THE CONSULSHIP AND TRIUMVIRATE
_Gravesque_
_principum amicitias._
[Sidenote: Octavian’s position at the beginning of B.C. 43.]
The campaign of Mutina, in which Octavian had now embarked, was ended by
two battles—one at Forum Gallorum on the 15th, and another at Antony’s
camp on the 21st of April. After the latter date there were military
movements of some interest and importance, but no actual conflict. Before
these battles Octavian’s position had been difficult and delicate; and
though it was much improved after them, it was not in the way expected
by the Senate. The change was due to his own prudence and energy. Since
his start from Alba to follow Antony the aspect of affairs at Rome had
been much modified, and he had had good reason to doubt the favour of
the party over whom Cicero was now exercising a predominant influence.
Cicero appears indeed to have kept up a constant correspondence with
Octavian, in which he did his best by flattery and argument to retain
his aid and lull his suspicions. But there were facts which it must
have been difficult for him to explain to Octavian’s satisfaction. It
is true that besides the honours voted to him in the Senate in the
first week of B.C. 43, he had been joined with the other magistrate
in the _Senatus-consultum ultimum_, empowering them to “see that
the state took no harm.”[117] But though the decrees also gave him a
constitutional right to command soldiers,[118] yet the despatch of the
two consuls to the seat of war deprived him of the chief command; while
the more moderate party had carried over Cicero’s head a resolution to
send three commissioners to negotiate with Antony. Cicero asserts that
they were only authorised to convey to Antony the Senate’s order that
he was to quit the Gallic province. That was not, however, the view of
the commissioners themselves. One of them—Serv. Sulpicius Rufus—died
on the journey; but the other two—L. Calpurnius Piso and L. Marcius
Philippus—brought back some proposals from Antony in February, which, had
they been accepted, might perhaps have secured the safety of Brutus and
Cassius, but would certainly have left Octavian out in the cold, without
any pretext for keeping up his military force.
[Sidenote: Antony’s proposals.]
Antony proposed to give up the Cisalpine province, on condition of
receiving Transalpine Gaul—exclusive of Narbonensis—with the six legions
already under him, supplemented by those at present commanded by Dec.
Brutus, for five years, or for such time as Brutus and Cassius should
be consuls or proconsuls. Secondly, on condition that the _acta_ of his
consulship—including the use of the money from the temple of Ops and
his grants of lands—should be left intact; and that those serving with
him should have complete indemnity.[119] The envoys were against the
extreme measure of declaring a state of war (rather than a _tumultus_)
and proclaiming Antony a _hostis_, and the majority of the Senate
agreed with them and voted for further negotiations. It was a strange
position. Octavian had been authorised by the Senate to drive Antony
from Cisalpine Gaul. One of the consuls—Aulus Hirtius—had left Rome with
two legions, and had, in fact, come into contact with the enemy in a
cavalry skirmish at Claterna; the other consul, Pansa, was also preparing
to follow. Yet the Senate was negotiating with Antony as though he were
not a _hostis_, but a citizen with a grievance. The time was soon to come
when Octavian, too, would find it convenient to make terms with Antony;
but nothing could have been more against his interests than the present
action of the Senate. It would seem to him a cynical disregard of their
mutual obligations. Nor was this the worst. Antony’s offer as to Brutus
and Cassius was only an offer to recognise an accomplished fact. These
two leaders in the assassination had been already nominated by the Senate
to Macedonia and Syria. Cicero was in constant correspondence with them,
addressing them as the chief hope of the constitution, and suggesting
that their armies might be used to maintain the hold of the party on
Italy. Trebonius, moreover, had been sent to Asia with the express
understanding that he was to fortify that province and collect money to
support Brutus and Cassius. When news came that Trebonius had been put to
death by Dolabella, the latter was declared a _hostis_ by the Senate, and
his punishment entrusted to Cassius.
[Sidenote: Antony’s letter to Octavian.]
These facts must have gradually made it quite clear to Octavian that
the complete triumph of the Ciceronian party would be no less damaging
to him than that of Antony. But though skilful use was made of them by
Antony himself in a letter addressed to Hirtius and Octavian,[120] the
young Cæsar was not to be induced to take any premature step. The Senate
might be dealt with hereafter: for the present the first necessity was to
prevent Antony from becoming strong enough to dictate terms to himself as
well as to the Senate. He therefore quietly continued to take his part in
the campaign.
[Sidenote: The military situation in the spring of B.C. 43.]
The Senatorial armies commanded the district round Mutina, except
Bononia, Regium Lepidi, and Parma. Of these towns, the first was
twenty-three miles east of Mutina along the Æmilian road; the other two
about the same distance west of it. They were in the hands of Antony,
affording him bases of operation on either side of Mutina. In the middle
of February Cicero was daily expecting to hear of Dec. Brutus ending
the war by a sally from Mutina. At that time Antony’s headquarters
were at Bononia, only a part of his troops actually investing Mutina.
Hirtius was at Claterna, eleven miles east of Bononia; Octavian at Forum
Cornelii (Imola), nine miles farther east. Bad weather had prevented
serious operations, but some time in March Antony evacuated Bononia to
push on the siege of Mutina with his full force. Hirtius and Octavian at
once occupied Bononia, and gradually pushed out fortified posts towards
Mutina;[121] for Dec. Brutus was hard pressed for food, and they feared
that he would have to surrender. But not being on an equality with
Antony, especially in cavalry, they were anxious to wait for the fresh
legions from Rome under Pansa. Some minor skirmishes took place from time
to time,[122] but as the days dragged on and Mutina was not relieved, the
anxiety at Rome grew greater and greater. “I am restlessly waiting for
news,” writes Cicero on the 11th of April; “the decisive hour is upon us;
for our whole hope depends on relieving Dec. Brutus.”[123] On the 15th
and 16th there was a panic in the city caused by the prætor Ventidius
Bassus. He had enrolled two legions of veterans, and was believed to be
about to enter Rome. He, however, marched off to Potentia to watch the
result of the struggle in Gallia Cisalpina; and a few days later came the
news of the victory of Forum Gallorum, which changed this unreasonable
panic into an exultation almost as unreasonable.[124]
[Sidenote: Battle of Forum Gallorum, April 15th, B.C. 43.]
Pansa was expected to reach the seat of war about the 16th of April.
A detachment, consisting of the Martia and two prætorian cohorts, was
sent out to conduct him and his four new legions into camp. In order to
intercept this force Antony concealed two legions in Forum Gallorum,
only allowing his cavalry and light armed to be seen. On the 14th Pansa
encamped near Bononia, and next morning started to join Hirtius in his
camp near Mutina, along with the troops sent out to meet him. The main
force marched over the open country; the two prætorian cohorts kept to
the _via Æmilia_. Near Forum Gallorum there was some marshy and difficult
ground. The Martia got through this first, and suddenly sighted Antony’s
cavalry. The men could not be held back: enraged at the recollection of
their comrades executed at Brundisium, they broke into a charge. Pansa,
unable to stop them, tried to bring up two new legions to their support.
But Antony was too quick for him. He suddenly led out his legions from
the village, and Pansa, in danger of being surrounded, had to retire upon
his camp of the previous night, having himself received two wounds,
while the prætorian cohorts on the Æmilian road were cut to pieces.
Antony seemed to have won the day. But he attempted too much. He pushed
on towards Bononia, hoping to storm the camp, but was beaten off and
forced to retire to his own quarters near Mutina. He was, however, many
hours’ march from them. His men were tired, and when they reached Forum
Gallorum again they were met by Hirtius, who, having heard of Pansa’s
disaster, had come out with twenty veteran cohorts. Antony’s wearied men
were utterly routed almost on the ground of their morning’s victory, and
he had to escape with his cavalry to his camp near Mutina, which he did
not reach till long after sunset. Hirtius had no cavalry to pursue him,
and accordingly went on to visit the wounded Pansa.
Though the prætorian cohorts which had suffered so severely on the road
were Octavian’s, he was not leading them, nor does he seem to have been
engaged in either of the battles. But it appears that some of Antony’s
men had threatened the camp in charge of which he had been left, and that
his success in repelling this attack was sufficiently marked for his
soldiers to greet him with the title of Imperator as well as Hirtius and
Pansa.[125]
[Sidenote: Antony’s second defeat at Mutina, 21 April.]
The news of this victory reached Rome on the 20th, and the extravagant
exultation of the Ciceronians may be gathered from the Fourteenth
Philippic. But Antony was still investing Mutina, and though he had lost
heavily, so also had his opponents, especially the Martia and Octavian’s
prætorian cohorts. Pansa, disabled by his wounds, had been carried to
Bononia, and for some days nothing of importance was attempted. But on
the 21st Hirtius and Octavian moved to the west of Mutina, where the
lines of investment were less complete, with the hope of relieving the
town on that side. Antony sent out his cavalry to intercept them, and,
after some skirmishing, two legions to support it. Octavian attacked
and drove them back to their camp, into which Hirtius forced his way,
but was killed within the vallum. Octavian got possession of the body,
but had presently to evacuate the camp. Still Antony’s losses in these
two battles had been so severe that he feared being himself invested by
Octavian, who would in that case, he felt sure, be joined by Lepidus and
Plancus. Whatever might then be the fate of Decimus Brutus, he at any
rate would be paralysed. He resolved to make a dash for the Transalpine
province, hoping there to be joined not only by Pollio, Lepidus, and
Plancus, but by Ventidius also. He accordingly raised the siege, and with
a strong body of cavalry marched along the _via Æmilia_. At Dertona he
left the road, and made the difficult pass of Aquæ Statiellæ, leading
to the coast at Vada Sabatia. There he was joined by Ventidius, and
proceeded along the Riviera into the province. Decimus Brutus did not
start in pursuit till the third day, partly owing to the exhausted state
of his men after their long investment, partly because he wished to
induce Octavian to join him.
[Sidenote: The exultant Ciceronians slight Octavian.]
The news of Antony’s retirement reached Rome on the 26th. The exultant
Ciceronians regarded the war as at an end, and next day, under Cicero’s
influence, Antony and his adherents were declared _hostes_ in the
Senate.[126] He was believed to be utterly ruined, and the Senate was
regarded as once more supreme. Decimus Brutus would of course cut to
pieces the poor remains of Antony’s troops; Lepidus and Plancus would
hold their provinces in obedience to the Senate. Octavian was no longer
necessary, and was immediately made to feel it. Not only were scandalous
rumours spread abroad, charging him with causing the death of Hirtius,
and suborning his physician to poison the wounds of Pansa,[127] but
in the vote of thanks to the army no mention was made of him. The vote
also was so framed as to introduce divisions in the army itself by
naming certain cohorts for honour and passing over others; while the
legates conveying these thanks and honours were instructed to communicate
directly with the men, not through Octavian as their commander. The
legions of Pansa were transferred to Decimus Brutus, even the Martia and
Quarta, formerly commended for joining Octavian. At the same time, all
those most likely to be hostile to him were promoted. Sext. Pompeius was
declared head of the naval forces of the republic; Brutus and Cassius
were confirmed in their provinces and given special powers in all other
provinces east of the Adriatic; a commission of ten was appointed to
revise the _acta_ of Antony’s consulship, in which Octavian had no
place.[128] Lastly, his claim to a triumph and to be a candidate for one
of the vacant consulships was rejected, though as a kind of sop he was
granted _consularia ornamenta_,[129] and Cicero appears to have proposed
his having an ovation.[130] But it was about the same time that Cicero’s
unlucky epigram as to “distinguishing and extinguishing” him was reported
to Octavian.[131] If Cicero, who was in constant correspondence with
him, and was even discussing the possibilities of their holding the
consulship as colleagues,[132] could thus speak, what was he to think of
the rest? No doubt all these circumstances contributed to fix Octavian’s
resolve. He at once declined to co-operate with Decimus Brutus, or to
surrender his legions to him. Although those under Hirtius and Pansa
had been assigned bodily by the Senate to Brutus, the Martia and Quarta
refused to obey the order, and declared their loyalty to Octavian. Their
example was followed by the other veterans, who refused to serve under
an assassin of their old imperator. Thus fortified, Octavian adopted
a line of conduct which partly alarmed and partly puzzled the other
commanders of troops. He established secret communications with Antony,
releasing prisoners taken from his army, and allowing certain officers
to rejoin him; while he himself, remaining inactive for some months, was
privately preparing to enforce his claim on the consulship. The departure
of Decimus Brutus left him in undisturbed command of the greater part of
Cisalpine Gaul, and there were no military forces between him and Rome,
now that Ventidius had accomplished his rapid march from Potentia to the
western coast at Vada.
[Sidenote: Revulsion of feeling at Rome.]
The gradual disillusionment of the Ciceronians as to the victory over
Antony; the perplexity caused by the inactivity of Octavian; the delays
and helplessness of Decimus Brutus—all these are faithfully reflected
in the Cicero correspondence of this period. At first everything is
_couleur-de-rose_. On the 21st of April, on the receipt of the news of
the battle of Forum Gallorum, he writes:—
“In the youthful Cæsar there is a wonderful natural strain of
virtue. Pray heaven we may govern him in the flush of honours
and popularity as easily as we have held him up to this time!
This is certainly a more difficult thing, but nevertheless I
have no mistrust. For the young man has been convinced, and
chiefly by my arguments, that our safety is his work, and that,
at any rate, if he had not diverted Antony from the city, all
would have been lost.”[133]
On the 27th (after hearing of the fight at the camp) he thinks Octavian
is with Decimus Brutus in pursuit of Antony or, as he says, “of the
remnant of the enemy.”[134]
But presently he is informed that Octavian is not thus acting, or serving
the interests of the Senate. Decimus Brutus writes from Dertona on the
5th of May:—
“If Cæsar had hearkened to me and crossed the Apennines, I
should have reduced Antony to such straits that he would have
been ruined by failure of provisions rather than the sword. But
neither can any one control Cæsar, nor can Cæsar control his
own army—both most disastrous facts.”[135]
Decimus Brutus was inaccurately informed as to the relations between
Octavian and his troops,[136] but was quite right in concluding that
he had no help to expect from him. He wrote again on the 12th of May,
attributing his delay in beginning the pursuit to the fact that “he could
not put any confidence in Cæsar without visiting and conversing with
him.”[137] He had, however, gained nothing by the interview, and had
been specially dismayed to find that the Martia and Quarta refused to
join him.[138] On the 24th of May he writes again, warning Cicero that
Octavian has heard of his epigram; that the veterans are indignant at
the proceedings in Rome; and that Octavian had secured all the troops
lately commanded by Pansa.[139] Later in the same month he appears to
have suggested the recall of M. Brutus, and that meanwhile the defence of
Italy should be intrusted to Octavian.[140]
This last suggestion shows how far he had failed to penetrate the policy
of Octavian. The mistake was shared by L. Munatius Plancus, governor
of Celtic Gaul, who was moving down towards the province expecting to
be joined by Octavian in opposing Antony, or, at any rate, supposing
that Octavian’s army was at the disposal of the Senate. “Let Cæsar,”
he says, on the 6th of June, “come with the best troops he has, or, if
anything prevents him from coming in person, let his army be sent.”[141]
Some weeks later he too had learnt that Cæsar’s real purpose had been
misunderstood. He writes on the 28th of July:—
“I have never ceased importuning him by letter, and he has
uniformly replied that he is coming without delay, while all
the time I perceive that he has given up that idea, and has
taken up some other scheme. Nevertheless, I have sent our
friend Furnius to him with a message and a letter, in case he
may be able to do some good.”[142]
While the generals in Gaul were thus being gradually brought to see that
Octavian had an independent policy of his own, the hopes of support
entertained by Cicero at home were one by one disappearing. By the middle
of May he knew that Antony’s retreat was not the disorganised flight
supposed, nor the end of the war.
“The news which reached Rome,” he says, about the 15th of May,
“and what everybody believed, was that Antony had fled with
a small body of men, who were without arms, panic stricken,
and utterly demoralised. But if he is in such a position (as
Græceius tells us) that he cannot be offered battle without
risk, he appears to me not to have fled from Mutina, but merely
to have changed the seat of war. Accordingly there is a general
revulsion of feeling.”[143]
In these circumstances Cicero could do nothing but try to keep Decimus
Brutus, Lepidus, and Plancus loyal to the Senate, and urge them to act
with vigour.
“Be your own Senate,” he writes to Plancus about the 27th of
May, “and follow wherever the interests of the public service
shall lead you. Let it be your object that we hear of some
brilliant operation by you before we thought that it was going
to happen. I pledge you my word that whatever you achieve the
Senate will accept as having been done not only with loyal
intention, but with wisdom also.”[144]
But on the 29th of May Lepidus joined Antony.[145] On the 3rd of June
Decimus Brutus writes for the last time in despairing tones to Cicero
from near Grenoble,[146] and though a subsequent junction with Plancus
kept him from destruction for a few weeks longer, he was never able to
do anything of any account again. The only hope remaining to Cicero was
to induce M. Brutus or C. Cassius, or both, to come to Italy with their
armies. He had not, indeed, quite given up hope of Octavian’s loyalty,
but his old doubts were recurring, and though he still used flattering
words to him, he must have been conscious that Octavian had gauged their
value. Late in June, writing to urge M. Brutus to come to Italy, he says:
“The protecting force of the young Cæsar I regard as trustworthy; but so
many are trying to sap his loyalty that at times I am mortally afraid of
his giving in.”[147]
[Sidenote: Octavian, after some vain negotiations, at length moves on
Rome. Aug., B.C. 43.]
It does not seem true that Octavian yielded to the influence of others in
the steps which he now took. As at other times in his life he may have
listened to advice, but the final decision was always his own, adopted
from passing sentiment or passion, but with the cool determination of
settled policy. He had decided that to be able to treat with Antony on
equal terms he must obtain one of the vacant consulships. This would
make him legally head of the State, and add to his military strength
the prestige and authority of that position. If possible he would be
elected without any show of force, and therefore began negotiations
with the Senate soon after the battles of Mutina through Cicero. But
the Senate suspected Cicero of wishing for the consulship himself, and
would not listen to the suggestion. The constitutional difficulty
about the election gave the Senate a decent excuse for postponement.
Both consuls were dead, and the prætor was unable to “create” a higher
imperium than his own. There was no one to name a dictator, and as
magistrates with imperium still existed the _auspicia_ had not reverted
to the _patres_, therefore they could not name _interreges_. On the 1st
of January, when the curule offices would all be vacant, the _auspicia_
would revert to the Senate. Accordingly, after some discussion, Cicero
tells a correspondent at the end of June, it had been held to be best,
“in the interests of the constitution, to put off the elections till
January.”[148] But Octavian had no intention of being thwarted by this
technical difficulty. He had no wish for the present to farther weaken
Antony, and bring the whole weight of the Ciceronians upon himself, but
he was resolved that the consulship was necessary in order to be on
an equal footing with him.[149] He therefore allowed a deputation of
four hundred of his soldiers to go to Rome to demand the payment of the
bounties voted to them, with the understanding that they were also to
ask for the consulship for Octavian. There would be some show of reason
in combining these two demands, for they needed his protection against
the decemvirs, who were likely to interfere in the allotment of lands
made both by Iulius and Antony. But the deputation, though admitted to
the curia, received an unfavourable answer. We are told that the Senate
insisted on their appearing unarmed, but that one of them left the Senate
house and returned with a sword and the remark, “If you do not give Cæsar
the consulship this will do so.” Whereupon Cicero exclaimed, “If that is
your way of pressing his suit, he will get it.” The same story is told
of Iulius, and one is always suspicious of such dramatic scenes.[150] At
any rate, Octavian regarded the attitude of the Senate as hostile, and
determined to march on Rome with his eight legions,[151] a corresponding
force of cavalry, and some auxiliary troops.
[Sidenote: Octavian enters Rome and obtains the consulship. August, B.C.
43.]
He moved in two columns, the first consisting of his swiftest and most
active men, led by himself; for among other causes of anxiety was a
fear that his mother and sister might meet with ill-treatment in Rome.
The Senate had no troops to oppose to this formidable army, and in its
terror sent legates with the money promised to the men, but lately
refused to the deputation. Octavian however refused them entrance into
the camp, and pushed on without stopping. The panic in the city grew
daily more acute, and Cicero, who had pledged his credit for Octavian’s
loyalty,[152] found himself an object of suspicion and retired from Rome.
Then every concession was made in the Senate: the bounty promised to some
of the troops was doubled, and extended to all the troops alike, though
the exchequer was exhausted by the payment of only two legions.[153]
Octavian was to have the distribution of lands and rewards instead of the
decemvirs, and was allowed to be a candidate for the consulship in his
absence. Messengers were sent to announce these concessions to him; but
he had scarcely heard them when he was informed of a change of sentiment
in Rome. The legions, summoned by the Senate from Africa, had arrived;
Cicero had reappeared; the decrees were rescinded; and measures were
being taken to defend the city. The two legions from Africa were to be
supported by a levy _en masse_ and by a legion enrolled by Pansa but not
taken with him. The city prætor M. Cornutus was to be commander-in-chief.
At the same time boats and other means of transport were being prepared
in the Tiber for the escape of the chief citizens, their families and
property, in case of defeat; while a vigorous search was being made for
Octavian’s mother and sister as hostages. Octavian felt that no time
was to be lost. Sending forward messengers to assure the people that
they would not be harmed,[154] he continued his advance on Rome. A day’s
march from the city he was met by a large number of real or pretended
sympathisers; and felt it safe to leave his troops and enter Rome with
a strong bodyguard. Enthusiastic crowds greeted his entrance, and as he
approached the temple of Vesta he had the happiness of seeing his mother
and sister, who had taken sanctuary with the Vestals, and now came out to
embrace him. The three legions in Rome, in spite of some opposition from
their officers, declared for him; and the prætor Cornutus killed himself
in despair. It was all over, and Octavian was master of the situation.
For a moment indeed there seemed a gleam of hope. A rumour reached the
city that the Martia and Quarta had refused to follow Octavian to Rome.
Cicero hastily gathered some partisans into the Senate house in the
evening to discuss the possibility of further resistance. But while they
were in conference they learnt that the rumour was false. There was
nothing for it but to disperse, and Cicero was fain to seek out Octavian
and offer a tardy congratulation—received with ironical courtesy.
[Sidenote: The consulship and other honours.]
The constitutional difficulty as to the election was at once surmounted
by the investment of two men with proconsular powers to hold it. The rest
was a mere form, and on the 19th of August Octavian, with his cousin
Q. Pedius, entered upon their consulship. The now obsequious Senate
proceeded to heap honours upon him. He was to have money to pay the
promised bounties; to enjoy an imperium, when with an army, superior to
the consuls; to do whatever he thought necessary for the protection of
the city; and to take over the army lately assigned to Decimus Brutus.
The _lex curiata_ for his adoption under Cæsar’s will was at once
passed, and he was now by right as well as by courtesy a Cæsar. His
colleague, Q. Pedius, at the same time carried a law for the trial of all
concerned in the murder of Iulius, and the _quæstio_ seems at once to
have been instituted. All were condemned in their absence and lost their
citizenship and the protection of the laws.[155] Brutus and Cassius, with
the rest of the assassins, were thus put at a great disadvantage. It was
an act of war on their part, as condemned men, to hold their provinces or
command troops. That the Senate, in which the majority were doubtless in
favour of Brutus and Cassius, should have practically sanctioned these
measures,[156] shews how completely it was cowed. Octavian’s position
was, in fact, a very strong one. It was not possible for M. Brutus to
transport a sufficient force from Macedonia to crush him, much less for
Cassius from Syria. The two combined would no doubt hope some day to be
able to attack him; but meanwhile he had time to fortify himself by new
coalitions.
[Sidenote: Octavian goes to meet Antony.]
Cæsar—as we should now call him—only stayed in Rome to see these measures
secured. He then left the city under the care of Pedius, and marched
once more into Cisalpine Gaul. His nominal object was to destroy Decimus
Brutus—now a condemned man—but his real purpose was to come to an
understanding with Antony and Lepidus. Letters had already passed between
them, and some plan of action had been agreed upon. Antony was to crush
Decimus Brutus and Plancus, while the Senate was persuaded by Pedius to
rescind the decrees declaring Antony and Lepidus _hostes_. This news
was sent to Cæsar while on his leisurely march, and passed on by him to
Antony; who thereupon proceeded to fulfil his part of the bargain. He was
by this time, or shortly afterwards, reinforced by Asinius Pollio[157]
with two legions from Spain, who at once succeeded in securing the
cohesion of Plancus. The greater part of the troops under Decimus Brutus
also insisted on following Plancus; and Brutus was obliged to fly with a
small force.
[Sidenote: Death of Decimus Brutus.]
[Sidenote: The triumvirate arranged, Nov., B.C. 43.]
This settled the fate of Decimus Brutus, and left Northern Italy open to
Antony, unless Cæsar still chose to oppose him. After various fruitless
attempts to escape, Brutus was put to death by a Sequanian Gaul, under
orders from Antony,[158] who then with Pollio and Lepidus[159] marched
into Cispadane Gaul with a large part of their forces, the rest being
left to guard the province. The invading army marched along the Æmilian
road as though to attack Cæsar. But the real intention on both sides
was to come to terms. On an islet in a tributary of the Po, between
Mutina and Bononia, the three leaders, Antony, Lepidus, and Cæsar met
for conference, though not till elaborate precautions had been taken
against treachery. For two days they sat from morning till night in
earnest debate, in full view of their respective armies. On the third the
soldiers of both sides were summoned to a _contio_, and informed of the
articles which had been agreed upon, though the last and most terrible
of them—the proscription—was not communicated. The terms announced were:
(1) Cæsar agreed to abdicate the consulship, which was to be held for
the remainder of the year by Ventidius Bassus; (2) Lepidus and Plancus
were to be consuls for B.C. 42; (3) Lepidus, Cæsar, and Antony were to be
appointed by a _lex_ for the remainder of the year, and for five years
from the next 1st of January, _triumviri reipublicæ constituendæ_—a board
of three for settling the constitution.
[Sidenote: Powers of the Triumvirate.]
The Triumvirate was practically a dictatorship in commission. The word
was avoided owing to its prohibition in Antony’s law. But the triumvirs
were to exercise all the powers of a dictator; their _acta_ were to be
authoritative; they were to be independent of the Senate; superior to
all magistrates; to have the right of proposing laws to the _Comitia_;
to regulate the appointment of magistrates and provincial governors. The
colleagueship was an apparent concession to the fundamental principle of
the constitution; but from the first it was practically a duumvirate
rather than a triumvirate, Lepidus being treated almost at once as
inferior. The Empire east of the Adriatic was for the moment separated
from this home government, being held by Brutus and Cassius; but the
western part was to be divided among the three—Cæsar taking Africa,
Sardinia, and Sicily; Antony, Cisalpine Gaul and Transalpina, with the
exception of Narbonensis; Lepidus, Gallia Narbonensis and Upper Spain. In
these districts each would be supreme and govern personally or by their
legates. But the greater part of Cæsar’s share was still in the hands
of Sextus Pompeius, and would have to be won back. It was accordingly
arranged that in the following year Lepidus, as consul, should be
responsible for the order of Italy, while Cæsar undertook to put down
Sextus, and Antony to confront M. Brutus and Cassius.
The soldiers of both armies, having no desire to fight each other,
received the announcement with enthusiasm. Their devotion to Iulius
Cæsar’s memory was warmed by the belief that the anti-Cæsarean clique at
Rome meant to deprive them of the money and lands assigned to them. The
Triumvirs, on the other hand, promised them allotments in the choicest
parts of Italy—Capua, Rhegium, Venusia, Vibo, Beneventum, Ariminum,
Nuceria. There was land at most of these places which from one cause or
another had become _ager publicus_; and when that failed there would
always be owners, whose part in the war just over, and that about to
take place, would give opportunity for confiscation. This combination of
military chiefs therefore suited the views and wishes of the soldiers,
and some of them urged that the bond should be drawn still closer by
Cæsar’s marriage with Antony’s stepdaughter Clodia.[160] Cæsar assented
to the betrothal, but as Clodia was still quite young, he prudently
deferred the marriage. He doubtless foresaw possible inconveniences in
being too closely allied with Antony.
[Sidenote: The Proscription.]
The next step was for the three to enter Rome and obtain a legal
confirmation of their appointment. But they did not wait till their
arrival in the city to begin the vengeance. They had agreed to follow the
precedent of Sulla by publishing lists of men declared to be out of the
pale of the law. The larger list was reserved for further consideration;
but a preliminary list of seventeen names was drawn up at once, and
soldiers were sent with orders to put the men to death wherever found.
Among these were Cicero, his brother, and nephew. Plutarch tells us that
Cicero’s name was put upon the list as a compromise. Octavian bargained
for Lucius Cæsar, Antony’s uncle, and in return conceded to Antony the
inclusion of Cicero, while Lepidus consented to his brother, L. Paulus,
being entered.[161] Four of the seventeen were found at once and put to
death. Cicero escaped till the arrival of the triumvirs in Rome, but was
killed near Formiæ on the 7th of December, his brother and nephew having
already been put to death in Rome. Cæsar was the first to arrive in the
city, and was quickly followed by Antony and Lepidus, each with a strong
prætorian guard. Their appointment was duly confirmed in the _Comitia_
on the proposal of the tribune Titus Titius, and on the 27th of November
they entered upon their office.[162]
Naturally the sudden execution of three of the seventeen who were
found in Rome had created great alarm in the city, where no one knew
whose turn was to come next. The panic was somewhat lessened by Pedius
publishing the list of the seventeen, with the assurance that no more
executions were intended. He appears to have honestly believed this, but
the agitation of the night of horror was too much for him, and he died
within the next twenty-four hours. On the day after the installation
of the triumvirs (November 28th) the citizens were horrified to see an
edict fixed up in the Forum, detailing the causes of the executions
which were to follow, and offering a reward for the head of any one of
those named below—25,000 sesterces to a freeman, 10,000 and freedom to a
slave. All who aided or concealed a proscribed man were to suffer death
themselves. Below were two tablets, one for Senators and one for equites.
They contained 130 names, besides the original seventeen, to which were
shortly added 150 more. Additions were continually being made during the
following days, either from private malice or covetousness. In some cases
men were first killed and then their names inserted in the lists. The
edict made it the interest of slaves to betray their masters, against
whom perhaps in many cases these unfortunate men had a long list of
injuries to avenge. They had now the fierce gratification of seeing their
oppressors grovelling at their feet. But it also placed a severe strain
on the affection of the nearest kinsmen whose lives were forfeited if
they concealed or aided the proscribed. The sale of confiscated property
at low rates gave opportunities for the covetous, and many a man perished
because he possessed house or land desired by Fulvia or some friend of
Antony. But though the terror revealed much meanness and treachery, it
also brought to light many instances of courage and devotion. Wives and
sons risked death for husbands and fathers; and there were slaves who
assumed the dress of their masters and died for them.
The massacre began with Salvius, though holding the sacrosanct office
of tribune. Two prætors—Minucius and L. Velleius—were cut down while
engaged in their courts. To shew how no connections, however high, were
to save any man, at the head of the list was a brother of Lepidus, an
uncle of Antony, a brother of Plancus, and the father-in-law of Asinius
Pollio. But as usual in times of such horror, many perished who from
their humble position or their youth could have had no share in politics.
The total number eventually proscribed, according to Appian, was “three
hundred Senators and about two thousand equites.” Livy says that there
were 130 names of Senators on the lists, and a large number (_plurimi_)
of equites. Livy is probably giving the number of Senators who actually
perished.[163] In Rome itself the terror was probably brief. It would not
take long to find those who stayed in the city; the gates and roads were
strictly guarded, and it was difficult to evade military vigilance. But
many were hiding in the country, and the search for them went on into
the first months of the next year, and all through Italy soldiers were
scouring towns, villages, woods, and marshes in search of the proscribed.
Probably the exact number of those executed was never known. But it seems
likely that about half escaped, some of whom in happier times rose to
high office. There were three possible places of refuge, the camp of M.
Brutus in Macedonia, of Cassius in Syria, and the fleet of Sext. Pompeius
in Sicily. Pompeius sent vessels to cruise round the southern coasts of
Italy and pick up refugees; and tried to counteract the edict by offering
those who saved any one of them double the sum set upon their heads by
the triumvirs. He was liberal in relieving their necessities, and found
commands or other employments for those of high rank.[164] At length,
early in B.C. 42 Lepidus informed the Senate that the proscriptions were
at an end. He seems to have meant by this that no new list was to be
issued, not that those already proscribed were to be pardoned; and Cæsar,
who was present, entered a protest against being bound even by this
declaration.[165]
[Sidenote: Protest of Ladies.]
In fact another list was published, but this time it was of properties to
be confiscated, not of lives to be taken. In spite of the already large
confiscations the triumviral government was in financial difficulties.
Confiscated properties were liable to reductions for the dowries of
widows, 10 per cent. to sons, and 5 per cent. to daughters.[166] These
claims were not always paid perhaps, but they sometimes were. Again,
besides the natural fall of prices caused by so much property coming
into the market at once, much of it was sold to friends and partisans at
great reductions, few venturing to bid against men in power or soldiers.
The treasury, therefore, was not enriched as much as might have been
expected; and as the triumvirs had two wars in the immediate future to
face, they were in great need of money. The tributum and tax on slaves
were reimposed, but failed to produce a surplus. A device therefore was
hit upon something like the fines on “Malignants” in England, under the
Commonwealth. Lists of persons more or less suspect were put up, who were
ordered to contribute a tenth of their property. Each man had to value
his own estate, and this gave rise to frequent accusations of fraud,
generally resulting in the confiscation of the whole. Others found it
impossible to raise the money without selling property, which could only
be done just then at a ruinous sacrifice. An alternative was offered to
such men which proved equally ruinous. They might surrender their whole
estate and apply for the restoration of a third. The treasury was not
likely to be prompt in completing the transaction, for it had first to
sell and satisfy charges on the estate, nor to take a liberal view of
the amount due to the owner. It was an encumbered estates act, under
which the margin of salvage was always small, and tended to disappear
altogether.[167] Among those thus proscribed were about fourteen hundred
ladies. They did not silently submit, but applied to Octavia, as well
as to Antony’s mother Iulia, and his wife Fulvia. By Octavia and Iulia
they were kindly received, but were driven from Fulvia’s door. Undismayed
they appeared before the tribunal of the triumvirs, where Hortensia,
daughter of the orator Hortensius, pleaded their cause with something
of her father’s eloquence. “If they were guilty,” she argued, “they
ought to have shared the fate of their relations. If not it was as
unjust to injure their property as their persons. They had no share in
political rights, and therefore were not liable to taxation. Women had
of old voluntarily contributed their personal ornaments to the defences
of the country; but they had never contributed, and, she hoped, never
would contribute to a civil war, or shew sympathy on either side.” The
triumvirs received the protest with anger, and ordered their lictors to
drive the ladies away. But they were struck by marks of disapproval among
the crowd; and next day a new edict was substituted, which contained
only four hundred names of women, and, instead of naming individual
men, imposed on all properties above 100,000 sesterces (about £800) an
immediate tax of 2 per cent. of the capital, and one year’s income for
the expenses of the war.[168]
[Sidenote: Responsibility of Augustus for the proscriptions.]
For a just view of the character of Augustus, it is important to decide
how far he acquiesced in the cruelties of the proscription. With the
general policy he seems to have been in full accord; and as far as a
complete vengeance on those implicated in the murder of Iulius was
concerned, he was no doubt inexorable. But his administration as sole
head of the state was so equitable and clement, that many found it
difficult to believe that he did more than tacitly acquiesce in the rest
of the proscriptions. Augustus himself, in the memoir left to be engraved
after his death, omits all mention of them, and conveniently passes
from the legal condemnation of the assassins to the assertion that he
spared the survivors of Philippi. Paterculus only alludes to them in a
sentence, which contains a skilful insinuation that Augustus only joined
in them under compulsion. Appian makes no distinction between the three.
He tells us, indeed, some stories of mercy shown by Augustus, and of his
expressing approbation of acts of fidelity on the part of friends or
slaves. But he also credits Antony with at least one act of a similar
kind. Plutarch says that most blame was thought to attach to Antony, as
being older than Cæsar and more influential than Lepidus. Dio goes more
fully into the question. He affirms that Antony and Lepidus were chiefly
responsible for the proscriptions, pointing out that Octavian by his own
nature, as well as his association with Iulius, was inclined to clemency;
and moreover, that he had not been long enough engaged in politics to
have conceived many enmities, while his chief wish was to be esteemed and
popular; and lastly, that when he got rid of these associates, and was in
sole power, he was never guilty of such crimes. The strongest of these
arguments is that which claims for Cæsar’s youth immunity from widespread
animosities; and it does seem probable that outside the actual assassins
and their immediate supporters, Augustus would not personally have cared
to extend the use of the executioner’s sword. But he cannot be acquitted
of a somewhat cynical indifference to the cruelties perpetrated under
the joint name and authority of the triumvirs. None of them have been
directly attributed to him, except perhaps in the case of his (apparently
unfaithful) guardian Toranius; but neither is there any record of his
having interfered to prevent them. Suetonius seems to give the truer
account, that he resisted the proscription at first, but, when it was
once decided upon, insisted that it should be carried out relentlessly.
The proscription was an odious crime; but a proscription that did not
fulfil its purpose would have been a monstrous blunder also. I do not,
however, admit Seneca’s criticism that his subsequent clemency was merely
“cruelty worn out.”[169] The change was one of time and circumstance.
Youth is apt to be hard-hearted. With happier surroundings and lengthened
experience his character and judgment ripened and mellowed.
[Sidenote: Death of Atia.]
While these horrors were just beginning Cæsar lost his mother Atia,
the tender and careful guide of his childhood and youth, the first of
his near kin to recognise and approve his high destiny. She died while
he was still consul, that is, between the 19th of August and the 27th
of November, B.C. 43. Devoted to her in her life Cæsar now obtained for
her the honours of a public funeral. During the campaign of Mutina she
was, it seems, at Rome; and when his estrangement from the Senate made
her position unpleasant or dangerous, she had taken sanctuary with the
Vestal Virgins accompanied by Octavia, and was ready to greet him when
he returned to Rome. Nicolas of Damascus gives an attractive picture
of Octavian’s relations with his mother; and even the uncomplimentary
Suetonius owns that his dutiful conduct to her had been exemplary.
She had brought up her son with strictness, and the author of the
_de oratoribus_ classes her with the mother of the Gracchi. But her
strictness had not forfeited her son’s affection, nor failed to impress
upon him a high sense of duty. Her second husband Philippus survived her
several years.[170]