Siege of Richmond and Petersburg--Capture and Re-capture of Fort
Stedman, and Capture of Part of the Enemy's First Line in Front of
Petersburg by Keifer's Brigade, March 25, 1865--Battle of Five
Forks, April 1st--Assault and Taking of Confederate Works on the
Union Left, April 2d--Surrender of Richmond and Petersburg, April
3d--President Lincoln's Visit to Petersburg and Richmond, and His
Death
The Sixth Corps, as we have seen, returned from its memorable
campaign in Maryland and the Shenandoah Valley to the front of
Petersburg about December 5, 1864. It relieved a portion of the
Fifth Corps. The right of my brigade rested on the Weldon Railroad,
extending to the left to include Forts Wadsworth and Keene. On
the night of the 9th, with other troops, the brigade went on an
expedition to Hatcher's Run, returning the next day. Again the
Sixth Corps constructed winter quarters. The brigade was moved,
February 9, 1865, to the extreme left of the army, near the Squirrel
Level road, where it took up a position including Forts Welch,
Gregg, and Fisher, of which the first two were unfinished and the
last named was barely commenced. The brigade completed the
construction of these forts. Colonel McClennan, with the 138th
Pennsylvania, also occupied Fort Dushane on the rear line.
The brigade, a third time for the winter, constructed quarters.
Discipline in the army continued in all its severity. During my
entire service but one instance occurred where I was required to
execute a Union soldier of my command. Private James L. Hicks, of
the 67th Pennsylvania, a boy nineteen years old, was found guilty
of desertion. He had deserted to go to Philadelphia, his home, in
company with a soldier of another command, much his senior, who
had forged a furlough for himself and Hicks. Both were arrested,
returned to the army, and convicted and sentenced to be shot.
General Meade ordered me to execute the sentence as to Hicks,
February 10, 1865. The man who was largely responsible for Hicks'
desertion succeeded, through friends, in inducing President Lincoln
to commute his sentence to imprisonment at the Dry Tortugas. I
was aware of efforts being made to have Hicks' sentence likewise
commuted, and I tried to reach the President with communications
asking the same leniency for Hicks. So certain was I that Lincoln
had or would reprieve Hicks that I failed to have him shot on the
day named. Some officious persons reported my dereliction to Meade,
who thereupon (with some censure) ordered me to shoot Hicks on the
next day, and to report in person the fact of the shooting. This
order I was obliged to obey. The brigade was drawn up on three
sides of a square, with ranks opened facing each other, and in the
centre of the fourth and open side a grave was dug and a coffin
was placed beside it. The condemned soldier was marched between
the ranks of the command, preceded by a drum and fife band, playing
the "dead-march," and then was taken to the coffin, where he was
blindfolded and required to stand in front of six men armed with
rifles, five only of which were loaded with ball. At the command
"_Fire!_" from a designated officer, the guns were discharged and
poor Hicks fell dead. He was placed in the coffin and forthwith
buried. On the same day word came that Lincoln had pardoned Hicks.
Wright's corps became the left of the besieging army, and all the
troops were constantly on the alert, never less than one tenth of
them on guard or in the trenches.
The several corps of the Army of the Potomac were then commanded
as follows: Second, by General A. A. Humphreys; Fifth, by General
G. K. Warren; Sixth, by General H. G. Wright; the Ninth, by General
J. G. Parke. The last named was on the right and in part south of
the Appomattox. The Army of the James was north of Richmond and
the James, commanded by General B. F. Butler, until relieved, on
the request of General Grant, January 8, 1865, when General E. O.
C. Ord succeeded him.
The army under Grant had been engaged since June, 1864, besieging
Richmond and Petersburg with no signal success. It had, however,
held the main army of the Confederacy closely within intrenchments
where it could do little harm, and was difficult to provide with
supplies. Prior to this siege the Army of the Potomac had met the
enemy, save at Gettysburg, on his chosen battle-fields, and in its
forward movements had been forced to attack breastworks, assail
the enemy in mountain passes or gaps, force the crossings of deep
rivers, always guarding long lines of communications over which
supplies must be brought, and it was at all times the body-guard
of the Capital--Washington.
The Confederate Army under Lee, when the last campaign opened, was
strongly fortified from the James River above Richmond, extending
around on the north to the James below Richmond; thence to and
across the Appomattox; thence south of Petersburg extending in an
unbroken line westward to the vicinity of Hatcher's Run, with
interior lines of works and forts for use in case the outer line
was forced. Longstreet commanded north of the James. Generals R.
S. Ewell, R. H. Anderson, A. P. Hill, and John B. Gordon commanded
corps of the Army of Northern Virginia south of Petersburg and the
James, the whole under Lee. At the last, Ewell commanded in Richmond
and its immediate defences. The Confederates had water-batteries
and naval forces on the James immediately below Richmond. Their
forts and connecting breastworks had been laid out and constructed
by skilled engineers, on a gigantic scale, with months, and, in
some places, years of labor. On most of the main line there were
enclosed field-forts, a distance of a quarter to a half mile apart,
connected by strong earthworks and some masonry, the whole having
deep ditches in front, the approaches to which were covered by
_abattis_ composed of pickets sunk deep in the ground close together,
the exposed ends sharpened, and placed at an angle of about forty-
five degrees, the points of the pickets about the height of a man's
face. There were in place _chevaux-de-frise_ and other obstructions.
These fortifications could not be battered down by artillery; they
had to be scaled. They contained many guns ranging from 6 to 200-
pounders, all well manned. The Union lines conformed, generally,
to the Confederate lines and were near to them, but, being the
outer, were necessarily the longer. Richmond and Petersburg were
twenty miles apart. The Union works were substantially of the same
structure and strength as the Confederate.
Forts Welch, Gregg, and Fisher, and connecting works, held by six
of my regiments, formed a loop on the extreme left, to prevent a
flank attack. These forts were about nine miles from City Point,
Grant's headquarters. In the centre of the loop was a high
observation tower.( 1) In our front the Confederates had an outer
line of works to cover their pickets, and we had a similar one to
protect ours. The main lines were, generally, in easy cannon range,
in most places within musket range, and the pickets of the two
armies were, for the most part, in speaking distance, and the men
often indulged in talking, for pastime. Except in rare instances
the sentinels did not fire on each other by day, but sometimes at
night firing was kept up by the Confederates at intervals to prevent
desertion. During the last months of the siege, circulars were
issued by Grant offering to pay deserters for arms, accoutrements,
and any other military supplies they would bring with them, and to
give them safe conduct north. The circulars were gotten into the
enemy's lines by various devices, chief among which was, by flying
kits at night when the wind blew in the right direction, to the
tail of which the circulars were attached. When the kites were
over the Confederate lines the strings were cut, thus causing them
to fall where the soldiers might find them.( 2) So friendly were
the soldiers of the two armies that by common consent the timber
between the lines was divided and cut and carried away for fuel.
Petersburg was in plain view, to the northeast, from my headquarters.
In front of my line an event took place which brought about the
speedy overthrow of the Confederacy.
With Sherman moving triumphantly northward through the Carolinas
the time was at hand for the final campaign of the Army of the
Potomac. President Lincoln and General Grant were each anxious
that army should, without the direct aid of the Western army,
overcome and destroy the Army of Northern Virginia, which it had
fought during so many years with varying success.( 3)
Grant issued orders, March 24, 1865, for a general movement, to
commence the 29th; the objective of the movement to be the Confederate
Army as soon as it could be forced out of the fortifications.
At the time Grant was writing these orders, Lee was planning an
assault to break the Union lines, hoping he might gain some material
success and thereby prevent an aggressive campaign against him.
General Gordon, accordingly, at early dawn, March 25th, assaulted
Fort Stedman, and, by a surprise, captured it and a portion of our
line adjacent to it; but Union troops, from the right and left,
assailed and recaptured the works and about four thousand of Gordon's
command, the Union loss in killed, wounded, and captured being
about twenty-five hundred. This daring attack, instead of delaying,
precipitated the preparatory work of opening the campaign. About
1 P.M. I received an order to send two regiments to my advanced
line with orders to charge and carry the outer line of the enemy.
The latter was strongly intrenched and held by a large number of
men, besides being close under the guns of the Confederate main
works. The 110th and 122d Ohio were moved outside the forts, and
Colonel Otho H. Binkley was ordered to take command of both regiments
and the picket guard. He charged the enemy, but being unsupported
on the flanks and being exposed to a fierce fire from guns in the
enemy's main works, was forced to retire after suffering considerable
loss. I protested, vehemently, against the renewal of the attack
with so small a force. General Wright thereupon ordered me to
assemble the number of men necessary to insure success, take charge
of them in person, and make the desired capture. I added to the
Ohio regiments mentioned the 67th Pennsylvania, portions of the
6th Maryland and 126th Ohio, and a battalion of the 9th New York
Heavy Artillery, and under a severe fire, at 3 P.M., without halting
or firing, charged over the enemy's first intrenched line, capturing
over two hundred prisoners. Notwithstanding a heavy artillery fire
concentrated upon us the captured works were held. Our loss was
severe and hardly compensated for by the number of the enemy killed
and captured. For my part in this affair I was complimented by
Meade in general orders.
It turned out that the section of works taken was more important
to us than first estimated.
Sheridan, with his cavalry, having recently arrived from the
Shenandoah Valley _via_ the White House, moved to the left on the
29th of March in the direction of Dinwiddie Court-House, where he
encountered a considerable force. A battle ensued on the 30th and
31st, in which Sheridan with his cavalry, in part dismounted, fought
some of the best cavalry and infantry of Lee's army, the former
commanded by Fitzhugh Lee and the latter by Pickett of Gettysburg
fame. By using temporary barricades, Sheridan, though outnumbered,
repulsed the attacks of Fitz Lee and Pickett, and at nightfall of
the 31st was in possession of the Court-House.
In consequence of incessant rain for two days Grant, from his
headquarters, then on Gravelly Run, issued orders the evening of
the 30th to suspend all further movements until the roads should
dry up; but he was visited by Sheridan and persuaded to continue
the campaign. Sheridan asked that the Sixth Corps should be ordered
to follow and support him.( 4) He claimed this corps had served
under him in the Valley and its officers were well known to him.
His request was not acceded to, as other work was already assigned
to Wright. Grant ordered Meade to send the Fifth Corps under
General G. K. Warren to reinforce Sheridan. Meade was directed to
"_urge Warren not to stop for anything_." Sheridan, April 1st,
determined to press the enemy, regardless of bad roads and his
isolated position. Pickett and Fitz Lee, heavily reinforced from
Lee's main army, concentrated in front of Five Forks, where they
intrenched.
Warren was ordered to push rapidly on the left of the enemy.
Sheridan promptly opened battle, but he was hard pressed throughout
the day. Warren, for some not satisfactorily explained cause, did
not arrive on the field and bring his three infantry divisions into
action until late in the day, but yet in time to strike the enemy
on his left and rear, as had been planned. Just at night a combined
assault of all arms completely overthrew Pickett and Fitz Lee,
taking six of their guns, thirteen battle-flags, and nearly six
thousand prisoners. The Confederates who escaped were cut off from
the remainder of Lee's army and thrown back on the upper Appomattox.
Warren, in the full flush of the victory, was, by Sheridan, with
Grant's previous authority, relieved on the battle-field from the
command of his corps for the alleged dilatory march to the relief
of the imperilled cavalry. Warren had long commanded the Fifth
Corps, and was beloved by it. But the fates of war were inexorable.
The removal of Warren was perhaps unjust, in the light of the
previous conduct of the war. He had not been insubordinate. He
had imbibed the notion too often theretofore acted on, that in the
execution of an important order, even when other movements depended
on it, the subordinate officer could properly exercise his own
discretion as to the time and manner of its execution. Warren was
a skilled engineer officer and held too closely in an emergency to
purely scientific principles. He had none of Sheridan's precipitancy,
and did not believe in violating, under any circumstances, principles
of war taught by the books. Before a subsequent court of inquiry
Warren produced what appeared to be overwhelming testimony from
experienced and distinguished officers of the army to the effect
that he had moved his corps to Five Forks with the energy and
celerity usually exhibited by an officer of ordinary skill and
ability.
Sheridan was called as a witness before the same court, and when
interrogated, corroborated the other officers' testimony, adding,
that it was not an officer of _ordinary_ skill and ability that
was required to meet an emergency when a battle was on, but one of
_extraordinary_ skill and ability; that officers of the former
class were plenty, but they were not fit to command an army corps
in time of battle. Sheridan wanted an officer like Desaix, who,
by putting his ear to the ground, heard the thunder of the guns at
Marengo, though far off, and marched to their sound without awaiting
orders, and to the relief of Napoleon, arriving in time to turn
defeat into victory, though losing his own life. Warren had many
friends and sympathizers, but he died many years after the war of
a broken heart.
In anticipation of Sheridan's success, orders were issued for the
Sixth Corps to assault Lee's main fortifications on Sunday morning,
April 2d. The place selected for the assault was in front and a
little to the left of Forts Fisher and Welch and directly opposite
the intrenched line taken by me on March 25th.( 5) Other corps to
the right of the Sixth were ordered to be ready to assault also.
It was originally intended the troops should be formed in the quiet
of the night, and that the assault should be made, as a surprise,
at four o'clock in the morning. Grant, fearing that Lee, in the
desperation of defeat at Five Forks, would strip his fortified
lines of troops to overwhelm and destroy Sheridan, now fairly on
Lee's right flank, at 10 P.M. on the night of the 1st ordered all
his guns turned loose from the James to the Union left, to give
the appearance of a readiness to do just what had been ordered to
be done. This fire brought a return fire all along the lines.
The night was dark and dismal, and the scene witnessed amid the
deafening roar of cannon was indescribably wild and grand. Duty
called some of us between the lines of cross-fire when the screaming
shot and bursting shell from perhaps four hundred heavy guns passed
over our heads. The world's war-history described no sublimer
display. Being near the end of the Rebellion, the Confederacy,
and the institution of slavery, it was a fitting closing scene.
It was supposed that in consequence of this artillery duel, which
lasted about two hours, the assault ordered would be abandoned, as
a surprise was not possible. But at 12, midnight, the order came
to take position for the attack. The Sixth Corps, in the gloom of
the damp, chilly night, silently left its winter quarters and filed
out to an allotted position within about two hundred yards of the
mouths of the enemy's cannon, there to await the discharge of a
gun from Fort Fisher, the signal for storming the works. There
were no light hearts in the corps that night, but there were few
faint ones. The soldiers of the corps knew the strength and
character of the works to be assailed. They had watched their
completion; they knew of the existence of the _abattis_ and the
deep ditches to be passed, as well as the high ramparts to be
scaled. The night added to the solemnity of the preparation for
the bloody work.
The Second Division was formed on the right, the Third Division on
the left, each in two lines of battle, about two hundred feet apart.
The First Division (Wheaton's) was in echelon by brigades, in
support on Getty's right.( 6) The corps was formed on ground lower
than that on which the enemy's fortifications were constructed.
There was an angle in the enemy's line in front of the corps as
formed at which there was a large fort. Getty's division was to
assault to the right and Seymour's to the left of this fort. My
brigade was to assault between it and the fort about a third of a
mile to its left. The connecting breastworks were strong, as has
been explained, with a deep ditch and formidable _abattis_ in their
front, and well manned and supplied with artillery. The enemy was
alert and opened fire on us with artillery and musketry before we
were completely formed, inflicting some loss. Long before the hour
for the signal the corps was ready. Much preparation is necessary
for a well delivered assault. Every officer should be personally
instructed as to his particular duties, as commands can rarely be
given after the troops are in motion. The pioneer corps with axe-
men were required to accompany the head of the column, to cut down
and remove obstructions and to aid the soldiers in crossing trenches
and scaling the works. The _abattis_ was to be cut down or torn
up, and, wherever possible, used in the ditches to provide means
of crossing them.
A narrow opening, just wide enough for a wagon to pass through,
was known to exist in the enemy's line in front of my brigade,
though it was skillfully covered by a shoulder around it. The
existence of this opening was discovered from the observation tower,
and deserters told of it. I determined to take advantage of it,
and therefore instructed Colonel Clifton K. Prentiss of the 6th
Maryland when the time for the attack came to move his regiment by
the flank rapidly through this opening without halting or firing,
and when within, open on the Confederates behind the works, taking
them in flank, and, if possible, drive them out and thus leave for
our other troops little resistance in gaining an entrance over the
ramparts.
At 4.40 A.M., while still dark, a gray light in the east being
barely discernible, Fort Fisher boomed forth a single shot. All
suspense here ended. Simultaneously the command, "_Forward_," was
given by all our officers, and the storming column moved promptly;
the advance line, with bayonets fixed, guns not loaded, the other
line with guns loaded to be ready to fire, if necessary, to protect
those in advance while passing the trenches. A few only of the
officers were on horseback. The enemy opened with musketry and
cannon, but the column went on, sweeping down the _abattis_, making
use of it to aid in effecting a passage of the deep ditches and to
gain a footing on the berme of the earthworks. Muskets and bayonets
were also utilized by thrusting them into the banks of the ditches
to enable the soldiers to climb from them. Men made ladders of
themselves by standing one upon another, thus enabling their comrades
to gain the parapets. The time occupied in the assault was short.
Colonel Prentiss with his Marylanders penetrated the fortifications
at the opening mentioned. They surprised the enemy by their presence
and a flank fire, and, as anticipated, caused him to fall back.
The storming bodies swarmed over the works, and the enemy immediately
in their front were soon killed, wounded, captured, or dispersed.
Ten pieces of artillery, three battle-flags, and General Heth's
headquarters flag were trophies of my command. The Third Division
gained an entrance first, owing to the shortness of the distance
it had to pass over. Getty's division (Second), however, promptly
obtained a foothold within the fortifications to the right of the
angle, followed on its right closely by Wheaton's division. The
fort at the salient angle was quickly evacuated, and the corps
charged forward, taking possession of the enemy's camps. Some hand-
to-hand fighting occurred on the ramparts of the fortifications
and in the camps, in which valuable lives were lost. A Confederate
soldier emerged from a tent, shot and killed Captain Henry H.
Stevens (110th Ohio), and immediately offered to surrender. One
week before a like incident occurred in my presence, where a
Confederate officer shot, with a pistol, a Union soldier, then
threw down his arms and proposed to surrender. Officers seldom
restrained soldiers from avenging, on the spot, such cowardly and
unsoldierly acts. Such incidents were, happily, very rare.
Though thus far the assault had been crowned with success, the
greatest danger was still before us. Experience had taught that
the fate which one week before befell Gordon at Fort Stedman was
a common fate of troops who, in a necessarily broken state, gained
an entrance inside of an energetic enemy's lines. Our position
was not dissimilar to Gordon's after he had taken Fort Stedman.
To our left was a strong, closed star-fort, well manned and supplied
with cannon. It was impossible at once to restore order. Many of
our men passed, without orders, far to the north, some as far as
the Southside Railroad leading into Petersburg, which they began
to tear up.
One important incident must be mentioned.
Corporal John W. Mouk (138th Pennsylvania), with one comrade, having
penetrated in the early morning some distance in advance of our
other troops, was met by a Confederate general officer, accompanied
by his staff. The general demanded his surrender, whereupon the
corporal fired and killed him. He proved to be Lieutenant-General
A. P. Hill, then in command of Lee's right wing, and one of the
ablest officers the Confederacy produced. The corporal and his
comrade escaped, and Hill's staff bore his body away. It has been
claimed the corporal deceived Hill by pretending to surrender until
the General was in his power, then shot him. I investigated this
incident at the time and became convinced the corporal practised
no deception, and that his deliberate conduct--natural to him--led
Hill and his staff to assume he intended to surrender.
But to return to the captured works. I entered them on horseback,
with some of my staff, close after Colonel Prentiss. Up to this
time no general orders had been given, save those promulgated prior
to the assault. The ranks were much broken, regiments were
intermingled, and excitement prevailed. I was charged with the
duty of carrying the next fort to our left. The steady fire on us
from this fort helped to recall the troops to a sense of danger.
Day was just dawning. I ordered Major S. B. Larmoeaux (9th New
York Heavy Artillery) to man such of the captured artillery as was
available. He soon had four guns firing on the fort, under cover
of which I ordered a general rush of the still disordered Union
troops on the fort. This charge resulted in its capture with six
more guns and a number of prisoners. The real danger was still
not passed. It was soon discovered that a Confederate division
was advancing on us from a camp to our left. As the men now in
the captured fort were in a disorganized state I made, with the
aid of other officers, every effort to withdraw the surplus men
for the purpose of formation and to relieve it of a too crowded
condition for defence. We also tried to man the guns of the fort.
Before we were prepared the enemy was upon us in a counter charge,
and the fort, with its guns, was lost, and some of our men were
taken; the greater number, however, escaped to a position still
within the captured lines. In this affair not many were killed or
wounded. The final ordeal was now on us. From the fort again came
shot, shell, and rifle-balls on our unprotected men. Under cover
of the fire of the before-mentioned captured artillery (having, by
that time, discovered an ample supply of ammunition) we succeeded
in making a somewhat confused formation, and again charged the
fort. The resistance was obstinate, but it was now light enough
to distinguish friend from foe. Though of short duration, the most
determined and bloody fight of the day took part on the ramparts
of and in this fort, resulting in our again taking it, and with it
its guns and most of the Confederate division. The brave Colonel
Prentiss as he led a storming column over the parapet of the fort,
was struck by a ball which carried away a part of his breast-bone
immediately over his heart, exposing its action to view. He fell
within the fort at the same moment the commander of the Confederate
battery fell near him with what proved to be a mortal wound. These
officers, lying side by side, their blood commingling on the ground,
there recognized each other. They were brothers, and had not met
for four years. They were cared for in the same hospitals, by the
same surgeons and nurses, with the same tenderness, and in part by
a Union chaplain, their brother. The Confederate, after suffering
the amputation of a leg, died in Washington in June, 1865, and
Colonel Prentiss died in Brooklyn, N. Y., the following August.
Our hard fighting and bloody work for the day ended with the struggle
just described. We, a little later, with others of the corps,
swept to the left to the vicinity of Hatcher's Run, carrying
everything before us. We then, with the other divisions of the
corps, turned back towards Petersburg, reaching an inner line of
works by 10 A.M.
General Parke with the Ninth Corps made a vigorous assault in front
of Fort Sedgwick near the Jerusalem plank-road at the same time
the Sixth made its assault, and with some success, but failed to
gain a permanent footing inside of the enemy's main fortifications.
The Sixth Corps alone made a secure lodgment within Lee's lines.
It made a rift in the Confederacy.
The army then believed the end of the war was near, but blood enough
had not yet been spilled to destroy human slavery.
General Ord, who had been transferred from the front of Richmond,
met and drove back some troops on Hatcher's Run, and Sheridan
advanced from Five Forks to the Appomattox, thence, uniting with
Ord, proceeded down it towards Petersburg. The left of Grant's
army was thrown across the Southside Railroad to the Appomattox
above Petersburg, and some isolated inner forts were taken, and
the enemy was crowded into his last line in the suburbs of Petersburg.
Grant ordered a general assault to be made at 6 A.M. of the 3d.
Thus far, since the general movement commenced, Lee had lost about
12,000 prisoners and about 50 guns. The killed and wounded were
not proportionately great. Lee had been forced to withdraw Longstreet
from north of Richmond, leaving his lines there very slimly defended.( 7)
General Weitzel had been left with a division north of the
James to threaten Richmond. Lee, early on the 2d, realized the
critical situation, and at 10.30 of that memorable Sabbath morning
wired Mr. Breckinridge, Secretary of War, at Richmond:
"I see no prospect of doing more than holding our position here
until night. I am not certain I can do that. If I can I shall
withdraw to-night north of the Appomattox, and, if possible, it
will be better to withdraw the whole line to-night from James River.
I advise that all preparations be made for leaving Richmond to-
night. I will advise you later according to circumstances."
This was handed to Mr. Davis while at church. He arose quietly
and retired, but the portent of the message was soon known and
caused great consternation among the inhabitants of the Confederate
Capital. For almost four years Richmond had been the defiant centre
of the rebellion. Now it was to be abandoned on less than twelve
hours' notice.
Jefferson Davis wired Lee:
"The Secretary of War has shown me your dispatch. To move to-night
will cause the loss of many valuables, both for the want of time
to pack and of transportation. Arrangements are progressing, and
unless you otherwise advise the start will be made."
Lee responded:
"I think it absolutely necessary that we should abandon our position
to-night. I have given all the necessary orders on the subject to
the troops, and the operation, though difficult, I hope will be
performed successfully. I have directed General Stevens to send
an officer to your Excellency to explain the routes to you by which
the troops will be moved to Amelia Court-House, and furnish you
with a guide and any assistance you may require for yourself."( 8)
Richmond and Petersburg were evacuated the night of April 2d. The
troops in and around the two cities commenced to retire at 8 P.M.,
and were directed to concentrate at Amelia Court-House, about sixty
miles distant, where Lee had ordered supplies for his army to be
collected. Ewell withdrew the troops north of Richmond and the
marines from the James. There was insufficient transportation for
the archives and other valuables of the several departments of the
Confederacy, to say nothing of other public and private property.
Army supplies had to be destroyed or abandoned. A panic seized
the city, and in burning some public stores it took fire in two
places, and but for the arrival, about 8 A.M. of the 3d, of Union
troops from Weitzel's command, it would have burned down. Petersburg
suffered little in the evacuation. Its mayor and council surrendered
it about 4 A.M. of the 3d. The besieging army, so long striving
for its possession, was not permitted to enter it.
President Lincoln was at City Point when the movement of Grant's
army commenced, and remained until Richmond and Petersburg fell.
Grant, on the 2d, in anticipation of further success, suggested
that the President visit him at the front next day. Mr. Lincoln
accordingly met Grant in Petersburg the morning of its surrender
and held an interview with him of an hour and a half. Secretary
Stanton, learning that the President contemplated going to the
front, wired from Washington on the morning of the 3d, protesting
against his exposing "the nation to the consequence of any disaster
to himself in the pursuit of a dangerous enemy like the rebel army."
The President answered from City Point at 5 P.M.:
"Yours received. Thanks for your caution, but I have already been
to Petersburg. Staid with Grant an hour and a half and returned
here. It is certain now that Richmond is in our hands, and I will
go there to-morrow. I will take care of myself."( 9)
Mr. Lincoln made his entry into Richmond on the 4th (on foot from
a boat), almost without personal protection, and excited the highest
interest of the people, especially of the slaves, who looked upon
and adored him as their savior. There were no bounds to their
rejoicing. He, while there, in consultation with Judge J. A.
Campbell and other former Confederate leaders, talked of plans of
reconstruction, and went so far as to sanction the calling of the
Confederate Legislature of Virginia together with a view to its
withdrawing the Virginia troops from the army.(10)
He was in a generous mood, willing to concede much to secure a
speedy restoration of the Union.
Mr. Campbell reports the President's position thus:
"His indispensable conditions are the restoration of the authority
of the United States and the disbanding of the troops, and no
receding on his part from his position on the slavery question as
defined in his message in December and other official documents.
All other questions to be settled on terms of sincere liberality.
He says that to any State that will promptly accept these terms he
will relinquish confiscation, except where third persons have
acquired adverse interests."(11)
Abraham Lincoln returned from Richmond to Washington filled to
overflowing with hope, joy, and thoughts of generous treatment of
his rebellious countrymen. He, too, was soon to become a sacrifice
in atonement for his nation's sins. He fell, at the apex of human
glory, by the hands of a disloyal assassin, April 14, 1865.(12)
The great and the humble friends of freedom, not only of his own
country but of the world, wept. He had been permitted, however,
to look through the opening portals of peace upon a restored Union
with universal freedom, under one flag.
( 1) See map, and _Battles and Leaders of the War_, vol. iv., p.
538.
( 2) One enterprising Confederate managed to escape to our lines
with a wagon and six mules from a party gathering wood. His outfit
was valued at $1200.
( 3) Grant's _Memoirs_, vol. ii., p. 460.
( 4) _Memoirs of Sheridan_, vol. ii., pp. 145-7.
( 5) General Wright, speaking of this position in his report of
the storming of the fortifications at Petersburg, says:
"It should here be remarked that, but for the success of the 25th
ultimo, in which was carried the intrenched line of the enemy,
though at a cost in men which at the time seemed hardly to have
warranted the movement, the attack of the 2d inst. on the enemy's
main lines could not have been successful. The position thus gained
was an indispensable one to the operations on the main lines, by
affording a place for the assembling of assaulting columns within
striking distance of the enemy's main intrenchments." _War Records_,
vol. xlvi., Part I., p. 903.
( 6) _War Records_, vol. xlvi., Part I., p. 954.
( 7) _Manassas to Appomattox_, pp. 603-5.
( 8) _War Records_, vol. xlvi., Part III., p. 1378.
( 9) _War Records_, vol. xlvi., Part III., p. 509.
(10) _Ibid_., pp. 612, 655-7, 724-5.
(11) _War Records_, vol. xlvi., Part III., p. 723.
(12) Abraham Lincoln, on the evening of March 14, 1865, attended
Ford's Theatre in Washington in company with Mrs. Lincoln, Miss
Harris, and Major Henry R. Rathbone (daughter and stepson of Senator
Ira Harris of New York), and while in a private box (at 10 P.M.)
was shot by John Wilkes Booth. The bullet entered his head on the
left side, passed through the brain, and lodged behind the left
eye. He was carried to a house across the street, where he died
(never being conscious after the shot) at twenty-two minutes after
seven the morning of April 15, 1865. Secretary Stanton, standing
by him as his life went out, more than prophetically said: "_Now
he belongs to the ages_."
An attempt was made the same night to assassinate Secretary Wm. H.
Seward, which came near being successful. He was, also his son
Frederick, terribly wounded and beaten.