PHILIPPI
_Cum fracta virtus, et minaces_
_turpe solum tetigere mento._
[Sidenote: M. Brutus and C. Cassius in the East.]
The first task of the Triumvirs, after securing their power at Rome, was
the restoration of unity and peace to the Empire, which was threatened
at two points: Brutus and Cassius were in arms in the East, Sext.
Pompeius in the West. The opposition of Brutus and Cassius seemed the
more formidable of the two. Brutus, indeed, after holding Macedonia
throughout B.C. 43, after capturing and eventually putting to death Gaius
Antonius, and after winning some laurels in contests with surrounding
barbarians, had towards the end of the year practically abandoned the
province and removed to Asia, in which a decree of the Senate had given
him proprætorial authority along with Cassius. But at Cyzicus and on
the coast of Bithynia he had collected a considerable fleet, and having
thus strengthened himself and levied large sums of money, he sent urgent
messages to Cassius to join him in the defence of the republic.
Meanwhile Cassius had done much towards securing the rest of the East to
their cause. At the end of B.C. 44 he had entered Palestine, and been
joined successively by the forces of L. Statius Murcus, proconsul of
Syria; of M. Crispus, proconsul of Bithynia; of Cæcilius Bassus, the old
Pompeian officer who had seduced the troops of Sextius Iulius from their
allegiance; and by four legions from Egypt under Aulus Allienus, whom
Dolabella had sent to bring them to himself. With twelve legions he had
shut up Dolabella at Laodicea-ad-Mare, aided by a fleet raised in part by
Lentulus, the proquæstor of Asia, and had eventually terrified him into
suicide. He had himself also, or by his legates, collected a fleet strong
enough to prevent Cleopatra sending aid to Antony and Octavian, while
part of it, under Statius Murcus and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, was to
watch the harbour of Brundisium and prevent the despatch of troops from
Italy.
In the spring of B.C. 42, therefore, when Brutus and Cassius met at
Smyrna they were both in possession of formidable forces, naval and
military, and Cassius at any rate was also well supplied with money. They
did not, however, at once push on to Macedonia, for they believed that
the danger threatened by Sext. Pompeius would delay the advance of the
Triumvirs. They therefore spent some months in farther securing the East.
Brutus proceeded to reduce the cities in Lycia, Cassius sailed against
Rhodes, while one of his legates invaded Cappadocia, and defeated and
killed King Ariobarzanes. Both encountered some resistance, but when they
met again in the summer at Sardis they had successfully carried out their
objects; and Cassius had refilled his exchequer by the taxes of Asia, the
towns in which had been compelled to pay nearly ten years’ revenue in
advance.
Having told off a portion of his fleet to keep up the watch over
Cleopatra and at Brundisium, the two proconsuls set out together for
Abydos, and thence crossed to Europe. They marched along the coast road,
formerly traversed by Persian invaders, their fleet also, like that of
the Persian king of old, coasting along parallel with their march, till
they came to the part of the Pangæan range which covers the ten miles
between Philippi and its harbour Neapolis (Datum). There they found the
road blocked by Gaius Norbanus and Decidius Saxa, with eight legions,
sent in advance by Antony. When they left the main road and attempted
to pass nearer Philippi they found the heights immediately south of the
town also guarded. They drove off the enemy and encamped on two hills
which they connected by a trench and stockade; and eventually farther
secured their position by occupying a line of hills commanding the road
to the sea. They thus kept up communication with the fleet at Thasos as a
base of supplies. Norbanus and Saxa did not venture to attack them, but
retired upon Amphipolis, and thence sent intelligence to Rome, meanwhile
keeping the enemy in check by skirmishing parties of cavalry. Brutus and
Cassius were in no hurry to advance, for they had an excellent position,
and were sure of supplies while in touch with their fleet; whereas their
opponents depended on the country, which was neither rich nor well
stocked. The fleet of Murcus and Domitius might also delay, and perhaps
prevent Antony and Cæsar from bringing reinforcements, while the fleet at
Thasos could stop supplies being conveyed by sea.
[Sidenote: The difficulties of Antony and Cæsar with Sextus Pompeius.]
Nor were these the only difficulties in the way of the Triumvirs. Ever
since the battle of Munda (B.C. 45) Sextus Pompeius had been leading
a piratical life in the Western Mediterranean. His forces had been
continually increased by fugitive Pompeians and by natives from Africa,
until he had become possessed of a formidable power against which the
successive governors of Southern Spain had been able to effect little.
After the death of Iulius Cæsar an attempt was made through Lepidus to
come to terms with him, and he had agreed to submit to the government on
condition of a _restitutio in integrum_, including the restoration of
his father’s property. But though Antony obtained a confirmation from
the Senate the arrangement was never carried out. Probably the immense
sum named as the value of the property—about five millions sterling—made
it impossible, especially when the money in the temple of Ops had been
squandered. Moreover Pompeius seems to have demanded the actual house
and estates of his father, and these were in Antony’s hands, who would
not easily surrender them. Sextus therefore stayed in Spain or with his
fleet. When the Senate broke with Antony it renewed negotiations with
Sextus, promised him the satisfaction of his claims, passed a vote of
thanks to him for services, and confirmed him in his command of all
Roman ships on active service.[171] The Triumvirs deposed him from this
command, and put his name on the proscription list. His answer was to
sail to Sicily, force Pompeius Bithynicus to surrender Messana, and take
possession of the island. Here he was joined by numerous refugees of the
proscribed and many skilful seamen from Africa and elsewhere. By thus
holding Sicily and Sardinia he could do much towards starving out Italy,
upon the southern shores of which he also made frequent descents. He
acted as an independent ruler, and presently put Bithynicus to death on a
charge of plotting against him.[172]
[Sidenote: The campaign of Philippi.]
Cæsar and Antony suspected Lepidus of keeping up communication with
Pompeius, and consequently he was practically shelved. He was to remain
at Rome to keep order and carry out formal duties, while Antony was to
transport his legions from Brundisium to attack Brutus and Cassius, and
Cæsar was to conduct the war against Sextus Pompeius. But the strength
of Pompeius seems not to have been fully realised. Cæsar despatched a
fleet under Q. Salvidienus to Sicily, while he himself went by land
to Rhegium. But Salvidienus was badly defeated by Pompeius and had to
retire to the Italian shore to refit,[173] and before Cæsar had time
to do anything more he was called to the aid of Antony, who was in
difficulties at Brundisium, the exit of the harbour being blocked by the
ships of Statius Murcus, presently reinforced by those of Ahenobarbus.
The arrival of Cæsar and his fleet enabled the transports to cross,
and Antony marched along the Egnatian Way to join his advanced army at
Amphipolis. Cæsar was once more attacked by illness and obliged to stay
at Dyrrachium; but hearing that Antony, on his arrival, had suffered
some reverses in cavalry skirmishes, he resolved to join him at all
hazards. It was indeed a crisis of the utmost importance to him. He was
leaving Italy exposed to a double danger, on the east from Murcus and
Ahenobarbus, on the south from Sextus Pompeius. If Antony were defeated
Cæsar would be in a most alarming position; if Antony won without him,
his own prestige would be damaged and he might have to take a second
place in the joint government. As before in the Spanish journey his
resolution conquered physical weakness, and he reached the seat of war
before any general engagement had taken place. He found the army somewhat
discouraged. Antony had left his heavy baggage at Amphipolis, which had
been secured by Decidius and Norbanus, and had advanced over the wide
plain (about sixty miles) to within a mile of the high ground on which
Brutus and Cassius were entrenched. But they were too strongly posted to
be attacked, and he had suffered some losses in his attempts to draw them
down. His men were getting demoralised by the evidently superior position
of the enemy, who were protected on the right by mountains, and on their
left by a marsh stretching between them and the sea, so that it was
impossible to turn their position on either side. Delay was all in favour
of Brutus and Cassius, whose fleet afforded abundant provisions, while
Antony would have great difficulty in feeding his army during the winter,
and the season was already advanced. In mere numbers there was not much
difference. Both had nineteen legions; and, though those of Brutus were
not at their full strength, he and Cassius had 20,000 cavalry, as against
13,000 of Antony and Cæsar.
[Sidenote: First battle at Philippi.]
The first battle (late in October) was brought on by an attempt of
Antony’s to get across the marsh by a causeway which he had himself
constructed, and storm an earthwork which Cassius had thrown up to
prevent him. Repulsing a flank attack made by the division of Brutus, he
carried the earthwork and even took the camp of Cassius, who with his
main body retired to the heights nearer Philippi with heavy loss. But
Antony had also suffered severely, and the fate of the day could not be
considered decided until it was known how Brutus had fared, who after
the unsuccessful attack on Antony’s flank, had attacked Cæsar’s division
which was opposite him. In this last movement he had been entirely
successful. Cæsar’s camp had been stormed and his men driven into flight,
he himself being absent through illness. The result of this cross victory
was that both armies returned to their original positions. Antony,
finding that the left wing was defeated, did not venture to remain in the
camp of Cassius. Cassius might have returned to it, but for a mistake
which cost him his life. He was wrongly informed that Brutus had been
defeated, and being short-sighted he mistook a squadron of cavalry that
was riding up to announce Brutus’s success for enemies, and anticipated
what he supposed to be inevitable capture by suicide. Brutus, informed
of this, withdrew his men from the attack on Cæsar’s camp, and retired
behind their lines, occupying again Cassius’s abandoned quarters.
[Sidenote: Second battle at Philippi, November.]
Nearly at the same time as this indecisive battle the cause of the
triumvirs had suffered a disaster nearer home. A fleet of transports
conveying the Martia, another legion, and some cavalry was destroyed by
Murcus and Ahenobarbus, and the greater part of the men had been lost at
sea or forced to surrender. Though Brutus did not yet know this he held
his position for about a fortnight longer. But the tidings when they
came made it more than ever necessary for Antony and Cæsar to strike a
blow; for they were still more isolated than before and more entirely
cut off from supplies. On the other hand, the officers and men in the
army of Brutus were inspired by it with an eager desire to follow up
the good news by fighting a decisive battle. Brutus yielded against his
better judgment and drew out his men. Antony and Cæsar did the same. But
it was not until the afternoon was well advanced that the real fighting
began. After spending more time than usual in hurling volleys of pila
and stones, they drew their swords and grappled in a furious struggle at
close quarters. Both Antony and Cæsar were active in bringing up fresh
companies to fill up gaps made by the fallen. At last the part of the
line against which Cæsar was engaged began to give way, retiring step by
step, and fighting desperately all the while. But the order grew looser
and looser, until at length it broke into downright flight. The camp
of Brutus was stormed and his whole army scattered. Cæsar was left to
guard the captured camp, while Antony (as at Pharsalia) led the cavalry
in pursuit. He ordered his men to single out officers for slaughter or
capture, lest they should rally their men and make a farther stand. He
was particularly anxious to capture Brutus, perhaps as hoping to avenge
his brother. But in this his men were foiled by a certain Lucilius, who
threw himself in their way professing to be Brutus, and the mistake
was not discovered till he was brought to Antony. Brutus had, in fact,
escaped to high ground with four legions. He hoped with this force to
recapture his camp and continue the policy of wearing out the enemy by
delay. But a good look-out was maintained by Antony during the night, and
the next morning his officers told Brutus that they would fight no more,
but were resolved to try to save their lives by making terms with the
victors. Exclaiming that he was then of no farther use to his country,
Brutus called on his freedman Strato to kill him, which he immediately
did.
[Sidenote: Conduct of Cæsar after the victory.]
There is some conflict of testimony as to the severitie inflicted after
the victory. The bulk of the survivors with their officers submitted
and were divided between the armies of the two triumvirs. A certain
number who had been connected with the assassination and included in
the proscription lists felt that they had no mercy to expect, and saved
farther trouble by putting an end to their own lives. But some also, as
Favonius the Stoic, imitator of Cato, were executed. Suetonius attributes
to Cæsar not only special severity, but cruel and heartless insults to
those whom he condemned. To one man begging for burial he answered that
“that would be business of the birds.” A father and son begging their
lives he bade play at _morra_ for the privilege of surviving. And he
ordered the head of Brutus to be sent home that it might be placed at
the foot of Iulius Cæsar’s statue. As usual there remain some doubts as
to these stories. That of the father and son, for instance, is related
by Dio, but placed after Actium.[174] And the story as to the head of
Brutus is somewhat inconsistent with the honourable treatment of the
body attributed to Antony.[175] The refusal of funeral rites is contrary
to his own assertion in his autobiography; and, in the _Monumentum
Ancyranum_, he declares that he “spared all citizens.”[176] But it must
be conceded that until the assassins and their supporters were finally
disposed of he shewed himself relentless. The milder sentiments are those
of a later time. The plea of a duty to avenge his “father’s” murder may
mitigate, but cannot annul, his condemnation.
[Sidenote: Second division of the Empire, B.C. 42.]
The victory of Philippi reunited the eastern and western parts of the
Empire, and therefore necessitated a fresh distribution of spheres of
influence among the triumvirs. The new agreement was reduced to writing
and properly attested, partly that Cæsar might silence opposition at
Rome, but partly also because the two men had already begun to feel some
of their old distrust of each other. During the late campaign, when there
seemed some chance of defeat, Antony had expressed regret at having
embarrassed himself with Cæsar instead of making terms with Brutus and
Cassius, and such words, however hasty or petulant, would be sure to
reach Cæsar’s ears. The respect also shewn by Antony to the remains of
Brutus, and the evident tendency of the defeated party to prefer union
with him rather than with Cæsar, as well as the more generous terms which
he was willing to grant, must all have suggested to Cæsar the precarious
nature of the tie between them. It was necessary therefore to put the
arrangement now made beyond dispute.
The division did not, as two years later, distinguish between East and
West. It was still only the western half of the Empire which was to be
divided. Italy was to be treated as the centre of government, open to all
the triumvirs alike for recruiting and other purposes. The provinces were
to be administered in the usual way by governors approved of by them,
except that Antony was to have Gaul and Africa, Cæsar Spain and Numidia,
thus securing to each a government in the west and south roughly equal
in extent and in importance, now that Sicily and Sardinia were in the
hands of Sextus Pompeius and thus actually hostile to Italy. But the last
article in the agreement, though intended to provide only for a passing
state of affairs, did in fact foreshadow the division of the Empire into
East and West. By it Antony undertook to go at once to Asia to crush
the fragments of the republican party still in arms in the East, and to
collect money sufficient for the payment of the promised rewards to the
veterans. Cæsar, on the other hand, was to return to Italy to carry on
the war against Sextus Pompeius and arrange the assignation of lands.
Lepidus was still consul as well as triumvir, but if the suspicion of his
being in correspondence with Pompeius was confirmed he was to have no
province and was to be suppressed by Cæsar. If it did not turn out to
be true Antony undertook to hand over Africa to him. He was throughout
treated as subordinate—
“a slight, unmeritable man,
Meet to be sent on errands.”
The real governors of the Empire were to be Antony and Cæsar. The force
of circumstances ordained that for the next ten years Antony was to
govern the East and Cæsar the West. And as yet the heart and life of
the Empire was in the west. It was this, as much as the difference of
his character, which eventually secured to Cæsar the advantage over his
colleague and made him master of the whole.