CHAPTER VII

ACTIUM

_Altera iam teritur bellis civilibus aetas._

_Sævis Liburnis, scilicet invidens,_

_privata deduci superbo_

_non humilis mulier triumpho._

[Sidenote: The early manhood of Augustus and its fruits.]

When Sextus fled from Sicily Cæsar was about to complete his 27th year.

It was nearly nine years since, while little more than a boy, he had

first boldly asserted himself in opposition to men more than twice his

own age, and had forced those who had been statesmen before he was born

to regard him as their champion or respect him as their master. Since

that time he had had little rest from grave anxieties or war. At Mutina,

Philippi, Perusia, and in Sicily, he had tasted danger and disaster as

well as victory; and had more than once been in imminent hazard. These

fatigues had been made more trying by frequent illness, apparently

arising from a sluggish liver, to which he had been subject from boyhood.

Through all he had been supported by an indomitable persistence and a

passionate resolve to avenge his adoptive father, all the more formidable

perhaps in a character naturally cold and self-contained. As he went on

there gradually awoke in him a nobler ambition, that of restoring and

directing the distracted state. Neither now nor afterwards do the more

vulgar attributes of supreme power—wealth, luxury, and adulation—seem to

have had charms for him. He felt the governing power in him, he believed

in his “genius,” what we might call his “mission,” and the difficulties

of a divided rule became more and more clear to him. From this time,

therefore, he used every means which wise statesmanship or crafty policy

could suggest to rid himself of the remaining partner in the Triumvirate,

and to gain a free hand in the work of restoration which he had already

begun.

[Sidenote: Marriage with Livia, B.C. 38.]

In private life he had taken a step which was the source of a lifelong

happiness to him. The political marriage with Scribonia in B.C. 40,

contracted with the idea of conciliating Sextus Pompeius, had been ended

by divorce on the very day of the birth of his only daughter Iulia.

The reason alleged was her disagreeable disposition; but, besides the

change in the political situation, there was another reason of a more

personal nature. The peace of Misenum had permitted many partisans of

Brutus, Cassius, or Lucius Antonius, who had fled to Sextus Pompeius,

to return to Rome. Among others came Tiberius Nero,[191] with his young

wife, Livia Drusilla. Unless statues and coins are more than usually

false, she was possessed of rare beauty. In B.C. 38 she was twenty years

old, and had one son (the future Emperor Tiberius) now in his fourth

year, and was within three months of the birth of her second son Drusus.

Even to the lax notions of divorce and re-marriage then current this

seemed somewhat scandalous. A year was held to be the necessary interval

for a woman between one marriage and another. But the object of this

convention was to prevent ambiguity as to the paternity of children; and

when Cæsar consulted the pontifices, they told him that, if there was no

doubt as to the paternity of the child with which Livia was pregnant,

the marriage might lawfully take place at once. No opposition seems to

have been made by Livia’s husband, who was at least twenty years her

senior.[192] He acted as a father in giving her to her new husband, and

entertained the bridal pair at a banquet. The marriage was so prompt

that a favourite page of Livia’s, seeing her take her place on the same

dinner couch as Cæsar, whispered to his mistress that she had made a

mistake, for her husband was on the other couch. On the birth of Drusus,

Cæsar sent the infant to its father, thus complying with the conditions

of the pontifices. That the two men should have been on good terms

is not incredible in view of the prevailing sentiment as to divorce.

We find Cicero, for instance, writing effusively to Dolabella almost

directly after he had compelled his daughter to divorce him for gross

misconduct, and there are other instances. At any rate Tiberius Nero, on

his death-bed in B.C. 33, left the guardianship of his sons to Cæsar; and

in spite of such a beginning the marriage proved permanently happy. Cæsar

was devoted to Livia to the day of his death; his last conscious act was

to kiss her lips.[193]

[Sidenote: Honours voted to Cæsar.]

The victory in Sicily left him supreme in the West, and he at once

devoted himself to the re-establishment of order and prosperity. The

relief to Italy and Rome was immense; for with Pompeius master of the

sea the city was always in danger of famine, and the Italian coast of

devastation. This feeling of relief found expression in the proceedings

of the Senate, which now began those votes of special honours and powers

to Cæsar, which in the course of the next ten or twelve years gradually

clothed him with every attribute of supremacy in the state. On his return

from Sicily he was decreed an ovation, as after Philippi,[194] as well

as statues and a triumphal arch. On the day of the victory over Pompeius

(2nd of September), there were to be _feriæ_ and _supplicationes_ for

ever; he and his wife and family were to be feasted on the Capitol;

and he was to have the perpetual right of wearing the laurel wreath of

victory. He refused the office of Pontifex Maximus, as long as Lepidus

lived, but he accepted the privileges of the tribuneship—the personal

sanctity which put any one injuring or molesting him under a curse, and

the right of sitting with the tribunes in the Senate. This it seems

gave him practically the full _tribunicia potestas_ within the city.

But it was a novel measure, and its full consequences were not perhaps

foreseen.[195] He had twice before wished to be elected tribune, but his

“patriciate” stood in his way. This was meant as a kind of compromise,

and it furnishes the keynote to his later plans for absorbing the powers

of the republican offices.

[Sidenote: Measures of conciliation and restoration.]

[Sidenote: The wars for security of frontiers.]

Cæsar’s chief difficulties now came from the large military forces of

which he found himself possessed, either by his own enlistment or from

that of the various defeated leaders. To disband them was neither safe in

view of possible complications with Antony, nor possible without finding

large sums of money or great tracts of unoccupied land with which to

reward the men; whereas his object now was to put an end to confiscation,

fines, and unusual imposts, and to bring back confidence and security.

After suppressing more than one incipient mutiny, he contrived to secure

enough land for those who had served their full time, partly by purchases

from Capua, where there was still a good deal of unassigned land. He

repaid the colony by granting it revenues from lands at Cnossus in

Crete, which had become _ager publicus_ on the defeat of the pirates, and

on some of which a Roman colony was not long afterwards established.[196]

Some of the men, again, who had been most clamorous and mutinous he sent

to Gaul as a _supplementum_ to colonies already existing, or to found

new colonies.[197] He was thus able to make remission of taxation, as

well as of arrears due from the lists of forfeiture published by the

triumvirs. His enemies said that his object was to throw the odium of

their original imposition upon Antony and Lepidus; or to make a merit of

necessity, since in most cases it would have been impossible to collect

the money. These motives may have had a share in his policy, but he

doubtless also wished to restore confidence and cause an oblivion of

the miseries of the civil wars. For the soldiers who remained various

other employments were found. The weakness of the central government had

long been shewn by the existence of marauding bands in various parts

of Italy. The civil wars had aggravated the evil, till travelling had

become dangerous almost everywhere, and even the streets of Rome were

unsafe. Cæsar now organised a police force of soldiers under Sabinus

Cotta to patrol the city and Italy, and within a few months the evil

was much mitigated.[198] Besides this, Statilius Taurus was sent with

an army to restore order in the two African provinces—Proconsularis and

Numidia.[199] Another expedition was sent against the Salassi, inhabiting

the modern Val d’Aosta, who had for two years been holding out against

Antistius Vetus. He had driven them into their mountain fastnesses; but

when he left the district they once more descended and expelled the Roman

garrisons. The war was entrusted to Valerius Messalla, who reduced them

at least to temporary submission (B.C. 35-34).[200] Another similar war

was that against the Iapydes, living in what is now Croatia, who in their

marauding expeditions had come as far as Aquileia and plundered Roman

colonies. To this Cæsar went in person. He destroyed their capital,

Metulum, on the Colapis (mod. _Kolpa_), after a desperate resistance, in

the course of which he was somewhat severely injured by the fall of a

bridge. The rest of the country then submitted.[201] The Iapydes had no

doubt provoked the attack. But that does not seem to be the case with the

Pannonians, whom Cæsar proceeded to invade. They were a mixed Illyrian

and Celtic tribe, dwelling in forests and detached villages without great

towns, and appear to have lived peaceably. But Cæsar resolved to take

their one important town, Siscia, at the junction of the Kolpa and Save,

partly as a convenient magazine in wars against the Daci, and partly for

the mere object of keeping his army employed and paid at the expense

of a conquered country. The siege of the town lasted thirty days, and

after its fall he returned to Rome, leaving Fufius Geminus to continue

the campaign. So again in the spring of B.C. 34 Agrippa was sent against

the Dalmatians, and when later in the season he was joined by Cæsar

in person, their chief towns were taken and burnt; and this people,

who since their defeat of Gabinius in B.C. 44-43, had been practically

independent, had again to submit and pay tribute, with ten years’

arrears, and restore the standards taken from Gabinius. Their submission

was followed by that of other tribes, and by the middle of B.C. 33, the

whole of Illyricum was restored to obedience.

These were the sort of successes to make a man popular at Rome; for they

were not costly in blood or treasure, and they affected the interests

of a large number of merchants and men of business. Nor was this all.

One of his legates, Statilius Taurus, was so successful in Africa, and

another, C. Norbanus, in Spain, that both were decreed triumphs in B.C.

34, and in the same year Mauretania was made a Roman province. Cæsar had

declined a triumph after the Pannonian war, but accepted honours for

Octavia and Livia, who were exempted from the _tutela_, to which all

women were subject; and during these two years his name was becoming

associated with success and with the expansion of the Empire and of trade.

[Sidenote: Improvements in the city.]

This was accompanied by restorations and improvements in the city

calculated to appeal still more strongly to popular imagination. In B.C.

33 Agrippa as ædile reformed the water supply of Rome, constructing 700

basins, 500 fountains, and repairing the aqueducts.[202] He also cleansed

the cloacæ, adorned the circus, distributed oil and salt free, and opened

the baths gratis throughout his year of office, besides throwing among

the spectators at the theatre _tesseræ_ (tickets) entitling the holders

to valuable presents. Cæsar himself, who was consul for a few months at

the beginning of B.C. 33, erected the Porticus Octaviæ, named in honour

of his sister, with the spoils of the Illyrian and Pannonian wars,[203]

and began the building of the temple of Apollo and the two libraries, on

the site bought for a house on the Palatine before B.C. 36, when that of

Hortensius had been granted to him by the Senate,[204] and while he was

still living in the house of Calvus near the Forum.

[Sidenote: The contrast of Antony’s career.]

[Sidenote: The Parthians.]

These successes in the Western provinces, combined with such costly

improvements in the city, impressed (as it was intended that they should)

the minds of the people in Rome with the feeling that Cæsar’s name was

the best guarantee for the era of peace and prosperity which seemed

at last to be succeeding the ruin and horror of civil war. In strong

contrast—carefully emphasized by Cæsar and his friends—were the military

expeditions in the East, and the extravagance of Antony’s infatuation for

Cleopatra in Egypt. In B.C. 40 he had been roused from the intoxication

of love and revelry in Alexandria to find Syria in the hands of the

Parthian Pacorus, son of Orodes, and of Labienus, son of the old legate

of Iulius, who had joined the enemy after the battle of Philippi. They

had defeated and killed his legate, Decidius Saxa, and taken possession

of the province. It is true that next year, B.C. 39, P. Ventidius drove

away Labienus, and in B.C. 38 defeated the Parthians and killed Pacorus.

But Antony was jealous of Ventidius, deposed him from his command, and

went in person to besiege the remains of the Parthian army in Samosata,

where they had been received by Antiochus, king of Commagene. He failed

to take the town, and though in his despatch he took all the credit of

previous successes, the truth was well known in Rome. After his failure

at Samosata he made somewhat inglorious terms with Antiochus, and going

off to meet Cæsar at Tarentum left C. Sosius in charge of Syria. Sosius

put down an insurrection in Judæa and established Herod as king (B.C.

38-7). But in B.C. 36 Antony suffered severe reverses in an expedition

against Phraates, who had just succeeded his father Orodes as king of

Parthia. One success, however, in the course of an inglorious campaign

enabled him to send home laurelled despatches, the real value of which

Cæsar and his friends took care should be known. In B.C. 35 he began

carving out a kingdom for his elder son by Cleopatra, and making

preparations for an expedition against the king of Armenia, whom he

accused of failing in his duty of supporting him in the previous year.

Having first made a treaty of friendship with the king of Media, in B.C.

34 he invaded Armenia, and getting possession of the person of the king

by an act of treachery which shocked Roman sentiment—not very scrupulous

in such matters—he brought him in silver chains to Alexandria.

[Sidenote: Cleopatra.]

Thus Antony’s career as an administrator and defender of the Empire

was rightly or wrongly looked upon as comparing unfavourably with that

of Cæsar. But still more shocking to Roman feeling was his position in

Cleopatra’s court. Though the moral standard at Rome was far from high,

it was rigid in regard to certain details. Just as a valid marriage

could only be contracted with a woman who was a _civis_, so for a man

in high position to live openly with a foreign mistress, however high

her rank, was peculiarly scandalous. The beloved Emperor Titus, a

hundred years later, had to give way to this sentiment and dismiss his

Idumæan mistress. But that a Roman imperator should not only have such a

connection with a “barbarous” queen, but should act as her officer and

courtier; that she should have a bodyguard of Roman soldiers; should give

the watchword to them as their sovereign; and should even employ them to

deal with what in one sense or another was Roman territory—this seemed an

outrage of the worst kind. In a poem written it seems while the campaign

at Actium was still undecided, but when rumours of Antony’s defeat were

reaching Rome, Horace well expresses the disgust with which the position

conceded to Cleopatra by Antony’s fondness was regarded:

False, false the tale our grandsons will declare—

That Romans to a woman fealty sware;

Shouldered their pikes; presented arms; and did

Whate’er her wrinkled eunuchs deigned to bid:

Or that among our Roman flags were seen

The gauzy curtains of her palanquin.”[205]

Antony himself made no concealment as to the queen’s connection with

the army. After his disastrous expedition of B.C. 36-5, Cleopatra

supplied him with money, and he told his men when paying them that

they were receiving it from her. The connection also involved a breach

with Cæsar. Their friendship—always doubtful—had been patched up from

time to time by formal reconciliations; in B.C. 43 after Mutina; in

B.C. 40 at Brundisium; and in B.C. 37 at Tarentum. For a time Antony

had found great pleasure in the society of Octavia, with whom he lived

for a time at Athens. But after the meeting at Tarentum he left Octavia

with her brother on his return to the East, and soon fell again under

Cleopatra’s spell, who, though not beautiful, fascinated him by her art

and infinite variety. When in B.C. 35 Octavia, trying to effect another

reconciliation, went to Athens, taking money and soldiers for him from

her brother, Antony accepted the gifts, but sent her word that she was

to return to Rome. Cæsar would have had her repudiate him at once, but

she seems to have been sincerely attached to him, and to have shrunk

from the idea of an insult to herself being made an occasion of civil

war. She persisted in living in his town house, and in bringing up with

liberality, not only her own children by him, but also Antony’s children

by Fulvia.

[Sidenote: Final breach between Cæsar and Antony.]

But after his return from the Armenian expedition (B.C. 34) Antony became

still more infatuated with Cleopatra. He publicly gave her the title of

“Queen of Queens,” and her eldest son the name of Cæsarion and “King

of Kings”; while to his two sons and daughter by Cleopatra he assigned

kingdoms in Syria, Armenia, Libya, and Cyrene. He had the assurance to

write to the Senate asking for the confirmation of these _acta_. When

his two friends, C. Sosius and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus entered on their

consulship (1st of January, B.C. 32), they resolved to suppress this

despatch, in spite of Cæsar’s wishes; but they communicated to the Senate

his message that the second period of the Triumvirate having expired

(on the last day of B.C. 33), he had no desire for its renewal. He did

not, however, lay down his imperium, and the object of this declaration

was to embroil Cæsar with the Senate, should he wish to retain his

extraordinary powers. Ahenobarbus, indeed, had had enough of civil war

and wished to take no step likely to bring it about. But Sosius made

an elaborate speech in praise of Antony, and attacking, or at least

depreciating, Cæsar; and was only prevented from bringing in a motion

in Antony’s favour by the intervention of a tribune. A few days after

this Cæsar (who had not been present on the 1st of January) summoned the

Senate, and delivered a speech from the consular bench, which though

studiously moderate as regards himself, was very outspoken as regards

Sosius and Antony. No one ventured to reply, and the Senate was dismissed

with the assurance that Cæsar would produce proofs of what he had said

about Antony. The two consuls, without taking any farther step, left

Rome privately and joined Antony in Alexandria. They were followed by a

considerable number of Senators, Cæsar giving out that they went with his

full consent, and declaring that others might go if they chose.

[Sidenote: The grievances of either side.]

[Sidenote: War proclaimed against Cleopatra, B.C. 32.]

This was a division of the governing body similar to that of B.C. 49-8,

and it was evident that a civil war was imminent. Sentiment was by no

means all on one side at Rome, as is proved by the numbers of the Senate

who crossed to Antony. Party feeling, in fact, was so keen that the very

boys in the streets divided themselves into Cæsarians and Antonians;[206]

and both leaders shewed great eagerness by arguments and declarations to

put themselves in the right. Antony’s grievances against Cæsar were:

(1) that he deprived Lepidus of Africa without consulting him; (2) that

he had not shared with him the countries formerly controlled by Sextus

Pompeius; (3) that he enrolled soldiers in Italy without sending him

the contingents due by their agreement. Cæsar’s against Antony were

that he was occupying Egypt (not a Roman province) without authority;

had executed Sextus Pompeius, whom he (Cæsar) had wished to spare; had

disgraced the Roman name by his conduct to the king of Armenia, by his

connection with Cleopatra, and by bestowing kingdoms on his children by

her; and, lastly, had wronged him by acknowledging Cæsarion as a son of

Iulius Cæsar. Letters and messages were interchanged for some months on

these and other points, both trying to justify themselves. Antony, in

one letter at least, preserved by Suetonius, ridicules in the coarsest

terms what he regards as Cæsar’s hypocritical or prudish objection to his

connection with the queen. But at length Cæsar found means to discredit

Antony in the eyes of the Senators, and to convince them that they must

prevent an invasion of Italy by a proclamation of war against Cleopatra,

which would be understood to be against Antony. He did this by using two

of Antony’s officers who had quarrelled with him and returned to Rome—M.

Titius and L. Munatius Plancus. The latter, Cicero’s correspondent,

the governor of Celtic Gaul in B.C. 44, and consul in B.C. 42, had

joined Antony in Alexandria as his _legatus_, and had been much in his

confidence. He is held up to scorn by contemporary writers as a monster

of fickleness and an ingrained traitor, and his thus turning upon Antony

was regarded with much contempt even by the Cæsarians. The story he and

his companion had to tell, however, served Cæsar’s turn. They brought

word that, on hearing of his speech in the Senate, Antony had publicly

divorced Octavia in the presence of the Senators, and had announced that

he intended to undertake a war against him. They also told how Antony

styled Cleopatra his queen and sovereign, gave her a bodyguard of Roman

soldiers, with her name on their shields; how he escorted her to the

forum and sat by her side on the seat of justice; how, when she rode

in her chair he walked on foot by her side among the eunuchs; how he

called the general’s quarters or prætorium “the Palace,” wore an Egyptian

scimitar and a robe embroidered with gold, and sat on a gilded chair;

and how some religious mummeries had been played, in which he took the

part of Osiris, she of the Moon and Isis. The Roman world believed that

Antony was bewitched by Cleopatra; and the serious consequences likely to

ensue were made more manifest by his will, of which Augustus got either

a copy or an account of its contents from Plancus, and read it publicly

from the Rostra. In it Antony affirmed the legitimacy of Cæsarion, gave

enormous legacies to his children by Cleopatra, and ordered his body to

be buried with that of the queen’s in the royal mausoleum. Altogether

people began to believe the report that he meant to hand over the Empire,

even Rome itself, to Cleopatra, and to transfer the seat of government to

Alexandria. There was one of those outbursts of feeling which carries all

before it. Even those who had been neutral, or inclined to be suspicious

of Cæsar, turned violently against Antony. He was deposed from the

consulship for B.C. 31, to which he had been elected, and declared to be

divested of imperium. It seems probable that he was not at first declared

a _hostis_,[207] but war was voted against Cleopatra. It was enough

for his enemies that he should be found fighting with the Egyptians

against Rome; and the vote was well understood to include him. Cæsar was

appointed to proclaim the war with all the _Fetial_ ceremonies, and the

Senate assumed the _sagum_.[208]

Both sides were now making preparations in earnest. Cæsar could draw

forces from Italy, Gaul, Spain, Illyricum, Sardinia, Sicily, and other

islands. Antony relied on Asia, the parts about Thrace, Greece and

Macedonia, Egypt, Cyrene, and the islands of the Ægean, besides a large

number of client kings who had owed their position to him.[209] He

silenced their scruples, when gathered at Samos, by pointing out that

they would not be formally at war with Rome, and promising that within

two months of the victory he would lay down his imperium and remit all

power to the Senate and people. Nor did he confine his exertions to

the East. Agents were sent to cities in Italy carrying money, though

Cæsar—who kept himself well informed—frustrated this attempt for the most

part.

[Sidenote: Antony approaches Italy.]

From Samos Antony removed his headquarters to Athens, whence in the

winter of B.C. 32 he started to invade Italy. But at Corcyra he

got intelligence of an advanced squadron of Cæsar’s fleet near the

Acroceraunian promontory, and thinking that Cæsar was there in full

force, he decided to put off hostilities till the spring, by which time

he expected to be joined by the forces of the client kings. He himself

wintered at Patræ, distributing his forces so as to guard various points

in Greece. He scornfully rejected Cæsar’s proposal for an interview, on

the ground that there was no one to decide between them, if either broke

the terms upon which they might agree. The proposal was probably not

seriously meant. It was only another means of putting Antony in the wrong.

[Sidenote: B.C. 31, Con., C. Octavius Cæsar, Val. Messala. The beginning

of hostilities.]

Nothing, however, was done before the end of the year, a storm having

frustrated an attempt of Cæsar’s to surprise some of the enemy’s ships

at Corcyra. In the early spring the first move was made by Agrippa,

who swooped down upon Methone in Messenia, killed Bogovas, late king

of Mauretania, and harassed the shores of Greece by other descents, in

order to divert Antony’s attention; who was now with his main fleet in

the Ambracian gulf, having secured the narrow entrance to it by towers

on either side, and with ships stationed between. His camp was close to

the temple of Apollo, on the south side of the strait. The successes of

Agrippa encouraged Cæsar to move. He landed troops in Ceraunia, making

his own headquarters at the “Sweet Haven,” at the mouth of the Cocytus,

and sent a detachment by land round the Ambracian sea to threaten

Antony’s camp. Having failed to entice the fleet from the Ambracian

gulf, or to tempt the men to abandon Antony, he seized the high ground

overlooking the strait, and opposite Actium, where he entrenched himself,

on the ground on which he afterwards built Nicopolis. The summer months,

however, were wearing away without any decisive blow being struck by

either side, and the delay was irksome to both. Rome was in a state of

simmering revolt owing to distress and heavy taxes, a discontent which

found expression in the conspiracy of Lepidus, son of the ex-triumvir.

It was promptly suppressed, indeed, and Lepidus was sent over to Cæsar

to receive his condemnation; but, nevertheless, Mæcenas, who was in

charge of Rome, found that he had no sinecure. To Antony, again, delay

meant discontent among his Eastern followers, tottering loyalty, and

probable abandonment. Above all, Cleopatra was in a highly nervous state,

and was urging a return to Egypt. At last on the 31st of August, a

cavalry engagement going against Antony, she became clamorous; and after

long deliberation, Antony determined to follow her advice. He ordered

his ships to be prepared for battle, but with the secret intention of

avoiding a fight and sailing away to Alexandria.[210]

[Sidenote: Battle of Actium, Sept. 3, B.C. 31.]

Cæsar was kept informed of this, and resolved to prevent it. His idea

was to allow the Antonian fleet to issue out and begin their course,

and then to fall upon their rear. But Agrippa thought that the superior

sailing powers of the Antonian fleet would render this impossible, and

urged an attack as soon as the ships cleared the straits. There had

been rough weather for four days, but on the 3rd of September there was

a calm,[211] or only some surf from the preceding storms; and when the

trumpet rang out for the start Antony’s huge vessels, furnished with

towers and filled with armed men, began streaming out of the straits.

They did not at first show any signs of standing out to sea. The ships

took up a close order and waited to be attacked. There was a brief pause

on Cæsar’s side. He or Agrippa hesitated to attack these great galleons

with their smaller craft. But before long an order was issued to the

vessels on the extremities of Cæsar’s fleet to exert their utmost powers

in rowing in order to get round Antony’s two wings. To avoid this danger

Antony was forced against his will to order an attack.

The battle raged all the afternoon without decisive result; though the

smallness of Cæsar’s vessels proved in many points a decided advantage.

They could be rowed close up to bigger ships and be rowed away again

when a shower of javelins had been poured in upon the enemy. Antony’s

men returned the volleys and used grappling irons of great weight. If

these irons caught one of the smaller ships they were doubtless very

effective; but if the cast missed they either seriously damaged their own

ship, or caused so much confusion and delay that an opportunity was given

to the enemy to pour in fresh volleys of darts. At length Cleopatra,

whose ships were on the southern fringe of the fleet, could bear the

suspense no longer. She gave the signal for retreat, and a favourable

breeze springing up, the Egyptian ships were soon fading out of sight.

Antony thinking that this was the result of a panic, and that the day

was lost, hastened after the retiring squadron. The example of their

leader was followed by many of the crews, who lightening their ships by

throwing overboard the wooden towers and war tackle, fled with sails full

spread. But others still maintained the struggle, and it was not until

Cæsar’s men began throwing lighted brands upon the enemy’s ships that the

rout became general. Even then the work was not over, for Cæsar spent

the whole night on board endeavouring to rescue men from the burning

ships.[212]

[Sidenote: The finale of the civil war in Egypt, B.C. 31-30.]

Antony got clear off from pursuit, but his camp on land was easily taken,

and his army was intercepted while trying to retreat into Macedonia. For

the most part the men took service in Cæsar’s legions, the veterans being

disbanded without pensions. Antony, however, was followed to Egypt by

many of his adherents of rank, and still thought himself strong enough

to make terms with Cæsar. But he could no longer hope for aid from the

client kings. They all hastened to make their peace with Cæsar, or were

captured and punished. Even Cleopatra was secretly prepared to betray him.

With the exception of one visit to Brundisium of seven days, to suppress

the mutiny of some discontented veterans, Cæsar spent the winter at

Samos and Athens, collecting an army and navy destined to deprive Egypt

permanently of its independence. Cleopatra had indeed tried to brave it

out. She returned to Alexandria with her prows decked with flowers and

her pipers playing a triumphant tune. The people are not likely to have

been deceived, but there was no sign of revolt. She was able to seize

the property of those whose fidelity she suspected, and even put to

death the captive king of Armenia to gratify her ally the king of Media.

Messages were sent to the kings who had been allied with Antony, and for

some gladiators whom he had in training at Trapezus. The gladiators

started but were intercepted, and no help came from the client kings.

A still worse disappointment awaited him in Cyrene, over which he had

placed L. Pinarius Scarpus with four legions. When, leaving Cleopatra

at Parætonium, he went to take over these legions, Pinarius refused to

receive him and even put his messengers to death, and shortly afterwards

handed over his province and army to Cæsar’s legate, Cornelius Gallus.

This was an unmistakable sign that Antony’s day of influence was over.

Cleopatra returned to Alexandria and made secret preparations for

retiring into Asia, as far as Iberia (_Georgia_) if necessary, though

still keeping up appearances and sending in every direction for aid.

Cleopatra’s son Cæsarion and Antony’s son by Fulvia (Antyllus) were

declared of man’s estate and capable of governing, and messages were

despatched to Cæsar proposing that Antony should retire to Athens as a

_privatus_, and that Cleopatra should abdicate in favour of Cæsarion.

The queen also, without Antony’s knowledge, sent Cæsar a gold sceptre

and crown. He made no reply to Antony, but answered in threatening terms

to Cleopatra, while sending his freedman Thyrsus to give her privately a

reassuring message. Antony suspected the purport of Thyrsus’s mission,

and with a last ebullition of his old swaggering humour had him flogged,

and sent back with the message, that if Cæsar felt aggrieved he might

put his freedman Hipparchus (who had joined Cæsar) to the torture in

revenge. But things went from bad to worse with him. News came that

the gladiators had been impounded, that his own legatus in Syria (Q.

Didius) had bidden the Arabs burn the ships which he had prepared for his

flight in the Red Sea, and that the only two client kings who had seemed

inclined to stand by him—those of Cilicia and Galatia—had fallen off. He

therefore tried once more to open communications with Cæsar. He sent him

as a prisoner one of the assassins of Iulius, whom he had protected and

employed, P. Turullius, and a considerable sum of money by the hands

of his son Antyllus. Cæsar put Turullius to death and took the money,

but returned no answer to Antony, though he again sent a private message

to Cleopatra. Presently Antony was informed that Gallus had arrived at

Parætonium with the four legions taken over from Pinarius; and believing

that even now his personal influence was sufficient to win back the men,

he hurried thither, accompanied by the remains of his fleet coasting

along to guard him. But this only led to farther disaster. The soldiers

refused to listen to him; and when his ships entered the harbour the

chains were made fast across the mouth and they were trapped. On land he

now found himself between two hostile forces; for Cæsar with Cleopatra’s

connivance had landed at Pelusium and was marching on Alexandria, and

Gallus was attacking him from Parætonium. He once more executed one

of those rapid movements for which he was famous. Hastening back to

Alexandria he flung his cavalry upon Cæsar’s vanguard when tired with its

march. But the success of this movement encouraged him to make a general

attack, in which he was decisively beaten. His last resource, the ships

still remaining in the harbour of Alexandria, failed him. Acting under

Cleopatra’s orders the captains refused to receive him. The queen, it is

said, had shut herself up in the Tomb-house or Ptolemæum, hoping to drive

Antony to despair and suicide, as the only solution of the difficulty. If

that was indeed her motive, she was both successful and repentant. Antony

stabbed himself, and begged to be carried to the Tomb-house, where he

died in her arms.

[Sidenote: Death of Cleopatra.]

Cæsar was now eager to secure Cleopatra’s person. He sent Gallus to her

with soothing messages, which he delivered to her at the porch. But while

he was speaking with her C. Proculeius entered by a window, seized the

queen, and conveyed her to the Palace, where she was allowed her usual

attendants and all the paraphernalia of royalty. Of the two accounts of

Cæsar’s interview with her the more picturesque one is given by the

usually prosaic Dio. He found her looking charming in her mourning,

surrounded by likenesses of various kinds of the great Iulius, and in

the bosom of her dress a packet of letters received from him. On his

entrance she rose with a blush and greeted him as her lord and master.

She pleaded that Iulius had always honoured her and acknowledged her as

queen. She read affectionate passages from his letters, which she kissed

passionately with tears streaming from her eyes, being at the same time

careful to put respectful admiration and affection for Cæsar himself into

her looks and the tone of her voice. Cæsar quite appreciated the drama

thus played for his behoof, but feigned unconsciousness, keeping his

eyes fixed on the ground and saying nothing but: “Courage, madam! Do not

be alarmed, for no harm will happen to you.” He said no word, however,

as to her retention of royal power, nor did his voice betray the least

tenderness. In an agony of disappointment she flung herself at his feet

and besought him by the memory of his father to allow her to die and

share Antony’s tomb. Cæsar made no reply except once more to bid her not

be alarmed; but he gave orders that though allowed her usual attendants

she was to be closely watched. Cleopatra understood only too well that

the intention was to take her to Rome that she might adorn the victor’s

triumph. But in order to secure greater freedom she feigned submission

and to be busied in collecting presents to take to Livia. Having thus

diminished the vigilance of Epaphroditus and her other guards, she some

days afterwards made a parade of writing a letter to Cæsar, which she

induced Epaphroditus to convey. When he returned, however, he found

the queen, decked in royal robes, lying dead with two of her waiting

women dead or dying by her side. “No one knows for certain,” says Dio,

“how she died. Some say that a venomous snake was conveyed to her in a

water-vessel or in some flowers. Others that the long pin with which

she fastened her hair had a poisoned point, with which she pricked her

arm.” Plutarch, with a like expression of doubt, says that the snake was

conveyed in a basket of figs; and that on receiving the letter brought

by Epaphroditus Cæsar understood her purpose and hurried to the Palace

to prevent it, and even summoned some of the mysterious Psylli—snake

charmers and curers—to suck out the poison.[213] But in spite of his

disappointment, he admired her spirit and gave her a royal funeral.

Perhaps after all he felt relieved of a difficulty. According to Plutarch

she had shown him that she was not to be easily managed. At the end of

her conversation with Cæsar, he says, she handed him a schedule of the

royal treasures. But when one of her stewards or treasurers remarked

that she was keeping back certain sums, the enraged queen sprang up,

clutched his hair, and beat his face with her fists. When Cæsar smiled

and tried to pacify her, she exclaimed: “A pretty thing, Cæsar, that you

should visit and address me with honour in my fallen state, and that one

of my own slaves should malign me! If I have set apart certain women’s

ornaments, it was not for myself, but for Octavia and Livia, that they

might soften your heart to me.”

It would be pleasanter if the death of Cleopatra and the confiscation of

her treasury were the end of the story. But the executions of the two

poor boys, Cæsarion and Antyllus, were acts of cold-blooded cruelty.

The former, who could not have been more than sixteen, had been sent by

his mother with a large supply of money to Æthiopia, but was betrayed

by his _pædagogus_, overtaken by Cæsar’s soldiers, and put to death.

The young Antonius (or Antyllus) begged hard for his life, and fled for

safety to the _heroum_ of the divine Iulius, constructed by Cleopatra,

but was dragged away and killed. He could at most have been no more

than fourteen, and had in childhood been betrothed to Cæsar’s infant

daughter, Iulia. Perhaps the pretensions of Cæsarion to the paternity of

Cæsar, and his acknowledgment as heir to the throne of Egypt, made his

death inevitable; but the extreme youth of Antyllus and his helplessness

might have pleaded for him. The rest of Antony’s children were protected

by Octavia, and brought up as became their rank.

It is impossible not to feel some sympathy for Antony, who had thus flung

away fame and life for a woman’s love. But it was doubtless a happy thing

for the world that the direction of affairs fell to the cautious Augustus

rather than to him. He had some attractive qualities, but no virtues.

Boundless self-indulgence in a ruler more than outweighs good-nature or

liberality. It brings more suffering to subjects than the occasional

gratification caused by the latter qualities can compensate. His scheme

for erecting a series of semi-independent kingdoms in the East would

almost certainly have been the cause of endless troubles. He was not more

than fifty-three at his death, but there were signs of a great decay of

energy and activity. The people thought of him—

“As of a Prince whose manhood was all gone,

And molten down in mere uxoriousness.”

And undoubtedly, if instead of spending a winter in Samos in luxury and

riot and part of another at Athens in much the same way, he had begun his

attack on Cæsar a year earlier, the result might have been different. But

he let the occasion slip and found, as others have done, that the head of

Time is bald at the back.

[Illustration: Obv.: Head of Augustus. Rev.: The Sphinx.

Obv.: Heads of Augustus and Agrippa. Rev.: Crocodile and Palm. _Colonia

Nemausi_ (Nismes).

Obv.: Head of Augustus. Rev.: Triumphal Arch, celebrating the

reconstruction of the roads.

Obv.: Head of Drusus. Rev.: The Trophy of Arms taken from the Germans.

Obv.: Head of Livia. Rev.: Head of Julia.

_To face page 130._]

Augustus: The Life and Times of the Founder of the Roman Empire · 第 7 / 16 章