Mine Run Campaign and Battle of Orange Grove, November, 1863--Winter
Cantonment (1863-64) of Army of the Potomac at Culpeper Court-
House, and its Reorganization--Grant Assigned to Command the Union
Armies, and Preparation for Aggressive War
Though the roads were bad from frequent rains and much use, and
November winds warned that winter was at hand to stop further field
campaigning on an extended scale, and though all attempts to cross
the Rapidan in the fine weather of the spring and summer had failed,
yet, when the Army of the Potomac was again bivouacked at Culpeper,
the public cry was heard--"On to Richmond!"
Lee's last campaign was looked upon in high quarters as a big bluff
that should have been "called" by Meade while the Army of Northern
Virginia was north of the Rappahannock. Meade, however, acted
persistently and conscientiously on his own judgment, formed in
the light of the best knowledge he could obtain. He would not
stand driving, and was something of a bulldozer himself, and
sometimes--said to have been caused by fits of dyspepsia--was
unreasonably irascible, and displayed a most violent temper towards
superiors and inferiors. Notwithstanding this, he never lost his
equipoise or acted upon impulse alone, and he never permitted mere
appearances to move him. Nor could his superiors induce him to
act against his judgment as to a particular military situation.
It will be remembered that he was urged to fight Lee north of the
Potomac after Gettysburg. He was urged to bring on a battle before
the departure of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps for the West, and
when Lee moved north on his flank his opportunity seemed to have
come to fight a battle, but his fear of the same strategy displayed
by the Confederate Army in the second Bull Run campaign against
Pope induced him to be over-cautious, and to so concentrate his
army as to avoid the possibility of its being beaten in detachments.
The next day (October 16th), after Meade reached Centreville, the
President, in his anxiety that Lee should not again escape without
a general battle, addressed this characteristic note to Halleck:
"If General Meade can now attack him (Lee) on a field no more than
equal for us, and do so with all the skill and courage which he,
his officers, and men possess, the honor will be his if he succeeds,
and the blame may be mine if he fails.
"Yours truly,
"A. Lincoln."
This note was forwarded to Meade.
To this he answered that it had been his intention to attack the
enemy when his exact whereabouts was discovered; that lack of
information as to Lee's position and intentions and the fear of
jeopardizing his communications with Washington had prevented his
doing so sooner. But the pressure continued. Halleck, the 18th,
wired Meade:
"Lee is unquestionably bullying you. If you cannot ascertain his
movements, I certainly cannot. If you pursue and fight him, I
think you will find out where he is. I know of no other way."
This was too much for Meade's temper. He responded:
" . . . If you have any orders to give me I am prepared to receive
and obey them, but I must insist on being spared the infliction of
such truisms in the guise of opinion as you have recently honored
me with, particularly as they have not been asked for. I take this
occasion to repeat what I have before stated, that if my course,
based on my own judgment, does not meet with approval, I ought to
be, and I desire to be, relieved from command."
Although Halleck apologized "if he had unintentionally given
offence," and Meade thanked him for the "explanation," these and
other like occurrences had their influence on Meade's conduct.
As he had failed to bring Lee to bay at Culpeper, the only
opportunity to do so must be sought south of the Rapidan. Meade
was not averse to battle.
On November 26, 1863, Meade's army was put in motion with a view
to a general concentration south of the Rapidan, at Robertson's
Tavern on the turnpike road, by evening of that day. Lee's army
of about 50,000 men was mainly massed and in winter quarters in
front of Orange Court-House, with an intrenched line in its front
across the plank road and turnpike, extending to the river.
Meade's design was, by a rapid movement, to carry this line before
Lee had time to concentrate behind it.
The Fifth Corps (Sykes) was directed to cross the Rapidan at
Culpeper Mine Ford, and thence move by the plank road to Parker's
Store and the junction of the road to Robertson's Tavern; the First
Corps (Newton), with two divisions, to follow the Fifth. The Second
Corps (Warren) was to force a crossing at Germanna Ford, thence
march directly to Robertson's Tavern, and there await the arrival
of other corps.
The Third Corps (General William H. French), followed closely by
the Sixth (Sedgwick), was directed to cross at Jacob's Ford (Mill),
and continue the march, bearing to the left, to Robertson's Tavern.
Jacob's Ford, with its steep banks, proved so difficult to pass
that some delay occurred, and the artillery had to be sent around
by Germanna Ford, and did not rejoin the corps until the morning
of the 27th. Jacob's Ford was the highest up the river, and
consequently brought French, on passing it, in close proximity to
the enemy. Lee, by the evening of the 26th, had thrown forward
cavalry and some infantry of Hill's corps to the vicinity of
Robertson's Tavern, though not in sufficient force to prevent Warren
taking his designated position. Nor was Sykes seriously interfered
with. The cavalry crossed at Ely's and other fords. French, with
the aid of pontoons, safely passed the river, but he did not advance
on the 26th more than three miles beyond the crossing, time having
been lost in hunting blind country roads, waiting for artillery to
arrive, and reconnoitering. A force of the enemy showed itself on
intersecting roads to his right, where were a number of such roads
leading from Sisson, Witchell, Tobaccostick and Morton's Fords,
and one which led from Raccoon Ford--still higher up the river--to
an intersection at Jones' house, with the most direct road to the
Tavern. The enemy's intrenchments covered a considerable part of
this last road, from which he could easily debouch and attack the
flank and rear or the trains of the marching columns.( 1) These
conditions rendered French's situation perilous, and caused him to
move with extreme caution, as the Sixth Corps could not arrive
until he was out of the way. Notwithstanding French had some miles
farther to march than Warren, and unusual difficulties to overcome
or guard against, Meade dispatched him, as early as 1 P.M. of the
26th, that his delay was retarding the operations of Warren, and
again at 3 P.M. he dispatched French:
"I would not move forward farther from the river than to clear the
way for General Sedgwick, until he comes up and crosses."
The Second Division, General Henry Prince, with some cavalry, was
in the advance; the Third, Carr's, and the First, General David B.
Birney's, following in the order named. At the Widow Morris', a
somewhat obscure road bore off abruptly to the left, but which,
somewhat circuitously, led to Robertson's Tavern. The head of
Prince's column, however, was on the more direct road to Tom Morris'
house, with flankers and cavalry well to the right. These were
soon attacked and driven in or recalled.
It seems Prince was led to believe he was in communication with
Warren's left.( 2)
It soon became evident that the head of French's column was near
the Raccoon Ford road, and the intrenchments held by at least two
divisions of Ewell's corps of Lee's army, and there seemed to be
no possible chance to extricate it without a battle.
At 11.45 A.M., on the 27th, Meade dispatched French:
"If you cannot unite with Warren by the route you are on, you must
move through to him by the left."
At 1.45 P.M. Meade again dispatched French:
"Attack the enemy in your front immediately, throwing your left
forward to connect with General Warren at Robertson's Tavern. The
object of an attack is to form junction with General Warren, which
must be effected immediately."
Prince had, by this time, formed line of battle and engaged the
enemy. Carr's division was ordered forward to take position on
Prince's left, and at 3 P.M. Birney's division was ordered to form
in support of Carr.
Prince covered the road leading to a junction with the Raccoon Ford
road. The First Brigade of Carr's division (General W. H. Morris)
moved to the left of Prince, my brigade--the Second--was ordered
to pass behind Morris, and take position on his left, and Colonel
B. F. Smith's brigade--the Third--was sent to my left.
Morris became somewhat entangled in a ravine and in thick timber,
and was slow in forming good line. In this position he was fired
upon from a ridge not two hundred yards from his front, the bullets
falling among my men as they passed his rear. I appealed to Morris
to face to the front, charge, and take the ridge, but he declined
to do so for want of orders.
As soon as I could get my two leading regiments, 110th and 122d
Ohio, on Morris' left, I led them to the crest of the ridge, captured
some prisoners, and posted the regiments in good position behind
a fence on the summit. My other regiments, 6th Maryland and 138th
Pennsylvania, successively, on their arrival, took position on the
left of the Ohio troops. The ridge which extended to my right
along Morris' front was still held by the enemy in strong force,
and both my flanks were threatened. Through a misunderstanding of
orders the Ohio regiments fell back a short distance, but soon
retook the crest and were again fiercely engaged, though under an
enfilading fire of artillery and a galling fire of musketry. The
ground being somewhat open to the front, I could see the enemy
massing for an attack. I again, but vainly, appealed to Morris to
advance and close the gap, as otherwise his position in the ravine
and thick woods could not be held. The assault came, and Morris
was forced, in some confusion, to retire. By refusing my right
somewhat, I maintained my isolated position and threatened the
enemy's right. The First Brigade, though composed in part of
regiments not before in strong battle, was quickly re-formed, and,
under Carr's order, soon obtained full possession of the ridge by
a splendid charge, and thus the gap was closed. The battle by this
time raged furiously all along the front. Colonel Smith, passing
too far to the rear, lost his way in the thickets, and failed to
come up on my left. He did not rejoin the division until the battle
was over. This misfortune was hard to account for, as Colonel
Smith was an intelligent, brave, and skilled officer--a graduate
of West Point. He met some scouting parties of the enemy, and, as
directed, sought to find a connection with troops of Warren's corps.
His failure caused my left to remain uncovered.
Two assaults were made upon my line by the enemy in columns not
less than three lines deep. The first came in front of Horn's
regiment, but was anticipated, and McClennan's regiment, moving
into the open ground, struck the right flank of the enemy and
(firing buck and ball from .69 calibre muskets) did great execution.
McClennan was severely wounded, and in consequence was obliged to
leave the field.
The battle raged with unabated fury until dark, and as late as 8
P.M. enfilading shells from heavy guns on our right screamed and
crashed through the timber over our heads, bursting with loud noise,
producing a most hideous and weird appearance, but really doing
little damage.
As night approached, the ammunition of my regiments gave out, and
all my command, save one regiment, was relieved by regiments of
Birney's division.( 3)
The bravery and fighting skill of Colonels Ball, Horn, and McClennan,
also of Lieutenant-Colonels M. M. Granger and W. N. Foster, and
Major Otho H. Binkley, and others, was most conspicuous. Lieutenant
James A. Fox of the 110th here lost his life. He had risen from
the ranks, but was a proud-spirited and promising officer. We
buried him at midnight, in full uniform, wrapped in his blanket,
behind a near-by garden fence.
I wish to bear testimony also, at this late day, to the quiet
gallantry and high soldierly qualities of the long-since-dead
General David B. Birney.( 4) He did not obey orders to the letter
only. His division being in reserve and support, he took position
where he could watch the progress of the battle, and note in time
when and where he was needed. He made no display on the field.
When he noticed, by the slackening fire of my men, that their
ammunition was about exhausted, he rode to my side and quietly
suggested that he be allowed to order regiments from his own command
to take their places. That there might not be, even momentarily,
a break in the line, his regiments were moved up, and my men lay
down while his stepped over them and opened fire. The relieved
troops were then withdrawn and resupplied with ammunition.
While the battle was in progress, the Sixth Corps, still some
distance to the rear, was directed by another road on Robertson's
Tavern, and during the night the Third Corps was ordered to withdraw
and follow the Sixth.
The enemy retired at the close of the battle, leaving in our
possession his dead, unburied, and his wounded on the field and in
hospitals. We fought a great part, if not all, of Ewell's corps.
Casualties were reported in thirteen Confederate brigades, in forty-
four regiments, and in the artillery of Early, Johnson, and Rodes'
divisions, total 601.( 5)
The losses in the Third Corps were 10 officers and 115 enlisted
men killed, 28 officers and 719 enlisted men wounded, total 872.
The brigades of Morris and Keifer suffered the most severely,
although Prince's division was first engaged. My own killed and
wounded numbered 172, those of Prince's division 163. There were
no captured or missing men of my command.
This engagement has been called by the Confederates the battle of
Payne's Farm;( 5) but by the Union side it is generally known as
the battle of Orange Grove; the place, however, is sometimes referred
to as Locust Grove, and by both sides it is often mentioned as Mine
Run, though in no proper sense did the contest occur on that stream.
The battle, fought by French under the circumstances narrated, gave
rise to much crimination and recrimination between Generals Meade
and French, and probably led to a reorganization of the Army of
the Potomac four months later.
Meade attributed the miscarriage of the campaign to French's failure
on the 26th, and his further failure on the 27th, to connect with
Warren's left at Robertson's Tavern. He claimed that if such
junction had been made he could have fallen on the portion of Lee's
army on the turnpike and destroyed it, and that he would then have
been able to seize the line behind Mine Run before Lee could occupy
it with his united forces. Meade further contended that, on the
27th, French got on the wrong road, and, consequently, had to fight
a fruitless battle alone, while the other corps of the army were
standing idle, waiting for him. French stoutly insisted that his
march, being on the extreme right and exposed flank, on the longest
line, and _via_ a difficult ford, without a good guide and over
blind roads, with a doubt as to which one should be taken, warranted
him in acting with caution, and in fighting where he did when he
found his command attacked; and he further claimed that when he
brought Ewell's corps to battle, Meade should have fallen on the
enemy in Warren's front and overwhelmed it; that by fighting when
and where he did, he was doing more than he otherwise could have
done to prevent a concentration of the Confederate Army, especially
in preventing it from massing in front of Robertson's Tavern. A
considerable part of the Union Army sympathized with French, yet
the fact remained that Meade's plan of concentration and of battle
at the appointed time and place failed.
On the 28th the armies were brought face to face, the Confederate
army in fortifications behind and along the high west bank of Mine
Run, both armies extending from a short distance south of the plank
road to the north of the turnpike, in the direction of the battle-
field of the 27th.( 6) The Third Corps held the Union centre.
Warren's corps, with a division of the Third Corps, was sent to
reconnoitre for a point of attack on the Confederate right. Warren
reported an attack there feasible. Other reconnoissances were made
on the 29th, and Meade decided to assault from both flanks the next
morning, the Sixth and Fifth Corps under Sedgwick on the enemy's
left and the Second Corps and two divisions of the Third on his
right. Carr's division of the Third marched at 4 A.M. two miles
to the left and joined Warren's column. The night was cold and
there was much suffering.
Warren had about 20,000 men in readiness, and was to attack at 8
A.M. at a signal from the batteries of the centre. Sedgwick was
to attack an hour later. The signal batteries opened, and we stood,
in grand array, soberly withing for the order to charge. The
enemy's strong works, with guns bristling in the morning sun, were
in our immediate front. Minutes of delay were as hours to the
waiting troops. Many sent up silent prayers for safety, and not
unfrequently through the column there could be seen on a soldier's
breast a paper giving his name, company, regiment, and home address,
so, if killed, his body could be identified. Warren hesitated,
and just before 9 A.M. dispatched Meade, then four miles distant:
"The full light of sun shows me that I cannot succeed."
Meade suspended Sedgwick's attack, then in progress, and hastened
to Warren. I saw the two men at a small, green, pine wood fire,
earnestly discussing the critical situation. Meade seemed to be
censuring Warren, yet the latter adhered to his view that the
assault could not be successfully made, and Meade yielded. Somehow
the troops of the great column, before the final decision was
announced, came to believe the charge would not be made, and they
cautiously commenced badgering each other, soldier like, over wasted
prayers. The different commands were later ordered to their former
positions.
French opposed an assault on the centre. The enemy's position,
naturally a strong one, had been greatly strengthened by labor.
The wisdom of not making any assault, in the light of all the facts,
was, I think, generally recognized. The season was unfavorable;
Meade was a long distance from his base; success could only have
been temporary and could not have been followed up, and defeat
under the circumstances would have been a fatal catastrophe. Even
Grant, in 1864, was "all summer" in trying to gather fruits of what
were called successes.
The 1st of December was spent by both armies in watching each other,
and behaving as if they dared each other to attack.
"One was afraid and the other dare not"--but which?
The campaign had been delayed beyond all expectation; all hope of
gaining an advantage by a surprise or otherwise was passed, food
was becoming scarce, and hence Meade decided to retire his army to
its base of supplies. At dusk of the 1st, therefore, the Union
Army moved by different roads to various fords of the Rapidan, the
Third Corps to Culpeper Mine Ford, the farthest down the river of
any used, and by 8 A.M. of the coming morning all had recrossed,
and on the 3d they were in their former camps at Brandy Station.
The Army of the Potomac lost in this campaign, killed and wounded,
1272.( 7)
Thus ended the Mine Run campaign; not bloodless, yet disappointing,
as were many others. In it Meade demonstrated his willingness to
fight, and that his army was loyal to him. Another opportunity to
fight a great battle in independent command on the field never came
to him. His chief glory for all time must rest on Gettysburg.
Lee, the night of December 1st, feeling certain Meade would not
assault him in his strong position, and knowing the latter was far
from his base, in an unfamiliar country, encumbered with trains,
determined to assume the offensive by throwing two of his divisions
against Meade's left on the following morning. But Meade was safely
away when morning came, and pursuit impossible.
Lee, it is said, was greatly chagrined over his lost opportunity,
and exclaimed to his generals:
"I am too old to command this army; we should never have permitted
these people to get away."( 8)
Before starting on this campaign Meade expressed a purpose to take
position in front of Fredericksburg, but Halleck disapproved the
plan.( 9)
The Army of the Potomac, having ended its historic work of the
memorable year 1863, went into winter quarters around Culpeper
Court-House, with Brandy Station for its base of supplies. My
brigade occupied log huts on John Minor Botts' (10) farm, partly
constructed by the Confederates prior to November 8th.
The caring, in winter, for a large army calls for great vigilance,
skill, and energy. The season not permitting much opportunity for
drill, discipline is hard to maintain. Sickness becomes prevalent,
and there is much unrest, both of officers and soldiers.
Camp guards, however, had to be maintained; also grand-guards and
pickets around the front and flanks of the whole army. The freezing
and thawing and the constant moving of supply trains caused deep
mud in the roads and camps. The brigade commanders of the Third
Corps, and of other corps as well, were, alternately, detailed as
corps officer-of-the-day, the duties of which lasted twenty-four
hours, and required the officer to be with the advance-guard and
on the corps' picket lines to see that vigilance was preserved;
that orders were understood and obeyed, and to report any unusual
occurrences. He was required to visit all guards and pickets,
personally, at least once by day and once by night. The Third
Corps' advance line was from Mt. Pony, its left, around the front
of Culpeper Court-House, covering the Madison Court-House road;
in length about five miles. This service was arduous, trying, and,
by night, attended with danger.
During my service as corps officer-of-the-day, in March, 1864,
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Townsend (106th N. Y.), in charge of
the grand-guard on the Sperryville road, in violation of orders,
admitted some refugee ladies, who presented a pass from an officer
of an outer cavalry picket. The orders were to recognize no pass
for a citizen not emanating from army headquarters. The Colonel
reported the occurrence to me, and I disapproved his action, but
made no report of it. The ladies, on some errand, reached
headquarters, and told of their admittance on this road. Meade
ordered me to report the delinquent officer, which I did, giving
all excuses I could for him, but they were unavailing. I was
ordered to prefer charges against Colonel Townsend, "for disobedience
of orders." A general court-martial was called for his trial, of
which General D. B. Birney was President, and, notwithstanding I
had preferred the charges, I was made a member of it.
On the trial I protested my interest and asked the court to excuse
me from sitting, but my request was refused. The court found
Townsend guilty and sentenced him: "To be suspended from rank and
pay for two months." This sentence was approved by General Meade,
April 1st, but Townsend's suspension from rank was remitted, and
he was ordered to duty. He was a gallant and accomplished officer,
and, feeling keenly the disgrace, rushed to his death at Cold Harbor
just after the sixty days' suspension of pay elapsed. The incident
illustrates the severity of discipline and the fate of war.
The soldiers of the army, as far as possible, were kept active,
but the cold winter, with frequent rains, caused much discomfort,
and many were in hospital; few were furloughed. Many rude log
chapels were erected and used, often alternately, for religious
worship, lectures, concerts, readings, and dances. Civilian visitors
were, at times, numerous. One most notable army ball was given at
the headquarters of General Joseph B. Carr. This event took place
January 25, 1864, and was attended generally by officers of the
army, by some military officials from Washington and elsewhere, by
officers' wives and their friends visiting the army, and by invited
ladies and gentlemen from Washington, New York, Philadelphia,
Boston, and Baltimore. Over four thousand attended. The ball was
held in large communicating tents, erected for the purpose. Ample
floors were laid for promenades and dancing. Dinner was provided,
where everything obtainable from land or sea was served, with
liquors and wines without stint. The night was entirely devoted
to it. It was brilliant beyond descriptions. To hundreds it was
their last ball, or appearance in social life.
Notwithstanding the necessarily promiscuous character of the
participants, and though no scandal attended it, and all decorum
usual on such occasions was observed, it was at the time the subject
of much severe criticism through the press, from the pulpit, and
by people generally. General Carr and his good wife were adepts
in social affairs, and are entitled to the distinction of having
assembled and directed the most numerously attended ball of its
kind ever held in the United States.
Horse racing and other sports were indulged in, especially by the
cavalry. But all these were mere diversions, and did not indicate
that the army was not preparing for the bloody work yet ahead of it.
Grant, with the armies under General George H. Thomas, W. T. Sherman,
and Joseph Hooker, November 25, 1863, drove Bragg from his perch
on Missionary Ridge and to a precipitate retreat, and the Army of
the Tennessee under Sherman subsequently relieved Burnside, besieged
at Knoxville by Longstreet, thus closing the campaigns of 1863 in
the West about the time they closed in the East. Soon thereafter
rumors were current that Grant was to be promoted to chief command
of all the Union armies. A law passed Congress February 29, 1864,
reviving the grade of Lieutenant-General, and President Lincoln,
the next day, appointed Ulysses S. Grant to the office, and the
Senate, the succeeding day, confirmed the appointment. March 10,
1864, Halleck was relieved from duty as General-in-Chief, and became
thereafter Chief of Staff of the Army. Grant was, the same day,
assigned by the President, "pursuant to the act of Congress, to
command the Armies of the United States," headquarters of the Army
to be in Washington, and "with General Grant in the field." Grant
established his field-headquarters at Culpeper Court-House, March
26, 1864, and remained with the Army of the Potomac until Appomattox
came. Just prior to his joining the Army of the Potomac, March
23, 1864, it was reorganized, the First and Third Corps being broken
up as separate organizations, and the troops composing them
distributed to the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps, they retaining
their former corps badges. Hancock resumed command of the Second
Corps. Warren was assigned to command the Fifth. Carr was
transferred to the Second. The Third Division, Third Corps, became
the Third Division of the Sixth (Sedgwick's) Corps, the old Third
Division of the Sixth being consolidated with its other divisions.
General H. Prince was assigned to command the Third Division of
the Sixth. The Second Brigade (Keifer's) of this division, with
the 126th Ohio (Colonel Smith) and the 67th Pennsylvania (Colonel
Staunton) added, was placed under the command of General David A.
Russell,(11) but he was soon transferred to another command, and
Colonel B. F. Smith for a time succeeded him. Major-General James
B. Ricketts, before April 30, 1864, relieved General Prince, and
thereafter the Third Division of the Sixth Corps was known as
"Ricketts' Division."
Much bad feeling existed on the part of Generals French, Sykes,
Newton, and others over the breaking up of their commands and their
being relieved from field duty. The consolidation of divisions
and brigades in the corps retained, also caused much discontent,
and excited jealousies towards the organizations from the disbanded
corps which took their old designations. This was the second time
troops I commanded had this experience. While in camp or on marches
an officer may become disliked by his men, but a great battle in
which he does his duty will always restore him to popularity. The
Third Corps badge was a diamond; the Sixth a Greek cross. The
Third Division for a time adhered to the _diamond_, but later, wore
both proudly, and finally rejoiced alone under the _Greek cross_.
The Army of the Potomac was for the first time reduced to three
corps. There was, however, belonging to this army, a large artillery
reserve, not attached to any corps, but under a chief, General
Henry J. Hunt; also a cavalry corps, consisting of three divisions
and a reserve brigade, which Major-General Philip H. Sheridan was
assigned (April 5, 1864) to command.(12) To each corps was attached
an artillery brigade. This army, like any other well-appointed
one, also had (each with a chief officer) its Commissary, Quartermaster,
Ordnance, and Medical Departments; also a Provost-Guard, consisting
of a brigade of infantry and a regiment of cavalry under a Provost
Marshal-General;(13) also Signal and Engineer Corps, and other
minor and somewhat independent organizations, such as body-guards
to commanding generals, pioneers, pontoniers, etc.
The Army of the Potomac, thus organized, commanded, and appointed,
with the new commander of all the armies of the Union with it, now
awaited good weather to enter upon the bloodiest campaign civilized
man has ever witnessed.
( 1) See sketch attached to Meade's report, _War Records_, vol.
xxix, Part I., p. 19.
( 2) _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 738.
( 3) Birney's Report, _War Records_, vol. xxvii., Part I., p. 750.
( 4) He died of disease October 18, 1864.
( 5) _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., pp. 836-8.
( 6) _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 19. (Sketch).
( 7) _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 686.
( 8) _Battles and Leaders_, vol. iii., p. 241 (Col. Venable).
( 9) _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 18.
(10) Botts was then on his farm--a Union man. He had been an old
line Whig, and was personally hostile to Jeff. Davis.
(11) _War Records_, vol. xxxiii., pp. 717, 722, 732, 745.
(12) _Ibid_., 798, 806.
(13) A badge for each fighting corps of the Union Army was adopted
(January, 1863), its color indicating the number of the division
in a corps. Three divisions of three brigades each usually
constituted a corps. Each officer and soldier wore on his hat or
cap his proper corps badge; the first division being red, second
white, and third blue. The badge appeared prominently in the centre
of all headquarters flags. Division flags were square, brigade,
tri-cornered, all of white ground save those of a second division
which were blue; the flag of a second brigade had a red border next
to the pole, and of a third brigade a red border on all sides.