With the internal difficulties Sir Evelyn Baring had been struggling
bravely ever since his appointment, trying to evolve out of the
ever-changing policy and contradictory orders of the British government
some sort of coherent line of action, and to raise the administration to
a higher standard. For two or three years it seemed doubtful whether he
would succeed. All over Egypt there was a feeling of unrest, and the
well-meant but not very successful efforts of the British to improve the
state of things were making them very unpopular. The introduction of
English officials and English influence into all the administrative
departments was resented by the native officials, and the action of the
irrigation officers in preventing the customary abuses of the
distribution of water was resented by the great landowners, who had
been, from time immemorial, in the habit of taking as much as they
wanted, to the detriment of the fellahin. Even these latter, who gained
most by the reforms, considered that they had good reason to complain,
for the defeat of Arabi and the re-establishment of order had enabled
the Christian money-lenders to return and insist on the payment of
claims, which were supposed to have been extinguished by the rebellion.
Worst of all, the government was drifting rapidly towards insolvency,
being quite unable to fulfil its obligations to the bondholders and meet
the expenses of administration. All departments were being starved, and
even the salaries of poorly paid officials were in arrear. To free
itself from its financial difficulties the government adopted a heroic
remedy which only created fresh troubles. On the advice of Lord
Northbrook, who was sent out to Cairo in September 1884 to examine the
financial situation, certain revenues which should have been paid into
the Caisse for the benefit of the bondholders were paid into the
treasury for the ordinary needs of the administration. Immediately the
powers protested against this infraction of the law of liquidation, and
the Caisse applied for a writ to the Mixed Tribunals. In this way the
heroic remedy failed, and to the internal difficulties were added
international complications.
Fortunately for Egypt, the British government contrived to solve the
international difficulty by timely concessions to the powers, and
succeeded in negotiating the London Convention of March 1885, by which
the Egyptian government was relieved from some of the most onerous
stipulations of the law of liquidation, and was enabled to raise a loan
of L9,000,000 for an annual payment of L135,000. After paying out of the
capital the sums required for the indemnities due for the burning of
Alexandria and the deficits of the years 1882 and 1883, it still had a
million sterling, and boldly invested it in the improvement of
irrigation. The investment proved most remunerative, and helped very
materially to save the country from bankruptcy and internationalism. The
danger of being again subjected to the evils of an international
administration was very great, for the London Convention contained a
stipulation to the effect that if Egypt could not pay her way at the end
of two years, another international commission would be appointed.
To obviate this catastrophe the British reformers set to work most
energetically. Already something in the way of retrenchment and reform
had been accomplished. The public accounts had been put in order, and
the abuses in the collection of the land tax removed. The constant drain
of money and men for the Sudan had been stopped. A beginning had been
made for creating a new army to replace the one that had been disbanded
and to allow of a portion of the British garrison being withdrawn. In
this work Sir Evelyn Wood had shown much sound judgment as well as great
capacity for military organization, and had formed an efficient force
out of very unpromising material (see the section above on the _Egyptian
Army_). His colleague in the department of public works, Sir Colin
Scott-Moncrieff, had been not less active. By mitigating the hardships
of the _corvee_, and improving the irrigation system, on which the
prosperity of the country mainly depends, he had conferred enormous
benefits on the fellahin, and had laid the foundation of permanent
budgetary equilibrium for the future. Not less active was Sir Edgar
Vincent, the financial adviser, who kept a firm hold on the
purse-strings and ruthlessly cut down expenditure in all departments
except that of irrigation (see S Finance).
The activity of the British officials naturally produced a certain
amount of discontent and resistance on the part of their Egyptian
colleagues, and Lord Granville was obliged to declare very plainly that
such resistance could not be tolerated. Writing (January 1884) to Sir
Evelyn Baring, he said:
"It should be made clear to the Egyptian Ministers and Governors of
Provinces that the responsibility which for the time rests on England
obliges H.M. Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which
they recommend; and that it will be necessary that those Ministers and
Governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their
offices."
Relations between British and native officials.
Nubar Pasha, who continued to be prime minister, resisted occasionally.
What he chiefly objected to was direct interference in the provincial
administration and the native tribunals, and he succeeded for a time in
preventing such interference. Sir Benson Maxwell and Mr Clifford Lloyd,
who had been sent out to reform the departments of justice and the
interior, after coming into conflict with each other were both recalled,
and the reforming activity was for a time restricted to the departments
of war, public works and finance. Gradually the tension between natives
and foreigners relaxed, and mutual confidence was established.
Experience had evolved the working principle which was officially
formulated at a much later period: "Our task is not to rule the
Egyptians, but as far as possible to teach the Egyptians to rule
themselves.... European initiative suggests measures to be executed by
Egyptian agency, while European supervision controls the manner in which
they are executed." If that principle had been firmly laid down and
clearly understood at the beginning, a good deal of needless friction
would have been avoided.
International problems.
The international difficulty remained. The British position in Egypt was
anomalous, and might easily give rise to international complications.
The sultan might well protest against the military occupation of a
portion of his empire by foreign troops. It was no secret that France
was ready to give him diplomatic support, and other powers might adopt a
similar attitude. Besides this, the British government was anxious to
terminate the occupation as soon as possible. With a view to
regularizing the situation and accelerating the evacuation, Sir Henry
Drummond Wolff was sent to Constantinople in August 1885 on a special
mission. On the 24th of October of that year he concluded a preliminary
convention by which an Ottoman and a British high commissioner, acting
in concert with the khedive, should reorganize the Egyptian army,
tranquillize the Sudan by pacific means, and consider what changes might
be necessary in the civil administration. When the two commissioners
were assured of the security of the frontier and the good working and
stability of the Egyptian government, they should present reports to
their respective governments, and these should consult as to the
conclusion of a convention regulating the withdrawal of the English
troops. Mukhtar Pasha and Sir Henry Drummond Wolfe were appointed
commissioners, and their joint inquiry lasted till the end of 1886, when
the former presented his report and the latter went home to report
orally. The remaining stipulations of the preliminary convention were
duly carried out. Sir Henry Drummond Wolff proceeded to Constantinople
and signed on the 22nd of May 1887 the definitive convention, according
to which the occupation should come to an end in three years, but
England should have a right to prolong or renew it in the event of
internal peace or external security being seriously threatened. The
sultan authorised the signature of this convention, but under pressure
of France and Russia he refused to ratify it. Technically, therefore,
the preliminary convention still remains in force, and in reality the
Ottoman commissioner continued to reside in Cairo till the close of
1908.
Progress of reform.
The steadily increasing prosperity of the country during the years 1886
and 1887 removed the danger of national bankruptcy and international
interference, and induced Sir Evelyn Baring to widen the area of
administrative reforms. In the provinces the local administration and
the methods of dispensing justice were still scandalously
unsatisfactory, and this was the field to which the British
representative next directed his efforts. Here he met with unexpected
opposition on the part of the prime minister, Nubar Pasha, and a
conflict ensued which ended in Nubar's retirement in June 1888. Riaz
Pasha took his place, and remained in office till May 1891. During these
three years the work of reform and the prosperity of the country made
great progress. The new Egyptian army was so far improved that it gained
successes over the forces of the Mahdi; the burden of the national debt
was lightened by a successful conversion; the _corvee_ was
abolished;[27] the land tax was reduced 30% in the poorest provinces,
and in spite of this and other measures for lightening the public
burdens, the budgetary surplus constantly increased; the quasi-judicial
special commissions for brigandage, which were at once barbarous and
inefficient, were abolished; the native tribunals were improved, and Mr
(afterwards Sir John) Scott, an Indian judge of great experience and
sound judgment, was appointed judicial adviser to the khedive. This
appointment was opposed by Riaz Pasha, and led to his resignation on the
plea of ill-health. His successor, Mustafa Pasha Fehmi, continued the
work and co-operated cordially with the English officials. The very
necessary reform of the native tribunals was then taken seriously in
hand. The existing procedure was simplified and accelerated; the working
of the courts was greatly improved by a carefully organized system of
inspection and control; the incompetent judges were eliminated and
replaced by men of better education and higher moral character; and for
the future supply of well-qualified judges, barristers, and law
officials, an excellent school of law was established. Later on the
reforming activity was extended to prisons, public health, and
education, and has attained very satisfactory results.
Accession of Abbas.
In January 1892 the khedive Tewfik, who had always maintained cordial
relations with Sir Evelyn Baring, died suddenly, and was succeeded by
his son, Abbas Hilmi, a young man without political experience, who
failed at first to understand the peculiar situation in which a khedive
ruling under British protection is necessarily placed. Aspiring to
liberate himself at once from foreign control, he summarily dismissed
Mustafa Pasha Fehmi (15th January 1893), whom he considered too amenable
to English influence, and appointed in his place Fakhri Pasha, who was
not a _persona grata_ at the British Agency. Such an incident, which
might have constituted a precedent for more important acts of a similar
kind, could hardly be overlooked by the British representative. He had
always maintained that what Egypt most required, and would require for
many years to come, was an order of things which would render
practically impossible any return to that personal system of government
which had well-nigh ruined the country. In this view the British agent
was warmly supported by Lord Rosebery, then secretary of state for
foreign affairs. The young khedive was made therefore to understand that
he must not make such changes in the administration without a previous
agreement with the representative of the protecting power; and a
compromise was effected by which Fakhri Pasha retired, and the post of
premier was confided once more to Riaz. With this compromise the
friction between the khedive and Sir Evelyn Baring, who had now become
Lord Cromer, did not end. For some time Abbas Hilmi clung to his idea of
liberating himself from all control, and secretly encouraged a
nationalist and anti-British agitation in the native press; but he
gradually came to perceive the folly, as well as the danger to himself,
of such a course, and accordingly refrained from giving any overt
occasion for complaint or protest. In like manner the relations between
the British officials and their Egyptian colleagues gradually became
more cordial, so that it was found possible at last to reform the local
administration in the provinces according to the recommendations of Mr
(afterwards Sir) Eldon Gorst, who had been appointed adviser to the
ministry of the interior. Nubar Pasha, it is true, who succeeded Riaz as
prime minister in April 1894, objected to some of Mr Gorst's
recommendations, and in November 1895 resigned. He was succeeded by
Mustafa Fehmi, who had always shown a conciliatory spirit, and who had
been on that account, as above stated, summarily dismissed by the
khedive in January 1893. After his reinstatement the Anglo-Egyptian
condominium worked without serious friction.
Fashoda.
The success of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, and the consequent
economic and financial prosperity of Egypt proper, rendered it possible,
during 1896-1898, to recover from the Mahdists the Sudanese provinces
(see _Military Operations_), and to delimit in that part of Africa, in
accordance with Anglo-Egyptian interests, the respective spheres of
influence of Great Britain and France. The arrangement was not effected
without serious danger of a European conflict. Taking advantage of the
temporary weakness of Egypt, the French government formed the project of
seizing the Upper Nile valley and uniting her possessions in West Africa
with those at the entrance to the Red Sea. With this object a small
force under Major Marchand was sent from the French Congo into the
Bahr-el-Ghazal, with orders to occupy Fashoda on the Nile; whilst a
Franco-Abyssinian Expedition was despatched from the eastward, to join
hands with Major Marchand. The small force from the French Congo reached
its destination, and a body of Abyssinian troops, accompanied by French
officers, appeared for a short time a little higher up the river; but
the grand political scheme was frustrated by the victorious advance of
an Anglo-Egyptian force under General Kitchener and the resolute
attitude of the British government. Major Marchand had to retire from
Fashoda, and as a concession to French susceptibilities he was allowed
to retreat by the Abyssinian route. By an agreement signed by Lord
Salisbury and the French ambassador on the 21st of March 1899, and
appended to Art. IV. of the Anglo-French convention of June 14th, 1898,
which dealt with the British and French spheres of influence in the
region of the Niger, France was excluded from the basin of the Nile, and
a line marking the respective spheres of influence of the two countries
was drawn on the map from the northern frontier of the Congo Free State
to the southern frontier of the Turkish province of Tripoli.
The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.
The administration of the Sudan (q.v.) was organized on the basis of an
agreement between the British and Egyptian governments signed on the
19th of January 1899. According to that agreement the British and
Egyptian flags are used together, and the supreme military and civil
command is vested in a governor-general, who is appointed by the khedive
on the recommendation of the British government, and who cannot be
removed without the British government's consent. Neither consular
jurisdiction, nor that of the mixed tribunals, was permitted, the Sudan
being made absolutely free of the international fetters which bound
Egypt. Sir Reginald Wingate, the sirdar of the Egyptian army (in which
post he succeeded Lord Kitchener at the close of 1899) was named
governor-general, and in the work of regeneration of the country, the
officials, British, Egyptian and Sudanese, had the cordial co-operation
of the majority of the inhabitants.
Egypt's growing prosperity.
The growing prosperity of Egypt in the opening years of the 20th century
was very marked, and is reflected in the annual reports on the country
supplied to the British foreign office by Lord Cromer. Thus, in 1901 he
was able to declare that "the foundations on which the well-being and
material prosperity of a civilized community should rest have been
laid.... The institution of slavery is virtually defunct. The _corvee_
has been practically abolished. Law and order everywhere reign supreme.
The _curbash_ is no longer employed as an instrument of government." So
little danger to internal peace was apprehended that during this year
Arabi Pasha, who had been in exile in Ceylon since 1882, was permitted
to return to Egypt. This happy condition had been brought about largely
as the result of giving fiscal reform, accompanied by substantial relief
to the taxpayers, the first place in the government's programme, and
with the abolition of octroi duties in 1902 disappeared the last of the
main defects in the fiscal system as existing at the time of the British
occupation. In these conditions the machinery of government, despite its
many imperfections and anomalies, worked smoothly. Land increased in
value as irrigation schemes were completed, and European capital was
increasingly eager to find employment in the country. The bulk of the
fellahin enjoyed a material prosperity to which they had been strangers
for centuries. In the midst of this return of plenty Lord Cromer (in his
report for 1903) sounded a note of warning:--
"As regards moral progress (he wrote), all that can be said is that it
must necessarily be slower than advance in a material direction. I
hope and believe, however, that some progress is being made. In any
case the machinery which will admit of progress has been created. The
schoolmaster is abroad.... Every possible facility and every
encouragement are afforded for the Egyptians to advance along the path
of moral improvement. More than this no government can do. It remains
for the Egyptians to take advantage of the opportunities offered to
them."
The Anglo-French understanding of 1904.
The facilities enjoyed by the British and Egyptian governments for
securing the material if not the moral development of Egypt were greatly
enlarged in 1904, as the result of the understanding then come to
between France and Great Britain. The natural irritation in France
arising from the British occupation of the Nile valley, and the
non-fulfilment of the pledge to withdraw the British garrison from
Egypt, which had grown less acute with the passing of years, flamed out
afresh at the time of the Fashoda crisis, while the Anglo-Boer war of
1899-1902 led to another access of irritation against England. During
1903 a great change came over public opinion on both sides of the
Channel, with the result that the statesmen of both countries were
enabled to complete negotiations settling many points in dispute between
the two nations. On the 8th of April 1904 a declaration was signed by
the representatives of France and Great Britain which virtually
recognized the dominant position of France in Morocco and of Britain in
Egypt. The chief provisions concerning Egypt were:--
"His Britannic Majesty's government declare that they have no
intention of altering the political status of Egypt.
"The government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that
they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country by
asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation, or in
any other manner.
"His Britannic Majesty's government, for their part, will respect the
rights which France, in virtue of treaties, conventions and usage,
enjoys in Egypt."
Similar declarations and engagements were made by Germany, Austria and
Italy. Annexed to the Anglo-French agreement was the text of a proposed
khedivial decree altering the relations between Egypt and the foreign
bondholders. With the consent of the powers this decree (promulgated on
the 28th of November 1904) came into operation on the 1st of January
1905. The combined effect of the declaration and the khedivial decree
was great. The first-named put an end to an anomalous situation and gave
a practically valid sanction to the presence of Britain in Egypt,
removing all ground for the reproach that Great Britain was not
respecting its international obligations. In effect it was a European
recognition that Britain was the protecting power in Egypt. It put a
period to a question which had long embittered the relations between
England and France, and locally it caused the cessation of the
systematic opposition of the French agents in Cairo to everything
tending to strengthen the British position--however beneficial to Egypt
the particular scheme opposed might be. Scarcely less important were the
results of the khedivial decree. By it Egypt achieved in effect
financial independence. The power of the Caisse de la Dette, which had
virtually controlled the execution of the international agreements
concerning the finances, was swept away, together with almost all the
other financial fetters binding Egypt. The Railway and Port of
Alexandria Board ceased to exist. For the first time since 1875 Egypt
was free to control her own revenue. In return she pledged the greater
part of the land tax to the service of the debt. The functions of the
Caisse were restricted to the receipt of the funds necessary for this
service. It was entirely deprived of its former power to interfere in
the machinery of government. Moreover, some L10,000,000, being
accumulated surpluses in the hands of the Caisse after meeting the
charges of the debt, were handed over to the Egyptian treasury. The
Egyptian government was henceforth free to take full advantage of the
financial prosperity of the country.
Evils of the Capitulations.
In one respect the Anglo-French agreement made no alteration--it left
untouched the extra-territoriality enjoyed by Europeans in Egypt in
virtue of the treaties with Turkey, i.e. the system of Capitulations.
One of the anomalies under that system had, it is true, been got rid of,
for, as has been stated, consular jurisdiction in civil matters had been
replaced in 1876 by that of the Mixed Tribunals. In criminal cases,
however, foreign consuls still exercised jurisdiction, but the main evil
of the Capitulations regime was the absence of any proper machinery for
enacting laws applicable to the whole of the inhabitants of Egypt. No
change could be made in any law applicable to Europeans without the
unanimous consent of fifteen foreign powers--a state of affairs wholly
incompatible with the condition of Egypt in the 20th century, "an
oriental country which has assimilated a very considerable portion of
European civilization and which is mainly governed by European methods."
It was, however, far easier to acknowledge that the Capitulations regime
was defective and had outlived its time than to devise a remedy and get
all the nations interested to accept it. The solution favoured by Lord
Cromer (vide Blue-books, _Egypt No. 1_ (1906), pp. 1-8, and _Egypt No.
1_ (1907), pp. 10-26) was the creation of a council--distinct from the
existing native legislative council and assembly--composed of Europeans,
which should have the power to pass legislation which when promulgated
by the Egyptian government, with the assent of the British government,
would bind all foreigners resident in Egypt. Every reservation for the
benefit of British subjects should enure for the benefit of subjects of
other powers. The jurisdiction exercised by consuls in civil and
criminal affairs Lord Cromer proposed should cease _pari passu_ with the
provision by the Egyptian government, under the powers conferred by the
treaty required to set up the new council, of courts having competence
to deal with such matters, various safeguards being introduced to
prevent injustice in criminal cases. As to civil cases the proposal was
to make permanent the Mixed Tribunals, hitherto appointed for
quinquennial periods (so that if not reappointed consular jurisdiction
in civil cases would revive).
The pan-Islamic movement.
While the removal of ancient jealousies among the European powers
interested in Egypt helped to smooth the path pursued by the Egyptian
administration under the guiding hand of Great Britain, the intrigues of
the Turks and the danger of a revival of Moslem fanaticism threatened
during 1905-1906 to disturb the peace of the country. A party had also
arisen, whose best-known leader was Mustafa Kamel Pasha (1874-1908),
which held that Egypt was ready for self-government and which saw in the
presence of the British a hindrance to the attainment of their ideal.
This "national" party lent what weight it had to the pan-Islamic
agitation which arose in the summer and autumn of 1905, regardless of
the fact that a pan-Islamic triumph meant the re-assertion of direct
Turkish rule in Egypt and the end of the liberty the Egyptians enjoyed.
The pan-Islamic press, allowed full licence by the Cairo authorities,
spread abroad rumours that the Egyptian government intended to construct
fortifications in the Sinai peninsula with the design of menacing the
railway, under construction by Turkey, from Damascus to Mecca. This
baseless report led to what is known as the Taba incident (see below).
This incident inflamed the minds of many Egyptians, and almost all the
opposition elements in the country were united by the appeal to
religious fanaticism, of which the incident was partly the effect and
partly the cause. The inflammatory writing of the newspapers indicated,
encouraged by many persons holding high positions both inside and
outside Egypt, created, by every process of misrepresentation, an
anti-Christian and anti-European feeling among the mass of the people.
After more than a quarter of a century of just rule, i.e. since the
accession of Tewfik, the tyranny of the Turkish system was apt to be
forgotten, while the appeal to rally in support of their khalif found a
response in the hearts of many Egyptians. The feeling entertained by
large numbers even of the educated class of Egyptians was strikingly
illustrated by the terms of an anonymous letter received by Lord Cromer
in May 1906. The writer, probably a member of the Ulema class,
addressing the British agent as the reformer of Egypt, said:--
" ... He must be blind who sees not what the English have wrought in
Egypt; the gates of justice stand open to the poor; the streams flow
through the land and are not stopped by order of the strong; the poor
man is lifted up and the rich man pulled down, the hand of the
oppressor and the briber is struck when outstretched to do evil. Our
eyes see these things and they know from whom they come.... While
peace is in the land the spirit of Islam sleeps.... But it is said,
'There is war between England and Abdul Hamid Khan.' If that be so a
change must come. The words of the Imam are echoed in every heart, and
every Moslem hears only the cry of the Faith.... Though the Khalif
were hapless as Bayezid, cruel as Murad, or mad as Ibrahim, he is the
shadow of God, and every Moslem must leap up at his call.... You will
say, 'The Egyptian is more ungrateful than a dog, which remembers the
hand that fed him. He is foolish as the madman who pulls down the
roof-tree of his house upon himself.' It may be so to worldly eyes,
but in the time of danger to Islam the Moslem turns away from the
things of this world and thirsts only for the service of his Faith,
even though he looks in the face of death...."
Denshawai.
To establish confidence in the minds of the Egyptian public that the
authorities could maintain order and tranquillity, it was determined to
increase permanently the strength of the British garrison. An incident
occurred in June 1906 which illustrated the danger which might arise if
anything happened to beget the idea that the protecting power had
weakened its hold. While mounted infantry of the British army were
marching from Cairo to Alexandria, five officers went (on the 13th of
June) to the village of Denshawai to shoot pigeons.[28] An attack was
made on the party by the villagers. The officers were told by their
guide that they might shoot, but the villagers had not given permission
and were incensed at the shooting of their pigeons by other officers in
the previous year. A premeditated attack was made on the officers; a gun
seized from one of them went off and slightly injured four natives--one
a woman. The attack had been preceded by a trifling fire at a threshing
floor, either accidentally caused (but not by the officers' shots) or
lit as a signal for the assault. Captain S. C. Bull of the 6th Dragoons
received serious injuries and died a few hours later, and two other
officers were seriously injured. A number of persons were arrested and
tried by a special tribunal created in 1895 to deal with offences
against the army of occupation. On the 27th of the same month four of
the ringleaders were sentenced to death, others received various terms
of imprisonment,[29] and seven were sentenced to fifty lashes. The
executions and floggings were carried out the next day at the scene of
the outrage and in the presence of some five hundred natives. The
quieting effect that this drastic action might have had was marred by
the fact that certain members of the British parliament called in
question the justice of the sentences--passed unanimously by a court of
which the best English and the best native judge were members. For a
time there was considerable ferment in Egypt. The Anglo-Egyptian
authorities received, however, the firm support of Sir Edward Grey, the
foreign secretary in the liberal administration formed in December 1905.
As far as responsible statesmen were concerned the change of government
in Great Britain made no difference in the conduct of Egyptian affairs.
The Taba incident.
The Taba incident, to which reference has been made, arose in the
beginning of 1906 over the claim of the sultan of Turkey to jurisdiction
in the Sinai peninsula. The origin of the dispute dated back, however,
to 1892, when Abbas Hilmi became khedive. Mehemet Ali and his successors
up to and including Tewfik had not only administered the Sinai peninsula
but certain posts on the Hejaz or Arabian side of the gulf of Akaba. The
firman of investiture issued by the sultan on the occasion of the
succession of Abbas differed, however, from the text of former firmans,
the intention being, apparently, to exclude Egypt from the
administration of the Sinai peninsula. The British government intervened
and after considerable pressure upon Turkey obtained a telegram (dated
the 8th of April 1892) from the grand vizier in which it was declared
that the _status quo_ was maintained in the Sinai peninsula, but that
the sultan resumed possession of the posts in the Hejaz heretofore
garrisoned by Egypt. To this last course Great Britain raised no
objection. As officially stated by the British government at the time,
the eastern frontier of the Sinai peninsula was taken to be a line
running in a south-easterly direction from Rafa, a place on the
Mediterranean, east of El Arish, to the head of the gulf of Akaba. The
fort of Akaba and other posts farther east Egypt abandoned. So matters
rested until in 1905 in consequence of lawlessness among the Bedouins of
the peninsula a British official was appointed commandant and inspector
of the peninsula and certain administrative measures taken. The report
was spread by pan-Islamic agents that the intention of the Egyptian
government was to construct fortifications on the frontier near Akaba,
to which place the Turks were building a branch railway from the
Damascus-Mecca line. In January 1906 the sultan complained to the
British ambassador at Constantinople of Egyptian encroachments on
Turkish territory, whereupon the khedive asked that the frontier should
be delimited, a request which Turkey rejected. A small Egyptian force
was then directed to occupy Taba, a port near Akaba but on the western
side of the gulf. Before this force could reach Taba that place had been
seized by the Turkish commandant at Akaba. A period of considerable
tension ensued, the Turks removing the boundary posts at Rafa and
sending strong reinforcements to the frontier. The British government
intervened on behalf of the khedive and consistently maintained that the
Rafa-Akaba line must be the frontier. In April a conference was held
between the khedive and Mukhtar Pasha, the Ottoman commissioner. It then
appeared that Turkey was unwilling to recognize the British
interpretation of the telegram of the 8th of April 1892. Turkey claimed
that the peninsula of Sinai consisted only of the territory south of a
straight line from Akaba to Suez, and that Egyptian territory north of
that line was traced from Rafa to Suez. As a compromise Mukhtar Pasha
suggested as the frontier a line drawn direct from Rafa to Ras Mahommed
(the most southern point of the Sinai peninsula), which would have left
the whole of the gulf of Akaba in Turkish territory. In other words the
claim of the Porte was, to quote Lord Cromer:--
"to carry the Turkish frontier and strategical railways to Suez on the
banks of the canal; or that if the Ras Mahommed line were adopted, the
Turkish frontier would be advanced to the neighbourhood of Nekhl, i.e.
within easy striking distance of Egypt, and that ... the gulf of Akaba
... would practically become a _mare clausum_ in the possession of
Turkey and a standing menace to the security of the trade route to the
East."
Such proposals could not be entertained by Great Britain; and as the
sultan remained obstinate the British ambassador on the 3rd of May
presented a note to the Porte requiring compliance with the British
proposals within ten days. The Turkish ambassador in London was informed
by Sir Edward Grey, foreign secretary, that if it were found that
Turkish suzerainty in Egypt were incompatible with the rights of the
British government to interfere in Egyptian affairs, and with the
British occupation, the British position in Egypt would be upheld by the
whole force of the empire. Thereupon the sultan gave way and agreed (on
the 14th of May) that the line of demarcation should start at Rafa and
run towards the south-east "in an approximately straight line as far as
a point on the gulf of Akaba at least 3 m. distant from Akaba."[30] The
Turkish troops were withdrawn from Taba, and the delimitation of the
frontier was undertaken by a joint Turco-Egyptian commission. An
agreement was signed on the 1st of October finally settling the frontier
line.
With the ending of this dispute and the strengthening of the British
garrison in Egypt a demonstration was given of the ability of the
protecting power to maintain its position. At the same time
encouragement was given to that section of Egyptian society which sought
the reform of various Moslem institutions without injury to the
principles underlying the faith of Islam: a more truly national movement
than that of the agitators who clamoured for parliamentary government.
Resignation of Lord Cromer.
In April 1907, a few days after the appearance of his report for 1906,
in which the "Nationalist" and pan-Islamic movements were shown to be
detrimental to the welfare of Egypt, Lord Cromer resigned his post of
British agent and consul-general. His resignation, dictated by reasons
of health, was described by Sir Edward Grey as "the greatest personal
loss which the public service of this country (Britain) could suffer."
Lord Cromer's work was in a sense complete. He left the country in a
state of unexampled material prosperity, free from the majority of the
international fetters with which it was bound when he took up his task
in 1883, and with the legitimate expectation that the work he had done
would endure. The magnitude of the task he had accomplished is shown by
the preceding pages, and it need only be added that the transformation
effected in Egypt and the Sudan, during his twenty-four years' occupancy
of the British Agency, was carried out in every department under his
guidance and inspiration. Lord Cromer was succeeded by Sir Eldon Gorst,
who had served in Egypt eighteen years under him, and was at the time of
his appointment to Cairo an assistant under secretary of state for
foreign affairs.
Notwithstanding, or, rather, as a consequence of, the unexampled
material prosperity of the country, 1907 was a year of severe financial
crisis, due to over-trading, excessive credit and the building mania
induced by the rapid economic progress of Egypt, and aggravated by the
unfavourable monetary conditions existing in America and Europe during
the latter part of the year. Though the crisis had results disastrous to
the speculators, the position of the fellahin was hardly affected; the
cotton crop was marketed with regularity and at an average price higher
than that of 1906, while public revenue showed a satisfactory increase.
The noisy "Nationalist" agitation which was maintained during this
period of financial stringency reacted unfavourably on public order.
Although the degree of insecurity prevailing in the provinces was
greatly exaggerated--serious crime in 1907 being less than in the
preceding year--an increasing number of crimes were left untraced to
their authors. The release of the Denshawai prisoners in January 1908
and the death of Mustafa Kamel in the following month had a quieting
effect on the public mind; while the fact that in the elections
(December 1907) for the legislative council and the general assembly
only 5% of the electors went to the polls, afforded a striking
commentary alike on the appreciation of the average Egyptian of the
value of parliamentary institutions and of the claims of the
"Nationalist" members of the assembly to represent the Egyptian people.
The "Nationalists" were, too, divided into many warring
sections--Mahommed Bey Ferid, chosen as successor to Mustafa Kamel, had
to contend with the pretensions of several other "leaders." The khedive,
moreover, markedly abstained from any association with the agitation of
the Nationalists, who viewed with disfavour his highness's personal
friendship with Sir Eldon Gorst. The agitators gained their chief
strength from the support accorded them by certain Radical politicians
in England. A number of members of the council and assembly visited
England in July 1908 and were received by Sir Edward Grey, who gave them
assurances that Great Britain would always strive to remedy the
legitimate grievances of Egyptians.
The establishment of constitutional rule in Turkey in the summer of 1908
excited the hopes of the Egyptian Nationalists, and a deputation was
sent to Constantinople to confer with the Young Turk committee. From the
Young Turks, however, the deputation received no encouragement for their
agitation and returned with the advice to work in co-operation with the
British. In view of the rumours current, Sir Eldon Gorst, in the form of
an interview in _El Mokattam_, a widely read native paper, restated
(October 1908) the British view as to the occupation of the country and
the demand for a parliament. Great Britain, he declared, had no
intention of proclaiming a protectorate over Egypt; on the other hand,
recent events in Turkey in no way affected the question of
self-government in Egypt. It would be folly to think of introducing
unrestricted parliamentary government at present, the conditions for its
successful working not existing. The "wild and foolish" agitation on
this question only served to confirm the impression that the Egyptians
were not yet fit to govern themselves. At the same time steps were being
taken to give them a much greater part in the management of local
affairs. If the Egyptians showed that the existing institutions and the
new provincial councils could do useful work, it would prove the best
argument for extending their powers. Sir Eldon Gorst's statements were
approved by the British government.
In November 1908 Mustafa Fehmi, who had been premier since 1895,
resigned, and was succeeded by Boutros Pasha, a Copt of marked ability,
who had been for several years foreign minister. Boutros incurred the
enmity of the "Nationalists" and was murdered in February 1910.
(D. M. W.; F. R. C.)
AUTHORITIES.--D. A. Cameron, _Egypt in the Nineteenth Century_
(London, 1898), a clear and useful summary of events up to 1882; E.
Dicey, _The Story of the Khedivate_ (London, 1902); J. C. McCoan,
_Egypt under Ismail_ (London, 1899); P. Mouriez, _Histoire de
Mehemet-Ali_ (4 vols., Paris, 1855-1858); L. Brehier, _L'Egypte de
1789 a 1900_ (Paris, 1901); C. de Freycinet, _La Question d'Egypte_
(Paris, 1905). See also MEHEMET ALI.
For the period immediately preceding and during the British occupation
the standard authority is Lord Cromer's _Modern Egypt_ (2 vols.,
London, 1908). In this invaluable work the history of Egypt from 1875
to 1892 and that of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from 1882 to 1907 is
treated fully. Lord Cromer's annual reports (1888-1906) to the British
government on the affairs of Egypt should also be consulted. Next in
interest are Alfred (Lord) Milner's _England in Egypt_ (11th ed.,
London, 1904), and Sir A. Colvin's _The Making of Modern Egypt_
(London, 1906). Consult also _Khedives and Pashas_ (London, 1884), by
C. F. Moberly Bell (published anonymously); D. M. Wallace, _Egypt and
the Egyptian Question_ (London, 1883); W. S. Blunt, _Secret History of
the English Occupation of Egypt_ (2nd ed., London, 1907), a partisan
record; C. v. Malortie, _Egypt_, _Native Rulers and Foreign
Interference_, 2 vols. (London, 1883); O. Borelli, _Choses politiques
d'Egypte_, 1883-1895 (Paris, 1895); H. Resener, _Agypten unter
englischer Okkupation_ (Berlin, 1896). Morley's _Life of Gladstone_
and Fitzmaurice's _Life of Granville_ throw considerable light on the
inner history of the period 1880-1893. See further the historical
works cited in SUDAN: _Anglo-Egyptian_, and those given at the end of
the first section of this article.
For military operations 1882-1899 see C. Royle, _The Egyptian
Campaigns 1882 to 1899_, revised ed. (London, 1900); H. Brackenbury,
_Narrative of the Advance of the River Column of the Nile
Expeditionary Force_ (Edinburgh, 1885); Sir W. F. Butler, _Campaign of
the Cataracts_ (London, 1887); Count A. E. W. Gleichen, _With the
Camel Corps up the Nile_ (London, 1888); _Gordon's Last Journal_
(London, 1885); Sir C. W. Wilson, _From Korti to Khartum_ (Edinburgh,
1886); J. Grant, _Cassell's History of the War in the Soudan_, 6 vols.
(London, 1885 et seq.); "An Officer," _Sudan Campaigns_ 1896-1899
(London, 1899); G. W. Steevens, _With Kitchener to Khartum_
(Edinburgh, 1898); W. S. Churchill, _The River War_, new edition
(London, 1902).
Bibliographical notes for each section of this article are given in
their several places. The following bibliographies may be consulted:
Ibrahim Hilmi, _Literature of Egypt and the Soudan_, 2 vols. (London,
1886-1888); H. Jolowicz, _Bibliotheca aegyptiaca_ (Leipzig, 1858;
supplement, 1861); M. Hartmann, _The Arabic Press of Egypt_ (London,
1899). (F. R. C.)