Bombardment of Alexandria.
In February 1879 a slight outbreak of discharged officers and soldiers
occurred at Cairo, which led to the despatch of British and French ships
to Alexandria. On the 26th of June of that year Ismail Pasha was removed
from Egypt, and Tewfik assumed the khediviate, becoming practically the
_protege_ of the two western powers. On the 1st of February 1881 a more
serious disturbance arose at Cairo from the attempt to try three
colonels, Ahmed Arabi, Ali Fehmy, and Abd-el-Al, who had been arrested
as the ringleaders of the military party. The prisoners were released by
force, and proceeded to dictate terms to the khedive. Again British and
French warships were despatched to Alexandria, and were quickly
withdrawn, their presence having produced no apparent impression. It
soon became clear that the khedive was powerless, and that the military
party, headed by Arabi, threatened to dominate the country. The "dual
note," communicated to the khedive on the 6th of January 1881, contained
an intimation that Great Britain and France were prepared to afford
material support if necessary; but the fall of Gambetta's ministry
produced a reaction, and both governments proceeded to minimize the
meaning of their language. The khedive was practically compelled to form
a government in which Arabi was minister of war and Mahmud Sami premier,
and Arabi took steps to extend his influence throughout his army. The
situation now became critically serious: for the third time ships were
sent to Alexandria, and on the 25th of May 1882 the consuls-general of
the two powers made a strong representation to Mahmud Sami which
produced the resignation of the Egyptian ministry, and a demand, to
which the khedive yielded, by the military party for the reinstatement
of Arabi. The attitude of the troops in Alexandria now became
threatening; and on the 29th the British residents pointed out that they
were "absolutely defenceless." This warning was amply justified by the
massacres of the 11th of June, during which more than one hundred
persons, including an officer and two seamen, were killed in the streets
of Alexandria, almost under the guns of the ships in harbour. It was
becoming clear that definite action would have to be taken, and on the
15th the channel squadron was ordered to Malta. By the end of June
twenty-six warships, representing the navies of Great Britain, France,
Germany, Italy, Austria, Russia, the United States, Spain, Greece and
Turkey, lay off the port of Alexandria, and large numbers of refugees
were embarked. The order received by Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour
(afterwards Lord Alcester) on the 3rd of July was as follows:--
"Prevent any attempt to bar channel into port. If work is resumed on
earthworks, or fresh guns mounted, inform military commander that you
have orders to prevent it; and if not immediately discontinued,
destroy earthworks and silence batteries if they open fire, having
given sufficient notice to population, shipping and foreign
men-of-war."
On the 9th the admiral received a report that working parties had been
seen in Fort Silsileh "parbuckling two smoothbore guns--apparently
32-pounders--towards their respective carriages and slides, which were
facing in the direction of the harbour." Fort Silsileh was an old work
at the extreme east of the defences of Alexandria, and its guns do not
bear on the harbour. On the 10th an ultimatum was sent to Toulba Pasha,
the military commandant, intimating that the bombardment would commence
at sunrise on the following morning unless "the batteries on the isthmus
of Ras-el-Tin and the southern shore of the harbour of Alexandria" were
previously surrendered "for the purpose of disarming." The fleet
prepared for action, and the bearer of the reply, signed by the
president of the council, and offering to dismount three guns in the
batteries named, only succeeded in finding the flagship late at night.
This proposal was rejected, and at 7 A.M. on the 11th of July the
"Alexandra" opened fire and the action became general. The attacking
force was disposed in three groups: (1) the "Alexandra," "Sultan" and
"Superb," outside the reef, to engage the Ras-el-Tin and the earthworks
under weigh; (2) the "Monarch," "Invincible" and "Penelope," inside the
harbour, to engage the Meks batteries; and (3) the "Inflexible" and
"Temeraire," to take up assigned stations outside the reef and to
co-operate with the inshore squadron. The gunboats "Beacon," "Bittern,"
"Condor," "Cygnet" and "Decoy" were to keep out of fire at first and
seek opportunities of engaging the Meks batteries. Meks fort was
silenced by about 12.45 P.M., and a party from the "Invincible" landed
and disabled the guns. As the fire delivered under weigh was not
effective, the offshore squadron anchored at about 10.30 A.M., and
succeeded in silencing Fort Ras-el-Tin at about 12.30 P.M., and Fort
Adda, by the explosion of the main magazine, at 1.35 P.M. The
"Inflexible" weighed soon after 8 A.M. and engaged Ras-el-Tin,
afterwards attacking Forts Pharos and Adda. The "Condor," followed by
the "Beacon," "Bittern" and "Decoy," engaged Fort Marabout soon after 8
A.M. till 11 A.M., when the gunboats were recalled. After the works were
silenced, the ships moved in closer, with a view to dismount the
Egyptian guns. The bombardment ceased at 5 P.M.; but a few rounds were
fired by the "Inflexible" and "Temeraire" on the morning of the 12th at
the right battery in Ras-el-Tin lines.
The bombardment of the forts of Alexandria is interesting as a gauge
of the effect to be expected from the fire of ships under specially
favourable conditions. The Egyptians at different times during the day
brought into action about 33 R.M.L. guns (7-in. to 10-in.), 3 R.B.L.
guns (40 prs.), and 120 S.B. guns (6.5-in. and 10-in.), with a few
mortars. These guns were disposed over a coast-line of about 10 sea
miles, and were in many cases indifferently mounted. The Egyptian
gunners had been little trained, and many of them had never once
practised with rifled ordnance. Of seventy-five hits on the hulls of
the ships only five can with certainty be ascribed to projectiles from
rifled guns, and thirty were unquestionably due to the old
smoothbores, which were not provided with sights. The total loss
inflicted was 6 killed and 27 wounded. The British ships engaged fired
1741 heavy projectiles (7-in. to 16-in.) and 1457 light (7-prs. to
64-prs.), together with 33,493 machine-gun and rifle bullets. The
result was comparatively small. About 8 rifled guns and 19 smoothbores
were dismounted or disabled and 4 and 1 temporarily put out of action
respectively. A considerable portion of this injury was inflicted,
after the works had been silenced, by the deliberate fire of the
ships. As many as twenty-eight rifled guns and 140 smoothbores would
have opened fire on the following day. The Egyptians made quite as
good a stand as could be expected, but were driven from their guns,
which they were unable to use with adequate effect; and the
bombardment of Alexandria confirms previous experience that the fire
of ships cannot really compete with that of well-mounted and
well-handled guns on shore.
In the afternoon of the 12th, fires, which were the work of
incendiaries, began to break out in the best quarters of Alexandria; and
the town was left to murder and pillage till the following day, when a
party of bluejackets and marines was landed at about 3 P.M.
British expedition under Sir Garnet Wolseley.
Tell-el-Kebir.
Military intervention being now imperatively demanded, a vote of credit
for L2,300,000 was passed in the British House of Commons on the 27th of
July. Five days later the French government failed to secure a similar
vote, and Great Britain was left to deal with the Egyptian question
alone. An expeditionary force detailed from home stations and from
Malta was organized in two divisions, with a cavalry division, corps
troops, and a siege train, numbering in all about 25,000 men. An Indian
contingent numbering about 7000 combatants, complete in all arms and
with its own transport, was prepared for despatch to Suez. General Sir
Garnet Wolseley was appointed commander-in-chief, with
Lieutenant-General Sir J. Adye as chief of the staff. The plan of
operations contemplated the seizure of Ismailia as the base for an
advance on Cairo, Alexandria and its suburbs to be held defensively, and
the Egyptian forces in the neighbourhood to be occupied by
demonstrations. The expeditionary force having rendezvoused at
Alexandria, means were taken by Rear-Admiral Hoskins and Sir W. Hewett
for the seizure of the Suez canal. Under orders from the former, Captain
Fairfax, R.N., occupied Port Said on the night of 19th August, and
Commander Edwards, R.N., proceeded down the canal, taking possession of
the _gares_ and dredgers, while Captain Fitzroy, R.N., occupied Ismailia
after slight opposition. Before nightfall on the 20th of August the
canal was wholly in British hands. Meanwhile, leaving Sir E. Hamley in
command at Alexandria, Sir G. Wolseley with the bulk of the
expeditionary force arrived at Port Said on the 20th of August, a naval
demonstration having been made at Abukir with a view to deceive the
enemy as to the object of the great movement in progress. The advance
from Ismailia now began. On the 21st Major-General Graham moved from
Ismailia with about 800 men and a small naval force, occupying Nefiche,
the junction with the Suez line, at 1.30 A.M. without opposition. On the
22nd he made a reconnaissance towards Suez, and on the 23rd another to
El-Magfar, 4 m. from Nefiche. It now appeared that the enemy had dammed
the sweet-water canal and blocked the railway at Tell-el-Mahuta, where
entrenchments had been thrown up and resistance seemed to be
contemplated. At 4 A.M. on the 24th Sir Garnet Wolseley advanced with 3
squadrons of cavalry, 2 guns, and about 1000 infantry, placed under the
orders of Lieutenant-General Willis. The enemy showed in force,
estimated at 7000 with 12 guns, and a somewhat desultory action ensued.
Reinforcements from Ismailia were ordered up, and the British cavalry,
operating on the right, helped to check the enemy's attack, which showed
little vigour. At night the troops, now reinforced by the Guards
Brigade, an infantry battalion, 2 cavalry regiments and 10 guns,
bivouacked on the ground. Early on the morning of the 25th the advance
was continued to Tell-el-Mahuta, which the enemy evacuated, while the
mounted troops and horse artillery pressed on to Mahsama, capturing the
Egyptian camp, with 7 guns and large quantities of ammunition and
supplies. On the same evening Major-General Graham, with about 1200
marines (artillery and light infantry), reached Mahsama, and on the
following day he occupied Kassassin without opposition. The advance
guard had now outrun its communications and was actually short of food,
while a considerable force was distributed at intervals along the line
Ismailia-Kassassin. The situation on the 27th tempted attack by an
enterprising enemy, and Major-General Graham's force, consisting of a
squadron of the 19th Hussars, the York and Lancaster Regiment, the duke
of Cornwall's Light Infantry, the Marine Artillery Battalion and two
R.H.A. guns, short of ammunition, was in danger of being overwhelmed by
vastly superior numbers from Tell-el-Kebir. On the 28th Major-General
Graham's troops were attacked, and after repulsing the enemy, made a
general advance about 6.45 P.M. The cavalry, summoned by heliograph from
Mahsama, co-operated, and in a moonlight charge inflicted considerable
loss. The British casualties amounted to 14 killed and 83 wounded.
During the lull which followed the first action of Kassassin, strenuous
efforts were made to bring up supplies and troops and to open up railway
communication to the front. On the 9th of September the Egyptians again
attacked Kassassin, but were completely repulsed by 9 A.M., with a loss
of 4 guns, and were pursued to within extreme range of the guns of
Tell-el-Kebir. The British casualties were 3 killed and 78 wounded. The
three following days were occupied in concentrating troops at Kassassin
for the attack on Tell-el-Kebir, held by about 38,000 men with 60 guns.
The Egyptian defences consisted of a long line of trench (2-1/2 m.)
approximately at right angles to the railway and the sweet-water canal.
At 11 P.M. on the 12th of September the advance of about 15,000 men
commenced; the 1st division, under Lieutenant-General Willis, was on the
right, and the 2nd division, under Lieutenant-General Hamley, was on the
left. Seven batteries of artillery, under Brigadier-General Goodenough,
were placed in the centre. The cavalry, under Major-General Drury Lowe,
was on the right flank, and the Indian contingent, under Major-General
Macpherson, starting one hour later, was ordered to move south of the
sweet-water canal. The night was moonless, and the distance to be
covered about 6-1/4 m. The ground was perfectly open, slightly
undulating, and generally firm gravel. The conditions for a night march
were thus ideal; but during the movement the wings closed towards each
other, causing great risk of an outbreak of firing. The line was,
however, rectified, and after a halt the final advance began. By a
fortunate accident the isolated outwork was just missed in the darkness
by the left flank of the 2nd Division; otherwise a premature alarm would
have been given, which must have changed all the conditions of the
operation. At dawn the Highland Brigade of the 2nd Division struck the
enemy's trenches, and carried them after a brief struggle. The 1st
Division attacked a few minutes later, and the cavalry swept round the
left of the line of entrenchments, cutting down any fugitives who
attempted resistance and reaching the enemy's camp in rear. The Indian
contingent, on the south of the canal, co-operated, intercepting the
Egyptians at the canal bridge. The opposition encountered at some points
was severe, but by 6 A.M. all resistance was at an end. The British loss
amounted to 58 killed, 379 wounded and 22 missing; nearly 2000 Egyptians
were killed, and more than 500 wounded were treated in hospital. An
immediate pursuit was ordered, and the Indian contingent, under
Major-General Macpherson, reached Zagazig, while the cavalry, under
Major-General Drury Lowe, occupied Belbeis and pushed on to Cairo, 65 m.
from Tell-el-Kebir, next day. On the evening of the 14th the 10,000
troops occupying Abbasia barracks, and 5000 in the citadel of Cairo,
surrendered. On the 15th General Sir Garnet Wolseley, with the brigade
of Guards under H.R.H. the duke of Connaught, entered the city.
The prompt following up of the victory at Tell-el-Kebir saved Cairo from
the fate of Alexandria and brought the rebellion to an end. The Egyptian
troops at Kafr Dauar, Abukir and Rosetta surrendered without opposition,
and those at Damietta followed on the 23rd of September, after being
threatened with attack. On the 25th the khedive entered Cairo, where a
review of the British troops was held on the 30th. The expeditionary
force was now broken up, leaving about 10,000 men, under Major-General
Sir A. Alison, to maintain the authority of the khedive. In twenty-five
days, from the landing at Ismailia to the occupation of Cairo, the
rebellion was completely suppressed, and the operations were thus
signally successful.
The Sudan question.
The authority of the khedive and the maintenance of law and order now
depended absolutely on the British forces left in occupation. Lord
Dufferin, who had been sent to Cairo to draw up a project of
constitutional reforms, advocated the re-establishment of a native army,
not to exceed 5000 to 6000 men, with a proportion of British officers,
for purely defence purposes within the Delta; and on the 13th of
December 1882 Sir Evelyn Wood left England to undertake the organization
of this force, with the title of sirdar. Lord Dufferin further advised
the formation of a gendarmerie, which "should be in a great measure a
mounted force and empowered with a semi-military character" (despatch of
January 1st, 1883). The strength of this military police force was fixed
at 4400 men with 2562 horses, and Baker Pasha (General Valentine Baker)
was entrusted with its formation, with the title of inspector-general.
In a despatch of the 6th of February 1883 Lord Dufferin dealt with the
Sudan, and stated that Egypt "could hardly be expected to acquiesce" in
a policy of withdrawal from her Southern territories. At the same time
he pointed out that,
"Unhappily, Egyptian administration in the Sudan had been almost
uniformly unfortunate. The success of the present mahdi in raising the
tribes and extending his influence over great tracts of country was a
sufficient proof of the government's inability either to reconcile the
inhabitants to its rule or to maintain order. The consequences had
been most disastrous. Within the last year and a half the Egyptians
had lost something like 9000 men, while it was estimated that 40,000
of their opponents had perished."
Moreover, to restore tranquillity in the Sudan,
"the first step necessary was the construction of a railway from
Suakin to Berber, or what, perhaps, would be more advisable, to
Shendi, on the Nile. The completion of this enterprise would at once
change all the elements of the problem."
Disaster to Hicks Pasha.
The immense responsibilities involved were most imperfectly understood
by the British government. Egyptian sovereignty in the Sudan dates from
1820, when Mehemet Ali sent a large force into the country, and
ultimately established his authority over Sennar and Kordofan. In 1865
Suakin and Massawa were assigned to Egyptian rule by the sultan, and in
1870 Sir Samuel Baker proceeded up the Nile to the conquest of the
Equatorial provinces, of which General Gordon was appointed
governor-general in 1874. In the same year Darfur and Harrar were
annexed, and in 1877 Gordon became governor-general of the Sudan, where,
with the valuable assistance of Gessi Pasha, he laboured to destroy the
slave trade and to establish just government. In August 1879 he returned
to Cairo, and was succeeded by Raouf Pasha. Misrule and oppression in
every form now again prevailed throughout the Sudan, while the slave
traders, exasperated by Gordon's stern measures, were ready to revolt.
The authority of Egypt was represented by scattered garrisons of armed
men, badly officered, undisciplined and largely demoralized. In such
conditions a leader only was required to ensure widespread and dangerous
rebellion. A leader appeared in the person of Mahommed Ahmed, born in
1848, who had taken up his abode on Abba Island, and, acquiring great
reputation for sanctity, had actively fomented insurrection. In August
1881 a small force sent by Raouf Pasha to arrest Mahommed Ahmed was
destroyed, and the latter, proclaiming himself the mahdi, stood forth as
the champion of revolt. Thus, at the time when the Egyptian army was
broken up at Tell-el-Kebir, the Sudan was already in flames. On the 7th
of June 1882, 6000 men under Yusef Pasha, advancing from Fashoda, were
nearly annihilated by the mahdists. Payara and Birket in Kordofan
quickly fell, and a few days before the battle of Tell-el-Kebir was
fought, the mahdi, with a large force, was besieging El Obeid. That town
was captured, after an obstinate defence, on the 17th of January 1883,
by which time almost the whole of the Sudan south of Khartum was in open
rebellion, except the Bahr-el-Ghazal and the Equatorial provinces, where
for a time Lupton Bey and Emin Pasha were able to hold their own.
Abd-el-Kader, who had succeeded Raouf, telegraphed to Cairo for 10,000
additional troops, and pointed out that if they were not sent at once
four times this number would be required to re-establish the authority
of the government in the Sudan. After gaining some small successes,
Abd-el-Kader was superseded by Suliman Niagi on the 20th of February
1883, and on the 26th of March Ala-ed-din Pasha was appointed
governor-general. Meanwhile 5000 men, who had served in the Egyptian
army, were collected and forcibly despatched to Khartum via Suakin. In
March 1883 Colonel William Hicks, late of the Bombay army, who in
January had been appointed by the khedive chief of the staff of the army
of the Sudan, found himself at Khartum with nine European officers and
about 10,000 troops of little military value. The reconquest of the
Sudan having been determined upon, although Sir E. Malet reported that
the Egyptian government could not supply the necessary funds, and that
there was great risk of failure, Colonel Hicks, who had resigned his
post on the 23rd of July, and had been appointed commander-in-chief,
started from Khartum on 9th September, with a total force of about
10,000 men, including non-combatants, for Kordofan. On the 22nd of May
Sir E. Malet had informed Sherif Pasha that,
"although Colonel Hicks finds it convenient to communicate with Lord
Dufferin or with me, it must not be supposed that we endorse in any
way the contents of his telegrams.... Her Majesty's government are in
no way responsible for his operations in the Sudan, which have been
undertaken under the authority of His Highness's government."
Colonel Hicks was fully aware of the unfitness of his rabble forces for
the contemplated task, and on the 5th of August he telegraphed: "I am
convinced it would be best to keep the two rivers and province of
Sennar, and wait for Kordofan to settle itself." Early in November the
force from Khartum was caught by the mahdists short of water at Kashgil,
near El Obeid, and was almost totally destroyed, Colonel Hicks, with all
his European officers, perishing. Sinister rumours having reached Cairo,
Sir E. Baring (Lord Cromer), who had succeeded Sir E. Malet, telegraphed
that "if Colonel Hicks's army is destroyed, the Egyptian government will
lose the whole of the Sudan, unless some assistance from the outside is
given," and advised the withdrawal to some post on the Nile. On the
following day Lord Granville replied: "We cannot lend English or Indian
troops; if consulted, recommend abandonment of the Sudan within certain
limits"; and on the 25th he added that "Her Majesty's government can do
nothing in the matter which would throw upon them the responsibilities
for operations in the Sudan." In a despatch of the 3rd of December Sir
E. Baring forcibly argued against British intervention in the affairs of
the Sudan, and on the 13th of December Lord Granville telegraphed that
"Her Majesty's government recommend the ministers of khedive to come to
an early decision to abandon all territory south of Assuan, or, at
least, of Wadi Halfa." On the 4th of January 1884 Sir E. Baring was
directed to insist upon the policy of evacuation, and on the 18th
General Gordon left London to assist in its execution.
Defeat of General Baker.
The year 1883 brought a great accession of power to the mahdi, who had
captured about 20,000 rifles, 19 guns and large stores of ammunition. On
the Red Sea littoral Osman Digna, a slave dealer of Suakin, appointed
amir of the Eastern Sudan, raised the local tribes and invested Sinkat
and Tokar. On the 16th of October and the 4th of November Egyptian
reinforcements intended for the former place were destroyed, and on the
2nd of December a force of 700 men was annihilated near Tamanieb. On the
23rd of December General Valentine Baker, followed by about 2500 men,
gendarmerie, blacks, Sudanese and Turks, with 10 British officers,
arrived at Suakin to prepare for the relief of Sinkat and Tokar. The
khedive appears to have been aware of the risks to be incurred, and in a
private letter he informed the general that "I rely upon your prudence
and ability not to engage the enemy except under the most favourable
circumstances." The tragedy of Kashgil was repeated on the 4th of
February 1884, when General Baker's heterogeneous force, on the march
from Trinkitat to Tokar, was routed at El Teb by an inferior body of
tribesmen. Of 3715 men, 2375, with 11 European officers, were killed.
Suakin was now in danger, and on the 6th of February British bluejackets
and marines were landed for the defence of the town.
British expedition under Sir G. Graham: battles of El Teb and Tamanieb.
Two expeditions in the Sudan led by British officers having thus ended
in disaster, and General Gordon with Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Stewart
having reached Khartum on the 18th of February, the policy of British
non-intervention in regard to Sudan affairs could no longer be
maintained. Public opinion in England was strongly impressed by the fact
that the Egyptian garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat were perishing within
striking distance of the Red Sea littoral. A British force about 4400
strong, with 22 guns, made up of troops from Egypt and from units
detained on passage from India, was rapidly concentrated at Suakin and
placed under the orders of Major-General Sir G. Graham, with
Major-Generals Sir R. Buller and J. Davis as brigadiers. News of the
fall of Sinkat, where the starving garrison, under Tewfik Bey, made a
gallant sortie and was cut to pieces, reached Suakin on the 12th of
February. On the 24th General Graham's force disembarked at Trinkitat
and received information of the surrender of Tokar. At 8 A.M. on the
29th the force advanced towards Tokar in square, and came under fire at
11.20 A.M. from the enemy entrenched at El Teb. The tribesmen made
desperate efforts to rush the square, but were repulsed, and the
position was taken by 2 P.M. The cavalry, 10th and 19th Hussars, under
Brigadier-General Sir H. Stewart, became involved in a charge against an
unbroken enemy, and suffered somewhat severely. The total British loss
was 34 killed and 155 wounded; that of the tribesmen was estimated at
1500 killed. On the following day Tokar was reached, and on the 2nd of
March the force began its return to Suakin, bringing away about 700
people belonging to the late garrison and the civil population, and
destroying 1250 rifles and a quantity of ammunition found in a
neighbouring village. On the 9th of March the whole force was back at
Suakin, and on the evening of the 11th an advance to Tamai began, and
the force bivouacked and formed a zeriba in the evening. Information was
brought by a native that the enemy had assembled in the Khor Ghob, a
deep ravine not far from the zeriba. At about 8.30 A.M. on the 13th the
advance began in echelon of brigade squares from the left. The left and
leading square (2nd Brigade) moved towards the khor, approaching at a
point where a little ravine joined it. The enemy showing in front, the
leading face of the square was ordered to charge up to the edge of the
khor. This opened the square, and a mass of tribesmen rushed in from the
small ravine. The brigade was forced back in disorder, and the naval
guns, which had been left behind, were temporarily captured. After a
severe hand-to-hand struggle, in which the troops behaved with great
gallantry, order was restored and the enemy repulsed, with the aid of
the fire from the 1st Brigade square and from dismounted cavalry. The
1st Brigade square, having a sufficient field of fire, easily repelled
all attempts to attack, and advancing as soon as the situation had been
restored, occupied the village of Tamai. The British loss was 109 killed
and 104 wounded; of the enemy nearly 2000 were killed. On the following
day the force returned to Suakin.
Two heavy blows had now been inflicted on the followers of Osman Digna,
and the road to Berber could have been opened, as General Graham and
Brigadier-General Sir H. Stewart suggested. General Gordon, questioned
on the point, telegraphed from Khartum, on the 7th of March, that he
might be cut off by a rising at Shendi, adding, "I think it, therefore,
most important to follow up the success near Suakin by sending a small
force to Berber." He had previously, on the 29th of February, urged that
the Suakin-Berber road should be opened up by Indian troops. This, and
General Gordon's proposal to send 200 British troops to Wadi Halfa, was
opposed by Sir E. Baring, who, realizing soon afterwards the gravity of
the situation, telegraphed on the 16th of March:--
"It has now become of the utmost importance not only to open the road
between Suakin and Berber, but to come to terms with the tribes
between Berber and Khartum."
The government refused to take this action, and Major-General Graham's
force was employed in reconnaissances and small skirmishes, ending in
the destruction of the villages in the Tamanieb valley on 27th March. On
the 28th the whole force was reassembled at Suakin, and was then broken
up, leaving one battalion to garrison the town.
Entanglement of General Gordon at Khartum.
The abrupt disappearance of the British troops encouraged the tribesmen
led by Osman Digna, and effectually prevented the formation of a native
movement, which might have been of great value. The first attempt at
intervention in the affairs of the Sudan was made too late to save
Sinkat and Tokar. It resulted only in heavy slaughter of the tribesmen,
which afforded no direct or indirect aid to General Gordon or to the
policy of evacuation. The public announcement of the latter was a grave
mistake, which increased General Gordon's difficulties, and the
situation at Khartum grew steadily worse. On the 24th of March Sir E.
Baring telegraphed:--
"The question now is, how to get General Gordon and Colonel Stewart
away from Khartum.... Under present circumstances, I think an effort
should be made to help General Gordon from Suakin, if it is at all a
possible military operation.... We all consider that, however
difficult the operations from Suakin may be, they are more practicable
than any operations from Korosko and along the Nile."
A telegram from General Gordon, received at Cairo on the 19th of April,
stated that
"We have provisions for five months and are hemmed in.... Our position
will be much strengthened when the Nile rises.... Sennar, Kassala and
Dongola are quite safe for the present."
At the same time he suggested "an appeal to the millionaires of America
and England" to subscribe money for the cost of "2000 or 3000 nizams"
(Turkish regulars) to be sent to Berber. A cloud now settled down upon
Khartum, and subsequent communications were few and irregular. The
foreign office and General Gordon appeared to be somewhat at cross
purposes. The former hoped that the garrisons of the Sudan could be
extricated without fighting. The latter, judging from the tenor of some
of his telegrams, believed that to accomplish this work entailed the
suppression of the mahdi's revolt, the strength of which he at first
greatly underestimated. He had pressed strongly for the employment of
Zobeir as "an absolute necessity for success" (3rd of March); but this
was refused, since Sir H. Gordon advised at this time that it would be
dangerous. On the 9th of March General Gordon proposed, "if the
immediate evacuation of Khartum is determined upon irrespective of
outlying towns," to send down the "Cairo _employes_" and the garrison to
Berber with Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Stewart, to resign his commission,
and to proceed with the stores and the steamers to the equatorial
provinces, which he would consider as placed under the king of the
Belgians. On the 13th of March Lord Granville gave full power to General
Gordon to "evacuate Khartum and save that garrison by conducting it
himself to Berber without delay," and expressed a hope that he would not
resign his commission.
Relief expedition: question of route.
By the end of March 1884 Sir E. Baring and the British officers in Egypt
were convinced that force would have to be employed, and the growing
danger of General Gordon, with the grave national responsibility
involved, began to be realized in Great Britain. Sir Henry Gordon,
however, who was in personal communication with Mr Gladstone, considered
that his brother was in no peril, and for some time disbelieved in the
need for a relief expedition. Meanwhile it was at least necessary to
evolve some plan of action, and on the 8th of April the adjutant-general
addressed a memorandum to the secretary of state for war detailing the
measures required for placing 6500 British troops "in the neighbourhood
of Shendi." The battle of the routes began much earlier, and was
continued for some months. Practically the choice lay between the Nile
and the Suakin-Berber road. The first involved a distance of 1650 m.
from Cairo along a river strewn with cataracts, which obstructed
navigation to all but small boats, except during the period of high
water. So great was this obstruction that the Nile had never been a
regular trade route to the Sudan. The second entailed a desert march of
about 250 m., of which one section, Obak-Bir Mahoba (52 m.), was
waterless, and the rest had an indifferent water supply (except at
Ariab, about half-way to Berber), capable, however, of considerable
development. From Berber the Nile is followed (210 m.) to Khartum. This
was an ancient trade route with the Sudan, and had been used without
difficulty by the reinforcements sent to Hicks Pasha in 1883, which were
accompanied by guns on wheels. The authorities in Egypt, headed by
General Stephenson, subsequently supported by the Admiral Lord John Hay,
who sent a naval officer to examine the river as far as Dongola, were
unanimous in favour of the Suakin-Berber route. From the first
Major-General Sir A. Clarke, then inspector-general of fortifications,
strongly urged this plan, and proposed to begin at once a metre gauge
railway from Suakin, to be constructed by Indian labour under officers
skilled in laying desert lines. Some preliminary arrangements were made,
and on the 14th of June the government sanctioned certain measures of
preparation at Suakin. On the other side were the adjutant-general (Lord
Wolseley) and a small number of officers who had taken part in the Red
River expedition of 1870. The memorandum of the adjutant-general above
referred to was based on the hypothesis that Khartum could not hold out
beyond the 15th of November, and that the expedition should reach Berber
by the 20th of October. Steamers were to be employed in such reaches as
proved practicable, but the force was to be conveyed in special
whale-boats, by which "the difficulty of transport is reduced to very
narrow limits." The mounted force was to consist of 400 men on native
horses and 450 men on horses or camels. The question of routes continued
to be the subject of animated discussion, and on the 29th of July a
committee of three officers who had served in the Red River expedition
reported:--
"We believe that a brigade can easily be conveyed in small boats from
Cairo to Dongola in the time stated by Lord Wolseley; and, further,
that should it be necessary to send a still larger force by water to
Khartum, that operation will present no insuperable difficulties."
Lord Wolseley sent out; Nile route adopted.
This most inconclusive report, and the baseless idea that the adoption
of the Nile route would involve no chance of bloodshed, which the
government was anxious to avoid, seem to have decided the question. On
the 8th of August the secretary of state for war informed General
Stephenson that "the time had arrived when some further measures for
obtaining accurate information as to his (General Gordon's) position,
and, if necessary, for tendering him assistance, should be adopted."
General Stephenson still urged the Suakin-Berber route, and was informed
on the 26th of August that Lord Wolseley would be appointed to take over
the command in Egypt for the purposes of the expedition, for which a
vote of credit had been taken in the House of Commons on the 5th of
August. On the 9th of September Lord Wolseley arrived at Cairo, and the
plan of operations was somewhat modified. A camel corps of 1100 men
selected from twenty-eight regiments at home was added, and the
"fighting force to be placed in line somewhere in the neighbourhood of
Shendi" was fixed at 5400. The construction of whale-boats began on the
12th of August, and the first batch arrived at Wadi Halfa on the 14th of
October, and on the 25th the first boat was hauled through the second
cataract. The mounted forces proceeded up the banks, and the first
half-battalion embarked at Gemai, 870 m. from Khartum, on the 5th of
November, ten days before the date to which it had been assumed General
Gordon could hold out. In a straggling procession the boats worked their
way up to Korti, piloted by Canadian _voyageurs_. The labour was very
great, and the troops, most of whom were having their first lesson in
rowing, bore the privations of their unaccustomed conditions with
admirable cheerfulness. By the 25th of December 2220 men had reached
Korti, of whom about 800 only had been conveyed by the whale-boats, the
last of which did not arrive till the 27th of January. Beyond Korti lay
the very difficult section of the river to Abu Hamed, which was quite
unknown. Meanwhile news of the loss of the "Abbas" and of the murder of
Colonel J. D. Stewart and his party on the 18th of September had been
received. A letter from Gordon, dated the 4th of November and received
on the 17th of November, stated that his steamers would await the
expedition at Metemma, and added, "We can hold out forty days with ease;
after that it will be difficult." In his diary, on the 13th of December,
when his difficulties had become extreme, he noted that "if the
expeditionary force does not come in ten days, the town may fall."
Stewart's Desert Column; battle of Abu Klea wells.
Failure of relief expedition.
It was clear at Korti that something must be done at once; and on the
13th of December 1100 men, with 2200 camels, under General Sir H.
Stewart, were despatched to occupy Jakdul wells, 96 m. on the desert
route to Metemma. Stewart returned on the 5th of January, and started
again on the 8th, with orders to establish a fort at Abu Klea and to
occupy Metemma. The Desert Column, 1800 men, with 2880 camels in poor
condition and 153 horses, found the enemy in possession of Abu Klea
wells on the 16th, and was desperately attacked on the 17th. The want
of homogeneity of the force, and the unaccustomed tactics imposed upon
the cavalry, somewhat hampered the defence, and the square was broken at
the left rear corner. Driven back upon the camels in the centre, the
troops fought hand to hand with the greatest gallantry. Order was
quickly restored, and the attack was repulsed, with a loss of 74 killed
and 94 wounded. At least 1100 of the enemy were killed. The wells being
occupied and a zeriba formed, the column started on the evening of the
18th. The wrong road was taken, and great confusion occurred, during the
night, but at dawn this was rectified; and after forming a rough fort
under fire, by which General Sir H. Stewart was fatally wounded, an
advance was made at 3 P.M. The square was again heavily attacked, but
the Arabs could not get to close quarters and in the evening a bivouac
was formed on the Nile. The British losses on this day were 23 killed
and 98 wounded. The Desert Column was now greatly exhausted. On the 20th
the village of Gubat was occupied; and on the following day Sir C.
Wilson, on whom the command had devolved, advanced against Metemma,
which was found too strong to assault. On this day General Gordon's four
steamers arrived; and on the morning of the 24th Sir C. Wilson, with 20
British soldiers in red coats and about 280 Sudanese, started in the
"Bordein" and "Telahawiyeh" for Khartum. The "Bordein" grounded on the
following day, and again on the 26th, by which twenty-four hours were
lost. At 11 A.M. on the 28th Khartum was sighted, and it soon became
clear that the town was in the hands of the enemy. After reconnoitring
farther, the steamers turned and proceeded down stream under a heavy
fire, the Sudanese crews showing signs of disaffection. The
"Telahawiyeh" was wrecked on the 29th of January and the "Bordein" on
the 31st, Sir C. Wilson's party being rescued on the 4th of February by
Lord C. Beresford in the "Safieh," which had come up from Gubat on
receipt of news carried there by Lieutenant Stuart Wortley in a
row-boat. Khartum had been taken and General Gordon killed on the
morning of the 26th of January 1885, having thus held out thirty-four
days beyond the date when he had expected the end. The garrison had been
reduced to starvation; and the arrival of twenty British soldiers, with
orders to return at once, could not have affected the situation. The
situation of the Desert Column and of its transport was most imperfectly
understood at Korti, where impossible plans were formed. Fortunately
Major-General Sir R. Buller, who arrived at Gubat on the 11th of
February, decided upon withdrawal, thus averting impending disaster, and
by the 16th of March the Desert Column had returned to Korti.
The advance from Korti of the River Column, under Major-General Earle,
began on the 28th of December, and great difficulties of navigation were
encountered. On the 10th of February an action was fought at Kirbekan
with about 800 of the enemy, entailing a loss of 10 killed, including
Major-General Earle, and 47 wounded. The column, now commanded by
Brigadier-General Brackenbury, continued its slow advance, and on the
morning of the 24th of February it was about 26 m. below Abu Hamed, a
point where the Korosko desert route strikes the Nile, 350 m. from
Khartum. Here it received orders to retire, and it reached Korti on the
8th of March.
Suakin operations.
The verbal message received from General Gordon on the 30th of December
1884 rendered the extreme danger of the position at Khartum painfully
apparent, and the secretary of state for war, acting on Sir E. Baring's
advice, offered to make an active demonstration from Suakin. To this
proposal Lord Wolseley demurred, but asked that ships of war should be
sent to Suakin, and that "marines in red coats should be frequently
landed and exercised." Lord Hartington replied that the government did
not consider that a demonstration of this kind could be effective, and
again suggested stronger measures. On the 8th of January 1885 Lord
Wolseley repeated that "the measures you propose will not assist my
operations against Khartum," adding:--
"I have from first endeavoured to impress on government that I am
strong enough to relieve Khartum, and believe in being able to send a
force, when returning by way of Berber, to Suakin, to open road and
crush Osman Digna."
On this very day the small Desert Column started from Korti on its
hazardous mission to the relief of a town fully 270 m. distant, held by
a starving garrison, and invested by 30,000 fighting men, mostly armed
with good rifles. Before reaching the Nile the Desert Column had lost
300 men and was unable to take Metemma, while its transport had
completely broken down. On the 8th of February Lord Wolseley
telegraphed, "The sooner you can now deal with Osman Digna the better,"
and recommended the despatch of Indian troops to Suakin, to "co-operate
with me in keeping road to Berber open." On the 11th of February, the
day on which Sir R. Buller most wisely decided to withdraw the Desert
Column from a position of extreme danger, it was determined at Korti
that the River Column should proceed to attack Berber, and Lord Wolseley
accepted the proposal of the government to make a railway from Suakin,
telegraphing to Lord Harrington:--
"By all means make railway by contract to Berber, or as far as you
can, during summer. It will be invaluable as a means of supply, and I
recommend it being begun immediately. Contract to be, if possible, for
so much per ton military stores and supplies and men carried, per
mile."
Battle of Hashin.
Every effort was now concentrated upon sending an expeditionary force to
Suakin, and before the end of March about 13,000 men, including a
brigade from India and a field battery from New South Wales, with nearly
7000 camels and 1000 mules, were there assembled. Lieutenant-General Sir
G. Graham was placed in command of this force, with orders to break down
the power of Osman Digna and to press the construction of the railway
towards Berber. The troops at Suakin, on arrival, were much harassed by
small night attacks, which ceased as soon as the scattered camps were
drawn together. On the 19th of March Sir G. Graham, with the cavalry
brigade and the infantry of the Indian contingent, reconnoitred as far
as Hashin, finding the country difficult on account of the dense mimosa
scrub. The enemy occupied the hills and fired upon the cavalry. On the
20th Sir G. Graham, with about 9000 men, again advanced to Hashin, and
Dehilbat hill was taken by the Berkshire regiment and the Royal Marines.
A squadron of the 9th Royal Lancers, which was dismounted in the thick
bush, was driven back with the loss of 9 men; but elsewhere the Arabs
never succeeded in closing, and the troops returned to Suakin in the
afternoon, leaving the East Surrey regiment in a zeriba covering some
low hills near Hashin village. The total British loss was 9 killed and
39 wounded.
McNeill's zeriba.
On the 22nd of March a force, consisting of two British and three Indian
battalions, with a naval brigade, a squadron of lancers, two companies
of engineers, and a large convoy of camels carrying water and supplies,
under Major-General Sir J. McNeill, started from Suakin for Tamai, with
orders to form a half-way zeriba. The advance was much impeded by the
dense bush, and the force halted at Tofrik, about 6 m. out, at 10.30
A.M. A native had brought information that the enemy intended to attack
while the zeriba was being formed, and this actually occurred. The force
was caught partly unprepared soon after 2.30 P.M., and severe fighting
took place. The enemy were repulsed in about twenty minutes, the naval
brigade, the Berkshire regiment, the Royal Marines, and the 15th Sikhs
showing the greatest gallantry. The casualties, including those among
non-combatants, were 150 killed, 148 missing, and 174 wounded. More than
500 camels were killed. The tribesmen lost more than 1000 killed. As
soon as firing was heard at Suakin, Sir G. Graham, with two battalions
of Guards and a battery of horse artillery, started for Tofrik, but
returned on being assured that reinforcements were not required. On the
24th and 26th convoys proceeding in square to Tofrik were attacked, the
enemy being repulsed without difficulty. On the 2nd of April a force
exceeding 7000 men, with 14 guns and 1600 transport animals, started
from Suakin at 4.30 A.M., and bivouacked twelve hours later at Tesela
Hill. Next morning an advance was made towards Tamai, and a number of
huts in the Khor Ghob were burned. The force then returned to Suakin.
The railway was now pushed on without interruption, reaching Otao on the
30th. On the night of the 6th of May a combined movement was made from
Suakin and Otao, which resulted in the surprise and break-up of a force
of the enemy under Mahommed Sardun, and the capture of a large number of
sheep and goats. The moral effect of this operation was marked, and
large numbers of tribesmen placed themselves unconditionally at the
disposal of Sir G. Graham. A great native movement could now have been
organized, which would have kept the route to Berber and enabled the
railway to be rapidly pushed forward.
Political and military situation at end of operations.
Meanwhile many communications had passed between the war office and Lord
Wolseley, who at first believed that Berber could be taken before the
summer. In a long despatch of the 6th of March he discussed the general
situation, and pointed out that although the force at his disposal "was
amply sufficient" for raising the siege of Khartum and defeating the
mahdi, the conditions were changed by the fall of the town. It was now
"impossible ... to undertake any offensive operations until about the
end of the summer," when twelve additional British battalions, four
strong squadrons of British cavalry, and two R.H.A. batteries, together
with a large extension of the Wadi Halfa railway, eleven steamers, and
three hundred more whale-boats, would be required. He considered it
necessary to hold Dongola, and he reported that he was "distributing
this army along the left bank of the Nile, on the open reach of water"
between the Hannek cataract and Abu Dom, opposite Merawi. On the 30th of
March Lord Wolseley quitted the army and proceeded to Cairo. A cloud
having arisen on the frontiers of Afghanistan, the withdrawal of the
troops from the Sudan was ordered on the 11th of May. On the formation
of Lord Salisbury's cabinet, the new secretary of state for war, Mr W.
H. Smith, inquired whether the retirement could be arrested, but
Major-General Sir R. Buller reported that the difficulties of
reoccupation would be great, and that if Dongola was to be held, a fresh
expedition would be required. On the 22nd of June, before the British
rearguard had left Dongola, the mahdi died. The withdrawal of the Suakin
force began on the 17th of May, and the friendly tribes, deprived of
support, were compelled to make terms with Osman Digna, who was soon
able to turn his attention to Kassala, which capitulated in August,
nearly at the same time as Sennar.
The failure of the operations in the Sudan had been absolute and
complete, and the reason is to be sought in a total misconception of the
situation, which caused vacillation and delay, and in the choice of a
route by which, having regard to the date of the decision, the relief of
General Gordon and Khartum was impossible. (G. S. C.)