 5 the number of
organizations charged with an attack within the city increased
rapidly and it is possible that those which had been formed
during Spanish rule had never been disbanded. Sandico's
clubs for athletic exercises and mutual improvement formed
a nucleus for these bodies and the directing boards of
the popular committees took up the work of recruiting,
while some of the members became officers of the militia or
sandatahan. On January 6 the commander of militia in Trozo,
Manila, reported that 1130 soldiers had been enrolled by the
popular committee. On January 7 Bonifacio Arévalo forwarded
to the head of the central committee a list of the officers
of the battalion which had just been organized in Sampaloc
for the defence of their liberties. Apparently about the
same time J. Limjap submitted to Sandico a project for
arming the prisoners in Bilibid Prison with the arms of the
American soldiers quartered in the Zorrilla Theatre across
the street. He said:--
"'Jacinto Limjap having been proclaimed commander of the
volunteers of the penitentiary, I ask you to authorize the
creation of a disciplinary battalion and the provisional
appointments of officers for 600 sandatahan, or militia,
ready to provide themselves by force with the American rifles
in the Zorrilla Theatre.'
"He followed by a statement of the officers desired. It was
not difficult for him to obtain volunteers there to rob,
to burn, to rape and to murder. These were the crimes for
which they were serving sentences. The political prisoners
had been released....
"On January 18 Sandico approved of the officers for the first
battalion organized by the committees of Sampaloc; on January
27 he approved those of the second battalion. By January 22 two
battalions had been organized in Quiapo. At least one regiment
of eight companies was raised in Binondo, for on January 23
its commander forwarded a roll of the officers to Aguinaldo
for his approval.... On January 25 T. Sandico, at Malolos,
submitted for approval the names of a number of officers of the
territorial militia in the city of Manila. On January 30, 1899,
a roll of four companies just organized in Malate was forwarded
approved by T. Sandico, and on the same day the committee
of Trozo, Manila, applied to T. Sandico for permission to
recruit a body for the defence of the country. The regiment
of 'Armas Blancas' had already been raised in Tondo and
Binondo. It was in existence there in December, 1898, and
may have been originally organized to act against Spain. On
February 2 all officers of the territorial militia in Manila
reported at Caloocan, in accordance with orders of Sandico,
for the purpose of receiving their commissions and taking the
oath to the flag. A man who took part in this ceremony wrote
that a multitude of men were present in uniform, and that
the oath was administered by Gen. Pantaleón García. There is
no reason for believing that this is a complete statement of
sandatahan organized in Manila by the end of January, and yet
this statement gives a force of at least 6330 men. General
Otis said that this force had been reported to him as being
10,000 men. It is probably true that only a small number of
them had rifles; but armed with long knives and daggers they
could have inflicted much damage in a sudden night attack in
the narrow and badly lighted streets of Manila. On January 9,
1899, Aguinaldo wrote his instructions for the sandatahan
of Manila. Members of this body were to enter the houses
of the American officers on the pretext of bringing them
presents. Once in they were to kill. The sentinels at the
gates of the barracks were to be approached by men dressed as
women and killed. The gates of the barracks held and as many
officers as possible treacherously murdered, the sandatahan
were to rise throughout the city, and by attacking in the
rear the United States troops on the outer line were to aid
in opening a way for Aguinaldo's force. To further increase
the confusion and perhaps to punish the natives who had not
joined them, the sandatahan were to fire the city.
* * * * *
"It is a fair deduction from Luna's orders for an uprising
in Manila, from Aguinaldo's instructions for the sandatahan,
from other documents among the papers of the insurgents and
from what was done in Manila on February 22 that Aguinaldo
and his advisers about the middle of January, 1899, drew up a
plan of attack upon Manila which would, if carried out, have
inflicted a severe blow upon the Americans. It was not carried
out, but that was not the fault of Aguinaldo or of Luna.
"It is true that the instructions were general; but that
particular instructions were given by Aguinaldo himself for
the murder of General Otis is shown by his note on the back
of a document presented to him. [212]
"... And then there was nothing abhorrent to Aguinaldo and
the men about him in beginning a war by the murder of the
commanding general on the other side.
* * * * *
"... Aguinaldo and all his followers have declared that on
February 4 the Americans attacked the unsuspecting Filipinos
who were using their utmost efforts to avoid a war. And yet
here in Aguinaldo's own handwriting is the record of the
fact that on January 10, 1899, he ordered the murder of the
American commander.
"The attack which Aguinaldo was preparing to deliver upon
and in Manila was not to be a mere raid such as the bandits
of Cavite were in the habit of making upon the defenceless
towns. The plan was a piece of calculated savagery in which
murder and outrage were considered means to accomplish a
purpose. The servants were to kill their employers; organized
bands, dressed in the dress of civilians, living in the city
of Manila under the government of the Americans, in many cases
employed by the Americans, were to suddenly fall upon the
barracks of the American soldiers and massacre the inmates;
all Americans in the streets were to be killed, the city was
to be fired and its loot was to be the reward of loyalty to
Aguinaldo. If this plan had been carried out no white man and
no white woman would have escaped. The reinforcements from
the United States would have arrived to find only the smoking
ruins of Manila. Buencamino had warned General Augustín what
the fate of Manila would be if taken by a horde of Indians
drunk with victory. That fate was now deliberately planned
for the city. Aguinaldo planned to occupy the capital not as
it had been occupied by the Americans. He planned to take it
as Count Tilly took Magdeburg.
"The authors of this plan were not savages. Mabini,
Sandico, and Luna, Asiatics educated in European schools,
were men of trained and subtle minds. With them cruelty
and assassination was not a matter of savage impulse but of
deliberate calculation; with them assassination was employed
as an effective addition to political propaganda, and murder
as an ultimate resource in political manoeuvres." [213]
Some portions of Aguinaldo's instructions to the _sandatahan_ are
particularly worthy of perpetuation, as they illustrate his ideas
as to the conduct which should be observed by cultured, patriotic,
honourable and very humane men, who were not cruel:--
"_Art_. 3. The chief of those who go to attack the barracks
should send in first four men with a good present for the
American commander. Immediately after will follow four others
who will make a pretence of looking for the same officer
for some reason and a larger group shall be concealed in the
corners or houses in order to aid the other groups at the first
signal. This wherever it is possible at the moment of attack.
"_Art_. 4. They should not, prior to the attack, look at
the Americans in a threatening manner. To the contrary,
the attack on the barracks by the sandatahan should be a
complete surprise and with decision and courage. One should
go alone in advance in order to kill the sentinel. In order
to deceive the sentinel one of them should dress as a woman
and must take great care that the sentinel is not able to
discharge his piece, thus calling the attention of those
in the barracks. This will enable his companions who are
approaching to assist in the general attack.
"_Art_. 5. At the moment of the attack the sandatahan should
not attempt to secure rifles from their dead enemies, but
shall pursue, slashing right and left with bolos until the
Americans surrender, and after there remains no enemy who
can injure them, they may take the rifles in one hand and
the ammunition in the other.
"_Art_. 6. The officers shall take care that on the
tops of the houses along the streets where the American
forces shall pass there will be placed four to six men,
who shall be prepared with stones, timbers, red-hot iron,
heavy furniture, as well as boiling water, oil and molasses,
rags soaked in coal oil ready to be lighted and thrown down,
and any other hard and heavy objects that they can throw on
the passing American troops. At the same time in the lower
parts of the houses will be concealed the sandatahan, who will
attack immediately. Great care should be taken not to throw
glass in the streets, as the greater part of our soldiers
go barefooted. On these houses there will, if possible,
be arranged, in addition to the objects to be thrown down,
a number of the sandatahan, in order to cover a retreat or
to follow up a rout of the enemy's column, so that we may be
sure of the destruction of all the opposing forces.
"_Art_. 7. All Filipinos, real defenders of their country,
should live on the alert to assist simultaneously the inside
attack at the very moment that they note the first movement
in whatever barrio or suburb, having assurance that all
the troops that surround Manila will proceed without delay
to force the enemy's line and unite themselves with their
brothers in the city. With such a general movement, so firm
and decided against the Americans, the combat is sure to be a
short one, and I charge and order that the persons and goods
of all foreigners shall be respected and that the American
prisoners shall be treated well.
* * * * *
"_Art_. 9. In addition to the instructions given in paragraph
6, there shall be in the houses vessels filled with boiling
water, tallow, molasses and other liquids, which shall be
thrown as bombs on the Americans who pass in front of their
houses, or they can make use of syringes or tubes of bamboo. In
these houses shall be the sandatahan who shall hurl the
liquids that shall be passed to them by the women and children.
"_Art_. 10. In place of bolos or daggers, if they do not
possess the same, the sandatahan can provide themselves with
lances and arrows with long sharp heads, and these should be
shot with great force in order that they may penetrate well
into the bodies of the enemy, and these should be so made that
in withdrawal from the body the head will remain in the flesh.
* * * * *
"_Art_. 12.... Neither will you forget your sacred oath and
immaculate banner; nor will you forget the promises made
by me to the civilized nations, whom I have assured that
we Filipinos are not savages, nor thieves, nor assassins,
nor are we cruel, but on the contrary, that we are men of
culture and patriotism, honourable and very humane." [214]
Aguinaldo enjoined order on his subordinates. [215]
The Filipinos were now ready to assume the offensive, but desired, if
possible, to provoke the Americans into firing the first shot. They
made no secret of their desire for conflict, but increased their
hostile demonstrations and pushed their lines forward into forbidden
territory. Their attitude is well illustrated by the following extract
from a telegram sent by Colonel Cailles to Aguinaldo on January 10,
1899:--
"Most urgent. An American interpreter has come to tell me to
withdraw our forces in Maytubig fifty paces. I shall not draw
back a step, and in place of withdrawing, I shall advance a
little farther. He brings a letter from his general, in which
he speaks to me as a friend. I said that from the day I knew
that Maquinley (McKinley) opposed our independence I did not
want any dealings with any American. War, war, is what we
want. The Americans after this speech went off pale." [216]
Aguinaldo approved the hostile attitude of Cailles, for there is a
reply in his handwriting which reads:--
"I approve and applaud what you have done with the Americans,
and zeal and valour always, also my beloved officers and
soldiers there. I believe that they are playing us until the
arrival of their reinforcements, but I shall send an ultimatum
and remain always on the alert.--E. A. Jan. 10, 1899." [217]
On this same day Aguinaldo commissioned Feliciano Cruz and Severino
Quitiongco to assassinate General Otis. [218]
On January 13 Noriel and Cailles telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--
"We desire to know results of ultimatum which you mention
in your telegram, and we also wish to know what reward our
Government is arranging for the forces that will be able
first to enter Manila."
This telegram is endorsed in Aguinaldo's handwriting:
"As to the contents of your telegram, those who will be the
heroes will have as their rewards a large quantity of money,
extraordinary rewards, promotions, crosses of Biak-na-bató,
Marquis of Malate, Ermita, Count of Manila, etc., besides the
congratulations of our idolizing country on account of their
being patriotic, and more, if they capture the regiments with
their generals, and, if possible, the chief of them all who
represents our future enemies in Manila, which (lot?) falls
to you, or, better said, to General Noriel and Colonel Cailles.
"The ultimatum has not been sent, but it will be within a
few days.
(Signed) "E. A.
"_Malolos_, Jan. 14, 1899." [219]
On January 14, 1899, the people at Aparri shouted: "Death to the
Americans," and held a review to celebrate the rupture of friendly
relations with the United States. [220]
At this time Aguinaldo had a dream about a victorious attack upon
Manila and telegraphed it to some of his officers. General García
replied from Caloocan on January 17 that the dream would come true
as soon as the conflict with the Americans began. [221]
In January 21, 1899, Aguinaldo was still not quite ready, and ordered
that the Filipino soldiers in the walled city keep on good terms with
the Americans, in order to deceive them, "since the hoped-for moment
has not yet arrived." [222]
The Insurgents grew surer and surer that the Americans were cowards,
[223] and openly boasted that when the attack began they would drive
them into the sea.
On January 21 General Otis wrote to Admiral Dewey that:--
"The insurgents will not now permit us to cross their lines and
have been very insulting to our officers, calling to them that
very shortly they will give us battle. My best information
is that they have fully determined to attack both outside
and within the city before our additional troops arrive,
and the least spark may start a conflagration." [224]
As the date of the proposed attack drew near, the work of strengthening
the Insurgent positions around Manila was pushed with all possible
speed. [225]
About the middle of January General Otis stationed the First Nebraska
Regiment upon the high ground at Santa Mesa for sanitary reasons. Of
conditions at this time, and of the circumstances leading to the
actual outbreak of hostilities Taylor says:--
"During the latter part of January General Otis was informed
on good insurgent authority that the insurgents meditated an
attack upon those troops, and he was advised to remove them,
as in their exposed position they would kill them all. General
MacArthur, under whose command the regiment was, placed
two guns in position there, as it was fully expected that
the insurgents would direct their attack upon that point,
as in fact they did. On February 4, 1899, the tents of the
regiment covered the ridge, and its outposts extended along
the San Juan River, a small stream which formed part of the
line of delimitation between the Americans and the insurgents.
"For some days before the outbreak of hostilities the pressure
of the insurgents was constant along this position, so constant
indeed that in the light of subsequent events it indicated a
premeditated purpose on the part of some one in the insurgent
army to force a collision at that point. On February 2 General
MacArthur, commanding the Second Division of the Eighth Army
Corps, wrote to the commanding general of the Filipino troops
in the third zone in front of him that--
"'An armed party from your command now occupies the village in
front of blockhouse No. 7, at a point considerably more than
a hundred yards on my side of the line, and is very active in
exhibiting hostile intentions. This party must be withdrawn
to your side of the line at once. From this date if the line
is crossed by your men with arms in their hands they must be
regarded as subject to such action as I may deem necessary.'
"Colonel San Miguel, who commanded at San Juan del Monte,
replied upon the receipt of this communication that the action
of his troops was foreign to his wishes and that he would
give immediate orders for them to retire. At about half past
8 on the night of February 4 a small insurgent patrol entered
the territory within the American lines at blockhouse No. 7
and advanced to the little village of Santol in front of an
outpost of the Nebraska regiment. This was the same point from
which the insurgents had been compelled to retire on February
2. An American outpost challenged, and then as the insurgent
patrol continued to advance the sentinel fired, whereupon the
insurgent patrol retired to blockhouse No. 7, from which fire
was immediately opened upon the Americans. This fire spread
rapidly down the American and insurgent lines and both forces
at once sprang to arms." [226]
General Otis's account of the opening of active hostilities follows:--
"On the night of February 2 they sent in a strong detachment
to draw the fire of our outposts, which took up a position
immediately in front and within a few yards of the same. The
outpost was strengthened by a few of our men, who silently bore
their taunts and abuse the entire night. This was reported to
me by General MacArthur, whom I directed to communicate with
the officer in command of the insurgent troops concerned. His
prepared letter was shown me and approved, and the reply
received was all that could be desired. However, the agreement
was ignored by the insurgents and on the evening of February 4
another demonstration was made on one of our small outposts,
which occupied a retired position at least 150 yards within
the line which had been mutually agreed upon, an insurgent
approaching the picket and refusing to halt or answer when
challenged. The result was that our picket discharged his
piece, when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened a
spirited fire on our troops there stationed.
"The insurgents had thus succeeded in drawing the fire of
a small outpost, which they had evidently labored with all
their ingenuity to accomplish, in order to justify in some
way their premeditated attack. It is not believed that the
chief insurgent leaders wished to open hostilities at this
time, as they were not completely prepared to assume the
initiative. They desired two or three days more to perfect
their arrangements, but the zeal of their army brought on
the crisis which anticipated their premeditated action. They
could not have delayed long, however, for it was their object
to force an issue before American troops, then en route,
could arrive in Manila." [227]
Thus began the Insurgent attack, so long and so carefully planned
for. We learn from the Insurgent records that the shot of the American
sentry missed its mark. There was no reason why it should have provoked
a hot return fire, but it did.
The result of the ensuing combat was not at all what the Insurgents
had anticipated. The Americans did not drive very well. It was but a
short time before they themselves were routed and driven from their
positions.
Aguinaldo of course promptly advanced the claim that his troops had
been wantonly attacked. The plain fact is that the Insurgent patrol in
question deliberately drew the fire of the American sentry, and this
was just as much an act of war as was the firing of the shot. Whether
the patrol was acting under proper orders from higher authority is
not definitely known.
In this connection the following telegram sent by Captain Zialcita
from Santa Ana on February 4, 1899, at 9.55 P.M., to Major Gray,
San Juan del Monte, is highly interesting:
"I received the telegram forwarded from Malolos. General
Ricarte is not here. I believe (that if the) Americans
open fire we shall attack. Will ask instructions (of)
Malolos." [228]
This looks as if Zialcita at least knew that something was to be done
to draw the American fire.
Aguinaldo's first statement relative to the opening of hostilities
is embodied in a general order dated Malolos, February 4, 1899,
and reads in part as follows:--
"Nine o'clock P.M., this date, I received from Caloocan
station a message communicated to me that the American forces,
without prior notification or any just motive, attacked our
camp at San Juan del Monte and our forces garrisoning the
blockhouses around the outskirts of Manila, causing losses
among our soldiers, who in view of this unexpected aggression
and of the decided attack of the aggressors, were obliged to
defend themselves until the firing became general all along
the line.
"No one can deplore more than I this rupture of hostilities. I
have a clear conscience that I have endeavoured to avoid it
at all costs, using all my efforts to preserve friendship
with the army of occupation, even at the cost of not a few
humiliations and many sacrificed rights.
* * * * *
"... I order and command:--
"1. Peace and friendly relations between the Philippine
forces and the American forces of occupation are broken,
and the latter will be treated as enemies, with the limits
prescribed by the laws of war.
"2. American soldiers who may be captured by the Philippine
forces will be treated as prisoners of war.
"3. This proclamation shall be communicated to the accredited
consuls of Manila, and to congress, in order that it may
accord the suspension of the constitutional guarantees and
the resulting declaration of war." [229]
Aguinaldo's protestations relative to his efforts to avoid hostilities
are absurd, in view of his own instructions concerning the attack to
be made simultaneously within and without the city of Manila.
There is other correspondence which throws light on the situation which
existed immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities. On January
25, 1899, Agoncillo cabled from Washington to Apacible in Hongkong:
"Recommend you await beginning American aggression, justifying our
conduct nations." [230]
Apacible apparently did not take this view of the matter, for on
January 31 he wrote to Aguinaldo that the Senate in Washington would
take final vote upon the treaty of peace between the United States
and Spain on February 6, and said:--
"It is urgently necessary for America to answer us immediately
before the ratification of the treaty. A conflict after the
ratification of the treaty would be unfavorable to us in
public opinion." [231]
Obviously this letter might be interpreted as a recommendation
that hostilities begin before February 6 if America did not answer
meanwhile. It was evidently well understood in Hongkong that
Aguinaldo's receipt of Apacible's letter might cause war to begin,
for on February 3, 1899, Bray, anticipating the outbreak of hostilities
of the following day, cabled Senator Hoar at Washington as follows:--
"Receive caution news hostilities Manila discredited here
denied Filipino circles supposed political move influence vote
Senate to-day any ease insignificant skirmish due intentional
provocation.
"_Bray_." [232]
The extracts from the Insurgent records above quoted leave no escape
from the conclusion that the outbreak of hostilities which occurred on
February 4, 1899, had been carefully prepared for and was deliberately
precipitated by the Filipinos themselves.
Blount says:--
"It would be simply wooden-headed to affirm that they ever
expected to succeed in a war with us." [233]
It may have been wooden-headed for the Filipinos to expect this, but
expect it they certainly did. We have seen how they held their soldiers
in check until after Spain had been ousted from the Philippines by
the Treaty of Paris as they had originally planned to do. It now only
remained to carry out the balance of their original plan to get rid
of the Americans in one way or another.
General Otis states that "when Aguinaldo had completed his preparations
for attack he prepared the outlines of his declaration of war, the
full text of which was published at Malolos on the evening, and very
shortly after, hostilities began. This declaration was circulated in
Manila on the morning of February 5." [234]
The Insurgents brought down upon themselves the punishment which they
received on February 4 and 5.
Blount has stated [235] that if the resolutions of Senator Bacon
introduced on January 11, 1899, had passed, we never should have had
any war with the Filipinos. The resolutions in question concluded
thus:--
"That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control
over said islands except for the pacification thereof, and
assert their determination when an independent government
shall have been duly erected therein entitled to recognition
as such, to transfer to said government, upon terms which
shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured under the
cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and
control of the islands to their people."
I must take issue with Blount as to the effect which these resolutions
might have had if passed. The Insurgents felt themselves to be fully
competent to bring about such pacification of the islands as they
deemed necessary. At the time the resolutions were presented in the
Senate their soldiers were straining at the leash, ready to attack
their American opponents upon the most slender excuse. Aguinaldo
himself could not have held them much longer, and it is not impossible
that they got away from him as it was. They would have interpreted the
passage of the Bacon resolutions as a further evidence of weakness,
and hastened their attack. As we have seen, "war, war, war" was what
they wanted.
Blount has endeavoured to shift the responsibility for the outbreak
of hostilities to the United States by claiming that certain words
italicized by him in what he calls the "Benevolent Assimilation
Proclamation" were necessarily, to the Insurgents, "fighting
words." The expressions referred to have to do with the establishment
of United States sovereignty and the exercise of governmental control
in the Philippine Islands.
These words were not "fighting words," the Insurgent policy being,
as I have shown by the records, to consider the acceptance of a
protectorate or of annexation in the event that it did not prove
possible to negotiate absolute independence, or probable that the
American troops could be driven from the islands.
The growing confidence of the Insurgents in their ability to whip
the cowardly Americans, rather than any fixed determination on their
part to push a struggle for independence to the bitter end, led to
their attack.