Battle of Cedar Creek, October 19, 1864, with Comments Thereon--
Also Personal Mention and Incidents
General Early, upon his arrival at Fisher's Hill with his reorganized
army, assumed, on the 13th of October, an aggressive attitude by
pushing a division of infantry north of Strasburg and his cavalry
along the Back road towards Cedar Creek. This brought on sharp
engagements, in which Colonel Thoburn's division of Crook's corps
and Custer's cavalry participated. Early seems to have acted in
the belief that all but Crook's command had gone to Petersburg.
This action resulted in bringing Wright back to Cedar Creek, as we
have seen.
Secretary Stanton, by telegram on the 13th, summoned Sheridan to
Washington for consultation as to the latter's future operations.
Early, having met unexpected resistance, withdrew his forces at
night to Fisher's Hill, and quiet being restored, Sheridan started
on the 16th to Washington, _via_ Front Royal and Manassas Gap. He
took with him as far as Front Royal his cavalry, under Torbert,
intending to push them through Chester Gap to the Virginia Central
Railroad at Charlottesville, to make an extensive raid east of the
Blue Ridge.
Early had a signal station on Three Top Mountain in plain view of
our signal officers, who knew the Confederate signal code. From
this station there was flagged, on the 16th, this message:
"To Lieutenant-General Early:
"Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush
Sheridan.
"Longstreet, Lieutenant-General."
Wright, who was left in command of the army at Cedar Creek, forwarded
this message to Sheridan, who received it when near Front Royal.
Wright, also, in a communication accompanying the message, expressed
fear of an attack in the absence of the cavalry. He anticipated
that it would fall on his right. Sheridan, deeming it best to be
on the safe side, abandoned the cavalry raid, and ordered Torbert
to report back to Wright, cautioning the latter to be well on his
guard, and expressing the opinion to Wright that if attacked he
could beat the enemy.( 1) Sheridan with a cavalry escort proceeded
to Rectortown, the terminus of the railroad; there took cars, and
arrived in Washington the morning of the 17th. He held a consultation
with Stanton and Halleck, and with certain members of his staff
left Washington at 12 M. by rail, arriving the evening of the same
day at Martinsburg. Here he was met by an escort of three hundred
cavalry. He left Martinsburg the next morning (18th), and reached
Winchester about 3 P.M., twenty-two miles distant. He tarried at
the latter place over night, making some survey of the surrounding
heights as to their utility for fortifications.
But to return to his army. Torbert reached Cedar Creek with the
cavalry on the 17th. The Longstreet message was a ruse. Longstreet,
though in Richmond, was not on duty, not having fully recovered
from his wound received in the Wilderness.( 2)
The position of the opposing armies the night of the 18th of October
can be briefly stated.
The Union Army was encamped on each side of the turnpike, facing
southward, and north of Cedar Creek, a tributary of the Shenandoah,
which, flowing in general direction from northwest to southeast,
empties into the river about two miles west of Strasburg. The
north branch of the Shenandoah flows northward to Fisher's Hill,
thence bending to the eastward at the foot of and around the north
end of Three Top (or Massanutten) Mountain, thence, forming a
junction with the south branch, past Front Royal to the west and
again northward, emptying into the Potomac at Harper's Ferry.
Crook's two divisions, Colonel Joseph Thoburn and Colonel Rutherford
B. Hayes commanding, were wholly to the east of the pike; Thoburn's
division well advanced, his front conforming to the course of the
creek; the Nineteenth Corps (Emory's), two divisions, lay on each
side of the pike, covering the bridge and ford in its immediate
front, and the Sixth was on Emory's right. Ricketts, Wheaton, and
Getty's divisions of the Sixth were encamped in the order named
from left to right. Meadow Brook (sometimes called Marsh Run), a
small stream, with rugged banks, flowing from north to south and
emptying into Cedar Creek, separated the left of Ricketts' division
from the right of the Nineteenth Corps. The Sixth Corps' front
conformed to the line of Cedar Creek; Getty's division being retired,
and consequently much nearer than the others to Middletown. My
brigade was the left of the Sixth, and its left rested on Meadow
Brook. Merritt's cavalry was in close proximity to Getty's right.
Custer was about one and a half miles to Merritt's right, on the
Back road beyond a range of hills and near the foot of Little North
Mountain. The whole course of the Back road is through a rough
country not adapted to cavalry operations. Powell's cavalry division
was near Front Royal. Army headquarters were at the Belle Grove
House on the heights west of the pike, immediately in rear of the
right of the Nineteenth Corps. Wright's headquarters were a short
distance to the rear of Sheridan's.
The supply and baggage trains of our army were about one mile behind
its right centre and about the same distance from Middletown, a
village twelve miles south of Winchester, and about two miles north
of the Cedar Creek bridge. Getty and Merritt's camps were, in
general, westward of Middletown. The front of our army covered
about two miles; Custer's and Thoburn's divisions, on the right
and left, being outside of this limit.
The Union Army was not intrenched, save a portion of the Nineteenth
and Eighth Corps. Owing to reports that Early had withdrawn
southward, Wright ordered a brigade of the Nineteenth Corps to
start at daylight of the 19th to make a strong reconnoissance.
The Union troops, except only the usual guards and pickets, quietly
slept in their tents the night of the 18th of October.
The Confederate Army was encamped on Fisher's Hill, two miles south
of Strasburg and about six miles from the centre of the Union Army,
measured by the pike. Three Top Mountain was east and south of a
bend of the Shenandoah; its north end abutting close up to the
river. General J. B. Gordon and Captain Hotchkiss, from the
Confederate signal station of Three Top, on the 18th, with field-
glasses, marked the location of all the Union camps, and on their
report Early decided to attack the next morning.( 3) Accordingly,
Gordon, Ramseur, and Pegram's divisions and Payne's cavalry brigade
were moved in the night across the river, thence along the foot of
Three Top Mountain, and along its north end eastward to and again
across the river at Bowman and McIntorf's Fords below the mouth of
Cedar Creek, and thence, by 4 A.M., to a position east of the main
camp of Crook's corps. These divisions were under Gordon. Kershaw
and Wharton's divisions marched by the pike to the north of Strasburg,
and there separated; the former moving to the eastward, accompanied
by Early. Kershaw crossed Cedar Creek at Robert's Ford, about one
and a half miles above its mouth, which brought him in front of
Thoburn of Crook's corps. Wharton, followed by all of Early's
artillery, continued on the pike and took position in advance of
Hupp's Hill, less than a mile south of the bridge over Cedar Creek.
He had orders to push across the bridge as soon as Gordon made an
attack on the Union left and rear, and thus bring the artillery
into action. Lomax's cavalry division, theretofore posted in Luray
Valley, was ordered to elude Powell's cavalry, join the right of
Gordon, and co-operate with him in the attack. Rosser's cavalry
divisions were pushed up the night of the 18th close in front of
Custer, with orders to attack simultaneously with Gordon. The
enemy did not know Sheridan was absent from his army, and Payne's
cavalry, which accompanied Gordon, was ordered to penetrate to the
Belle Grove House and make him a prisoner.( 4)
Wright was in command of the army for all military operations, but
otherwise it was commanded in Sheridan's name, during his absence,
by his staff. Few of the army knew Sheridan was away when the
battle opened.
At 4 A.M. the still sleeping Union Army was aroused by sharp firing
far off on its right. Rosser had attacked Custer; but though there
was some surprise, Custer held his ground. This was the initial
attack, but almost at the moment Rosser's guns were heard came an
assault on Thoburn by Kershaw, followed at once by Gordon with his
three divisions and Payne's cavalry on Hayes' division of Crook's
corps. Besides being surprised Crook's divisions were largely
outnumbered, and, consequently, after a short and desperate
resistance, both divisions were broken and somewhat dispersed.
Thoburn was killed. The officers heroically did all in their power
to rally the men, but some were captured, and seventeen pieces of
artillery lost. Early soon joined Gordon with Kershaw, and together
they fell on the left of the Nineteenth Corps, which was at the
same time assailed in front by Wharton with all Early's artillery.
The Nineteenth shared the fate of Crook's corps, and was soon broken
and flying to the rear. This brought Early's five infantry divisions
and his artillery together on the heights near the Belle Grove
House, from whence they could operate against the Sixth Corps.
Sheridan's headquarters were captured, his staff being forced to
fly with such official papers as they could collect. Crook and
Emory's commands were routed before it was fully day-dawn. The
position of our cavalry was such that it could render no immediate
aid against the main attack. Gordon prolonged his line towards
Middletown, facing generally to the westward, and was joined on
his right by some irregular cavalry, part of which appeared north
of Middletown. These forces threatened our ammunition and other
trains. A thick fog helped to conceal the enemy's movements. The
disaster sustained must not be attributed to a want of skill and
bravery on the part of the troops of the Eighth and Nineteenth.
Crook, aided by such gallant officers as Colonels Thoburn, Thomas
M. Harris, and Milton Wells of the First, and Colonels R. B. Hayes,
H. F. Devol, James M. Comly, and B. F. Coates of his Second Division,
and Emory, assisted by Generals McMillen and Dwight and Colonels
Davis and Thomas of his First, and Generals Grover and Birge and
Colonels Porter, Molineux, Dan. McCauley, and Shunk of his Second
Division, did all possible under the circumstances to avert calamity.
No braver or more skillful officers could be found. These corps
were victims of a surprise. Their position was badly chosen, and
not well protected by pickets and guards. There is no necessity
to defend the good name of the officers and men who were so
ingloriously routed. The battle, so successful thus far for Early,
was, however, not over, nor was he to have continued good fortune.
Wright had retained the active command of the Sixth Corps, though
by virtue of seniority he was in command of the army. He, as soon
as the attack was made, turned his corps over to Ricketts, who
turned the command of his division (Third) over to me, and I turned
my brigade over to Colonel Wm. H. Ball of the 122d Ohio. My division
was the next to be struck by Early's troops. It had time, however,
to break camp, form, and face about to the eastward. Before it
was fairly daylight, my old brigade, under Colonel Ball, had crossed
Meadow Brook by my order and was advancing up the heights near the
Belle Grove House. Ball's brigade was run through by the broken
troops of the Nineteenth, and it was feared for a time it could
not be held steady. The enemy swung across the Valley pike to my
left and rear, and thus completely isolated my division from other
Union troops. Notwithstanding this situation the division firmly
held its exposed position. To cover a wider front the brigades
were fought and manoeuvred separately in single battle line, and
often faced in different directions. I soon found I was able to
drive or hold back any enemy in front of any part of my command.
The fighting became general and furious and promised an early
success to our arms. Wheaton, next on my right, and Getty next on
his right as camped, likewise faced about and moved eastward towards
the pike to meet the enemy already in possession of it immediately
south of Middletown. Getty encountered some of Gordon's infantry
and cavalry among our trains. Getty and Wheaton were soon widely
separated from each other, and Wheaton, the nearest, was still not
within a half mile of my division, which was the farthest south.
The broken troops of the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps had retreated
as far as Middletown, and some soon reached Newtown, pressing onward
towards Winchester, carrying exaggerated reports of disaster to
the whole army. Custer's cavalry was still held in Cedar Creek
Valley by Rosser. Merritt came gallantly to the rescue, and by 7
A.M. the enemy were confronted at every point and held at bay.
Getty met a strong force along Meadow Brook, near Middletown, but
maintained himself, though his right flank was assailed by one of
Gordon's divisions. Wheaton fought his division in the interval
between Getty's and my divisions, he having frequently to change
front, as had the other divisions, to meet flanking columns of the
enemy. The complete isolation of the divisions of the Sixth Corps
rendered it impossible for their commanders to know the real
situation throughout the field, and neither of them had any assurance
of co-operation or assistance from the others. My division, being
the farthest south, was in great danger of being cut off. Each
division maintained, from 6 A.M. until after 9 A.M., a battle of
its own. Neither division was, during that time, driven from its
position by any direct attack made on it, and every change of
position by any considerable part of the Sixth Corps was deliberately
made under orders and while not pressed by the enemy in front.
Wright was with Getty or Wheaton until assured of their ability to
cover the trains and to hold their ground. Ricketts, in command
of the corps, after directing me to hold my position near Cedar
Creek until further orders, left me, promising soon to return with
assistance, but about 7 A.M. he fell pierced through the chest with
a rifle ball, and was borne from the field.( 5) The command of
the corps then devolved on Getty, and the command of his division
of General L. A. Grant of Vermont.
About 8 A.M. Wright came to me with information of Getty and
Wheaton's success. He said he would soon have cavalry on the
enemy's right flank, and that he believed the battle could be won.
He was tranquil, buoyant, and self-possessed. He did not seem to
pay any attention to a wound under his chin, made by a passing
bullet, though he was bleeding profusely. He had no staff officer
with him, and was without escort.( 6) I ordered Captain Damon of
my staff to report to him. Wright repeated Ricketts' order to hold
my division behind Meadow Brook well down to Cedar Creek. This I
had been enabled to do when not threatened on my left flank. It
must be remembered that after 6 A.M. the divisions of the corps
having been faced about, and the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps driven
to the rear, Getty's division became the left, Wheaton's the centre,
and my division the right of the army, the whole line facing, in
general, eastward. In this position, isolated as before stated,
the divisions maintained the battle. My greatest anxiety arose of
the possibility of the ammunition of the men becoming exhausted.
One officer conducted to us through the fog, smoke, and confusion
a considerable supply of cartridges in boxes strapped on mules.
Colonel Ball sent Captain R. W. Wiley of his staff to hasten forward
another such mule-caravan. Owing to a change in the location of
the brigade, he conducted it within the Confederate lines. Captain
Wiley was the only officer of my division captured in the day's
battle.
Getty, who had successfully fought with his division near Middletown,
took up a position before 10 A.M. with the left of his division
resting on the turnpike north of the town about three fourths of
a mile.
My division was fiercely engaged all the morning. Colonel Tompkins,
Chief of Artillery of the Sixth Corps, assembled a number of guns
on the plateau to my left under Captains McKnight and Adams. They
were unsupported by infantry. The enemy approached under cover of
the smoke and fog and captured most of them. Under my direction,
Colonel W. H. Henry and Captain C. K. Prentiss with the 10th Vermont
and 6th Maryland changed front and retook them after a fierce
struggle. The guns not disabled were drawn off by hand. My position
was in open ground along the crest of a ridge, right resting near
Cedar Creek, covering Marsh Run (or Meadow Brook). The enemy forced
a crossing of the Run near its mouth, but soon were driven back;
then a fierce attack came on my left from a large force. This too
was repulsed. The battle raged with alternate assaults on the
front and flanks of my division. They were each repulsed with
considerable loss to the enemy. The situation grew so promising
that about 9 A.M. I ordered a general charge along the whole line.
This was promptly made, and the enemy were driven to the east of
Marsh Run, and complete success seemed assured, when a large force
of the enemy again appeared on my left in the direction of Middletown.
The charge had to be suspended and combinations made to meet the
new danger. The battle still raged with great fury, my line being
frequently compelled to change front to meet the flank attacks.
Sometimes a portion of it faced northward, another eastward, and
another southward. The enemy was at no time able to drive us.
All changes of position were made under my orders and after the
enemy had been repulsed in his direct attacks. The importance of
uniting the divisions of the Sixth Corps was kept in mind, and as
the enemy was driven back on my left, my command slowly moved
northward towards Getty and Wheaton's battles. My battle had been
maintained, in general, a mile and more southwestward of Middletown
and in the vicinity of our camps of the night before. Getty and
Wheaton had thus far fought their divisions near Marsh Run to the
south of Middletown. Before 10 A.M., I reached the Woollen Mill
road that ran parallel to the general line my troops were then
holding and almost at right angles to the turnpike, westward to
Cedar Creek from the south end of Middletown. At this time the
enemy was in my front, and our flanks were no longer threatened.
He had suspended further attacks with his infantry, but concentrated
on us a heavy artillery fire which our guns returned. We had lost
few prisoners; even the wounded of the division had been brought
off. The men were in compact order and no demoralization had taken
place. The captured and missing from the division the entire day
was two officers and thirty-four men.( 7) From this last position
I leisurely moved the division to the left and rear over the Old
Forge road (which extended west from the Valley pike at the north
end of Middletown over Middle Marsh Brook and a ridge to the Creek),
passing Wheaton's front, and united with Getty's right. Emerson's
brigade of the division through a mistake temporarily moved a short
distance north of the line designated, but the error was promptly
corrected. Colonel Ball was then, by me, directed to cover the
front of the entire division with a heavy line of skirmishers, and
he accordingly deployed the 110th Ohio and 138th Pennsylvania under
Lieutenant-Colonel Otho H. Binkley, and moved them about three
hundred yards to the front along the outskirts of a woods, with
orders to hold the enemy in check as long as possible if attacked.
Orders were at once given to resupply the troops with ammunition.
Wheaton's division soon formed on my right, and for the first time
after the battle opened the Sixth Corps was united.
The enemy was now in possession of the camps (except of the cavalry)
of our army, and was flushed with success. Wright had given orders
for all the broken troops to be re-organized, and for Merritt and
Custer's cavalry to move from the right to the left of the army,( 8)
and the division commanders were told the enemy would be attacked
about 12 M.
We left Sheridan at Winchester. He remained there the night of
the 18th of October. Before rising in the morning an officer on
picket duty in front of the city reported artillery firing in the
direction of his army. Sheridan interpreted this as a strong
reconnoissance in which the enemy was being felt. He had been
notified the night before that Wright had ordered such a reconnoissance.
Further reports of heavy firing having reached him, he, at 8.30
A.M. started to join his army. When he reached Mill Creek just
south of Winchester, with his escort following, he distinctly heard
the continuous roar of artillery, which satisfied him his army was
engaged in strong battle. As he approached Kearnstown and came
upon a high place in the road, he caught sight of some demoralized
soldiers, camp followers, and baggage and sutler wagons, in great
confusion, hurrying to the rear. There were in this mixed mass
sutlers and their clerks, teamsters, bummers, cow-leaders, servants,
and all manner of camp followers. The sight greatly disturbed
Sheridan; it was almost appalling to him. Such a scene in greater
or less degree may usually be witnessed in the rear of any great
army in battle. The common false reports of the army being all
overwhelmed and in retreat were proclaimed by these flying men as
justification of their own disgraceful conduct. Sheridan,
notwithstanding his experience as a soldier, was impressed with
the belief that his whole army was defeated and in retreat.( 9)
He formed, while riding through these people, erroneous impressions
of what had taken place in the morning battle which were never
removed from his mind. The steady roar of guns and rattle of
musketry should have told him that some organized forces were, at
least, baring their breasts bravely to the enemy and standing as
food for shot and shell. Sheridan mistook the disorganized horde
he passed through for substantial portions of a wholly routed army,
and this mistake prevented him, even later, from clearly understanding
the real situation.
He first met Torbert, his Chief of Cavalry, and from him only
learned what had taken place to the left of and around Middletown.
Torbert, who had not been to the right, where the battle with
infantry had raged for hours, assumed that demoralization extended
over that part of the field. Next Sheridan came to Getty's division
(10.30 A.M.),(10) and finding it and its brave commander in unbroken
line, facing the foe, assumed without further investigation that
no other infantry troops were doing likewise. He justly gives
Getty's division and the cavalry credit for being "in the presence
of and resisting the enemy."(11) Getty, though theretofore in
command of the Sixth Corps, did not pretend to know the position
or the previous movements of the army. He had remained constantly
with his division, and wisely held the turnpike, covering our left
flank and trains. This, too, was according to Wright's order.
When Sheridan arrived Getty was not actually engaged, but the enemy
were, at long range, firing artillery. A shot passed close to
Sheridan as he approached Getty. After the first salutation,
Sheridan said to Getty: "Emory's corps is four miles to your rear,
and Wheaton's division of your corps is two miles in your rear.
I will form them on your division." Sheridan then said nothing of
Crook's corps, or of the Third Division of the Sixth, which I
commanded.(12)
Up to this time Sheridan had not met Wright, who was on the right
of the army, nor could Sheridan see from the pike the troops of my
division nor of Wheaton's, still to my right. My division was at
no time as far to the rear as the left of Getty's line. Wright
confirms my recollection of the position of my division at the time
of Sheridan's arrival, but his recollection is that Wheaton had
not completed a connection with my right.(13)
Colonel Ball, in his report dated the day after the battle, speaking
of the final movement of the Second Brigade of my division to
connect with Getty's division, correctly says: "We were ordered
to move obliquely to the _left and rear_ and connect with the right
of the Second Division." Instead of having to _advance_ to form
line with Getty it was necessary to move obliquely to the _rear_.
By about 10 A.M., the divisions of the Sixth Corps were united,
the organized troops of our army were in line, and the enemy's
flank movements were over. Thenceforth he had to meet us in front.
Our trains were protected, and there was no thought of further
retiring. The Sixth Corps had not lost any of its camp equipage,
not a wagon, nor, permanently, a piece of artillery. Its organization
was perfect, and there were no stragglers from its ranks. A strong
line of skirmishers had been thrown forward and the men resupplied
with ammunition.
An incident here occurred which came near causing my dismissal from
the army. Colonel J. W. Snyder, of the 9th New York Heavy Artillery,
on being ordered to hold his command ready for an early advance,
notified me his men were practically out of ammunition, and that
the ordnance officer reported there were no cartridges to be had
of suitable size. This was the only regiment in the command armed
with smooth-bore .69 calibre muskets. They required buck and ball.
The other troops were armed with rifles, .58 calibre. I ordered
the Colonel to instruct his men to throw away their muskets as fast
as rifles could be found on the field to take their places. This
his men eagerly did, and Colonel Snyder soon reported his regiment
ready for action, with rifles in their hands and forty rounds of
cartridges. This regiment, a very large and splendid one (three
battalions, four companies each), was thus kept in line to participate
in the impending conflict. After the incident had been almost
forgotten a letter came through the army channels from the Chief
of Ordnance at Washington, advising me that the captains of companies
of the 9th New York had reported, severally, that their men had
thrown away their muskets "October 19, 1864, by order of Colonel
Keifer, division commander," and asking me for an explanation of
the reprehensible order. I plead guilty and stated the circumstances
giving rise to the unusual order, but soon received a further
communication from the same officer informing me that my name had
been sent to the President, through the Secretary of War, for
dismissal. I was told some correspondence arose over the matter,
in which Generals Sheridan and Wright approved my action fully.
This incident serves now to enable me to remember that Wright
proposed to attack Early at 12 M.
Two or three statements of Sheridan deserve special mention.
Speaking of his appearance on the field, he says:
"When nearing the Valley pike, just south of Newtown, I saw about
three fourths of a mile west of the pike a body of troops, which
proved to be Ricketts and Wheaton's divisions of the Sixth Corps."
And speaking of a time after he had met Getty and Wright, he says:
"I ordered Custer's division back to the right flank, and returning
to the place where my headquarters had been established, I met near
them Ricketts' division under General Keifer and General Frank
Wheaton's division, both marching to the front."(14)
The distance from Newtown to Middletown is five miles. My division
was at no time on that day within four miles of Newtown. This is
also true, I am sure, of Wheaton's division. Sheridan was deceived
by false reports received before his arrival, and by the sight of
magnified numbers of broken troops of other corps, who had continued
to the rear. It was impossible for Sheridan to have met Wheaton
and myself leading our divisions to the front; besides, our divisions
were not at any time within a mile of his then headquarters.
Wheaton's and the right of my division were farther advanced than
any part of Getty's division. This is proved by the recollection
of Wright, Getty, and others, also by the reports written soon
after the battle by many officers.(15) Sheridan, when he wrote,
must have remembered meeting Wheaton and myself when we, together,
rode to him from the right to tell him of the position and situation
of our respective commands, and to assure him we could hold our
ground and advance as soon as ordered. This ride brought Wheaton
and me nearer Newtown than we were at any other time that day.
Sheridan was so impressed by the circumstances attending his coming
to the field, and by his first meeting with Torbert and Getty, and
the previous reports to him, that he assumed a condition of things
which did not exist. It has been stated that my division joined
Getty on his right. It, however, turned out that a portion of
Hayes' division of Crook's corps had united with Getty's right,
though not at first distinguished by me from the latter's troops.
Years after the battle, ex-President Hayes referred to some statements
in Sheridan's _Memoirs_ thus:
"In speaking of that fight he says that, passing up the pike,
sometimes on one side, and sometimes on the other, coming to Cedar
Creek, he struck the First Division of Getty, of the Sixth Corps;
that he passed along that division a short distance, when there
arose out of a hollow before him a line consisting entirely of
officers of Crook's Army of West Virginia and of color-bearers.
The army had been stampeded in the morning, but these people were
not panic-stricken. They saluted him, but there was nothing now
between the enemy and him and the fugitives but this division of
Getty's. Said he: 'These officers seemed to rise right up from
the ground.' This was twenty-four years afterward, but he recollects
it perfectly well except names. Among them, however, he recollects
seeing one, Colonel R. B. Hayes, since President of the United
States, and drops the story there, leaving the impression that
there were no men there--no privates, no army--simply some color-
bearers and some officers.
"The fact is that in the hollow, just in the rear, was a line of
men, a thousand or twelve hundred, probably, and they had thrown
up a little barricade and were lying close behind it. He came up
and saw these officers and did not see the men, or seems not to
have seen them; but I had no idea at the time that he did not see
the private soldiers in that line. He now tells that singular
story of a line of officers, a line of color-bearers, and no force.
The fact is that first came Getty's division, and then mine, and
then came General Keifer's division, all lying down behind that
barricade, but in good condition, except that there had been some
losses in the morning. General Keifer was next to me, and then
came the rest of the Sixth Corps, and farther down I have no doubt
the Nineteenth Corps was in line. We had then been, I suppose, an
hour or an hour and a half in that position."(16)
Passing from disputed, though important, points relating to the
battle, all agree that when Sheridan reached his army a battle had
been fought and lost to all appearance, and that the Union Army
had been forced to retire to a new position. It should also be
regarded beyond controversy that the Sixth Corps had been united
before his arrival, that broken troops of other commands were being
formed on the Sixth, and that the enemy also had been forced to
change front, and was arrested in his advance.
Sheridan's presence went far towards giving confidence to his army,
and to inspire the men with a spirit of success. While the army
loved Wright, and believed in him, his temperament was not such as
to cause him to work an army up to a high state of enthusiasm. A
deep chagrin over the morning's disaster pervaded our army, and
had much to do with the subsequent efforts to win a victory.
Sheridan showed himself to the troops by riding along the front,
and he was loudly cheered. He assured them of success before the
day ended. During the lull in the day's battle some of the broken
troops of the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps were reorganized.
Wright resumed command of his corps and Getty his division. Before
Sheridan came Wright had instructed his division commanders that
he would assume the offensive, and it was understood our army would
advance about 12 M., as soon as an ample resupply of ammunition
could be issued. Sheridan, however, postponed the time for assuming
the offensive until 3 P.M. Early, still filled with high hopes of
complete victory, about 1 P.M. pushed forward on our entire front.
He did not drive in the strong line of skirmishers, and the attack
was easily repulsed. It seemed to me then, as it did to Wright
and others, that our whole army should have been thrown against
the enemy on this repulse, and thus decided the day. Sheridan,
however, adhered to his purpose to act on the defensive until later
in the day. A false report that a Confederate column was moving
towards Winchester on the Front Royal road caused Sheridan to delay
his attack until about 4 P.M.
Early promptly realized that the conditions had changed, that the
armies must meet face to face. It will be kept in mind that our
army was now fronting southward instead of eastward, and Early's
army was forced to face northward instead of westward, as in the
morning's battle.
Early, hoping to hold the ground already won and thus reap some of
the fruits of victory, retired, on his repulse, beyond the range
of our guns, and took up a strong position, with his infantry and
artillery, mainly on a natural amphitheatre of hills, centre a
little retired, extending from a point north of Cedar Creek near
Middle Marsh Brook on his left to and across the turnpike near
Middletown, protecting his flanks west of this brook and east of
the town with his cavalry and horse artillery. Early employed his
men busily for the succeeding two hours in throwing up lunettes or
redans to cover his field guns. His men were skillfully posted
behind stone fences, common in the Valley, and on portions of his
line behind temporary breastworks.
Early, before 12 P.M., wired Richmond he had won a complete victory,
and would drive the Union Army across the Potomac. At 4 P.M. our
army went forward in single line, with no considerable reserves,
but in splendid style. Getty, with his left still on the turnpike,
was the division of direction. My orders were to hold my left on
Getty's right. Wheaton was to keep connection with my right, and
the Nineteenth Corps with the right of the Sixth Corps; and the
cavalry, Merritt east of Middletown and Custer on Cedar Creek, to
cover the flanks. In verifying my position just before starting,
I found troops of Hayes' command filling a space of two or three
hundred yards between Getty's right and my left. I discovered
Hayes temporarily resting on the ground a short distance in rear
of his men, with his staff around him. From him I learned he had
no orders to advance, whereupon I requested him to withdraw his
men so I could close the interval before the movement commenced.
He promptly rose, mounted his horse, and said: "If this army goes
forward I will fill that gap, with or without orders." Unfortunately,
orders came to him to withdraw, and with others of his corps (Eighth)
form in reserve near the turnpike. His withdrawal left, at the
last moment, a gap which could only be filled by obliqueing my
division to the left as it was moving forward. This produced some
unsteadiness in the line, and the right brigade (Emerson's) continued
the movement too long, causing some massing of troops in the centre
of the division, and some disorder resulted while they were under
a severe infantry and artillery fire. This necessary movement also
caused an interval between Wheaton's division and mine, thereby
imperilling my right. Our attack, however, was not checked until
we had gone forward about one mile. The enemy's centre was driven
back upon his partially intrenched line on the heights mentioned.
This brought my division under a most destructive fire of artillery
and infantry from front and flanks. My right flank was especially
exposed, as it had gone forward farther than the troops on the
right.
The loss in the division was severe, and it became impossible to
hold the exposed troops to the charge. They had not fired as they
advanced. The division retired a short distance, where it was
halted and promptly faced about. In less than five minutes it was
again charging the Confederate left centre. The right of Getty's
division and Wheaton's left went forward with the second charge,
and an advance position in close rifle range of the enemy was gained
and held. My division was partly protected by a stone fence located
on the north of an open field, while the Confederates held the
farther side of the field, about three hundred yards distant, and
were also protected by a stone fence as well as by some temporary
breastworks. The enemy occupied the higher ground, and the field
was lower in the centre than on either side. The battle here was
obstinate and, for a time, promised to extend into the night.
Early's artillery in my front did little execution, as it was
located on the crest of the hills behind his infantry line, and
the gunners, when they undertook to work their guns, were exposed
to our infantry fire. Wheaton's division and that part of the
Nineteenth Corps to his right, though not keeping pace with the
centre, steadily gained ground; likewise the cavalry. Getty, though
under orders to hold his left on the pike, moved his division
forward slowly, making a left half wheel. In this movement Getty's
left reached Middletown, and his right swung somewhat past it on
the west.
Merritt's cavalry pushed around east of Middletown. At this
juncture, Kershaw's division and part of Gordon's division were in
front of my right and part of Ramseur's in front of my left.
Pegram's and Wharton's divisions were in front of Getty, Wharton
being, in part, east of the pike confronting our cavalry. Early's
left was held by Gordon's troops, including some of his cavalry.(17)
Early now made heroic efforts to hold his position, hoping at night
he could withdraw with some of the fruits of victory. Sheridan
made every possible exertion to dislodge the enemy, and to accomplish
this he was much engaged, personally, on the flanks with the cavalry.
Wright, calm, confident, and unperturbed, gave close attention to
his corps, and was constantly exposed. I frequently met him at
this crisis. He ordered a further charge upon the enemy's centre.
This seemed impossible with the tired troops. Preparation was,
however, made to attempt it. The firing in this last position had
continued for about an hour, during which both sides had suffered
heavily. As the sun was going down behind the mountains that
autumnal evening it became apparent something decisive must take
place or night would end the day of blood leaving the enemy in
possession of the principal part of the battle-field.
So confident was Early of final victory that, earlier, in the day,
he ordered up his headquarters and supply trains, and by 4 P.M.
they commenced to arrive on the field.
It must be remembered that the two armies had been manoeuvring and
fighting for twelve hours, with little food or rest and an insufficient
supply of water. Exhausted troops may be held in line, especially
when under some cover, but it is difficult to move then in a charge
with the spirit essential to success. There remained a considerable
interval between Wheaton's left and my right. An illustrative
incident again occurred here in resupplying our men with ammunition.
Three mules loaded with boxes filled with cartridges were conducted
by an ordnance sergeant through the interval on my right in open
view of both armies, and with indifferent leisure to and behind
the stone wall occupied by the Confederates. The sergeant and his
party were not fired on. Word was passed along the line for my
division to make a charge on a given signal, and all subordinate
officers were instructed to use the utmost exertion to make it a
success. The incident of the sergeant and his party going into
the enemy's line served to suggest to me the possibility of
penetrating it with a small body of our soldiers.
Before giving an order to charge, I instructed Colonel Emerson,
commanding the First Brigade, to hastily form, under a competent
staff officer, a small body of men, and direct them to advance
rapidly along the west of a stone wall extending traversely from
my right to the enemy's position, and to penetrate through a gap
between two of the enemy's brigades, with instructions to open an
enfilading fire on him as soon as his flank was reached. The gap
was between two of Gordon's brigades. The order was promptly and
handsomely executed, and its execution produced the desired effect.
Captain H. W. Day (151st New York, Acting Brigade Inspector) was
charged with the execution of this order.(18)
The party consisted of about 125 men, each of whom knew that if
unsuccessful death or capture must follow. Colonel Moses H. Granger
(122d Ohio) voluntarily aided, and, in some sense, directed the
movement of this small party. The gap was penetrated on the run
and a fire opened on the exposed flanks of the Confederates which
started them from the cover of their works and the stone wall. At
this juncture the division, as ordered, poured a destructive fire
upon the now exposed Confederates, and at once charging across the
field, drove the enemy in utter rout. A panic seized Gordon's
troops, who were the first struck, then spread to Kershaw's and
Ramseur's divisions, successively on Gordon's right.(19)
I quote from the report of Colonel Emerson, commanding my First
Brigade, in which he describes the final battle, including the
breaking of Early's line:
"The brigade lay here under a fire of shell until about 4 P.M.,
when Captain Smith came with an order to move forward connecting
on the left with the Second Brigade. The brigade moved through
the woods, when it received a very heavy fire on the right flank,
under which it was broken, but soon reformed in its old position,
and again moved forward to a stone fence, the enemy being behind
another stone wall in front with a clear field intervening. There
was a stone wall running from the right flank of the brigade to
the wall behind which the enemy lay. Some of my men lay scattered
along this last named wall. The First Division lay to the right
and in advance, nearly parallel with the enemy. Everything appeared
to be at a deadlock, with heavy firing of artillery and musketry.
At this stage Colonel Keifer, commanding division, came to me and
inquired what men were those lying along the wall running from our
line to the enemy's, and ordered me to send them forward to flank
the enemy and drive them from their position. The execution of
the order was entrusted to Captain H. W. Day, Inspector of the
[Second] Brigade, who proceeded along the wall, and getting on the
enemy's flank dislodged them, when the brigade was moved rapidly
forward, in connection with the Second Brigade, and did not stop
until we arrived in the works of the Nineteenth Corps, when, in
accordance with orders from Colonel Keifer, the brigade went into
its position of the morning, got its _breakfast_, and encamped,
satisfied that it had done a good day's work before breakfast."(20)
Also from a report of Colonel Ball, commanding Second Brigade:
"About 3 P.M. the whole army advanced in one line upon the enemy.
Immediately before advancing the troops were withdrawn to the left,
and my left connected with the Second Division, Sixth Army Corps,
while my right connected with the First Brigade, Third Division.
We advanced half a mile to the edge of the woods, when we were met
by a well-directed fire from the right flank. This fire was returned
with spirit some fifteen minutes, when the troops wavered and fell
back a short distance in some disorder. The Second and Third
Divisions gave way at the same time. The line was speedily reformed
and moved forward and became engaged with the enemy again, each
force occupying a stone wall. Advantage was taken of a wall or
fence running perpendicular to and connecting with that occupied
by the enemy. After the action had continued here about three
quarters of an hour a heavy volley was fired at the enemy from the
transverse wall. A hurried and general retreat of the enemy
immediately followed, and our troops eagerly followed, firing upon
the retreating army as it ran, and giving no opportunity to the
enemy to reform or make a stand.
"Several efforts were made by the enemy during the pursuit to rally,
but the enthusiastic pursuit foiled all such efforts. Our troops
were subject to artillery fire of solid shot, shell, and grape
during the pursuit, and we reached the intrenchments of the Nineteenth
Army Corps (which were captured in the morning) as the sun set.
Here the pursuit by the infantry was discontinued. The first and
second, and probably the third colors planted on the recovered
works of the Nineteenth Army Corps were of regiments composing this
brigade."(21)
General Early tells the effect on his army of penetrating his line
by the small body of our troops:
"A number of bold attempts were made during the subsequent part of
the day, by the enemy's cavalry, to break our line on the right,
but they were invariably repulsed. Late in the afternoon, the
enemy's infantry advanced against Ramseur, Kershaw, and Gordon's
lines, and the attack on Ramseur and Kershaw's front was handsomely
repulsed in my view, and I hoped that the day was finally ours,
but a portion of the enemy had penetrated an interval which was
between Evans' brigade, on the extreme left, and the rest of the
line, when that brigade gave way, and Gordon's other brigades soon
followed. General Gordon made every possible effort to rally his
men and lead them back against the enemy, but without avail. The
information of this affair, with exaggerations, passed rapidly
along Kershaw and Ramseur's lines, and their men, under the
apprehension of being flanked, commenced falling back in disorder,
though no enemy was pressing them, and this gave me the first
intimation of Gordon's condition. At the same time the enemy's
cavalry, observing the disorder on our ranks, made another charge
on our right, but was again repulsed. Every effort was made to
stop and rally Kershaw and Ramseur's men, but the mass of them
resisted all appeals, and continued to go to the rear without
waiting for any effort to retrieve the partial disaster."(22)
The charge of the division resulted in the total overthrow of
Early's army. Pegram and Wharton's divisions on our extreme left
near Middletown were soon involved in the disaster, and our whole
army went forward, meeting little resistance, taking many prisoners
and guns, only halting when Early's forces were either destroyed,
captured, or driven in the wildest disorder beyond Cedar Creek.(23)
Our cavalry under Merritt and Custer pursued until late in the
night to Fisher's Hill, south of Strasburg, and made many captures.
It often has been claimed that the cavalry on the right is entitled
to the credit of overthrowing Early's army. It is true Custer did
make some attempts on Gordon's left and rear, but the appearance
of Rosser's cavalry on Custer's right, north and east of Cedar
Creek, called him off, and it was not until after Early's position
had been penetrated and a general retreat had commenced that Custer
again appeared on the enemy's flank and rear. His presence there
had much to do with the wild retreat of Early's men. Custer, who
claimed much for his cavalry, and insisted that it captured forty-
five pieces of artillery, etc., did not in his report of the battle
pretend that his division caused the final break in Early's forces.
Speaking of his last charge on the left, Custer says:
"Seeing so large a force of cavalry bearing rapidly down upon an
unprotected flank and their line of retreat in danger of being
intercepted, the lines of the enemy, already broken, now gave way
in the utmost confusion."(24)
Part of Early's artillery and caissons, with ammunition and supply
trains, also ambulances and many battle flags, were captured north
of Cedar Creek. The cavalry, however, seized, south of the Creek,
other substantial fruits of the great victory, including many guns
and headquarters baggage and other trains, and some prisoners. A
panic seized teamsters on the turnpike; they cut out mules or horses
to escape upon, leaving the teams to mingle in the greatest disorder.
Drivers of ambulances filled with dead and wounded also fled, and
the animals ran with them unguided over the field. The scene was
of the wildest ruin. The gloom of night soon fell over the field
to add to its appalling character.
The guns lost by the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps were taken in the
morning to the public square of Strasburg and triumphantly parked
on exhibition. Our cavalry found them there at night. Little that
makes up an army was left to Early; the disaster reached every part
of his army save, possibly, his cavalry which operated on the remote
flanks. In a large sense, Rosser's cavalry, throughout the day,
had been neutralized by a portion of Custer's, and Lomax had been
held back by Powell on the Front Royal road. Dismay indescribable
extended to the Confederate officers as well as the private soldiers.
Among the former were some of the best and bravest the South
produced. Early himself possessed the confidence of General Lee.
Early had, as division commanders, General John B. Gordon (since
in the United States Senate), Joseph B. Kershaw, Stephen D. Ramseur,
John Pegram, and Gabriel C. Wharton, all of whom had won distinction.
Ramseur fell mortally wounded in attempting a last stand near the
Belle Grove House, and died there. Early fled from the field,
surrounded by a few faithful followers, deeply chagrined and
dejected, and filled with unjust censure of his own troops.(25)
The next day found him still without an organized army.(26) He
seems to have deserved a better fate. His star of military glory
had set. It never rose again. A few months later he reached
Richmond with a single attendant, having barely escaped capture
shortly before by a detachment of Sheridan's cavalry. He finally
returned to Southwest Virginia, where Lee relieved him of all
command, March 30, 1865.
His misfortunes in the Valley, doubtless, had much to do with his
continued implacable hatred to the Union. Sheridan was his nemesis.
Just after Kirby Smith had surrendered in 1865 and Sheridan was on
his way to the Rio Grande, the latter encountered Early escaping
across the Mississippi in a small boat, with his horses swimming
beside it. He got away, but his horses were captured.(27)
Sheridan, for his great skill and gallantry, justly won the plaudits
of his country, and his fame as a soldier will be immortal, but
not alone on account of his victory at Cedar Creek, nor on account
of "Sheridan's Ride," as described by the poet Read.(28)
My division, at dark, resumed its camp of the night before, as did
other divisions of the army.
When the fifteen hours of carnage had ceased, and the sun had gone
down, spreading the gloom of a chilly October night over the wide
extended field, there remained a scene more horrid than usual.
The dead and dying of the two armies were commingled. Many of the
wounded had dragged themselves to the streams in search of the
first want of a wounded man--_water_. Many mangled and loosed
horses were straggling over the field to add to the confusion.
Wagons, gun-carriages, and caissons were strewn in disorder in the
rear of the last stand of the Confederate Army. Abandoned ambulances,
sometimes filled with dead and dying Confederates, were to be seen
in large numbers, and loose teams dragged overturned vehicles over
the hills and through the ravines. Dead and dying men were found
in the darkness almost everywhere. Cries of agony from the suffering
victims were heard in all directions, and the moans of wounded
animals added much to the horrors of the night.
"_Mercy_ abandons the arena of battle," but when the conflict is
ended _mercy_ again asserts itself. The disabled of both armies
were cared for alike. Far into the night, with some all the long
night, the heroes in the day's strife ministered to friend and foe
alike, where but the night before our army had peacefully slumbered,
little dreaming of the death struggle of the coming day. To an
efficient medical corps, however, belong the chief credit for the
good work done in caring for the unfortunate.
The loss in officers was unusually great. Besides Colonel Thoburn,
killed in the opening of the battle, General D. D. Bidwell fell
early in the day, and Colonel Charles R. Lowell, Jr., was killed
near its close while leading a charge of his cavalry brigade.
Eighty-six Union officers were killed or mortally wounded.
Many distinguished officers were wounded. Of the six officers
belonging to my brigade staff who were turned over to Colonel Ball
in the early morning, one only (Captain J. T. Rorer) remained
uninjured at night. Two were dead.
All was peaceful enough on the 20th, though on every hand the
evidence of the preceding day's struggle was to be seen. The dead
of both armies were buried--the blue and the gray in separate
trenches, to await the resurrection morn.
I have no purpose to speak of individual acts of bravery. The
number of killed and wounded of each army was about the same. The
casualties in my division, excluding 36 captured or missing, were,
killed, 8 officers and 100 men; wounded, 34 officers and 528 men;
total, 670. Wheaton lost, killed and wounded, 470; and Getty, 677.
The killed and wounded in the Sixth Corps were 1926, including 109
of its artillery.
Much credit for the victory was given by Sheridan to the cavalry.
Its total loss, in the three divisions under Torbert, was, killed,
2 officers and 27 men; wounded, 9 officers and 115 men; total, 153;
not one fourth the number killed and wounded in my infantry division
alone. The killed and wounded in my old brigade, under Colonel
Ball, were 421.
The casualties of the Union Army are shown by the following official
table:(29)
Killed. Wounded. Captured or
Missing. Aggregate.
Officers. Officers. Officers.
| Men. | Men. | Men.
Sixth Army Corps 23 275 103 1525 6 194 2126
Nineteenth Army Corps 19 238 109 1127 14 776 2383
Army of West Virginia 7 41 17 253 10 530 858
Provisional Division 1 11 6 66 18 102
Cavalry 2 27 9 115 43 196
--- --- --- ---- --- ---- ----
Grand total 52 529 244 3186 30 1561 5665
The table includes 156 of the artillery, killed or wounded.
The total Union killed and wounded was 4074.
The dead and wounded in the Sixth Corps, and in some other of the
infantry divisions approximated twenty per cent. of those engaged.
This was larger by six per cent. than similar losses in the French
army at Marengo, where Napoleon won a victory which enabled him,
later, to wear the iron crown of Charlemagne; by six per cent. than
at Austerlitz, the battle of the "Three Emperors"; by eight per
cent. than in Wellington's army at Waterloo, where Napoleon's star
of glory set; or in either the German or French army at Gravelotte,
or at Sedan, where Napoleon III. laid down his imperial crown; and
larger by about fifteen per cent. than the average like losses in
the Austrian and French armies at Hohenlinden.
"Where drums beat at dead of night,
Commanding the fires of death to light."
The number killed and wounded in this battle is far below that in
some other great battles of the Rebellion, yet the loss for the
Union Army alone was only a little below the aggregate like losses
in the American army from Lexington to Yorktown (1775-1781), and
approximately the same as in the American army in the Mexican War,
from Palo Alto to the City of Mexico (1846-1848).(30)
If either of two things had not occurred prior to the battle, the
result of it might have been different. Had Early not precipitated
an attack with an infantry division and Rosser's cavalry on the
13th of October, Wright, with the Sixth Corps, would have gone to
Petersburg; and had the _fake_ (Longstreet) dispatch of the 16th
not been flagged from the Confederate signal station on Three Top
Mountain, Torbert, with the cavalry, would have been east of the
Blue Ridge on the intended raid. But for the Longstreet dispatch,
Sheridan most likely would have tarried in Washington or delayed
his movements on his return trip. Could the Sixth Corps, could
the cavalry, or could Sheridan have been spared from the battle?
The principal peculiarities of the engagement were: (1) That an
ably commanded army was surprised in its camp, and, in considerable
part, driven from it at the opening of the battle; (2) that
notwithstanding this, it won, at the close of the day, the most
signal and complete field-victory of the war, with the possible
exception of those won at Nashville and Sailor's Creek; (3) the
Confederate Army was destroyed, so there was no battle for the
morrow. In most instances during the Rebellion, it transpired that
the defeated army sullenly retired only a short way in condition
to renew the fight.
Cedar Creek, in some respects, bears a striking analogy to Marengo.
Both were dual in character, each two battles in one day; the
victors of the morning being the defeated and routed of the evening.
Sheridan's victory over Early, like that of Napoleon over Marshal
Melas, left no further fighting for the victors the next day. In
one other respect, also, the comparison holds good. The commander
of each of the finally routed armies sent a message about the middle
of the day of battle announcing to his government a great victory,
to be followed at sunset with the news of a most signal disaster.
In other respects, how dissimilar? Napoleon was, from the opening
to the close of Marengo, on the field, commanding in person, sharing
the defeat, then the victory. Sheridan was absent and did not
participate in the discomfiture of his army, but was present at
the final success. Napoleon, after his repulse, was reinforced by
Desaix with 6000 men; but the Army of the Shenandoah, after the
disaster of the morning, was reinforced only by its proper commander
--Sheridan.
There was not a great disparity of numbers in the opposing armies
at Cedar Creek. Probably 20,000 men of all arms were engaged on
each side. Relative position and situation of troops must be taken
into account, as well as numbers, in determining the strength of
one army over another. Early has tried to excuse his defeat by
claiming he had the smaller army. In response to this, Sheridan
and his Provost-Marshal, Crowninshield, have tried to show that
Early lost in captured more men than he claimed he had present for
duty.(31) After Opequon and Fisher's Hill Early was reinforced by
Kershaw's division of Longstreet's corps, Cutshaw's three batteries,
and Rosser's division of cavalry with light artillery, together
with many smaller detachments, all of which participated in Cedar
Creek. Sheridan received no reinforcements, and Edwards' brigade
of the First Division of the Sixth, Currie's of the Nineteenth,
and Curtis' of the Eighth Corps were each detached, after Opequon,
on other duties, and were not at Cedar Creek. The surprise and
breaking up in the morning of the greater parts of Crook's and
Emory's corps eliminated them, in large part, from the day's battle,
and left the Sixth Corps and the cavalry to wage an unequal contest.
The war closed on the bloody battle-ground of the Shenandoah Valley,
so far as important operations were concerned, with Cedar Creek.
President Lincoln appointed me a Brigadier-General by brevet,
November 30, 1864; the commission recited the appointment was "for
gallant and meritorious services in the battles of Opequon, Fisher's
Hill, and Cedar Creek, Virginia," and I was assigned to duty by
him as Brigadier-General, December 29, 1864.
Sheridan's army returned to Kearnstown and went into winter quarters.
The Sixth Corps was, however, soon transferred by rail and steamboat,
_via_ Harper's Ferry and Washington, to City Point, rejoining the
Army of the Potomac, December 5, 1864.
( 1) _Memoirs of Sheridan_, vol. ii., p. 64.
( 2) _Manassas to Appomattox_ (Longstreet), p. 574.
( 3) _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 580, Captain Hotchkiss'
Journal.
( 4) _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 580.
( 5) General Ricketts was supposed to be mortally wounded. His
wife a second time came to him on the battle-field. He was taken
to Washington, his home, and slowly recovered. He was able again
to perform some field service near the close of the war. He died
of pneumonia, September 22, 1887, and is buried at Arlington.
( 6) Major A. F. Hayden, of Wright's staff, while the battle was
raging in the early morning, was seen galloping towards me with
one hand raised to indicate he had some important order. Just
before reaching me he was shot through the body and plunged off
his horse on the hard ground, rolling over and over until he lay
almost in a ball. He was borne off in a blanket for dead. In
February following I met him on a steamer on the Chesapeake returning
to duty, and I saw him again at the Centennial in Philadelphia in
1876.
( 7) _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 132.
( 8) _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 53.
( 9) _Memoirs of Sheridan_, vol. ii., pp. 68-82.
(10) In one account Sheridan fixes his arrival at 9 A.M. In his
_Memoirs_ at 10.30 A.M. (p. 86). Getty, in his report of November,
1864, says, "Sheridan arrived at between 11 A.M. and 12 M." I made
a note (still preserved), of the time Sheridan was seen by me riding
up to the rear of Getty's division.
(11) _Memoirs_, p. 82.
(12) These facts are as stated in a private letter from General
Getty to the writer, dated December 31, 1893.
(13) Here is an extract from a letter of General Wright to me,
dated July 18, 1889:
"Orders had been given by me for the establishment of the lines,
and Getty's and your divisions (the Second and Third) were in
position, and Wheaton's (First) and the Nineteenth Corps were coming
into position when General Sheridan arrived upon the ground. I
advised him of what had been done and what it was intended to do,
and he made no change in the dispositions I had made. Indeed, as
I understand, he fully approved them. . . . General Sheridan did
later make some change in the disposition of the cavalry."
(14) _Memoirs_, vol. ii., pp. 82, 85.
(15) Colonel Moses M. Granger, of the Second Brigade, Third
Division, says: "It is plain that our brigade was in line on
Getty's right a considerable time before Sheridan's arrival."--
_Sketches War History_, vol. iii., p. 124.
(16) This extract is from remarks of General Hayes made at a Loyal
Legion banquet in Cincinnati, May 6, 1889. _Sketches War History_,
vol. iv., p. 23.
(17) _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 581.
(18) _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 228, 234, 251-2, 202.
(19) _Ibid_., p. 562 (Early's Report).
(20) _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 234.
(21) _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 250-1.
(22) _Battles and Leaders_, etc., vol. iv., p. 528.
(23) _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., pp. 562-3, 580.
(24) _Ibid_., p. 524.
(25) _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., pp. 562-3.
(26) Napoleon once remarked, "How much to be pitied is a general
the day after a lost battle!"
(27) _Memoirs of Sheridan_, vol. ii., p. 211.
(28) The distance from Winchester to Middletown is twelve miles.
(29) _War Records_, vol. xliii., Part I., pp. 131, 137.
(30) Great events in war are not always measured by the quantity
of blood shed. Sherman's dead and wounded list on his march from
"Atlanta to the Sea" was only 531. _Life of Grant_ (Church), pp.
297-8.
(31) _Battles and Leaders_, etc., vol. iv., p. 532.