Ismail's megalomania

The reign of Ismail (q.v.), from 1863 to 1879, was for a while hailed as

introducing a new era into modern Egypt. In spite of his vast schemes of

reform and the _eclat_ of his Europeanizing innovations, his oriental

extravagance led to bankruptcy, and his reign is historically important

simply for its compelling European intervention in the internal affairs

of Egypt. Yet in its earlier years much was done which seemed likely to

give Ismail a more important place in history. In 1866 he was granted by

the sultan a firman--obtained on condition of the increase of the

tribute from L376,000 to L720,000--by which the succession to the throne

of Egypt was made to descend "to the eldest of thy male children and in

the same manner to the eldest sons of thy successors," instead of, after

Turkish law, to the eldest male of the family. In the following year

another firman bestowed upon him the title of _khedive_ in lieu of that

of _vali_, borne by Mehemet Ali and his immediate successors. In 1873 a

further firman placed the khedive in many respects in the position of an

independent sovereign. Ismail re-established and improved the

administrative system organized by Mehemet Ali, and which had fallen

into decay under Abbas's indolent rule; he caused a thorough remodelling

of the customs system, which was in an anarchic state, to be made by

English officials; in 1865 he established the Egyptian post office; he

reorganized the military schools of his grandfather, and gave some

support to the cause of education. Railways, telegraphs, lighthouses,

the harbour works at Suez, the breakwater at Alexandria, were carried

out by some of the best contractors of Europe. Most important of all,

the Suez Canal was opened in 1869. But the funds required for these

public works, as well as the actual labour, were remorselessly extorted

from a poverty-stricken population.

A striking picture of the condition of the people at this period is

given by Lady Duff Gordon in _Last Letters from Egypt_. Writing in

1867 she said: "I cannot describe the misery here now--every day some

new tax. Every beast, camel, cow, sheep, donkey and horse is made to

pay. The fellaheen can no longer eat bread; they are living on

barley-meal mixed with water, and raw green stuff, vetches, | &c. The

taxation makes life almost impossible: a tax on every crop, on every

animal first, and again when it is sold in the market; on every man,

on charcoal, on butter, on salt.... The people in Upper Egypt are

running away by wholesale, utterly unable to pay the new taxes and do

the work exacted. Even here (Cairo) the beating for the year's taxes

is awful."

Steps leading to the deposition of Ismail.

In the years that followed the condition of things grew worse. Thousands

of lives were lost and large sums expended in extending Ismail's

dominions in the Sudan (q.v.) and in futile conflicts with Abyssinia. In

1875 the impoverishment of the fellah had reached such a point that the

ordinary resources of the country no longer sufficed for the most urgent

necessities of administration; and the khedive Ismail, having repeatedly

broken faith with his creditors, could not raise any more loans on the

European market. The taxes were habitually collected many months in

advance, and the colossal floating debt was increasing rapidly. In these

circumstances Ismail had to realize his remaining assets, and among them

sold 176,602 Suez Canal shares to the British government for

L3,976,582[25] (see BEACONSFIELD). This comparatively small financial

operation brought about the long-delayed crisis and paved the way for

the future prosperity of Egypt, for it induced the British government to

inquire more carefully into the financial condition of the country. In

December 1875 Mr Stephen Cave, M.P., and Colonel (afterwards Sir John)

Stokes, R.E., were sent to Egypt to inquire into the financial

situation; and Mr Cave's report, made public in April 1876, showed that

under the existing administration national bankruptcy was inevitable.

Other commissions of inquiry followed, and each one brought Ismail more

under European control. The establishment of the Mixed Tribunals in

1876, in place of the system of consular jurisdiction in civil actions,

made some of the courts of justice international. The Caisse de la

Dette, instituted in May 1876 as a result of the Cave mission, led to

international control over a large portion of the revenue. Next came (in

November 1876) the mission of Mr (afterwards Lord) Goschen and M.

Joubert on behalf of the British and French bondholders, one result

being the establishment of Dual Control, i.e. an English official to

superintend the revenue and a French official the expenditure of the

country. Another result was the internationalization of the railways and

the port of Alexandria. Then came (May 1878) a commission of inquiry of

which the principal members were Sir Rivers Wilson, Major Evelyn Baring

(afterwards Lord Cromer) and MM. Kremer-Baravelli and de Blignieres. One

result of that inquiry was the extension of international control to the

enormous landed property of the khedive. Driven to desperation, Ismail

made a virtue of necessity and accepted, in September 1878, in lieu of

the Dual Control, a constitutional ministry, under the presidency of

Nubar Pasha (q.v.), with Rivers Wilson as minister of finance and de

Blignieres as minister of public works. Professing to be quite satisfied

with this arrangement, he pompously announced that Egypt was no longer

in Africa, but a part of Europe; but before seven months had passed he

found his constitutional position intolerable, got rid of his irksome

cabinet by means of a secretly-organized military riot in Cairo, and

reverted to his old autocratic methods of government. England and France

could hardly sit still under this affront, and decided to administer

chastisement by the hand of the suzerain power, which was delighted to

have an opportunity of asserting its authority. On the 26th of June 1879

Ismail suddenly received from the sultan a curt telegram, addressed to

him as ex-khedive of Egypt, informing him that his son Tewfik was

appointed his successor. Taken unawares, he made no attempt at

resistance, and Tewfik was at once proclaimed khedive.

Re-establishment of Dual Control.

Arabi and the revolt of 1882.

After a short period of inaction, when it seemed as if the change might

be for the worse, England and France summoned up courage to look the

situation boldly in the face, and, in November 1879, re-established the

Dual Control in the persons of Major Baring and M. de Blignieres. For

two years the Dual Control governed Egypt, and initiated the work of

progress that England was to continue alone. Its essential defect was

what might be called insecurity of tenure. Without any efficient means

of self-protection and coercion at its disposal, it had to interfere

with the power, privileges and perquisites of a class which had long

misgoverned the country. This class, so far as its civilian members were

concerned, was not very formidable, because these were not likely to go

beyond the bounds of intrigue and passive resistance; but it contained a

military element who had more courage, and who had learned their power

when Ismail employed them for overturning his constitutional ministry.

Among the mutinous soldiers on that occasion was a fellah officer

calling himself Ahmed Arabi the Egyptian. He was not a man of

exceptional intelligence or remarkable powers of organization, but he

was a fluent speaker, and could exercise some influence over the masses

by a rude kind of native eloquence. Behind him were a group of men, much

abler than himself, who put him forward as the figurehead of a party

professing to aim at protecting the Egyptians from the grasping tyranny

of their Turkish and European oppressors. The movement began among the

Arab officers, who complained of the preference shown to the officers of

Turkish origin; it then expanded into an attack on the privileged

position and predominant influence of foreigners, many of whom, it must

be confessed, were of a by no means respectable type; finally, it was

directed against all Christians, foreign and native.[26] The government,

being too weak to suppress the agitation and disorder, had to make

concessions, and each concession produced fresh demands. Arabi was first

promoted, then made under-secretary for war, and ultimately a member of

the cabinet. The danger of a serious rising brought the British and

French fleets in May 1882 to Alexandria, and after a massacre (11th of

June) had been perpetrated by the Arab mob in that city, the British

admiral bombarded the forts (11th of July 1882). The leaders of the

national movement prepared to resist further aggression by force. A

conference of ambassadors was held in Constantinople, and the sultan was

invited to quell the revolt; but he hesitated to employ his troops

against Mussulmans who were professing merely to oppose Christian

aggression.

(3) _Egypt occupied by the British._--At last the British government

determined to employ armed force, and invited France to co-operate. The

French government declined, and a similar invitation to Italy met with a

similar refusal. England therefore, having to act alone, landed troops

at Ismailia under Sir Garnet Wolseley, and suppressed the revolt by the

battle of Tell-el-Kebir on the 13th of September 1882. The khedive, who

had taken refuge in Alexandria, returned to Cairo, and a ministry was

formed under Sherif Pasha, with Riaz Pasha as one of its leading

members. On assuming office, the first thing it had to do was to bring

to trial the chiefs of the rebellion. Had the khedive and Riaz been

allowed a free hand, Arabi and his colleagues would have found little

mercy. Thanks to the intervention of the British government, their lives

were spared. Arabi pleaded guilty, was sentenced to death, the sentence

being commuted by the khedive to banishment; and Riaz resigned in

disgust. This solution of the difficulty was brought about by Lord

Dufferin, then British ambassador at Constantinople, who had been sent

to Egypt as high commissioner to adjust affairs and report on the

situation. One of his first acts, after preventing the application of

capital punishment to the ringleaders of the revolt, was to veto the

project of protecting the khedive and his government by means of a

Praetorian guard recruited from Asia Minor, Epirus, Austria and

Switzerland, and to insist on the principle that Egypt must be governed

in a truly liberal spirit. Passing in review all the departments of the

administration, he laid down the general lines on which the country was

to be restored to order and prosperity, and endowed, if possible, with

the elements of self-government for future use.

Sir Evelyn Baring appointed consul-general, 1884.

The laborious task of putting these general indications into a practical

shape fell to Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer), who arrived as

consul-general and diplomatic agent, in succession to Sir Edward Malet,

in January 1884. At that moment the situation was singularly like that

which had existed on two previous occasions: firstly, when Ismail was

deposed; and secondly, when the Dual Control had undermined the existing

authority without having any power to enforce its own. For the third

time in little more than three years the existing authority had been

destroyed and a new one had to be created. But there was one essential

difference: the power that had now to reorganize the country possessed

in the British army of occupation a support sufficient to command

respect. Without that support Sir Evelyn Baring could have done little

or nothing; with it he did perhaps more than any other single man could

have done. His method may be illustrated by an old story long current in

Cairo. Mehemet Ali was said to have appointed as _mudir_ or governor in

a turbulent district a young and inexperienced Turk, who asked, "But how

am I to govern these people?" "Listen," replied the pasha; "buy the

biggest and heaviest _kurbash_ you can find; hang it up in the centre of

the _mudirieh_, well within your reach, and you will very seldom require

to use it." The British army of occupation was Sir Evelyn's _kurbash_;

it was well within his reach, as all the world knew, and its simple

presence sufficed to prevent disorder and enforce obedience. He had one

other advantage over previous English reformers in Egypt: his position

towards France was more independent. The Dual Control had been abolished

by a khedivial decree of 18th January 1883, and replaced by an English

financial adviser. France naturally objected; but having refused to

co-operate with England in suppressing the revolt, she could not

reasonably complain that her offer of co-operation in the work of

reorganization was declined. But though Dual Control was at an end, the

Caisse de la Dette remained, and this body was to prove a constant clog

on the financial measures of the Egyptian government.

The Policy of evacuation.

At first the intention of the British government was simply to restore

the power of the khedive, to keep his highness for some time in the

right path by friendly advice, and to withdraw the British troops as

soon as possible. As Lord Granville explained in a circular to the

powers, the position of England in Egypt imposed on her "the duty of

giving advice with the object of securing that the order of things to be

established shall be of a satisfactory character and possess the

elements of stability and progress." But there was to be no embarking on

a general scheme of reforms, which would increase unnecessarily the

responsibilities of the protecting power and necessitate the indefinite

prolongation of the military occupation. So far, therefore, as the

British government had a definite policy in Egypt, it was a _politique

de replatrage_. Even this policy was not strictly adhered to. Mr

Gladstone's cabinet was as unstable as the public opinion it sought to

conciliate. It had its hot fits and its cold fits, and it gave orders

now to advance and now to retreat. In the long run circumstances proved

too strong for it, and it had to undertake a great deal more than it

originally intended. Each little change in the administration engendered

a multitude of others, so that the modest attempts at reform were found

to be like the letting out of water. A tiny rill gradually became a

boisterous stream, and the boisterous stream grew into a great river,

which spread to all sections of the administration and ended by

inundating the whole country.

The Sudan question.

Of the numerous questions awaiting solution, the first to claim

immediate attention was that of the Sudan. The British government had

begun by excluding it from the problem, and by declaring that for events

in these outlying territories it must not be held responsible. In that

sphere of activity, therefore, the Egyptian government might do as it

thought fit. The principle of limited liability which this attitude

assumed was soon found to be utterly untenable. The Sudan was an

integral part of the khedive's dominions, and caused, even in ordinary

times, a deficit of L200,000 to the Egyptian treasury. At that moment

it was in a state of open rebellion, stirred up by a religious fanatic

who proclaimed himself a mahdi of Islam. An army of 10,000 men under an

English officer, Colonel William Hicks, formerly of the Bombay army,

otherwise Hicks Pasha, had been sent to suppress the revolt, and had

been annihilated in a great battle fought on the 5th of November 1883,

near Obeid. The Egyptian government wished to make a new attempt to

recover the lost province, and the idea was certainly very popular among

the governing class, but Sir Evelyn Baring vetoed the project on the

ground that Egypt had neither soldiers nor money to carry it out. In

vain the khedive and his prime minister, Sherif Pasha, threatened to

resign, and the latter actually carried out his threat. The British

representative remained firm, and it was decided that the Sudan should

be, for the moment at least, abandoned to its fate. Nubar, though as

strongly opposed to the abandonment policy as Sherif, consented to take

his place and accepted somewhat reluctantly the new regime, which he

defined as "the administration of Egypt under the government of Baring."

By this time the Mahdi was master of the greater part of the Sudan, but

Khartum and some other fortified points still held out. The efforts made

to extricate the garrisons, including the mission of General Gordon, the

fall of Khartum, and the Nile Expedition under Lord Wolseley, are

described below separately in the section of this article dealing with

the military operations. The practical result was that the khedive's

authority was limited to the Nile valley north of Wadi Halfa.

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, "Edwardes, Sir Herbert Benjamin" to "Ehrenbreitstein" Volume 9, Slice 1 · 第 23 / 28 题