Peace Negotiations--Lee's Suggestion to Jefferson Davis, 1862--
Fernando Wood's Correspondence with Mr. Lincoln, 1862--Mr. Stephens
at Fortress Monroe, 1863--Horace Greeley--Niagara Falls Conference,
1864--Jacquess-Gilmore Visits to Richmond, 1863-4--F. P. Blair,
Sen., Conference with Mr. Davis, 1865--Hampton Roads Conference,
Mr. Lincoln and Seward and Stephens and Others, 1865--Ord-Longstreet,
Lee and Grant Correspondence, 1865, and Lew Wallace and General
Slaughter, Point Isabel Conference, 1865.
The war had now lasted nearly four years, with varied success in
all the military departments, and the people North and South had
long been satiated with its dire calamities. There had, from the
start, been an anti-war party in the North, and in certain localities
South there were large numbers of loyal men, many of whom joined
the Union Army. The South was becoming exhausted in men and means.
The blockade had become so efficient as to render it almost impossible
for the Confederate authorities to get foreign supplies. It seemed
to unprejudiced observers that the Confederacy must soon collapse.
Sherman in his march from "Atlanta to the Sea" had cut the Confederacy
in twain. It was without gold or silver, and its paper issues were
valueless and passed only by compulsion within the Confederate
lines. Provisions were obtainable only by a system of military
seizure. The Confederacy had no credit at home or abroad; and
there was a growing discontent with President Davis and his advisers.
There also came to be a feeling in the South that slavery, in any
event, was doomed. Lastly, the "cradle and the grave" were robbed
to fill up the army; this by a relentless draft. The Confederate
Congress passed an act authorizing the incorporation into the army
of colored men--slaves. This was not well received, though General
Lee approved of the policy, suggesting, however, that it would be
necessary to give those who became soldiers, freedom.( 1)
Notwithstanding the desperate straits into which the Confederacy
had fallen it still had in the field not less than 300,000 well-
equipped soldiers, generally well commanded, and, although forced
to act on the defensive, they were very formidable.
The officers and soldiers of the Union Army longest in the field,
though confident of final and complete success, desired very much
to see the war speedily terminated--to return to their families
and to peaceful pursuits. This desire did not show itself so much
as in discontent as in a restless disposition towards those in
authority, who, it might be supposed, could in some way secure a
peace. The credit of the United States remained good; its bonds
commanded ready sale at home and abroad, yet an enormous debt was
piling up at the rate of $4,000,000 daily, and its paper currency
was depreciated to about thirty-five per cent. of its face value.
These and many other causes led to a general desire for peace. On
both sides, those in supreme authority were unjustly charged with
a disposition to continue the war for ulterior purposes when it
had been demonstrated that it was no longer justifiable.
This retrospect seems necessary before giving a summary of the
various efforts to negotiate a peace. About the first open suggestion
to that end came from General Robert E. Lee in a letter to President
Davis written at Fredericktown, Maryland, September 8, 1862. This
was just after the Second Bull Run, during the first Confederate
invasion of Maryland and in the hey-day of the Confederacy. Davis
was requested to join Lee's army, and, from its head, propose to
the United States a recognition of the independence of the Confederate
States. Lee in this letter showed himself something of a politician.
He urged that a rejection of such a proposition would throw the
responsibility of a continuance of the war on the Union authorities
and thus aid, at the elections, the party in the country opposed to
the war.( 2) Nothing, however, came of this suggestion of Lee.
Fernando Wood, who had kept himself in some sort of relations with
President Lincoln, though at all times suspected by the latter,
pretended in a letter to him, dated December 8, 1862, to have
"reliable and truthful authority" for saying the Southern States
would send representatives to Congress provided a general amnesty
would permit them to do so. The President was asked to give
immediate attention to the matter, and Wood suggested "that gentlemen
whose former social and political relations with the leaders of
the _Southern revolt_ may be allowed to hold unofficial correspondence
with them on this subject."
Mr. Lincoln, whose power to discern a sham, or a false pretense,
exceeded that of any other man of his time, promptly responded:
"I strongly suspect your information will prove groundless;
nevertheless, I thank you for communicating it to me." He said
further to Mr. Wood that if "the _people_ of the Southern States
would cease resistance, and would re-inaugurate, submit to, and
maintain the national authority within the limits of such States,
the war would cease on the part of the United States, and that if,
within a reasonable time, a full and general amnesty were necessary
to such an end, it would not be withheld." The President declined
to suspend military operations "to try any experiment of negotiation."
He expressed a desire for any "exact information" Mr. Wood might
have, saying it "might be more valuable before than after January
1, 1863," referring, doubtless, to the promised Emancipation
Proclamation. Wood's scheme, evidently having no substantial basis,
aborted.( 3)
Others, about the same time, pestered Mr. Lincoln with plans and
schemes for the termination of the war. One Duff Green, a Virginia
politician, wrote from Richmond in January, 1863, asking the
President for an interview "to pave the way for an early termination
of the war." He asked the same permission from Jeff. Davis. His
efforts came to nothing.
Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, conceiving,
in the early summer of 1863, that the times were auspicious for
peace negotiations, wrote Mr. Davis, asking to be sent to Washington,
ostensibly to negotiate about the exchange of prisoners, but really
to try to "turn attention to a general adjustment, upon such basis
as might be ultimately acceptable to both parties, and stop the
further effusion of blood." He assured Mr. Davis he had but one
idea of final adjustment--"the recognition of the sovereignty of
the States." Mr. Davis wired Stephens to repair to Richmond, and
he arrived on June 22, 1863. Davis and his Cabinet appear to have
seconded, with some heartiness, Stephens' scheme; all thinking it
might result in aiding the "peace party" North. The Confederate
leaders had been greatly encouraged by the gains of the Democratic
party in the elections of 1862; by repeated attacks on the
Administration by some of Lincoln's party friends; by public meetings
held in New York City at which violent and denunciatory speeches
were listened to from Fernando Wood and others, and by the nomination
of Vallandigham for Governor of Ohio. The military situation was
critical to both governments when Stephens reached Richmond.
Pemberton was besieged and doomed to an early surrender at Vicksburg.
On the other hand Lee was invading Pennsylvania, having just gained
some successes in the Shenandoah Valley; and there was a great
battle imminent on Northern soil. Stephens was directed to proceed
by the Valley to join Lee, and from his headquarters try to reach
Washington. Heavy rains and bad roads deterred the frail Vice-
President. At length the Secretary of the Confederate Navy sent
him in a small steamer (the _Torpedo_) under a flag of truce,
accompanied by Commissioner Robert Ould as his secretary, to Fortress
Monroe. He wrote from this place a letter to Admiral S. P. Lee in
Hampton Roads, of date of July 4, 1863, saying he was "bearer of
a communication in writing from Jefferson Davis, _Commander-in-
Chief_ of the land and naval forces of the Confederate States, to
Abraham Lincoln, _Commander-in-Chief_ of the land and naval forces
of the United States," and that he desired to go to Washington in
his own vessel. The titles by which Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Davis were
designated had been previously determined on by Davis and his
advisers. Anticipating there might be objection to the latter
being referred to as President of the Confederacy, the foregoing
was adopted as likely to be least objectionable. It was, however,
solemnly agreed at Richmond that if the designations or titles
adopted were such as to cause Mr. Stephens' communication to be
rejected, he was to say that he had a communication to "President
Lincoln from the President of the Confederacy." If this were
objectionable as an apparent recognition of Davis as President of
an independent nation, then Mr. Stephens' mission was to forthwith
terminate. Admiral Lee wired to Mr. Lincoln Mr. Stephens' arrival,
his mission, and desire to proceed to Washington. Mr. Lincoln did
not stand on punctilio. He was, at first, inclined to send a long
dispatch refusing Mr. Stephens permission to go to Washington, and
saying nothing would be received "assuming the independence of the
Confederate States, and anything will be received, and carefully
considered by him, when offered by any influential person or persons,
in terms not assuming the independence of the so-called Confederate
States." This was, however, decided to be too much in detail, and
the Secretary of the Navy was ordered to telegraph Admiral Lee:
"The request of A. H. Stephens is inadmissible. The customary
agents and channels are adequate for all needful communication and
conference between the United States and the insurgents."
This ended Mr. Stephens' first plans to secure peace. He, in his
book written since the war, admits or pretends that the ulterior
purpose of his proposed trip to Washington was, through a correspondence
that would be published, "to deeply impress the growing constitutional
(_sic!_) party at the North with a full realization of the true
nature and ultimate tendencies of the war . . . that the surest
way to maintain their liberties was to allow us the separate
enjoyment of ours."( 4)
Great events took place the day Mr. Stephens reached Fortress
Monroe. Vicksburg fell and Lee was, on that memorable Fourth of
July, sending off his wounded, preparatory to a retreat from the
fated field of Gettysburg.
Horace Greeley, a sincere enemy to slavery, who had somehow become
imbued with the notion that the Administration was responsible for
a prolongation of the war, became restless and complaining. He,
at the head of the New York _Tribune_, gave vent to much criticism,
which encouraged those in rebellion, and their friends in the North.
He listened to all sorts of pretenders and, finally, was duped into
the belief that a peace could be made through some Southern emissaries
in Canada. An adventurer calling himself "William Cornell Jewett
of Colorado," from Niagara Falls, July 5, 1864, wrote Mr. Greeley:
"I am authorized to say to you . . . that two ambassadors of Davis
& Co. are now in Canada with full and complete powers for peace,
and Mr. Sanders requests that you come on immediately to me at
Cataract House to have a private interview; or, if you will send
the President's protection for him and two friends, they will come
on and meet you. He says the whole matter can be consummated by
_me, you, them, and President Lincoln_.( 5)
Mr. Greeley was seemingly so impressed with this as an opening for
peace that he wrote a dictatorial letter to Mr. Lincoln reminding
him of the long continuance of the war; asserting the country was
dissatisfied with the manner in which it was conducted and averse
to further calls for troops; avowing that there was a widespread
conviction that the government did not desire peace; rebuking the
President for not having received Mr. Stephens the year before,
and prophesying that unless there were steps taken to show the
country that honest efforts were being made to secure an early
settlement of our difficulties the Union party would be defeated
at the impending Presidential election. Greeley suggested this
wholly impracticable and impossible plan of adjustment: (1) The
Union to be restored and declared perpetual; (2) slavery abolished;
(3) complete amnesty; (4) payment of $400,000,000 to slave States
for their slaves; (5) the slave States to have representation based
on their total population, and (6) a national convention to be
called at once. With a tirade on the condition of the country and
its credit and more warnings as to the coming election, Mr. Greeley
concluded by demanding that negotiations should be opened with the
persons at Niagara.
Mr. Lincoln, though without faith in either the parties in Canada
or Greeley's plan, wrote the latter, July 9th, saying:
"If you can find any persons, anywhere, professing to have any
proposition of Jefferson Davis in writing, for peace, embracing
the restoration of the Union, and abandonment of slavery, whatever
else it embraces, say to him he may come to me with you, and that
if he really brings such proposition he shall at the least have
safe conduct with the paper (and without publicity if he chooses)
to the point where you shall have met him. The same if there be
two or more persons."
The President, thus prompt and frank, utterly surprised and
disconcerted Mr. Greeley. Mr. Lincoln had accepted two main points
in Greeley's plan--restoration of the Union and abandonment of
slavery, and waived all others for the time being. The next day
Mr. Greeley replied by repeating reproaches over what he called
the "rude repulse" of Stephens, saying he thought the negotiators
would not "open their budgets"; referring to the importance of
doing something to aid the elections, and indicating that he might
try to get a look into the hand of the Niagara parties. Again, on
the 13th, he wrote Mr. Lincoln he had reliable information that
Clement C. Clay of Alabama and Jacob Thompson of Mississippi were
at Niagara Falls duly empowered to negotiate for peace, adding that
he knew nothing as to terms, and saying that it was high time the
slaughter was ended. The President, still without the slightest
faith in Greeley or his Canada negotiators, but stung with the
unjust assumption that he was averse to peace, wired Mr. Greeley,
on the 15th:
"I was not expecting you to send me a letter, but to bring me a
man or men," and saying a messenger with a letter was on the way
to him.
The letter of Mr. Lincoln was brief, but met the case:
"Yours of the 13th is just received, and I am disappointed that
you have not already reached here with those commissioners, if they
would consent to come, on being shown my letter to you of the 9th
inst. Show that and this to them, and if they will come on the
terms in the former, bring them. I not only intend a sincere effort
for peace, but I intend you shall be a personal witness that it is
made."
Mr. Greeley, on this letter being placed in his hands, expressed
much embarrassment, but decided to go in search of the Canada
parties provided he had a safe conduct for C. C. Clay, Jacob
Thompson, James P. Holcombe, and George N. Sanders to Washington,
in company with himself. The safe conduct was obtained through
John Hay, the messenger. On Mr. Greeley's arrival at Niagara he
fell into the hands of "Colorado Jewett," his vainglorious
correspondent, and through him addressed Clay, Thompson, and Holcombe
this letter:
"I understand you are duly accredited from Richmond as the bearers
of propositions looking to the establishment of peace; that you
desire to visit Washington in fulfilment of your mission; and that
you further desire that George N. Sanders shall accompany you. If
my information be thus far substantially correct, I am authorized
by the President of the United States to tender you his safe conduct
on the journey proposed, and to accompany you at the earliest time
that will be agreeable to you."
Mr. Greeley, in this communication, ignored all the conditions in
Mr. Lincoln's letters to him. Notwithstanding this, two of the
persons named responded (Thompson not having been with Clay and
Holcombe), saying they had no credentials to treat on the subject
of peace, and hence could not accept his offer. Clay and Holcombe
did say something about being acquainted with the views of their
government, and if permitted to go to Richmond could get, for
themselves or others, proper credentials. Mr. Greeley reported
the situation, asking of the President further instructions. It
now became apparent to everybody connected with the farce that if
it was kept up further, Mr. Lincoln would be put in the attitude
of suing the Confederacy for a peace. Lincoln determined to end
the situation and at the same time define his position before the
world, clearly. He dispatched John Hay to Niagara with this famous
letter:
"To Whom it May Concern: Any proposition which embraces the
restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the
abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority
that can control the armies now at war with the United States, will
be received and considered by the Executive of the United States,
and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral
points, and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct
both ways.
"Abraham Lincoln."
This explicit letter was communicated to Holcombe at the Clifton
House by Greeley and Hay. Mr. Greeley seems to have expressed to
Jewett his regret over the "sad termination of the initiatory steps
taken for peace, from the charge made by the President in his
instructions given him." Nothing could have been more unjust.
The Confederate emissaries wrote a long letter to Mr. Greeley,
which they gave to the public, arraigning Mr. Lincoln for bad faith.
They assumed Mr. Greeley had been sent by the President, on Mr.
Lincoln's own motion, to invite them to Washington to confer as to
a peace. It does not appear that Mr. Greeley tried to disabuse
the public mind of this error or to make known the truth. He
claimed to regard the safe conduct of July 16th as a wavier of all
the President's precedent terms; also of his own previously expressed
terms. The President did not think best to publish the whole
correspondence, preferring to suffer the injustice in silence.
Mr. Greeley continued in a bad state of mind. He refused to visit
Mr. Lincoln, as requested, for a conference. He wrote the President
on the 8th and again on the 9th of August, 1864, abusing certain
Cabinet officers, reiterating his reproaches of Mr. Lincoln for
not receiving Mr. Stephens, censuring him for not sending, after
Vicksburg, a deputation to Richmond to ask for peace, complaining
to him for not sending the "three biggest" Democrats in Congress to
sue for peace, saying, however, little of his Niagara Falls fiasco,
but adding: "Do not let the month pass without an earnest effort
for peace," and closing his last letter thus:
"I beg you, implore you, to inaugurate or invite proposals for
peace forthwith. And in case peace cannot now be made, consent to
an _armistice for one year_, each party to retain, unmolested, all
it now holds, but the rebel ports to be opened. Meantime, let a
national convention be held, and there will surely be no more war
at all events."
This suggestion of an armistice for one year and the opening of
the rebel ports, was equivalent to proposing to give one year for
the Confederacy to recuperate at home and from abroad; to strengthen
its credit, to arrange new combinations, and to tie the hands of
its friends of the Union and the Administration, to say nothing of
the confession of failure to suppress the insurrection.
While Mr. Greeley was a Union man and had, throughout his public
life, opposed slavery, he had no faith in war, nor did he have any
of the instincts of a soldier to enable him to discern its tendencies.
He was personally friendly, it may be assumed, to the President,
but hostile to Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, and probably intensely
jealous of all the distinguished generals of the army. Greeley
had long been, through the _Tribune_, a recognized factor in moulding
public opinion, and now that war had come to absorb all other
interests, his power and influence through the press had waned.
He was wholly impracticable in executive matters. His failure to
inaugurate a peace and to attain prominence in administrative
affairs during the war embittered him through life towards his old-
time party friends.
A review of Mr. Lincoln's course relating to Mr. Greeley's attempts
to negotiate a peace shows the former acted with the utmost candor,
and submitted, for the time, to the latter's dictatorial course
and the unjust charge of wavering and acting in bad faith, rather
then crush his old friend or endanger the general cause for selfish
glory.( 6)
Though in a sense inaugurated in 1863, another quite as futile
attempt to bring about peace was in progress in July, 1864. James
F. Jaquess, Colonel of the 73d Illinois, serving in Rosecrans' army
--a Methodist Episcopal clergyman, a D.D.--in May, 1863, wrote to
James A. Garfield, Chief of Staff, calling attention to the fact
that his church had divided on the slavery question; saying that
the Methodist Episcopal Church South had been a leading element in
the Rebellion and prominent in the prosecution of the war; that a
considerable part of the territory of that church South was in the
possession of the Union Army; that from its ministers, once bitterly
opposed to the Union, he had learned in person:
"That they consider the Rebellion has killed the Methodist Episcopal
Church South; that it has virtually obliterated slavery, and all
the prominent questions of difference between the North and the
South; that they are desirous of returning to the 'Old Church';
that their brethren of the South are most heartily tired of the
Rebellion; and that they most ardently desire peace, and the
privilege of returning to their allegiance to church and state,
and that they will do this on the first offer coming from a reliable
source. . . . And from these considerations, but not from these
alone, but because God has laid the duty on me, I submit to the
proper authorities the following proposition, viz.: _I will go
into the Southern Confederacy and return within ninety days with
terms of peace that the government will accept_."
He further stated;
"I propose no compromise with traitors--but their immediate return
to allegiance to God and their country. . . . I propose to do this
work in the name of the Lord; if He puts it in the hearts of my
superiors to allow me to do it, I shall be thankful; if not, I have
discharged my duty."
This letter Rosecrans forwarded to Mr. Lincoln, approving Jacquess'
application. The President, seeing the difficulties, wrote Rosecrans
saying Jacquess "could not go with any government authority," yet
left to Rosecrans the discretion to grant the desired furlough.
The furlough was granted. Jacquess, finding a mere furlough or
church influence would not aid him in getting into the Confederate
lines, repaired to Baltimore and besought General Schenck to send
him _via_ Fort Monore to Richmond. Schenck wired the President
(July 13th) Jacquess' wishes and was answered: "Mr. Jacquess is
a very worthy gentleman, but I can have nothing to do, directly or
indirectly, with the matter he has in view." The Colonel, however,
persuaded Schenck to send him to Fort Monroe, from whence he reached
Richmond through the connivance of officers conducting the exchange
of prisoners. In eleven days he was again in Baltimore asking the
President by letter to grant him permission to report the "valuable
information and proposals for peace" he had obtained. This permission
was not granted. Mr. Lincoln well understood that he could have
nothing official to report, and that in the brief time he was South
he could have gained no reliable information concerning public
sentiment. After lingering in Baltimore a little, this preacher-
colonel rejoined his regiment. It does not appear that he ever
made, even to Rosecrans or Garfield, any detailed report of this
his first trip to Richmond. Though his efforts had so far failed,
he was not discouraged, but with faith characteristic of his class,
resolved upon another effort. He now associated with him one J.
R. Gilmore, a lecturer and literary character known as "Edmund
Kirke," who had spent some time in the Western armies. Both were
enthusiastic, but their zeal constituted their principal merit in
the matter attempted. The President declined a personal interview
with Jacquess, but gave, July, 1864, Gilmore a pass, over his own
signature, to Grant's headquarters, with a note to Grant to allow
both "to pass our lines with ordinary baggage and go South." Mr.
Gilmore had previously (June 15, 1864) written Mr. Lincoln telling
him something of what Jacquess would propose. In substance he
would say: "Lay down your arms and resume peaceful pursuits; the
Emancipation Proclamation tells what will be done with the blacks;
amnesty will be granted the masses, and no terms with rebels. The
leaders to be allowed to seek safety abroad, and at the end of
sixty days not one of them must be found in the United States."
On the 16th, these two men passed from Butler's lines and were
allowed to proceed, under surveillance, to Richmond. Next day they
asked, through Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin, for an interview
with "President Davis," which was accorded them at nine o'clock
that night, both Davis and Benjamin being present.
The volunteer envoys were politely received, and the interview
lasted two hours. It seems that Jacquess and Gilmore did not even
mention the plan referred to in the latter's letter to Mr. Lincoln.
This was, however, immaterial, as they had no authority to submit
anything. They asked Mr. Davis if the "_dispute_" was not "narrowed
down to this: Union or Disunion." Davis answered: "Yes, or
independence or subjugation." The "envoys" suggested that the two
governments should go to the people with two propositions: (1)
"Peace with disunion and Southern independence," (2) "Peace with
Union, emancipation, no confiscation, and universal amnesty." A
vote to be taken on these propositions within sixty days, in which
the citizens of the whole United States should participate; the
proposition prevailing to be abided by. Pending the vote there
should be an armistice. Mr. Davis promptly said:
"The plan is wholly impracticable. If the South were only one
State it might work; but as it is, if only one State objected to
emancipation, it would nullify the whole thing: for you are aware
the people of Virginia cannot vote slavery out of South Carolina,
nor the people of South Carolina vote it out of Virginia."
The interview proceeded on these lines without approaching agreement.
It is evident that the "envoys" were overmatched by Davis and
Benjamin, and were subjected to a charge of ignorance of the form
of their own government. Davis indulged in some _bluff_ about
caring nothing for slavery, as his slaves were already freed by
the war; and he declared the Southern people "will be free"--will
govern themselves, if they "have to see every Southern plantation
sacked and every Southern city in flames." Davis also announced
that he would be pleased, at any time, to receive proposals "for
peace on the basis of independence. It will be needless to approach
me on any other."
The interview being over, Jacquess and Gilmore got quickly back
into the Union lines, and North. The latter published an account
of the interview in the _Atlantic Monthly_ for September, 1864.
His account does not materially differ from Benjamin's sent to the
Confederate diplomatic agents in Europe, or Davis' in his _Rise
and Fall of the Confederacy_.( 7)
On the whole the publication of the story of this visit to Richmond
did much good to the Union cause in the pending Presidential
campaign. The story closed the mouths of the peace factionists,
though a few of Mr. Lincoln's party friends, fearing the result of
the election, continued to demand more tangible testimony of his
disposition to negotiate a peace; this largely for the purpose of
its effect on the November election.
Henry J. Raymond, Chairman of the Republican National Executive
Committee, at a meeting of the committee in New York, apprehensive
of McClellan's nomination and possible election as President, August
22, 1864, indited a panicky letter to Mr. Lincoln, expressing great
fear of the latter's defeat at the polls, giving some unfavorable
predictions as to the result of the election by E. B. Washburne,
Governor Morton, Simon Cameron, and others, deploring the failure
of the army to gain victories, and assigning as a cause for reaction
in public sentiment:
"The impression is in some minds, the fear and suspicion in others,
that we are not to have peace in any event under this Administration
until slavery is abandoned."
Continuing:
"In some way or other the suspicion is widely diffused that we can
have peace with Union if we would. It is idle to reason with this
belief--still more idle to denounce it. It can only be expelled
by some authoritative act, at once bold enough to fix attention
and distinct enough to defy incredulity and challenge respect."
Raymond was bold enough to ask that a commission be appointed to
offer "peace to Davis, as the head of the rebel armies, on the sole
condition of acknowledging the supremacy of the Constitution--all
other questions to be settled in a convention of the people of all
the States." He stated that if the proffer were accepted the people
would put the execution of the details in loyal hands; if rejected
"it would plant seeds of disaffection in the South and dispel all
delusions about peace that prevail in the North." He demanded the
proposal should be made at once, as Mr. Lincon's "spontaneous act."
Mr. Raymond seemed to express the concurrent views of his Republican
associates.( 8) Three days later he and his committee reached
Washington to personally urge prompt action on the President. In
the light of recent attempts at Niagara and Richmond the Raymond
proposition was inadmissible, yet Mr. Lincoln resolved, if the step
must be taken, to again make the proposer the instrument to
demonstrate its folly. The President wrote a letter of instructions,
which he felt he might have to give to Mr. Raymond, authorizing
him to proceed to Richmond, and propose to "Honorable Jefferson
Davis that upon the restoration of the Union and the national
authority, the war shall cease at once, all remaining questions to
be left for adjustment by peaceful modes." If this proposition
were not accepted, Mr. Raymond was then "to request to be informed
what terms, if any, embracing the restoration of the Union, would
be accepted." "If the presentation of any terms embracing the
restoration of the Union" were declined, then Mr. Raymond was
directed to "request to be informed what terms of peace would be
accepted; and on receiving any answer report the same to the
Government."
It will be noticed that in the Raymond letter the President left
out all reference to slavery. In previous ones he had insisted on
the _abandonment of slavery by the South_ as well as the restoration
of the Union. On questions of amnesty, confiscation, and all other
matters the President was ready to grant everything to the South.( 9)
This letter was never delivered. Mr. Raymond, in personal interviews
with Mr. Lincoln, became convinced the latter understood the
situation and the sentiment of the country better than he and his
committee did, and the matter was dropped.
It must not be assumed that the President for a moment gave up his
long settled purpose to insist on the abolition of slavery as a
condition of peace. In his annual Message to Congress, December,
1864, in expressing his views and purposes on the subject of
terminating the war, he says:
"In presenting the abandonment of armed resistance to the national
authority on the part of the insurgents as the only indispensable
condition to ending the war on the part of the government, I retract
nothing heretofore said as to slavery. I repeat the declaration
made a year ago, that 'While I remain in my present position I
shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation
nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms
of that proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress.' If the
people should, by whatever mode or means, make it an Executive duty
to re-enslave such persons, another, and not I, must be their
instrument to perform it. In stating a single condition of peace,
I mean simply to say that the war will cease on the part of the
government whenever it shall have ceased on the part of those who
began it."
Mr. Lincoln was triumphantly re-elected, but notwithstanding this
and the foreshadowed collapse of the Confederacy, Francis P. Blair,
Sen., a veteran statesman who had flourished in Jackson's time,
came forward in the hope that he might become a successful mediator
between the North and the South. He personally gave the President
hints of his wishes in this respect, but received from the latter
no encouragement, save the remark: "Come to me after Savannah
falls." Sherman took Savannah, December 22, 1864. Mr. Lincoln,
without permitting Mr. Blair to reveal to him his plans in detail,
on December 28th, wrote and signed a card: "Allow the bearer, F.
P. Blair, Sr., to pass our lines, go South, and return."
With this credential Mr. Blair went to Grant at City Point, and
under a flag of truce sent communications to "Jefferson Davis,
President," etc., etc. The effect of one of the messages was to
request an interview with Mr. Davis to confer upon plans that might
ultimately "lead to something practicable"--peace. After some
vexatious delay, Mr. Blair was allowed to go to Richmond, where,
January 12, 1865, Davis accorded him an interview.
Mr. Blair explained to Mr. Davis that he came without President
Lincoln's knowledge of his plans but with the latter's knowledge
of his purpose to try and open peace negotiations. After some
preliminary talk Mr. Blair read to Mr. Davis an elaborate paper
containing his "suggestions." These covered a reference to slavery,
"the cause of all our woes," saying it was doomed and hence no
longer an insurmountable obstruction to pacification, adding that
as the South proposed to use slaves to "conquer a peace," and to
secure its independence, "their deliverance from bondage" must
follow.(10) With slavery abolished, Mr. Blair suggested the war
against the Union became a war for monarchy. Reference was then
made to Maximilian's reign in Mexico, under Austrian and French
protection, and of its danger to free institutions by establishing
a "Bonaparte-Hapsburg dynasty on our Southern flank." Mr. Davis
was complimented over his position being such as to be the instrument
to avert the danger. It was suggested that Juarez at the head of
the "Liberals of Mexico" could be persuaded to "devolve all the
power he can command on President Davis--a dictatorship if necessary
--to restore the rights of Mexico." Mr. Davis was to use his
veteran Confederates and Mexican recruits, with, if necessary,
"multitudes of the army of the North, officers and men" to drive
out the invaders, uphold the Monroe Doctrine, and thus "restore
the Mexican Republic." Mr. Blair further suggested that if Mr.
Davis accomplished all this it would "ally his name with Washington
and Jackson as a defender of the liberty of the country" and if
"in delivering Mexico he should model its States in form and
principle to adapt them to our Union and add a new Southern
constellation to its benignant sky," he would attain further glory.
This and more talk of like kind seemed to command Davis' attention,
for Mr. Blair says he pronounced the scheme "possible to be solved."
Mr. Davis declared he was "thoroughly for popular government."
There was nothing agreed upon, though the interview covered much
ground as reported by Mr. Blair. Mr. Davis was evidently anxious
for some arrangement, for on the 12th of January he addressed to
Mr. Blair, who was still in Richmond, a note saying among other
things he had "no disposition to find obstacles in forms," and was
willing "to enter into negotiations for peace; that he was ready
to appoint a commissioner to meet one on the part of the United
States to confer with a view to secure peace to the _two countries_."
This note was carried to Washington by Mr. Blair and shown to
President Lincoln, who, January 18th, addressed him a note saying,
he had constantly been and still was ready to appoint an agent to
meet one appointed by Mr. Davis, "with the view of securing peace
to the people of our _one common country_." With Mr. Lincoln's
note Mr. Blair returned to Richmond, and without any authority from
any source, shifted to a new project, namely, that Grant and Lee
should be authorized to negotiate. This failed to ripen into
anything. Mr. Lincoln's note proffering negotiations looking alone
to "peace to the people _of our one common country_" placed Mr.
Davis in a great dilemma. The situation was critical in the extreme.
The Confederate Congress had voted a lack of confidence in Mr.
Davis; Sherman had not only marched to the sea, but was moving up
the Atlantic coast through the Carolinas; Lee reported his army
had not two days' rations; and many of Davis' advisers had declared
success impossible. At last Mr. Davis, on consultation with Vice-
President Stephens and his Cabinet, decided to appoint a commission,
composed of Mr. Stephens, Senator R. M. T. Hunter, and ex-Secretary
of War John A. Campbell. This commission was directed (January
28, 1865) to go to Washington for informal conference with President
Lincoln "_upon the issues involved in the existing war, and for
the purpose of securing peace to the two countries_." Mr. Davis
was advised by his Secretary of State, Mr. Benjamin, to instruct
the commissioners to confer upon the subject of Mr. Lincoln's
letter. The instructions were not in accordance with Mr. Lincoln's
note, nor were they warranted by anything he had ever said.
Notwithstanding this, the commissioners appeared at the Union lines
and asked permission to proceed to Washington as "Peace Commissioners."
On this being telegraphed to Washington, Major Eckert of the War
Department was sent to Grant's headquarters, with directions to
admit them, provided they would say, in writing, they came to confer
on the basis of the President's note of January 18th. Before Major
Eckert arrived, they had, in violation of their instructions, asked
permission "to proceed to Washington to hold a conference with
President Lincoln upon the subject of the existing war, and with
a view of ascertaining upon what terms it may be terminated, in
pursuance of the course indicated by him in his letter to Mr. Blair
of January 18, 1865." They were admitted to Grant's headquarters
and Mr. Lincoln was advised of their last request. The latter sent
Secretary Seward to Fortress Monroe to meet them. Seward was, in
writing, instructed to make known to the commissioners that three
indispensable things were necessary: "(1) The restoration of the
national authority throughout all the States. (2) No receding by
the Executive on the slavery question from the position assumed
thereon in the late annual Message. (3) No cessation of hostilities
short of the end of the war, and the disbanding of all forces
hostile to the government." On other questions the Secretary was
instructed to say the President would act "in a spirit of sincere
liberality." Mr. Seward was not definitely to consummate anything.
He started to meet the commissioners on February 1st. Meantime,
on the same day, Major Eckert had met them at City Point and informed
them of the President's requirements, to which they responded by
presenting Davis' written instructions. Major Eckert at once
notified them they could not proceed unless strictly in compliance
with Mr. Lincoln's terms. This seemingly put an end to the mission
of Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell. Grant, being impressed with
their anxiety to secure a peace, wired Stanton his impression, and
expressed regret that Mr. Lincoln could not have an interview with
Stephens and Hunter, if not all three, before their return. The
President on reading Grant's dispatch decided to meet the commissioners
in person at Fortress Monroe. Mr. Lincoln joined Mr. Seward at
this place on the _River Queen_, where they were met by the
commissioners on the morning of February 3d. The conference which
ensued was wholly without significance. The President was frank
and firm, standing by his hitherto announced ultimatum. Stephens
tried to talk about Blair's Mexican scheme; about an armistice and
some expedient to "give time to cool." Mr. Lincoln met all
suggestions by saying: "The restoration of the Union is a _sine
qua non;_" and that there could be no armistice on any other terms.
It is not absolutely certain what was, in detail, proposed or
rejected on either side, as no concurrent report was made of the
conference and reporters were excluded from it. Mr. Lincoln,
according to the commissioners, declared the road to reconstruction
for the insurgents was to disband "their armies and permit the
national authorities to resume their functions." The President
stated he would exercise the power of the Executive with liberality
as to the confiscation of property. He is reported to have said
also that the effect of the Emancipation Proclamation was to be
decided by the courts, giving it as his opinion that as it was a
war measure, it would be inoperative for the future as soon as the
war ceased; that it would be held to apply only to such slaves as
had come under its operation. Mr. Seward called attention to the
very recent adoption by Congress of the Thirteenth Amendment to
the Constitution. The commissioners report him as saying that if
the seceding States would agree to return to the Union they might
defeat the ratification of the amendment.
It is apparent that some coloring entered into the statements of
Mr. Stephens and party. About the only good point made in the talk
about which there is no controversy was made by Mr. Lincoln. Mr.
Hunter, in attempting to persuade the latter that there was high
precedent for his treating with people in arms, cited the example
of Charles I. of England treating with his subjects in armed rebellion.
To this the President answered: "_I do not profess to be posted
in history. On all such matters I will turn you over to Mr. Seward.
All that I distinctly recollect about the case of Charles I. is
that he lost his head_."
The commissioners reached Richmond much disappointed, and reported
their failure. The effect on the South was depressing. Mr. Stephens
seemed to give up the Confederate cause at this time; he departed
from Richmond, abandoned the Rebellion and went into retirement.(11)
Mr. Davis transmitted his commissioners' report to the Confederate
Congress, stating that no terms of settlement could be obtained
"other than the conqueror might grant." The last flicker of the
Hampton Roads conference was seen in a public meeting held at the
African Church in Richmond, February 6, 1865, at which bravado
speeches were made by Mr. Davis and others. Mr. Davis announced
a belief that they would "compel the Yankees, in less than twelve
months, to petition us for peace on our own terms."(12)
General E. O. C. Ord, commanding the Army of the James, about
February 20th, attempted to inaugurate another peace conference to
be conducted through military channels, aided by the wives of
certain officers of the two armies. To this end he secured, on a
trivial pretext, an interview with General James Longstreet, then
commanding the Confederate forces immediately north of Richmond.
Ord, in the interview, referred to the Hampton Roads' conference,
stating (according to Longstreet) that the politicians North were
afraid to touch the question of peace; that there was no way to
open the subject save through officers of the armies; that on the
Union side the war had gone on long enough, and that the army
officers "should come together as former comrades and friends and
talk a little." Ord is reported as saying that the "work as
belligerents" should cease; Grant and Lee should have a talk; that
Longstreet's wife with a retinue of Confederate officers should
first visit Mrs. Grant within the Union lines; that then Mrs. Grant
should return the call at Richmond under escort of Union officers,
and that thus the ladies could aid Generals Grant and Lee in fixing
up peace on terms honorable to both sides. Longstreet took kindly
to Ord's talk. Lee met Longstreet at President Davis' house in
Richmond. Breckinridge (then Secretary of War) was present. At
this meeting it was decided that Longstreet was to seek a further
interview with Ord and see how the subject could be opened between
Grant and Lee. Longstreet summoned his wife from Lynchburg to
Richmond by telegraph. About the last day of February, Ord and
Longstreet had another meeting at which Ord suggested that if Lee
would write Grant a letter, the latter was prepared to receive it,
and thus a military convention could be brought about. Longstreet
reported the result of the talk with Ord, and Lee, March 1st, wrote
Grant that he was informed that Ord, in a conversation relating to
"the possibility of arriving at a satisfactory adjustment of the
present _unhappy difficulties_ by means of a military convention,"
had stated that if Lee desired an interview with Grant on the
subject, the latter would not decline, provided Lee had authority
to act. Lee, in his letter, said he was fully authorized in the
premises, and proposed a meeting at the place proposed by Ord and
Longstreet, on Monday the 6th. Accompanying Lee's letters was the
usual "by-play" letter on an immaterial subject. Grant, on receiving
Lee's communication, wired its substance to Secretary Stanton, who
laid the matter before President Lincoln at his room at the Capitol
whither he had gone to sign bills the last night of a session of
Congress. Mr. Lincoln, without advice from any person, took his
pen, and with his usual precision wrote:
"The President directs me to say that he wishes you to have no
conference with General Lee unless it be for capitulation of General
Lee's army, or on some minor or purely military matter. He instructs
me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any
political questions. Such questions the President holds in his
own hands, and will submit them to no military conferences or
conventions. Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military
advantages."
This perfectly explicit dispatch was shown to Mr. Seward, then
handed to Mr. Stanton, who signed and sent it the night of March
3, 1865. Grant, the next day, answered Lee in the light of the
dispatch, saying:
"In regard to meeting you, I would state that I have no authority
to accede to your proposition for a conference on the subject
proposed. Such authority is vested in the President of the United
States alone."(13)
Thus ended the Ord-Longstreet attempt to patch up a peace.
There was one more remarkable attempt made (before Lee surrendered)
to bring about a peace in part of the Confederacy. General Lew
Wallace was ordered, January 22, 1865, "to visit the Rio Grande
and Western Texas on a tour of inspection." Shortly after his
arrival at Brazos Santiago, by correspondence with the Confederate
General J. E. Slaughter, commanding the West District of Texas,
and a Colonel Ford, he arranged for a meeting with them at Point
Isabel (General Wallace to furnish the refreshments), nominally to
discuss matters relating to the rendition of criminals, but really
to talk about peace. The conference took place March 12th. General
Wallace assumed only to negotiate a peace for States west of the
Mississippi. He did not profess to have any authority from
Washington, nor did he offer to make the terms final. He must have
been wholly ignorant of the President's dispatch to Grant of March
3d. Wallace's plan was, at Slaughter and Ford's instance, reduced
to writing, and addressed to them, to be submitted to the Confederate
General J. G. Walker, commanding the Department of Texas. Here it
is:
"_Proposition.
"I. That the Confederate military authorities of the Trans-
Mississippi States and Territories agree voluntarily to cease
opposition, armed and otherwise, to the re-establishment of the
authority of the United States Government over all the region above
designated.
"II. The proper authorities of the United States on their part
guarantee as follows:
"1. That the officers and soldiers at present actually comprising
the Confederate Army proper, including its _bona fide attaches_
and employees, shall have, each and all of them, a full release
from and against actions, prosecutions, liabilities, and legal
proceedings of every kind, so far as the government of the United
States is concerned: _Provided_, That if any of such persons choose
to remain within the limits of the United States, they shall first
take an oath of allegiance to the same. If, however, they or any
of them prefer to go abroad for residence in a foreign country,
all such shall be at liberty to do so without obligating themselves
by an oath of allegiance, taking with them their families and
property, with privileges of preparation for such departure.
"2. That such of said officers and soldiers as thus determine to
remain in the United States shall, after taking the oath of allegiance
to the United States Government, be regarded as citizens of that
government, invested as such will all the rights, privileges, and
immunities now enjoyed by the most favored citizens thereof.
"3. That the above guaranties shall be extended to all persons
now serving as civil officers of the national and State Confederate
governments within the region above mentioned, upon their complying
with the conditions stated, viz., residence abroad or taking the
oath of allegiance.
"4. That persons now private citizens of the region named shall
also be included in and receive the same guaranties upon their
complying with the same conditions.
"5. As respects rights of property, it is further guaranteed that
there shall be no interference with existing titles, liens, etc.,
of whatever nature, except those derived from seizures, occupancies,
and procedures of confiscation, under and by virtue of Confederate
laws, orders, proclamations, and decrees, all of which shall be
admitted void from the beginning.
"6. It is further expressly stipulated that the right of property
in slaves shall be referred to the discretion of the Congress of
the United States.
"Allow me to say, in conclusion, that if the above propositions
are received in the spirit they are sent, we can, in my opinion,
speedily have a reunited and prosperous people.
"Very truly, gentlemen, your friend and obedient servant,
"Lew Wallace,
"Major-General of Volunteers, U. S. Army."(14)
General Wallace forwarded this pretentious proposition, with an
elaborate letter, through General Dix to General Grant, who received
both about March 29, 1865, but probably made no response thereto.
The Confederate officers submitted the plan to their chief, who,
besides severely reprimanding them for entertaining it, wrote
General Wallace, March 27, rejecting the proposition, "as to accede
to it would be the blackest treason"; adding, that "whenever there
was a willingness to treat as equal with equal, an officer of your
high rank and character, clothed with proper authority, will not
be reduced to the necessity of seeking an obscure corner of the
Confederacy to inaugurate negotiations."
The whole story of attempts to negotiate a peace is grotesque, yet
the conditions surrounding the North and the South and the stress
of the times speak in defence of the ambitious spirits who came to
the front and essayed, by negotiations, to put an end to the war.
Providence had another, more fitting and consummate, ending in
store, whereby the war should produce results for the good of
mankind commensurate with its cost in tears, treasure, and blood.
( 1) _Life of R. E. Lee_, White (Putnam's), pp. 416-17.
( 2) _Manassas to Appomattox_, p. 204.
( 3) _Lincoln_ (Nicolay and Hay), vol. vii., pp. 367-8.
( 4) _War Between the States_, vol. ii., pp. 557-62, 780; _Lincoln_
(Nicolay and Hay), vol. vii., pp. 371-4.
( 5) Jewett must have attended school where the master required
the class to parse the sentence, "_Dog, I, and father went a-
hunting_."
( 6) _Lincoln_ (Nicolay and Hay), vol. ix., pp. 184-200.
( 7) Vol. ii., p. 610. Also see _Lincoln_ (N. and H.), vol. ix.,
pp. 201-2.
( 8) The attitude of the Democratic party caused the political
friends of President Lincoln the deepest anxiety. In its National
platform adopted at Chicago, August 30, 1864, it demanded, "that
after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment
of war, immediate efforts should be made for a cessation of
hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of the States,
or other peaceable means, to the end that at the earliest practicable
moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of
the States."
( 9) _Lincoln_ (Nicolay and Hay), vol. ix., pp. 216-21.
(10) If the reader is curious to know what effort was made by the
Confederate authorities to enlist slaves and free negroes as
soldiers, he will find interesting correspondence on the subject
between Davis, Lee, Longstreet, and others. _War Records_, vol.
xlvi., Part III., pp. 1315, 1339, 1356, 1348, 1366, 1370.
(11) Alexander H. Stephens had a small body, small head, and his
whole appearance was that of a most emaciated person. For many
years of his life he was in most delicate health; so feeble he
could not stand or walk. He was moved about in a chair with wheels.
His intellect, however, was strong and elastic, and his voice was
sufficient to enable him to make a public speech. He wrote much.
He was not always consistent in his views. He opposed secession,
then advocated it; then again denied that secession was warranted
by the Constitution. I knew him well in Congress after the war.
He asserted when some of his Democratic brethren were denying Mr.
Hayes' title to the Presidency, that it was superior to the title
of any President who had preceded him--that by virtue of the decision
of the commission, it had become _res adjudicata_.
(12) _Lincoln_ (Nicolay and Hay), vol. x., pp. 113-31; _Lost Cause_
(Pollard), pp. 684-5; _War between States_ (Stephens), vol. ii.,
pp. 597, 608-12.
(13) _Manassas to Appomattox_ (Longstreet), pp. 584-7; _Lincoln_
(Nicolay and Hay), vol. x., pp. 157-8.
(14) _War Records_, vol. xlviii., Part I., p. 1281.