THE INHERITANCE
_Cui dabit partes scelus_
_expiandi Iuppiter?_
[Sidenote: News of Cæsar’s murder brought to Apollonia, March, B.C. 44.]
The news of his great-uncle’s death reached Octavius at Apollonia in the
afternoon, just as he and his suite were going to dinner. A vague rumour
of some great misfortune quickly spread through the town, and many of
the leading inhabitants hastened to the house with zealous friendliness
to ascertain its truth. After a hasty consultation with his friends,
Octavius decided to get rid of most of them while inviting a few of the
highest rank to discuss with him what should be done. This being effected
with some difficulty, an anxious debate was carried on into the night.
Opinions were divided. One party urged Octavius to go to the army in
Macedonia, appeal to its attachment to Cæsar, and call on the legions
to follow him to Rome to avenge the murdered Dictator.[72] Those who
thus advised trusted to the impression likely to be made by Octavius’s
personal charm and the pity which his position would excite. Others
thought this too great an undertaking for so young a man. They argued
that the many friends whom Cæsar had raised to positions of honour and
profit might be trusted to avenge his murder. They did not yet know that
theirs were the very hands which had struck him down. After listening to
the various opinions Octavius resolved to take no decisive step until
he had reached Italy, had consulted his friends there, and had seen the
state of affairs with his own eyes.
[Sidenote: Octavius prepares to go to Italy, April, B.C. 44.]
Preparations for crossing were begun at once, and in the few days before
the start farther details of the assassination reached Apollonia. The
citizens begged Octavius to stay, putting all the resources of the town
at his disposal; and a number of officers and soldiers came from the
army with tenders of service, whether to guard his person or to avenge
the Dictator. But for the present he declined all offers. He thanked the
Apolloniates and promised the town immunities and privileges—a promise
which in after years he did not forget. He told the officers and soldiers
that he would claim their services at some future time. For the present
he did not need them: “only let them be ready when the time came.” The
conduct of the Martia and Quarta a few months later shewed that these
feelings were genuine and lasting.
Octavius had a poor vessel and a stormy crossing, but landed in safety,
probably at Hydruntum (_Otranto_), the nearest point in Calabria, and in
fair weather only a five hours’ voyage.[73] That fact and the state of
the wind may have influenced the choice of the port. But he was also too
much in the dark as to affairs in Italy to venture upon such a frequented
landing-place as Brundisium, where he might have found himself in the
midst of political enemies or hostile troops. From Hydruntum he went by
land to Lupiæ, rather more than half way to Brundisium. There he first
met some who had witnessed Cæsar’s funeral, had heard the recitation of
his will, and could tell him that he was adopted as Cæsar’s son, and
(with a deduction of a liberal legacy to the citizens) was heir to
three-quarters of his property,[74] the remaining fourth being divided
between Cæsar’s two other grand-nephews Q. Pedius and Lucius Pinarius.
He learnt also that the Dictator’s funeral, which by his will was to be
conducted by Atia, had been performed in the Forum amidst great popular
excitement, caused partly by the sight of his wounded body,[75] partly by
Antony’s speech, and had been followed by attacks on the houses of the
chief assassins, who, after barricading themselves for three days on the
Capitol, had found it necessary to retire from Rome, first to the villa
of Brutus at Lanuvium, and then to Antium,[76] in spite of the amnesty
voted in the Senate on the 17th of March.
[Sidenote: Octavian accepts the inheritance and name, May, B.C. 44.]
Though deeply moved by this story Octavian did not allow his feelings
to betray him into taking any false or hasty step. _Satis celeriter
quod satis bene_ was his motto now as in after life.[77] He went on to
Brundisium, having ascertained that it was not occupied by enemies, and
there received letters from his mother and stepfather confirming what he
had already heard. His mother begged him to join her at once, to avoid
the jealousies roused by his adoption. Philippus advised him to accept
neither inheritance nor name, and to hold aloof from public business.
The advice was, no doubt, prompted by affection, and was natural in
the circumstances. But though Octavian never blustered, neither did he
easily turn aside: he wrote back declaring his determination to accept.
His own friends henceforth addressed him as “Cæsar,” his full name now
being Gaius Iulius Cæsar Octavianus.[78] The adoption indeed was not
complete without the formal passing of a _lex curiata_; but though that
was delayed for more than a year, the new name was assumed at once. He
complied with his mother’s wish that he should visit her first, and he
soon had the satisfaction of feeling that though Philippus was still
opposed, her heart was with him in the manly resolve to sustain the great
part which Cæsar’s affection had assigned to him. Cicero mentions in a
letter of April 11th that Octavius had arrived in Italy, and on the 18th
that he had reached Naples. On the 19th Balbus—the Dictator’s friend and
agent—called on him and learned from his own lips his resolve to accept
the inheritance. On the 22nd Cicero met him at his stepfather’s villa
near Puteoli, and anxiously watched for any indication of his political
aims. He was only partly satisfied.
“Octavius here treats me with great respect and friendliness.
His own people addressed him as ‘Cæsar,’ but as Philippus did
not do so, I did not do it either. I declare it is impossible
for him to be a good citizen! He is surrounded by such a number
of people who actually threaten our friends with death. He says
the present state of things is intolerable.”[79]
It was not Octavian’s cue as yet to break openly with the aristocrats.
The first struggles for his rights were likely to be with Antony, in
which the aid of Cicero and his party would be useful. At the same time
he was too cautious and self-controlled to commit himself or betray his
real intentions, which remained an enigma to the emotional orator, who
hardly ever spoke without doing so. Cicero consoled himself by the
reflection that at any rate Octavian’s claims must cause a quarrel with
Antony. Yet he was indignant that this stripling could go to Rome without
risk, while Brutus and Cassius and the other “heroes” of the dagger could
not. Octavian’s journey to Rome was for the twofold purpose of giving
formal notice to the prætor urbanus that he accepted the inheritance, and
of making a statement of his intentions as administrator of the will at a
public assembly. For the latter he needed to be introduced to the meeting
by a tribune. For this service he relied on Lucius Antonius. All three
brothers were in office this year—Marcus consul, Gaius prætor, Lucius
tribune; and as supporters of the late Cæsar they could not in decency
refuse him this opportunity of declaring his sentiments.
[Sidenote: Octavian and M. Antonius.]
Octavian reached Rome in the first week of May, duly accepted the
inheritance, and was introduced to a _contio_ by Lucius Antonius about
the 10th of that month.[80] The speech was not satisfactory to the
Ciceronian party. He declared his intention to carry out his “father’s”
will as to the legacy to the people, and to celebrate the games at the
dedication of the temple of Venus promised by Cæsar. Preparations for
them were begun at once, two of the Dictator’s friends, Matius and
Postumius, being selected to superintend them.[81] But though confining
himself to expressions of veneration for his “father’s” memory, and
uttering no threats against any one, Octavian had not given up for a
moment his resolve to punish the murderers. The amnesty voted in the
Senate he regarded as a temporary expedient. All that was needed was an
accuser, and he did not mean that such a person should be long wanting.
But meanwhile his first business was to secure his own position and the
possession of Cæsar’s property. This at once brought him into collision
with Antony.
[Sidenote: The money at the temple of Ops.]
The financial arrangements of the late Dictator were to a great degree to
blame for this. He seems to have introduced the system of the _fiscus_,
though without the name known in later times: that is, large sums of
money were deposited in the temple of Ops to his order, separate from the
public _ærarium_ of the temple of Saturnus, and not clearly distinguished
from his own private property. It was as though a Chancellor of the
Exchequer paid portions of the revenue to his private banking account,
and were to die suddenly without leaving any means of distinguishing
between public and private property.[82] Cicero says that this money
(700,000,000 sesterces, or about five and a half millions sterling) was
the proceeds of the sale of confiscated properties,[83] and there was, it
seems, much other property in lands and houses from the same source. The
claim by an heir of Cæsar would be met by a double opposition—from the
government, which would regard the whole as public; and from the owners
or their representatives, who might have hopes of recovering parts of it.
For at Rome confiscation did not bar claims under marriage settlements,
or for debts secured on properties. The large sum at the temple of Ops
had been taken over entirely by Antony the Consul, nominally as being
public money, really—as Cicero affirms—to liquidate his own enormous
debts. It is very likely that Antony shared the spoil with others,
perhaps with his colleague Dolabella, and they may have satisfied their
consciences with some partial use of it for public purposes.[84] At
any rate it was not forthcoming when Octavian put in his claim. Even
in regard to such property as was handed over to him he was constantly
harassed by lawsuits. Claimants were instigated, as he believed, by one
or other of the Antonies; while Gaius Antonius, acting _prætor urbanus_
for Brutus, would often preside in the court. He was resolved, however,
to carry out Cæsar’s will, even if he had to sell his own paternal estate
and draw upon his mother’s resources. But it seems, after all, that the
property of Cæsar which he did manage to get, or his own wealth, was so
ample, that he was able to do this without crippling himself. Pinarius
and Pedius got their shares, but handed them over to him, perhaps as
being too heavily weighted with legacies to be of much value to them, or
thinking that his great future made it a good investment. At any rate
the legacies were paid, the games given, and when some months later he
proceeded to enroll two legions of veterans he was able to pay each man
a bounty amounting to something like £20 of our money.[85] At no time in
his career does he seem to have had serious money difficulties. No doubt
his resources were always large, but he must also have had the valuable
faculty of husbanding them in small matters, while always having enough
for large outlays.
[Sidenote: Difficulties about Octavian’s adoption.]
But it was not only in regard to money that Octavian found himself
thwarted by Antony and his brothers. A tribune, probably Lucius Antonius
himself, prevented the formal passing of the _lex curiata_ for his
adoption, with a view of weakening his claims upon the inheritance. When
he wished to be elected tribune in the place of Cinna, who had fallen
a victim to the mob in mistake for L. Cinna, a prætor who had spoken
against Cæsar, he was prevented by the partisans of Antony.[86] There
was indeed a legal obstacle in the fact that he was now a patrician,[87]
was under age, and had not held the quæstorship, though this last was
a breach of custom rather than of law. Lastly, Antony treated him with
studied disrespect, keeping him waiting in his ante-room; while Lucius
Antonius and the other tribunes forbade him to place Cæsar’s gilded chair
in the Circus at his games.[88]
[Sidenote: Octavian and the Optimates. After the meeting of the Senate in
June.]
It was clear that a breach between the two was imminent. The younger man
was not abashed by the years or high office of the other; and though some
formal reconciliation was brought about by common friends or by military
officers, Octavian seems to have allowed the Ciceronians to believe that
he intended to join them in opposing Antony. His attentions to them
became more marked after the meeting of the Senate of the 1st of June. To
this meeting the Constitutionalists had been looking forward as likely
to bring the uncertainty to an end. At it the question of the provinces
was to be settled; the two consuls, with the aid of a committee, were to
report on what were the genuine _acta_ of Cæsar; and some means were to
be found to enable Brutus and Cassius to carry on their duties as prætors
in Rome with safety.
[Sidenote: Antony and Cæsar’s _acta_ and veterans.]
Meanwhile Antony had been availing himself of the papers of Cæsar as
though the committee had already reported. He had also been securing
himself—as he thought—by visiting the colonies of Cæsar’s veterans in
Campania[89] and by gradually collecting a bodyguard. This had now
assumed sufficiently formidable proportions to overawe the Senate.[90] It
is true that he had experienced difficulties at Capua, where the existing
coloni resented his attempt to plant others in the same territory; but,
on the whole, he seems to have improved his position by his tour in April
and May. Then again Lepidus had visited Sext. Pompeius in Spain, and was
reported to have induced him, on condition of recovering his father’s
property, to return to Rome and place his naval and military forces
(amounting to more than six legions) at the disposal of the consuls.[91]
This, thinks Cicero, would make Antony irresistible; and so no doubt
thought Octavian also.
[Sidenote: The position of Brutus and Cassius. The change of provinces.]
Nor did the meetings of the Senate in June effect anything to dissipate
these fears. What was done for Brutus and Cassius satisfied neither
party. They were offered the _cura annonæ_, superintendence of the
corn supply—Cassius in Sicily, Brutus in Asia—which would give them a
decent pretext for being absent from Rome for the rest of the year.
They, however, regarded this offer as an insult.[92] So also in regard
to the provinces: Brutus and Cassius were deprived of Macedonia and
Syria, which Cæsar had assigned to them respectively, and were offered
the unimportant governorships of Crete and Cyrene. But Antony in the
same meetings secured still greater military strength for himself by an
arrangement with Dolabella. The latter was appointed to Syria and the
command against the Parthians by a _lex_; and he then induced the Senate
to give Macedonia to himself, with the command of the legions stationed
there, one of which he had bargained with Dolabella to hand over to him.
These decrees having been passed,[93] he sent his brother Gaius over at
once to announce the fact to the legions in Macedonia and to give them
notice that they might at any time be summoned to Italy. For Antony
himself had no intention of going to Macedonia. His private resolve was
to hold Gallia Cisalpina with the largest force possible, as giving him
most hold on Italy. He had only accepted Macedonia in order to get these
legions into his hands. At the same time he carried a repeal of Cæsar’s
law confining the tenure of a province for a proprætor to one, and for a
proconsul to two, years.
[Sidenote: Antony gets himself nominated to Cisalpina Gaul.]
Though this increasing power of Antony was naturally calculated to alarm
Octavius, he was, on the other hand, opposed to Decimus Brutus—one of
the assassins—retaining Gallia Cisalpina. He therefore supported Antony
in carrying a law conferring that province on him at the end of his
consulship.[94] The Senators now saw that they had been tricked. They had
given Antony the Macedonian legions without conditions, and he would now
use them in another province given him by a _lex_—over which they had no
control. Suggestions were made to remove Gallia Cisalpina from the list
of provinces, and incorporate it (as was afterwards done by Augustus) in
Italy, thus doing away with any pretext for a proconsul residing there
with legions. But for the present the law stood which assigned it to
Antony for B.C. 43. It appears to have been passed by the beginning of
July, and he at once sent word to his brother to bring the legions over.
They were expected in July,[95] but did not actually arrive till nearly
three months later. Meanwhile a war of recriminations was maintained
between Antony the consul and Brutus and Cassius the prætors by letters
or edicts. Antony accused the prætors of collecting forces hostile to
the government, the prætors accused Antony of making it impossible for
them to come to Rome by denouncing them in speeches and edicts, in breach
of his promise. On the 1st of August L. Calpurnius Piso—father-in-law
of the late Cæsar—inveighed against Antony in the Senate, ending with
a hostile motion, of the exact nature of which we are not informed.
But he could get no one to speak or vote with him, so completely cowed
were the Senators by Antony’s military forces.[96] On the other hand,
Antony was uneasy at the growing popularity of Octavian, especially
among the veterans. He had himself made a bid for their favour by two
commissions for assigning land to them both in Italy and the provinces.
But the veterans were suspicious; they had expected some signal act of
vengeance for the murder of Cæsar; and at the same time Antony’s lavish
grants of public land to unworthy favourites impoverished the exchequer
and diminished the amount available for distribution. They lowered his
popularity with the veterans as much as they annoyed the Senators, who
yet did not venture to oppose him.
[Sidenote: Attempted assassination of Antony.]
The friction between the two men—varied by occasional
reconciliations—became more and more acute, until about the end of
September it was rumoured that Octavian had suborned men to assassinate
Antony. Of course Octavian disclaimed it, and upon Antony giving out that
certain men had been found in his house with daggers, he went openly
with an offer to serve along with his friends among his bodyguards. The
popular belief was that Antony had invented the whole story to discredit
him; but Cicero and others of his party both believed and approved, and
subsequent writers are divided in opinion. Nicolas of Damascus probably
gives Octavian’s own version, according to which Antony was unable to
produce the pretended assassins to a council of his friends, or to
induce them to advise active retaliation upon Octavian. Appian points
out that it was not to Octavian’s interest just then that Antony should
disappear, for it would have been a great encouragement to the party of
the Assassins, of whose real sentiments towards himself he was no doubt
aware.[97]
For with this party his alliance was a matter of great doubt. In June
Cicero had said of him:
[Sidenote: Octavian and the Optimates.]
“In Octavian, as I have perceived, there is no little ability
and spirit; and he seems likely to be as well disposed to our
heroes as I could wish. But what confidence one can feel in a
man of his age, name, inheritance, and upbringing may well give
us pause. His stepfather, whom I saw at Antium, thinks none at
all. However, we must foster him, and, if nothing else, keep
him estranged from Antony. Marcellus will be doing admirable
service if he gives him good advice. Octavian seems devoted to
him, but has no great confidence in Pansa and Hirtius.”[98]
Philippus was not a man for whom Cicero had a great respect.[99] But
Marcellus, the husband of Octavia (Cos. B.C. 50), was a sound aristocrat
and a trustworthy man. Still Octavian had done nothing since to identify
himself with the conservative party, in spite of his differences with
Antony. With Cicero himself he kept up friendly communications; yet at
the final breach between Cicero and Antony in September, it does not seem
to have occurred to Cicero to put forward Octavian as Antony’s opponent;
nor does he mention him in the first two Philippics. It was Octavian’s
own independent action which first shewed that he was ready and able to
assume that position, and Cicero viewed this at first with anxiety and
almost dismay.
[Sidenote: Octavian enrolls veterans.]
Antony left Rome on the 9th of October to meet the Macedonian legions
at Brundisium. Octavian no longer hesitated. Sending agents to tamper
with the loyalty of the newly arrived legions, he himself went a round
of the veterans in Campania, offering them a bounty of 500 denarii
(about £20), if they would enlist again. In doing this he acted wholly
on his own initiative and without authority from Senate or people, and
without holding any office giving him military command.[100] In after
years Augustus regarded this as the first step in his public career,
the first service rendered to the State: “When nineteen years old I
raised an army on my own initiative and at my own expense, with which
I restored to liberty the republic which had been crushed under the
tyranny of a faction.” And not only did he reckon this his first public
service; the wording of this statement is a declaration that he thereby
adopted the policy and was continuing the work of his “father,” for he
uses the very phrase which Cæsar had used in justifying himself.[101]
This phrase illustrates another point also. Ostensibly the enrolment of
veterans was to protect himself against Antony. Perhaps he did not yet
see how it was to be done, but at the bottom of his heart was the purpose
of checkmating, if not destroying, the clique which had caused Cæsar’s
murder, though for the moment he was with them in opposition to Antony,
and was eager to have Cicero’s support and approval. Yet how doubtful and
uneasy the orator felt is shewn by two letters in which he tells what
Octavian was doing.
“Puteoli, 2 November. On the evening of the 1st I got a letter
from Octavian. He is entering upon a serious undertaking.
He has won over to his views all the veterans at Casilinum
and Calatia. And no wonder: he gives a bounty of 500 denarii
apiece. Clearly his view is a war with Antony under his own
leadership. So I perceive that before many days are over we
shall be in arms. But whom are we to follow? Consider his name,
consider his age! Again, he demands to begin with a secret
interview with me at Capua of all places! It is really quite
childish to suppose that it can be kept quiet. I have written
to explain to him that it is neither necessary nor practicable.
He sent a certain Cæcina of Volaterræ to me, an intimate friend
of his own, who brought me news that Antony was on his way to
the city with the _Alaudæ_, was imposing money contribution
on the municipal towns, and was marching at the head of the
legion with colours flying. He wanted my opinion, whether he
should start for Rome with his legion of 3,000 veterans, or
should hold Capua, and so intercept Antony’s advance, or should
join the three Macedonian legions now sailing by the Mare
Superum, which he hopes are devoted to himself. They refused
to accept a bounty offered them by Antony, as my informant at
least asserts. They even used grossly insulting language to
him and moved off when he attempted to address them. In short,
Octavian offers himself as our military leader, and thinks
that our right policy is to stand by him. On my part I advised
his making for Rome. For I think he will have, not only the
city mob, but, if he can impress them with confidence, the
loyalists also on his side. Oh, Brutus! Where are you! What an
opportunity you are losing! I did not actually foresee this,
but I thought that something of the sort would happen.”
“Puteoli [3] November. Two letters on the same day from
Octavian! His present view is that I should come to Rome at
once, and that he wishes to act through the Senate. I told him
that a meeting of the Senate was impossible before the 1st of
January, and I believe it is so. But he adds also, ‘and by your
advice.’ In short he insists, while I suspend judgment. I don’t
trust his youth, I am in the dark as to his disposition, I am
not able to do anything without your friend Pansa. I am afraid
of Antony succeeding, and I don’t like moving far from the sea.
At the same time I fear some great _coup_ being struck without
my being there. Varro for his part dislikes the youth’s plan.
I don’t agree with him. He has forces on which he can depend.
He can count on Decimus Brutus, and is making no secret of his
intentions. He is organising his men in companies at Capua, he
is paying them their bounty money. War seems to be ever coming
nearer and nearer.”[102]
[Sidenote: Antony’s breach with the Senate, November-December, B.C. 44.]
In spite of these half-hearted and doubtful expressions of Cicero, the
Senate at his own suggestion was presently glad to approve Octavian’s
action, and to accept his aid. For events now followed quickly.
When Antony met the legions at Brundisium, sent over by his brother
Gaius,[103] he seems at first to have found them ready to obey him. But
difficulties were presently promoted by the agents of Octavian, who
offered the men liberal bounties, or scattered _libelli_ among them
denouncing Antony’s tyranny and neglect of Cæsar’s memory, and urging
Octavian’s claim on their allegiance. Signs of mutiny soon shewed
themselves, and after a stormy meeting at which some officers and men
used insubordinate language, Antony arrested and put to death several of
the officers as ringleaders, and about 300 men.[104] These severities,
followed by more liberal offers and some conciliatory language, seemed
for the time to put an end to the mutiny. Selecting therefore a
“prætorian cohort” from the legions, Antony started for Rome, ordering
the rest to march in detachments up the coast road to Ariminum, where the
_via Æmilia_ through the valley of the Po begins. In Cicero’s letters
of the 8th, 11th, and 12th of November are recorded the various rumours
of his approach, and the anxieties as to what he intended to do at
Rome.[105] He arrived about the 20th in full military array, and entered
the city with a strong bodyguard, the rest of his men being encamped
outside the walls. He did not stay long however. Having summoned the
Senate for the 25th, in an edict, in which he denounced the character and
aims of Octavian,[106] he went to Tibur, where he had ordered his new
levies to muster. Here he delivered a speech, which Cicero afterwards
described as “pestilent.”[107] On the 25th, however, he did not appear
in the Senate. A second edict postponed the meeting to the 29th. Cicero
insinuates that his non-appearance on the 25th was caused by some extra
debauch. But, in fact, the reason may have been the news about the _legio
Martia_, which, instead of going to Ariminum, had turned off from the
coast road and reached Alba Fucensis. It might be of course that the
legion was on its way to join Antony at Tibur, to which there was a good
road from Alba Fucensis (_via Valeria_). Antony therefore went to Alba,
but found the gates closed, and was greeted by a shower of arrows from
the walls. It was clear that this legion at least did not mean to serve
him. He came to Rome for the meeting of the Senate on the 29th, but was
informed just before it that the Quarta had followed the example of the
Martia, and was at Alba Fucensis. He understood that these legions meant
to join Octavian, and he no longer thought it possible to get Octavian
declared a _hostis_, though one of his partisans was ready to propose it.
Having therefore transacted some formal business—chiefly the allotment
of provinces, in which his brother Gaius obtained Macedonia, and a
supplicatio in honour of Lepidus, he hurriedly returned to Tibur. His
friends and supporters visited him in great numbers; but within a few
days he was on his march to Ariminum to join what remained of the five
Macedonian legions.[108]
[Sidenote: Cicero’s doubts as to Octavian’s intentions.]
Antony’s object was to attack Decimus Brutus, whose forces were
concentrated at Mutina. But at any rate, he was gone from Rome, and
Octavian had won the first trick in the game. Cicero attributes Antony’s
lowered tone in the Senate, and his hurried departure, to Octavian’s
promptness and success in raising the veterans, and inducing the Martia
and Quarta to desert him. At first, however, he had not felt easy as to
the young man’s intentions. Writing from Puteoli on the 5th of November
he tells Atticus that he gets a letter from Octavian every day, begging
him to come to Capua and once more to save the republic, or, if not, at
least to go to Rome. Cicero is “shamed to refuse and yet afraid to take”;
but owns that Octavian is acting with vigour, and will probably enter
Rome in great force. But he doubts whether the young man understands
the situation, or the terrorism established by Antony in the Senate. He
had better wait, he thinks, till the new consulate begins on January
1st.[109] About the 12th of November, he tells Atticus that if Octavian
wins now, the fear is that he will confirm Cæsar’s _acta_ more completely
than ever, which will be against the interests of Brutus, while, if he is
beaten, Antony will become more despotic still.[110] Early in December
(or the end of November), he mentions with alarm the possibility of
Octavian being elected for a chance vacancy in the Tribunate[111]; and
assents to a remark made by Atticus, that though Octavian had given
Antony a notable check, “they must wait to see the end.” Again he says to
Oppius, “I cannot be warmly on his side without having some security that
he will cordially embrace the friendship of Brutus and Cassius and the
other tyrannicides.”[112]
[Sidenote: Octavian begins his march.]
On the 9th of December, however, when he came to Rome after Antony’s
departure, Cicero made up his mind that for the present all distrust was
to be dismissed or at least concealed. Octavian had mustered his forces
at Alba Fucensis, and after some communications with the Senate—which
warmly welcomed his offer of aid—had started with his legions on the
track of Antony; who before the end of the year began the investment of
Mutina, upon the refusal of Decimus Brutus to quit the province.
[Sidenote: Octavian is recognised by the Senate, and obtains imperium,
Jan. B.C. 43.]
Accordingly, on the 20th of December, Cicero himself proposed a
resolution in the Senate authorising the Consuls-designate to provide for
the safe meeting of the Senate on the 1st of January; approving of an
edict of Decimus Brutus, just arrived, in which he forbade any one with
imperium entering his province to succeed him; directing all provincial
governors to retain their provinces till successors were named by the
Senate; and, lastly, approving the action of “Gaius Cæsar” in enrolling
the veterans, and of the Martia and Quarta in having joined him. These
resolutions were to be formally put to the Senate on the 1st of January
by the new consuls.[113] Accordingly on that and the following days,
after somewhat stormy debates, these decrees were passed, as well as one
which acknowledged the services of Octavian, and gave him the rank of
proprætor with imperium. It was also enacted that in regard to elections
to office he should be considered to have held the quæstorship. He
thus became a member of the Senate, with a right of speaking among the
_prætorii_, and consequently with a plausible claim to stand for the
consulship, in spite of his youth. A second decree—after the battles at
Mutina—gave him _consularia ornamenta_.[114]
Octavian was now fully launched on his public career. He had shown both
Antony and the Senate that he was no negligible quantity. Though the
Senate neither liked nor trusted him, he had played his cards with such
skill that it was forced to treat him as its champion; while Antony had
contrived to put himself in such clear opposition to the constitutional
claims of the Senate, that Octavian could attack him without thereby
committing himself to the support of the Assassins, and had made himself
so strong that (if he proved successful against Antony) he would
hereafter be able to dictate his own terms. Cicero saw this clearly
enough, but he hoped that the defeat of Antony would secure to the side
of the Senate the governors of Gaul and Spain with their legions,[115]
and that thus supported they would be able to discard their youthful
champion. “He was,” he said later on, “to be complimented, distinguished,
and—extinguished.”[116] We shall now see how the hopes of the sanguine
orator were once more blasted, and how all these intrigues were baffled
by the wary policy and cool persistence of “the boy.”