PERUSIA AND SICILY
_actus cum freto Neptunius_
_dux fugit ustis navibus._
[Sidenote: Augustus returns to Rome after Philippi, early in B.C. 41.]
The campaign which ended with the second battle at Philippi and the
death of Brutus had been won at the cost of much physical suffering to
Cæsar, who only completed his twenty-first year some days after it. He
had been in bad health throughout, barely able to endure the journey
across Macedonia, and only performing his military duties with the utmost
difficulty and with frequent interruptions. On his return journey he had
to halt so often from the same cause that reports of his death reached
Rome. The slowness with which he travelled also gave time for all kinds
of rumours to spread abroad as to farther severities to be exercised upon
the republican party on his return, and many of those who felt that they
were open to suspicion sought places of concealment for themselves or
their property.
[Sidenote: B.C. 41 Consuls L. Antonius Pietas, Serv. Vatia Isauricus II.
Allotting lands for the veterans.]
Cæsar sent reassuring messages to Rome, but he did not arrive in the city
till the beginning of the next year (B.C. 41). He found Lucius Antonius
consul, who had celebrated a triumph on the first day of the year for
some trifling successes in Gaul. The real control of affairs, however,
was being exercised by Fulvia, the masculine wife of Marcus Antonius,
widow successively of Clodius and Curio, against whom Lepidus had been
afraid or unable to act. Fulvia and Lucius professed to be safeguarding
the interests of Marcus and fulfilling his wishes, and Lucius adopted the
cognomen _Pietas_ as a sign of his fraternal devotion. But the moving
spirit throughout was Fulvia. Cæsar’s first business in Rome was the
allotment of land to the veterans. This had been begun a year before in
Transpadane Gaul, on the establishment of the Triumvirate, by Asinius
Pollio, left in command of that district; and Vergil has given us some
insight into the bitterness of feeling which it often roused:
“Shall some rude soldier hold these new ploughed lands?
Some alien reap the labours of our hands?
Ah, civil strife, what fruit your jangling yields!
Poor toilsome souls—for these we sowed our fields!”
When there was public land available for the purpose, the allotment could
generally be made without much friction; but as there was not enough of
it, the old precedent of “colonisation” was followed. A number of Italian
towns (nineteen in all) were selected, in the territories of which the
veterans of a particular legion were to be settled as _coloni_, with a
third of the land assigned for their support. No doubt in each case the
lands held by men who had served in the opposite camp were first taken as
being lawfully confiscated; but it must often have happened that there
was not enough of such lands, and that those of persons not implicated
in the civil wars were seized wholly or in part. In such cases it was
understood that the owners were to be compensated by money arising from
the sale of other confiscations. But this money was either insufficient
or long in coming. Petitions and deputations remonstrating against the
injustice poured in upon Cæsar, who, on the other hand, had to listen to
many complaints from the veterans of inadequate provision made for them
and of promises still unfulfilled.
[Sidenote: L. Antonius and Fulvia take advantage of the discontent.]
This was a sufficiently thorny task in itself. But it was made still
more irksome by L. Antonius and Fulvia. Their pretext was that the
veterans in Antony’s legions were less liberally treated than those
in Cæsar’s own; and Lucius claimed, as consul and as representing his
brother, the right of settling the allotments of Antony’s veterans. Cæsar
retorted by complaining that the two legions to which he was entitled
by his written agreement with Antony had not been handed over to him.
Starting from these counter charges they were soon at open enmity,
embittered by the frequent collision between the constitutional authority
of the consul and the extra-constitutional _imperium_ of the triumvir.
Lucius and Fulvia made capital out of this, maintaining that Marcus was
ready to lay down his extraordinary powers as triumvir, and to return to
Rome as consul. Fulvia was credited with a more personal motive. Antony’s
infatuation for Cleopatra was becoming known in Rome, and it was believed
that Fulvia designedly promoted civil troubles in the hope of inducing
her husband to return.[177] At any rate she and Lucius took advantage
of the ill-feeling against Cæsar caused by the confiscation of land.
They feigned to plead for the dispossessed owners, maintaining that the
confiscations had already produced enough for the payment of all claims,
and that, if it were found that this was not so, Marcus would bring home
from Asia what would cover the balance. They thus made Cæsar unpopular
with both sides—with the veterans who thought that he might have
satisfied their claims in full; with the dispossessed owners, who, over
and above the natural irritation at their loss, thought that his measure
had not been even necessary, and that he might have paid the veterans
without mulcting them, or might have waited for the money from Asia.
Specially formidable was the anger of landowners who were in the Senate.
The discontent was increased by the hardness of the times; for corn
was at famine price owing to Sextus Pompeius and Domitius Ahenobarbus
infesting the Sicilian and Ionian seas. Cæsar was therefore in a serious
difficulty. Unable to satisfy veterans and Senators at the same time, he
found how powerless is mere military force against widespread and just
resentment. His one answer to senatorial remonstrance had been, “But how
am I to pay the veterans?” Now, however, he found it necessary to let
alone the properties of Senators, the dowries of women, and all holdings
less than the share of a single veteran. This again led to mutinies
among the troops, who murdered some of their tribunes, and were within
a little of assassinating Cæsar himself. They were only quieted by the
promise that all their relations, and all fathers and sons of those who
had fallen in the war, should retain lands assigned to them. This again
enraged a number of the losers, and fatal encounters between owners and
intruding “colonists” became frequent. The soldiers had the advantage of
training, but the inhabitants were more numerous, and attacked them with
stones and tiles from the housetops, both in Rome and the country towns.
The burning of houses became so common that it was found necessary to
remit a whole year’s rent of houses let for 500 denarii (£20) and under
in the city, and a fourth part in the rest of Italy.
[Sidenote: Other provocations offered to Augustus. He takes steps to
protect himself.]
Cæsar was also made to feel that attachment to Antony meant hostility to
himself; for two legions despatched by him to Spain were refused passage
through the province by Q. Fufius Calenus and Ventidius Bassus, Antony’s
legates in Gallia Transalpina.[178] Alarmed by the aspect of affairs,
he tried to come to some understanding with Lucius and Fulvia, but
found them resolutely hostile. The mediation of officers in the army,
of private friends and Senators proved of no avail; though he produced
the agreement drawn up between Marcus and himself, and offered to allow
the Senate to arbitrate on their disputes. Satisfied that by the refusal
of this offer Lucius and Fulvia had put themselves in the wrong, he
determined to rely upon his army. For Lucius had been collecting men
among those offended by Cæsar, and Fulvia, accompanied by many Senators
and equites, had occupied Præneste with a body of troops, to which she
regularly gave the watchword as their commander, appeared among them
wearing a sword, and frequently harangued the men.
The men of Cæsar’s army, no doubt acting on a hint from himself, now
took the matter into their own hands. They suddenly entered Rome,
affirming that they wished to consult the Senate and people. Assembling
on the Capitol, with such citizens as ventured to come, they ordered the
agreement between Cæsar and Antony to be read, voted its confirmation,
constituted themselves judges between the disputants, and named a day
on which Fulvia, Lucius, and Cæsar were to appear before them at Gabii.
Having ordered these resolutions to be written out and deposited with
the Vestals, they peaceably dispersed. Cæsar was present and of course
consented to appear; but Lucius and Fulvia, though at first promising
to attend at Gabii, did not do so. They scoffed at the idea of a mob
of soldiers, a _senatus caligatus_[179] (a “Tommy-Atkins-parliament”),
presuming to speak for Senate and people. They were therefore voted in
their absence to be in the wrong, and Cæsar’s _acta_ were confirmed.
The show of legality thus gained for him was used by his officers to
justify the collection of money in all directions. Temples were stripped
of silver ornaments to be coined into money, and troops were summoned
from Cisalpine Gaul, which in spite of the claims of Marcus Antonius,
was now made a part of Italy without a provincial governor having a
right to maintain troops.[180] Lucius also, as consul, enrolled men
wherever his authority was acknowledged, and once more there was civil
war in Italy. It was in many respects a recrudescence of the republican
opposition lately headed by Brutus and Cassius. For Sextus Pompeius had
been joined by Murcus with vessels carrying two legions and 500 archers,
and was reinforced with the remains of the armies of Brutus and Cassius,
which had taken refuge in Cephallenia. In Africa Antony’s legate, Titus
Sextius, though he had surrendered the province to Cæsar’s legate
Lurco, had resumed possession and put Lurco to death. Lastly, Domitius
Ahenobarbus was threatening Brundisium with seventy ships. It was not
clear how far these movements were known or approved by Antony; but the
old republican party hoped that their upshot would be the dissolution of
the triumvirate, the downfall of Cæsar, and the restoration of the old
constitution.
[Sidenote: Open war between Augustus and L. Antonius B.C. 41-40.]
For the present Cæsar left Sextus Pompeius alone. But he sent a legion
to Brundisium and summoned Salvidienus with his six legions from his
march into Spain. Salvidienus had been opposed by Antony’s legates
Pollio and Ventidius, and was now harassed in his rear by them when he
turned homeward along the _via Cassia_. Open hostilities, however, began
elsewhere. Some legions at Alba Fucensis showed signs of mutiny, and both
Cæsar and Antonius started for Alba, hoping to secure their adhesion.
But Antonius got there first, and by lavish promises won them to his
side. Cæsar only came in time to skirmish with Antonius’s rearguard under
C. Furnius, and then moved northward to renew his attack on Furnius,
who had retreated to Sentinum in Umbria. On his way he unsuccessfully
attacked Nursia, where Antonius had a garrison, and while he was thus
engaged Antonius himself led his main army to Rome. Such troops as Cæsar
had left in or near the city surrendered to him; while Lepidus, without
attempting resistance, fled to Cæsar,[181] and the other consul made no
opposition. Lucius summoned a _contio_, declared that he meant to depose
Cæsar and Lepidus from their unconstitutional office, and to re-establish
the just authority of the consulship, with which his brother Marcus would
be fully satisfied. His speech was received with applause; he was hailed
_imperator_; and the command in a war was voted to him, though without
the enemy being named. Reinforced by veterans of his brother’s army he
started along the _via Cassia_ to intercept the returning Salvidienus.
Informed of these transactions Cæsar hurried to Rome, leaving Sentinum
still besieged. But it was Agrippa who struck the decisive blow. With
such forces as he could collect he, too, marched on the heels of Antonius
along the _via Cassia_, and occupied Sutrium, about thirty miles from
the city. This cut off L. Antonius’s communications with Rome, who,
with Salvidienus in front of him and Agrippa in his rear, could neither
advance or retire along the _Cassia_ without fighting. With an enemy
on both sides of him he did not venture to give battle, but turned off
the road to Perusia. At first he encamped outside the town expecting to
be soon relieved by Pollio and Ventidius. But finding that they were
moving slowly, and that three hostile armies—under Cæsar, Agrippa, and
Salvidienus—were threatening him, he retired within the walls; where he
thought he might safely winter. Cæsar at once began throwing up lines of
circumvallation, and cut him off from all chance of supply. Perusia is on
a hill overlooking the Tiber and the Trasimene lake. But its position,
almost impregnable to assault, made it also somewhat easy to blockade.
Fulvia was active in urging the legates of Antony in Gaul and North
Italy to come to the relief of Lucius. But Pollio and Ventidius hesitated
and doubted, not feeling certain of the wishes of Marcus; and though
Plancus cut up one legion on its march to join Cæsar, neither he nor any
of the others ventured to engage him when he and Agrippa threw themselves
in their way. Pollio retired to Ravenna, Ventidius to Ariminum, Plancus
to Spoletium, leaving Lucius to his fate; while Fufius Calenus remained
in the Alpine region without stirring. Meanwhile Salvidienus proceeded to
Sentinum, which he took, and shortly afterwards received the surrender of
Nursia.
[Sidenote: B.C. 40 Cos, C. Asinius Pollio, Cn. Domitius Calvinus. Fall of
Perusia.]
[Sidenote: Livia.]
Cæsar was thus able to use his whole force against Perusia. The blockade
lasted till March, B.C. 40, when L. Antonius was compelled to surrender
by hunger. Cæsar had taken an active share in the siege throughout, and
had run serious risks, at one time being nearly captured in a sally of
gladiators while engaged in sacrifice; at another being in danger from
a mutiny in his own army. On the fall of Perusia the townsmen suffered
severely from the victorious soldiery, apparently without the order, and
perhaps against the wish, of Cæsar; and in the course of the sack the
town itself was accidentally set on fire and in great part destroyed.
There is again a conflict of testimony as to Cæsar’s severities.
Suetonius says that he executed a great number, answering all appeals
with a stern “Death!” (_moriendum est_): and his enemies asserted that
he deliberately enticed L. Antonius into the war to have an excuse for
thus ridding himself of his opponents. Some also reported that he caused
300 to be put to death on the Ides of March, at an altar dedicated to
Iulius. On the other hand, it is certain that L. Antonius was allowed to
go away in safety; and Livy says that Cæsar pardoned him and “all his
soldiers.” Appian attributes the death of such leading men as fell to the
vindictiveness of the soldiers. Velleius, of course, takes the same view;
while Dio, equally of course, agrees rather with Suetonius. The first
writer to mention the _Perusinæ aræ_ is Seneca; but as his object was to
contrast the clemency of Nero with the cruelty of Augustus, it is fair
to suspect that he was not very particular as to the historical basis
for his allegations. If there were some executions and also some altar
dedicated to Iulius—both of which are more than probable—it would be easy
for popular imagination to connect the two. No doubt all in Perusia who
were implicated in the assassination, or had been on the proscription
lists, would have short shrift.[182] The altar story is unlike the usual
good sense of Augustus; but it seems that in this siege he desired to
emphasise the fact that he was the avenger of his “father,” some at least
of the leaden bullets used by the slingers bearing the words _Divom
Iulium_.[183] At any rate, whether during the siege or by executions
after it, there seems no doubt that at Perusia a blow was struck at the
old republican party—already decimated by civil war and proscription—from
which it never recovered. The victory, moreover, left Cæsar supreme in
Italy. The legates of M. Antonius for the most part abandoned their
legions and went to join him, or to Sicily to join Sextus Pompeius, who
was already negotiating with Antony. Fufius Calenus, indeed, refused to
surrender his eleven legions; but he died shortly afterwards, and his
son handed them over to Cæsar. Plancus, abandoned by his two legions,
escaped to Antony. Ventidius seems to have done the same; while Pollio,
though not leaving Italy, hung about the east coast in expectation of
Antony’s arrival. Among others, Tiberius Nero abandoned a garrison which
he was commanding, and, with his wife Livia (soon to be the wife of
Augustus) and his infant son (afterwards the Emperor Tiberius), fled to
Sextus Pompeius. Thither also went Antony’s mother Iulia, whom Pompeius
received with respect and employed as envoy to her son; while Fulvia
embarked at Brundisium and sailed to Athens to meet her husband. In Italy
there was no one to rival Cæsar, who by these surrenders and desertions
had now a formidable army. What he had still to fear was a combination of
Antony and Sextus Pompeius and an invasion of Italy by their joint forces.
[Sidenote: Fresh terms with M. Antonius.]
[Sidenote: Marriage with Scribonia, B.C. 40.]
Such an invasion was, in fact, contemplated. Antony was in Asia when
he heard of the fall of Perusia. Crossing to Athens he met Fulvia and
his mother Iulia, the latter bringing an offer from Sextus Pompeius of
support against Cæsar. Antony was in no good humour with his wife or
his agents, whom he must have regarded as having blundered. Nor was he
prepared to begin hostilities at once. But he promised that if Sextus did
so he would accept his aid; and that, even if he did not, he would do
his best to include him in any terms made with Cæsar. Meanwhile, though
the veterans were shy of enlisting against Antony, Cæsar found himself
at the head of more than forty legions, and with such an army had no
fear of not holding his own on land. But his opponents were strong at
sea, and, if they joined with Sextus Pompeius, would have the coasts
of Italy at their mercy. He therefore tried on his own account to come
to an understanding with Pompeius. With this view he caused Mæcenas to
negotiate his marriage with Scribonia, sister of Scribonius Libo, and
aunt to the wife of Pompeius. He had been betrothed in early life to a
daughter of his great-uncle’s colleague, P. Servilius Isauricus, and in
B.C. 43 to Antony’s stepdaughter, Clodia. But neither marriage had been
completed, and at the beginning of Fulvia’s opposition, in B.C. 41, he
had repudiated Clodia. The present union was one of political convenience
only. Scribonia had been twice married, and by her second husband had a
son only a few years younger than Cæsar himself. She was therefore much
the older, and seems also to have been of difficult temper. That at
least was the reason he gave for the divorce which followed a year later,
on the day on which she gave birth to her daughter Iulia. But a truer
reason (besides his passion for Livia) was the fact that by that time
circumstances were changed, and it was not necessary, or even convenient,
to have such a connection with Sextus Pompeius any longer.
[Sidenote: First reconciliation of Brundisium, and new division of the
Empire.]
Antony arrived off Brundisium in the summer of B.C. 40, and was joined
by Sextus and Domitius Ahenobarbus. The three made some descents upon
the coast and threatened Brundisium with a blockade. But before much
damage had been done the interference of common friends brought about
a reconciliation. Antony consented to order Sextus Pompeius to return
to Sicily, and to send away Ahenobarbus as proprætor of Bithynia. A
conference was held at Brundisium, at which Pollio represented Antony,
Mæcenas Cæsar, while M. Cocceius Nerva (great-grandfather of the Emperor)
attended as a common friend of both. The reconciliation here effected
was to be confirmed by the marriage of Antony (whose wife Fulvia had
just died at Sicyon) to Cæsar’s sister Octavia, widow of C. Claudius
Marcellus, the consul of B.C. 50. The two triumvirs accordingly embraced,
and agreed to a new division of the Empire. An imaginary line was to be
drawn through Scodra (_Scutari_) on the Illyrian coast. All west of this
line, up to the Ocean, was to be under the care of Cæsar, except Africa,
which was already in the hands of Lepidus; all east of it, up to the
Euphrates, was to go to Antony. The war against Sextus Pompeius (unless
he came to terms) was to be the common care of both, in spite of Antony’s
recent negotiations with him. Cæsar, on his part, agreed to amnesty all
who had joined Antony from the armies of Brutus and Cassius, in some
cases even though they had been among the assassins.[184] Lastly, both
were to have the right to enlist an equal number of soldiers in Italy.
This agreement was followed by an interchange of hospitalities, in which
Antony displayed the luxury and splendour learnt at the Egyptian court,
while Cæsar affected the simplicity of a Roman and a soldier.[185]
[Sidenote: A new agreement with Sext. Pompeius, B.C. 39.]
But Sextus did not tamely submit to be thus thrown over. He resumed
his old plan of starving out Italy. His freedman, Menodorus, wrested
Sardinia from the governor sent by Cæsar, and his ships, cruising off
Sicily, intercepted the corn-ships from Africa. The people of Rome
were threatened with famine, and on the arrival of Cæsar and Antony to
celebrate the marriage, though an ovation was decreed to both, there
were serious riots in which Cæsar’s life was in danger, and which had to
be suppressed by Antony’s soldiers. They were forced by the outcry to
renew negotiations with Sextus, whose brother-in-law Libo—in spite of the
advice of Menodorus—arranged a meeting between him and the triumvirs at
Misenum, early in B.C. 39. Every precaution was taken against treachery
at the hands of Pompeius. And not without reason. The execution of
Bithynicus three years before had been followed and surpassed by the
treacherous murder of Statius Murcus, followed by the cruel crucifixion
of his slaves on the pretence that the crime had been theirs. The
conference was therefore held on temporary platforms erected at the
end of the mole at Puteoli, with a space of water between them. But an
agreement having been reached, Antony and Cæsar accepted a banquet on
board his ship; and when Menodorus suggested to Pompeius that he should
cut the cables and sail away with them as prisoners, he answered that
Menodorus should have done it without asking, but that he himself was
bound by his oath. The terms made between them were that Sextus Pompeius
was to remain governor of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, with his
fleet, as well as in Peloponnesus, but was to remove all garrisons from
Italian towns and undertake not to hinder commerce or receive runaway
slaves,[186] and should at once allow the corn which he had impounded to
reach Italy. On the other hand, all men of rank who had taken refuge with
him were to have restitution of civil rights and property. If they had
been on the proscription lists, they were to recover only a fourth; and
if they had been condemned for the assassination, they were to be allowed
a safe place of exile. Those—not coming under these three classes—who had
served in his army or navy, were to have the same claim to pensions as
those in the armies of the triumvirs.
Pompeius then returned to Sicily, the triumvirs to Rome. Thence they went
different ways: Antony and Octavia to Athens; Cæsar to Gaul, where the
disturbed state of the country required his presence. Now, therefore,
begins the separate administration of East and West, and the different
principles on which it was carried on contributed largely to the final
rupture between the two men. Antony’s was the otiose policy of setting
up client kings who would take the trouble of government off his hands
and yet be ready to pay him court and do him service, because their
dignity and power depended upon his supremacy. Thus Darius, grandson
of Mithradates, was appointed to Pontus; Herod to Idumæa and Samaria;
Amyntas to Pisidia; Polemon to a part of Cilicia. To Cæsar, on the other
hand, fell the task of preserving order and establishing Roman rule in
countries nearer home, peace and good government in which were essential
to the comfort of the city. Above all, he was bound to prevent Sextus
Pompeius from again interrupting the commerce and corn supply of Italy.
The only service of any of Antony’s partisans near enough to be of active
interest to Rome was the victory of Pollio over the Parthini, for which
he was awarded a triumph.[187]
[Sidenote: B.C. 38, renewed war with Sextus Pompeius.]
But the war with Sextus Pompeius soon became Cæsar’s chief task, and
its renewal was with some justice laid at Antony’s door. For being as
he thought unfairly treated by Antony as to the Peloponnese, which the
latter had declined to hand over till he had collected the year’s taxes,
Pompeius once more began harassing the Italian shores and intercepting
corn-ships. Cæsar answered this by bringing troops from Gaul and building
ships. He established two depôts—at Brundisium and Puteoli—and invited
Antony’s presence at Brundisium to discuss the question of war. Antony
doubtless found it inconvenient to be closely pressed on this matter,
for he was greatly responsible for the difficulty. Though he came to
Brundisium, therefore, he left again immediately, without waiting for
Cæsar, who had been delayed. He gave out that he was opposed to any
breach of the treaty with Pompeius, ignoring the fact that Pompeius
had already broken it. He even threatened to reclaim Menodorus as his
slave, on the ground that he had been the slave of Cn. Pompeius, and had
therefore passed to him as the purchaser of Pompey’s confiscated estate.
Unable, therefore, to reckon on help from Antony, Cæsar undertook the
business himself. He strengthened assailable points on the Italian
coasts; collected ships at Rome and Ravenna; and took over Corsica and
Sardinia from Menodorus, who deserted to him and was made joint admiral
with Calvisius. He set sail himself from Tarentum, Calvisius from Cosa
in Etruria; while a large army was stationed at Rhegium. Pompeius was
almost taken by surprise, but yet managed to reach Cumæ and all but
defeat his enemy’s fleet. This was followed by a violent storm in which
Cæsar’s fleet suffered severely, off the Skyllæan promontory, and by a
second battle in which it only escaped destruction by nightfall. A second
terrible storm, which Pompeius’s more experienced mariners managed to
avoid, still further reduced Cæsar’s sea forces. Pompeius, elated by
these successes, assumed the title of son of Neptune, and wore sea-green
robes as a sign of his origin.[188]
[Sidenote: Activity of Agrippa, B.C. 37-6. Second reconciliation with
Antony.]
Cæsar did not give in, but he changed his generals. Agrippa was summoned
from Gaul, where he had been very successful, and for the first time
since the expedition of Iulius Cæsar, had led an army across the Rhine.
The construction and command of a new fleet were entrusted to him.
With characteristic energy he not only built and manned a large number
of ships, but began the formation of a new harbour (_portus Iulius_)
for their safety and convenience, by piercing the causeway between the
sea and the Lucrine Lake, deepening the lake itself, and connecting it
with the lake Avernus. Here he practised his ships and men during the
winter, and by the summer of B.C. 36 was ready for action. Meanwhile
fresh negotiations with Antony were conducted by Mæcenas, and in the
spring of B.C. 37 a reconciliation was arranged at Tarentum, with the
help of Octavia. The two triumvirs met on the river Taras, and after an
interchange of hospitalities they agreed: First, that the triumvirate
should be renewed for a second period of five years, that is, to the last
day of B.C. 33.[189] Secondly, that Antony should supply Cæsar with 120
ships for the war against Sextus, and Cæsar give Antony 20,000 men for
the Parthian war, which was now becoming serious. Some farther mutual
presents were made through Octavia, and Antony started for Syria leaving
her and their child with her brother.
[Sidenote: Continued war with Sextus Pompeius, B.C. 37-36.]
Cæsar’s plan of campaign for B.C. 37 was that on the 1st of July a
combined attack should be made on Sicily, from three points—from Africa
by Lepidus, from Tarentum by Statilius Taurus, and from Puteoli by
himself. Another violent storm baffled this plan; Cæsar had to take
refuge at Elea; Taurus had to put back to Tarentum; while, though
he reached Sicily, Lepidus returned without effecting anything of
importance. Another winter and spring had to be spent on preparations,
and it was not till the autumn of B.C. 36 that the final engagements
took place. At that time Pompeius’s fleet was stationed along the
Sicilian coast from Messana to Tyndaris, with headquarters at Mylæ.
After reconnoitring the position from the Æolian islands, Cæsar left the
main attack to Agrippa, while he himself joined Taurus at Leucopetra.
Agrippa repulsed the enemy’s ships, but not decisively enough to enable
him to pursue them to their moorings. It was sufficient, however, to
enable Cæsar to cross to Tauromenium, leaving his main body of men on
the Italian shore under the command of Valerius Messalla. Here he soon
found himself in the greatest danger. Pompeius’s fleet was not held up
by Agrippa, as Cæsar thought, but appeared off Tauromenium in force.
Messalla was unable to cross to his relief, and a body of Pompeian
cavalry attacked him while his men were making their camp. Cæsar himself
managed to get back to Italy, but he left three legions, 500 cavalry, and
2,000 veterans, under Cornificius, encamped near Tauromenium, surrounded
by enemies, and without means of supply. He himself landed in a forlorn
condition, with only one attendant, and with great difficulty found his
way to the camp of Messalla. Thence he sent urgent orders to Agrippa to
despatch a force to the relief of Cornificius; commanded Messalla to send
for reinforcements from Puteoli; while Mæcenas was sent to Rome with full
powers to suppress the disorders likely to occur when the ill-success
against Pompeius was known.
The force despatched by Agrippa found Cornificius and his men in a
state of desperate suffering in the difficult district of Mount Ætna,
and conveyed them to the fleet off Mylæ. So far, though Pompeius had
maintained his reputation at sea, he had not shown himself able to follow
up a success on land. And now the tide turned against him. Agrippa seized
Tyndaris, in which Pompeius had large stores, and Cæsar landed twenty-one
legions there, with 2,000 cavalry and 5,000 light-armed troops. His plan
was to assault Messana while Agrippa engaged the fleet. There was a good
road from Tyndaris to Messana (_via Valeria_), but Pompeius still held
Mylæ and other places along the coast with the defiles leading to them.
He was misled, however, by a report of an immediate attack by Agrippa,
and, withdrawing his men from these defiles and strong posts, allowed
Cæsar to occupy them. Finding the report to be false, he again attempted
to intercept Cæsar as he was marching with some difficulty over the
district of Mount Myconium. But his general (Tisienus) failed to take
advantage of Cæsar’s unfavourable position, who, having meanwhile been
joined by Lepidus, encamped under the walls of Messana. He was now strong
enough on land to send detachments to occupy the various towns from which
Pompeius drew supplies; and therefore it was necessary for the latter
to abandon Sicily, or to scatter the fleet of Agrippa and so open the
sea to his transports. In a second battle off Mylæ, however, the fleet
of Pompeius was nearly annihilated, and though he escaped himself into
Messana, his land forces under Tisienus surrendered to Cæsar. When he
discovered this Pompeius, without waiting for the eight legions which
he still had at Lilybæum, collected seventeen ships which had survived
the battle and fled to Asia, hoping that Antony in gratitude for former
services would save and possibly employ him.
[Sidenote: Deposition of Lepidus.]
The danger which for so many years had hung like a cloud about the shores
of Italy was thus at an end. But there was one more danger still to be
surmounted before Cæsar’s authority was fully established in Sicily. The
eight Pompeian legions from Lilybæum under Plennius presently arrived at
Messana. Finding Pompeius fled, as Cæsar happened to be absent, Plennius
handed them over to Lepidus, who was on the spot. Lepidus added them
to his own forces, and being thus strengthened, conceived the idea of
adding Sicily to his province of Africa. It had not been definitely
included in any of the triumviral agreements; he had been the first to
land there, and had in the course of his march forced or persuaded many
cities to submit,—why should he have less authority to deal with it than
Cæsar, whose office was the same as his own? He had originally bargained
for Narbonensis and Spain: he had been shifted to Africa without being
consulted, and his provinces had been taken over by Cæsar. He was now
at the head of twenty-two legions, and would no longer be treated as a
subordinate. His arguments were sound; but they needed to be backed by
a determination as fixed as that of his rival, and, above all, by the
loyalty of his army. Neither of these advantages were his. In a stormy
interview with Cæsar he shewed that he could scold as loudly as another.
But when they had parted, he failed from indolence or blindness to detect
that Cæsar’s agents were undermining the fidelity of his men, especially
in the Pompeian legions, by informing them that without Cæsar’s assent
the promises made them by Lepidus would not be held valid. On his next
visit to the camp of Lepidus with a small bodyguard, Cæsar was mobbed by
the soldiers, and even had some of his guard killed, but when in revenge
for this he invested Lepidus with his main army, the forces of the latter
began quickly to melt away, and before many days he was compelled to
throw himself at Cæsar’s feet. He was forced to abdicate the triumvirate,
and sent to reside in Italy, where he remained till his death (B.C. 13),
in a private capacity and subject to constant mortifications. He retained
indeed the office of Pontifex Maximus, because of certain religious
difficulties as to its abdication, but he was never allowed to exercise
any but the most formal functions. This treatment of a colleague was not
generous; but the whole career of Lepidus since the beginning of the
civil war had been weak and shifty. He was “the greatest weathercock in
the world” (_ventosissimus_),[190] as Decimus Brutus told Cicero, and he
certainly presents the most pitiful figure of all the leading men of the
day.
[Sidenote: The fate of Sextus Pompeius, B.C. 35.]
The old policy of Philippi and Perusia was followed as regards the
forces of Pompeius. Senators and equites were, it is to be feared, in
many cases put to the sword; while the rank and file were admitted into
Cæsar’s army, and an amnesty was granted to those Sicilian towns which
had submitted either to Pompeius or Lepidus. Africa and Sicily Cæsar
took over as his part of the Empire and appointed proprætors to each.
He did not attempt to pursue Sextus Pompeius; he preferred that Antony
should have the responsibility and perhaps the odium of dealing with him.
In fact, he did some years afterwards make his execution a ground of
complaint against Antony. Yet Antony seems to have had little choice in
the matter. For Pompeius acted in Asia much as he had acted in Sicily
and Italy, capturing towns and plundering ships, while sending peaceful
embassies to Antony, offering to serve him against Cæsar. Being at last
compelled to surrender to Amyntas (made king of Pisidia by Antony), and
being by him delivered to Antony’s legate Titius, he was taken to Miletus
and there put to death. But it was, and still remains, uncertain whether
this was done by Antony’s order.
He was just forty, and had led a strange life since he witnessed his
father’s death from the ship off the coast of Egypt. He seems to have
had some generous qualities which attached men to him. But the times
were out of joint, and he was compelled to live the life of a pirate
and freebooter, having a grievance against every successive party that
gained power at Rome, trusting none, and feeling no obligation to treat
them as fellow citizens or even as noble enemies. He seems to have missed
more than one chance of crushing Cæsar; but his troops, though numerous,
were fitted neither by spirit nor by discipline to encounter regularly
trained legions in open fight. We cannot withhold a certain admiration
for the courage and energy which maintained him as virtual ruler of no
inconsiderable portion of the Roman Empire for nearly twelve years.
[Illustration: AUGUSTUS ADDRESSING TROOPS.
_Photographed from the Statue in the Vatican by Edne. Alinari._
_To face page 108._]