Plans of Campaigns, Union and Confederate--Campaign and Battle of
the Wilderness, May, 1864--Author Wounded, and Personal Matters--
Movements of the Army to the James River, with Mention of Battles
of Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, and Other Engagements, and Statement
of Losses and Captures
A full detailed history of the great campaign of the Wilderness
and of the many battles fought in the spring and summer of 1864 in
Southeast Virginia and around Richmond and Petersburg will not here
be attempted. I shall confine myself to a general story of the
campaign, with dates, results of engagements and losses, and some
details of the fighting participated in by troops I was immediately
connected with or interested in.
General Grant (April 9, 1864), in a confidential communication to
General Meade,( 1) outlined his plan for the early movements of
all the principal Union armies. Texas was to be abandoned, save
on the Rio Grande, and General Banks, then on Red River, was to
concentrate a force, not less than 25,000 strong, at New Orleans
to move on Mobile. Sherman was to leave Chattanooga at the same
time Meade moved, "Joe Johnston's army being his objective point
and the heart of Georgia his ultimate aim"; if successful, Sherman
was to "secure the line from Chattanooga to Mobile, with the aid
of Banks." General Franz Sigel (then in command of the Department
of West Virginia ( 2)), was to start two columns, one from Beverly
under General Ord, to endeavor to reach the Tennessee and Virginia
Railroad west of Lynchburg, and the other from Charleston, West
Virginia, under General George Crook, to strike at Saltville and
go thence eastward to join Ord. General Quincy A. Gilmore was to
be transferred, with 10,000 men, from South Carolina to General B.
F. Butler at Fortress Monroe, and the latter General was to organize
a force of about 23,000 men, under the immediate command of General
W. F. Smith, with which, and Gilmore's command, he should "seize
City Point and operate against Richmond from the south side of the
river," moving simultaneously with Meade's army. To Meade he said:
"_Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes there
you will go also_." General Burnside, then at Annapolis organizing
the Ninth Army Corps, was to reinforce Meade with probably 25,000
men. There was to be naval co-operation on the James. Grant had
not then determined on which flank to attack Lee, or whether he
would cross the Rapidan above or below the Confederate Army.
All baggage was reduced to the lowest standard possible. "Two
wagons to a regiment of 500 men . . . for all baggage, exclusive
of subsistence stores and ordnance stores. One wagon to a brigade
and one to a division headquarters, . . . and about two to corps
headquarters."
Meade subsequently made a further reduction, and allowed only one
wagon to a regiment.
When it was finally determined to move by Lee's right flank, Meade
was ordered to have supplies forwarded to White House, on the
Pamunkey.( 3)
Sigel was directed to advance a column in co-operation from
Martinsburg up the Shenandoah Valley.
Grant, in a confidential dispatch,( 4) April 29th, to Halleck,
fixed May 4th as the date for putting the Army of the Potomac in
motion, saying:
"My own notions about our line of march are entirely made up, but
as circumstances beyond my control may change them, I will only
state that my effort will be to bring Butler's and Meade's forces
together."
The next day, on the authority of a rebel officer arrested in
Baltimore, who left Lee's army on April 17th, Halleck wired Grant
that Lee was about to move Longstreet by the mountain road westward
over the Blue Ridge with 20,000 men; that Hill, 50,000 strong, was
to force Grant's right at Culpeper, and with three divisions form
a junction at Warrenton with Ewell; that all Confederate troops
from East Tennessee were to strengthen Lee; that Breckinridge, with
25,000 men in West Virginia, accompanied by Morgan's cavalry, was
to force his way down the Kanawha into Ohio, near Gallipolis; that
if Lee reached Pennsylvania, Breckinridge was to join him, Morgan's
cavalry destroying all railroads to east and west; that Lee's
general direction was to be towards Wheeling and Pittsburg; that
Richmond's defence was to be left to Beauregard, with Pickett's
division of 15,000 men, the Maryland Line, details from hospitals,
conscripts, militia of Governor Smith's call (fifty to fifty-five
years of age), and a foreign legion of forced aliens.( 5)
This plan, if ever formed, comprehensive as it may have been in
conception, was never to be even partially put in execution. It
probably originated in the fertile imagination of the rebel officer
from whom Halleck obtained it.
In March, 1864, an equally comprehensive plan was conceived by
Longstreet, then at Greenville, Tennessee, by which Beauregard was
to lead an advance column from the borders of North Carolina through
the mountain passes, Longstreet to follow through East Tennessee,
uniting with Beauregard in Kentucky, and, together, move against
the line of railway from Louisville, and thus force Sherman to
retire from Johnston's front, allowing him to advance northward,
avoiding general battle until all the Confederate columns could
form a grand junction on or near the Ohio River. This plan was
approved by Lee, and by both Lee and Longstreet laid before President
Davis and the War Department at Richmond. Davis disapproved it.
Another plan, submitted by Bragg (then "Commander-in-Chief near
the President"), received the approval of Davis. By this Johnston
was to march to the headwaters of the Little Tennessee River,
Longstreet to the east of Knoxville and join Johnston, and, united,
they were to march west into Middle Tennessee and break the Union
line of supplies about Nashville. Though some orders were issued
looking to the execution of this plan, it was not seriously attempted,
as Joe Johnston regarded it as impracticable.( 6) Longstreet, with
the part of his command that had served in Virginia, was, early in
April, transferred to the Rapidan. Grant alone moved his armies
to the execution of his campaigns as planned.
_Wilderness_
Not until May 2d did Meade send orders to his corps for the movement
on the 4th across the Rapidan. On the day of starting he issued
a stirring and patriotic address to his soldiers.( 7) Grant had
determined to attack and turn Lee's right flank.( 8)
As soon in the early morning as engineers could lay pontoons the
cavalry crossed the river at Ely and Germanna Fords, and cleared
the way for the infantry. Hancock's (Second) corps crossed at
Ely's Ford and marched to the vicinity of Chancellorsville. Warren's
(Fifth) corps, with Sedgwick's (Sixth) following, crossed at Germanna
Ford. Warren proceeded to the Old Wilderness Tavern. Sedgwick
bivouacked on the heights south of the river. The reserve artillery
crossed at Ely's Ford, and subsistence and other trains at this
and Culpeper Mine Ford. All these movements took place as ordered.( 9)
No serious resistance was met with the first day. On the night of
the 4th I encamped immediately south of the Rapidan on the height
just above the ford. I was ordered to cover the ford and protect
the pontoon bridge until the head of Burnside's column should reach
it. The whole army slept without tents. On rising in the early
morning, and while standing on a bluff overlooking the river, Major
Wm. S. McElwain of my regiment, in a quiet but somewhat troubled
way, ventured to suggest that unless I was more prudent than usual
I would never recross it. I told him the chances of war were hardly
lessened by prudence where duty was involved, and that my chances
of going North alive were probably as good as his. He seemed to
have no concern about himself.
General Grant, his staff, and escort, rode by while we waited. He
was on a fine, though small, black horse, which he set well; was
plainly dressed, looked the picture of health, and bore no evidence
of anxiety about him. His plain hat and clothes were in marked
contrast with a somewhat gaily dressed and equipped staff. He
saluted and spoke pleasantly, but did not check his horse from a
rather rapid gait.
About 10 A.M. Burnside, at the head of his command, reached the
ford. His corps, the Ninth, had been recently organized by him at
Annapolis, Maryland, and officers and soldiers were, in general,
newly equipped and clothed, and all regiments and headquarters had
new flags. The long line, as displayed for miles, moving slowly
over the lowlands to the crossing, was most imposing, and gave rise
to varied reflections. But the time for strong battle had come.
The head of the Fifth Corps was pushed forward on the Orange and
Fredericksburg plank road, the purpose being to avoid the intrenchments
of Mine Run, but the enemy appearing on the turnpike running, in
general, parallel with the plank road and to the north of it, the
Sixth Corps (except the Second Brigade, Third Division) moved to
position on the right of the Fifth, save Getty's division, which
was sent to the intersection of the Brock and Orange plank roads
with instructions to hold it, at all hazards, until the arrival of
Hancock's corps from Todd's Tavern. About noon two divisions of
Warren's corps had a sharp combat with the head of Ewell's corps
on the pike, driving it back some distance when, being outflanked,
they were in turn forced back, losing two guns. Wadsworth's division
of this corps having been sent to the plank road was withdrawn to
a junction with Warren's other divisions. Warren suffered some
loss in prisoners taken from Crawford's division. Getty, on his
arrival on the plank road, found our cavalry being pressed back by
Hill's corps, but he deployed on each side of the road, and opening
fire on the enemy checked him. Getty was able to hold his position
until Hancock arrived about 2 P.M. Hancock, with his corps and
Getty's division, assailed the enemy furiously, and for a time
successfully, though meeting with stubborn resistance. General
Alexander Hays was killed in this action while repairing a break
in our line. The enemy moved troops from the turnpike to Hill's
relief, and Meade, seeing this, sent Wadsworth's division and
Baxter's brigade of the Fifth Corps to Hancock. Night came, and
the battle ceased on this part of the field before the reinforcements
arrived, both armies holding their positions.
The Sixth Corps (Getty's division absent with Hancock) with much
difficulty made its way through the dense low pine thicket, and
about 2 P.M. was in position, principally deployed, on the right
of the Fifth, Ricketts' division (Second Brigade absent) on the
left, and Wright on the right. Soon after the head of Burnside's
column reached Germanna Ford, my brigade moved to the battle-ground.
As we advanced, firing along the extended front soon told us where
serious work had begun. General Truman Seymour (of Olustee fame)
was assigned this day to command the brigade, but he did not promptly
join it. As we approached the battle, I was ordered by a staff
officer of Sedgwick to conduct the brigade to the right of that
part of the Sixth Corps already in line and partly engaged. This
order being executed, we became the extreme right of the army.
The other brigades of the Third Division being in position on the
left of the corps, I was not in touch with them, and reported to
General H. G. Wright, commanding the First Division.
Heavy firing already extended along the line of the Sixth Corps to
the left of us. The brigade, about 2 P.M., was put by me in position
in two lines, the 6th Maryland and 110th Ohio, from left to right,
in the front, and the 122d and 126th Ohio and the 138th Pennsylvania
on the rear line and in reserve. Skirmishers were advanced, who
pressed the enemy's skirmishers back a short distance to his main
line, and a sharp engagement ensued, lasting until about 5 P.M.,
when, proper support being promised, an aggressive attack was made.
I quote from my official report, dated November 1, 1864:
"I received orders to assume general charge of the first line, to
press the enemy, and, if possible, outflank him upon his left.
The troops charged forward in gallant style, pressing the enemy
back by 6 P.M. about one half mile, when we came upon him upon the
slope of a hill, intrenched behind logs which had been hurriedly
thrown together. During the advance the troops were twice halted
and the fire opened, killing and wounding a considerable number of
the enemy.
"The front line being upon the extreme right of the army, and the
troops upon its left failing to move forward in conjunction with
it, I deemed it prudent to halt without making an attack upon the
enemy's line. After a short consultation with Col. John W. Horn,
I sent word that the advance line of the brigade was unsupported
upon either flank, and that the enemy overlapped the right and left
of the line, and was apparently in heavy force, rendering it
impossible for the troops to attain success in a further attack.
"I soon after received an order to attack at once.
"Feeling sure that the word I sent had not been received, I delayed
until a second order came to attack. I accordingly made the attack
without further delay.
"The attack was made about 7 P.M. The troops were in a thick and
dense wilderness. The line was advanced to within 150 yards of
the enemy's works, under a most terrible fire from the front and
flanks. It was impossible to succeed; but the two regiments,
notwithstanding, maintained their ground and kept up a rapid fire
for nearly three hours, and then retired under orders, for a short
distance only.
"I was wounded about 8.30 P.M. by a rifle ball passing through both
bones of the left forearm, but did not relinquish command until 9 P.M.
"The troops were required to maintain this unequal contest under
the belief that other troops were to attack the enemy upon his
flank.
"In this attack the 6th Maryland lost in killed, two officers and
sixteen men, and eight officers and 132 men wounded; and the 110th
Ohio lost one officer and thirteen men killed, and six (6) officers
and ninety-three (93) men wounded, making an aggregate in the two
regiments of 271.
"Major William S. McElwain, 110th Ohio, who had won the commendations
of all who knew him, for his skill, judgment, and gallantry, was
among the killed.
"Lieutenant Joseph McKnight, 110th Ohio, and Captain Adam B. Martin,
6th Maryland, were mortally wounded, and have since died.
"Captain J. B. Van Eaton and Lieutenants H. H. Stevens and G. O.
McMillen, 110th Ohio, Major J. C. Hill, Captains A. Billingslea,
J. T. Goldsborough, J. J. Bradshaw and J. R. Rouser, and Lieutenants
J. A. Swarts, C. Damuth and D. J. Smith, 6th Maryland, were more
or less severely wounded.
"All displayed the greatest bravery, and deserve the thanks of the
country.
"Colonel John W. Horn, 6th Maryland, and Lieutenant-Colonel O. H.
Binkley, 110th Ohio, deserve to be specially mentioned for their
courage, skill, and ability.
"Captains Brown, 110th Ohio, and Prentiss, 6th Maryland, distinguished
themselves in their successful management of skirmishers.
"From reports of this night attack published in the Richmond papers
it is known that the rebel Brigadier-General J. M. Jones, (commanding
the Stonewall Brigade) and many others were killed in the attack."
In consequence of my wound I was absent from the brigade after the
battle of the Wilderness until August 26, 1864, and I am therefore
unable to give its movements and operations from personal knowledge.
Colonel Ball succeeded me on the field in command of the brigade,
and Colonel Horn in charge of the advance line in the night attack.
Seymour was not present with the attacking troops. He was captured
the next day, and the command of the brigade devolved on Colonel
B. F. Smith.
To enable the reader to follow it through the battle I quote further
from my report of November 1, 1864.
"Early on the morning of the 6th of May, the brigade formed in two
lines of battle and assaulted the enemy's works in its front, the
122d and 126th Ohio and 138th Pennsylvania in the front line, and
the 110th Ohio and 6th Maryland in the rear line. The brigade was
still the extreme right of the army. The assault was most vigorously
made, but the enemy was found to be in too great numbers and too
strongly fortified to be driven from his position. After suffering
very heavy loss, the troops were withdrawn to their original
position, where slight fortifications were thrown up. In the charge
the troops behaved most gallantly. The 122d and 126th Ohio and
138th Pennsylvania lost very heavily.
"About 2 P.M. Brigadier-General Shaler's brigade, of the First
Division, Sixth Army Corps, took position upon the right of this
brigade, and became the extreme right of the army.
"Skirmishing continued until about sunset, when the enemy turned
the right of the army and made an attack upon its flank and rear,
causing the troops to give way rapidly, and compelling them to fall
back for some distance before they were reformed. So rapid was
the enemy's advance upon the flank and rear, that time was not
given to change front to meet him, and some confusion occurred in
the retreat. Few prisoners were lost in the brigade. The lines
were soon re-established and the progress of the enemy stopped.
An attack was made by the enemy upon the re-established line about
8 P.M., but was handsomely repulsed.
"Unfounded reports were circulated that the troops of this brigade
were the first to give way, when the first attack of the enemy was
made.
"It is not improper to state here that no charges of bad conduct
are made against the troops upon its right, but that this brigade
remained at its post and successfully resisted a simultaneous attack
from the front, until the troops upon its right were doubled back
and were retreating in disorder through and along its lines."
The presence of a general officer in authority, or an intelligent
staff officer representing him, would have averted the useless
slaughter of the evening of the 5th, and the disaster of the evening
of the 6th, which, for a time, threatened the safety of the whole
army. A brigade or more of troops thrown on the enemy's left by
a little _détour_ on either evening would have doubled it back and
given us, with little loss, that part of the field and a free swing
for the next day.
The success in gaining ground on the 5th left our right in the air,
bent to the front, with the enemy on its flank, thus inviting the
attack made the next day by General J. B. Gordon, which drove back
the main part of the Sixth Corps on the Union centre. Gordon's
attack was a repetition of Stonewall Jackson's flank movement at
Chancellorsville, and it should have been so far anticipated as to
cause its disastrous failure.
In field-hospital, on seeing a staff officer of mine (Captain Thomas
J. Black, who was having a wounded hand dressed), I discussed the
situation, and predicted the enemy would seize the favorable
opportunity of attacking. Anticipating the attack, my servant
(Andy Jackson), in his eager solicitude for my safety, kept by
horse near the tent, saddled, so I might, when it came, be assisted
on him, and escape. Gordon's men advanced far enough for their
bullets to pass through the hospital tents, but the hospital was
not taken.
General Shaler's brigade of the First Division, Sixth Corps, having
been placed on the extreme right of the Sixth, was the first to
give way; then, the enemy being well on the rear of the Second
Brigade as well as on its flank, and it being at the same time
attacked from the front, it also gave way in some confusion, but,
under its brave officers, Colonels Ball, Horn, and McClennan,
Lieutenant-Colonels Granger, Ebright, Binkley, and others, it was
soon assembled in good line in front of Gordon's advancing column,
where it did much to arrest it. Generals Seymour and Shaler being
separated from their brigades, while searching for them were both
captured.(10)
But somebody needed, and sought, a "_scapegoat_." There were only
three regiments in the Second Brigade--6th Maryland, 110th and 122d
Ohio, which had served under Milroy in the Shenandoah Valley in
1863. Somebody reported to the press, and probably to Grant, that
on the evening of the 6th of May troops that had fought there under
Milroy were on the extreme right of the army, and were the first
to give way. This was necessarily false, as these troops were not
then on the extreme right at all, and did not retire until the
force to their right had been broken and routed. General Grant to
Halleck, in an excusatory and exculpatory letter (May 7th), as to
the disaster on his right, said: "Milroy's old brigade was attacked
and gave way in great confusion, almost without resistance, carrying
good troops with them."(10) This statement may have been made to
tickle Halleck's ear, as he was known to hate Milroy and his friends,
but it was, nevertheless, untrue and grossly unjust. Of the three
regiments from the Shenandoah Valley, 494 (one third their number)
fell dead or wounded on that field, through inefficiency and blunders
of high officers who were never near enough to it to hear the fatal
thud or passing whiz of a rifle ball. Many others of these regiments
had fallen (nearby) on the heights of Orange Grove, the November
before. Grant, long after, acknowledged the injustice of his
statement.
After I had been wounded, though yet in command of the attacking
force, a Major rode up from the left, and reported to me that his
officers and men were falling fast, and expressed the fear that
they could not be long held to their work. He was directed to
cheer them with the hope that the expected support would soon
arrive. As he swung his horse around to return, it was shot, fell,
and the Major, lighting on his feet, without a word quickly
disappeared (as seen by the light of flashing rifles) among the
dense scrub pines. He never was seen again, nor his body found.
He must have been killed, and his body consumed late by the great
conflagration which, feeding on the dry timber and _débris_, swept
the battle-field, licking up the precious blood and cremating the
bodies of the martyr dead. This was the gallant McElwain, who, in
the early morning, expressed so much anxiety for my safety.
Colonel William H. Ball, on hearing, late at night, of my wound,
inquired particularly as to its nature, and being assured it was
serious, characteristically exclaimed: "Good! he will get home
now and survive the war; his fighting days are over." Not so, nor
yet with him. As I was borne to the left along the rear of the
line on a stretcher towards the field-hospital, about midnight, a
quickened ear caught the sound of a voice, giving loud command,
familiar to me years before at my home city. I summoned the officer,
and found him to be my fellow-townsman, Colonel Edwin C. Mason,
then commanding the 7th Maine. A day or two more and he, too, was
severely wounded.
I had seen something of war, but, for the first time, my lot was
now cast with the dead, dying, and wounded in the rear. A soldier
on the line of battle sees his comrades fall, indifferently generally,
and continues to discharge his duty. The wounded get to the rear
themselves or with assistance and are seen no more by those in
battle line. Some of the medical staff in a well organized army,
with hospital stewards and attendants, go on the field to temporarily
bind up wounds, staunch the flow of blood, and direct the stretcher-
bearers and ambulance corps in the work of taking the wounded to
the operating surgeons at field-hospital. The dead need and generally
receive no attention until the battle is ended.
On my arrival at hospital, about 2 P.M., I was carried through an
entrance to a large tent, on each side of which lay human legs and
arms, resembling piles of stove wood, the blood only excepted.
All around were dead and wounded men, many of the latter dying.
The surgeons, with gleaming, sometimes bloody, knives and instruments,
were busy at their work. I soon was laid on the rough board
operating table and chloroformed, and skilful surgeons--Charles E.
Cady (138th Pennsylvania) and Theodore A. Helwig (87th Pennsylvania)
--cut to the injured parts, exposed the fractured ends of the
shattered bones, dressed them off with saw and knife, and put them
again in place, splinted and bandaged. I was then borne to a pallet
on the ground to make room for--"_Next_." The sensation produced
by the anaesthetic, in passing to and from unconsciousness, was
exhilarating and delightful. For some hours, exhausted from loss
of blood as I was, I fell into short dozes, accompanied with fanciful
dreams. Not all have the same experience.
From this hospital, on the 7th, I was taken by ambulance, in the
immense train of wounded, towards Spotsylvania Court House, but on
nearing that place, the train diverging from the track of the army,
moved, with the roar of the battle in our ears, slowly to
Fredericksburg. At its frequent halts, great kettles of beef tea
were made and brought to us. I drank gallons of it, as did others.
It was grateful to a thirsty, fevered palate, but afforded little
nourishment. For about ten days I was confined to a bed in a
private house--Mrs. Alsop's--taken for an officers' hospital. The
wounded from Spotsylvania also soon arrived at Fredericksburg, and
surgeons and nurses were overtaxed. Contract surgeons appeared
from the North; also nurses and attendants from each of the Sanitary
and Christian Commissions. I was visited by Miss Dorothea L. Dix
(then seventy years of age), who was in charge of a corps of hospital
nurses. Horace Mann had, long before, apotheosized her for her
philanthropic work for the insane.(11) A highly inflamed condition
of my arm threatened my life while here, but finally reaching Acquia
Creek, I went by hospital boat to Washington, thence home.
Everywhere, hotels, hospitals, boats, and cars were crowded with
the wounded, fresh from the Wilderness and Spotsylvania. Philanthropic
people of principal cities kept, day and night, surgeons with
skilled assistants at depots to care for the travelling wounded.
But to return to the Wilderness. The Sixth Corps, with little
fighting, recovered its lost position on the morning of the 7th.
The Fifth had a fierce engagement on the 6th, to the left of the
Sixth Corps, but without material success. Hancock's corps, with
Wadsworth's division of the Fifth and Getty's of the Sixth, opened
a brilliant battle on the plank road at early dawn of the 6th, and
drove the enemy more than a mile along the road in some confusion,
when Longstreet's corps arrived on Hancock's left and turned the
tide of battle, and in turn our troops were forced back to their
former position on the Brock road. General James S. Wadsworth was
mortally wounded while rallying his men, and the heroic Getty was
severely wounded. The losses in this engagement on both sides were
great. General Jenkins of the Confederate Army was killed, and
Longstreet severely wounded. They were shot by mistake, by their
own men,(12) as was "Stonewall" Jackson at Chancellorsville. Lee,
in person, was on the plank road giving direction to the battle.
He exposed himself to danger, and despaired of the result. At a
critical moment he sent his "Adjutant-General, Colonel W. H. Taylor,
back to Parker's Store to get the trains ready for a movement to
the rear."(13) Grant, early on the 6th, put Burnside's corps in
between the turnpike and plank roads, and it sustained the battle
in the centre throughout the day, both armies holding well their
ground. The morning of the 7th found Lee's army retired and strongly
intrenched on a new line, with right near Parker's Store, and left
extending northward across the turnpike.
On the 5th and 6th, Sheridan with his cavalry held the left flank
and covered the rear of the army, fighting and repulsing Stuart's
cavalry in attempts to penetrate to our rear. At Todd's Tavern,
on the 7th, a severe cavalry engagement took place in which Sheridan
was victorious. But the two great armies principally rested in
position on that day, and the great battle of the Wilderness, with
its alternate successes and repulses and its long lists of dead
and wounded, was ended.
Grant, having decided not to fight further in the Wilderness country,
on the night of the 7th put his army in motion for Spotsylvania
Court-House, the cavalry preceding the Fifth Corps over the Brock
road, followed by the Second and Sixth Corps on the plank and
turnpike roads, with the army trains in the advance, the Ninth
Corps in the rear. Lee, having either anticipated or discovered
the movement, threw Longstreet's corps in Warren's front on the
Brock road, and heavy fighting ensued on the 8th, most of the corps
of both armies being, at different times, engaged. Wilson's cavalry
division gained possession of the Court-House, but, being unsupported,
withdrew. May 9th, the enemy was pressed and his position developed.
Two divisions of the Ninth Corps, finding the enemy on the
Fredericksburg road, drove him back and across the Ny River with
some loss. This day, Major-General John Sedgwick, commanding the
Sixth Corps, while on the advance line looking for the enemy's
position, was killed by a sharp-shooter. He had the confidence
and love of his corps.
Sheridan, with the cavalry, cut loose from the main army on the
9th, with orders from Meade to move southerly, engage, whenever
possible, the enemy's cavalry, cut railroads, threaten Richmond,
and eventually communicate with or join the Union forces on James
River. He passed around the enemy's right and destroyed the depot
at Beaver Dam, two locomotives, three trains of cars, one hundred
other cars, and large quantities of stores and rations for Lee's
army; also the telegraph line and railroad track for ten miles,
and recaptured some prisoners. On the 10th of May he crossed the
South Anna at Ground Squirrel Bridge, captured Ashland Station, a
locomotive and a train of cars, and destroyed stores and railroad
track, and next day marched towards Richmond. At Yellow Tavern he
met the Confederate cavalry, defeated it, killing its commander,
General J. E. B. Stuart, and taking two pieces of artillery and
some prisoners, and forcing it to retreat across the Chickahominy.
On the 12th Sheridan reached the second line of works around
Richmond, then recrossed the Chickahominy, and after much hard
fighting arrived at Bottom's Bridge the morning of the 13th. On
the next day he was at Haxall's Landing on the James River, where
he sent off his wounded and recruited his men and horses. On the
24th he rejoined the Army of the Potomac at Chesterfield, returning
_via_ White House on the Pamunkey.(14)
Fighting at and around Spotsylvania Court-House continued during
the 10th and 11th, and on the 12th Hancock's corps assaulted the
enemy's centre, capturing Major-General Edward Johnson, with General
George C. Steuart and about three thousand men of his division.
On advancing to the enemy's second line of breastworks, Hancock
met with desperate resistance at what is known as the salient, or
"_dead angle_." This was the key to Lee's position, and concentrating
there his batteries and best troops, he mercilessly sacrificed the
latter to hold it. The Second Corps was reinforced by the Sixth,
under Major-General Horatio G. Wright, the successor of Sedgwick.
The most deadly fighting occurred, and the dead and wounded of both
sides were greater, for the space covered, than anywhere in the
war, if not in all history. Wheaton's brigade of the Sixth Corps
fought in the "dead angle"; and the 126th Ohio of the Second Brigade,
Third Division, was detached and ordered to assault it. In making
the assault it lost every fourth man.(15) The whole of the Second
Brigade fought with conspicuous gallantry at Spotsylvania.
The enemy retired to a shorter line during the night. From the
13th to the 17th, both armies being intrenched, nothing decisive
transpired, through there were frequent fierce conflicts. The
Union sick and wounded were sent to the rear _via_ Fredericksburg
and Acquia Creek, and supplies were brought forward.(16)
General Grant, the morning of the 11th, wrote Halleck:
"We have now ended the sixth day of very heavy fighting. The result
to this time is much in our favor. But our losses have been heavy,
as well as those of the enemy. We have lost to this time, eleven
general officers, killed, wounded, and missing, and probably 20,000
men. I think the loss of the enemy must be greater. We have taken
over 4000 prisoners in battle, while he has taken but few except
stragglers. I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons
for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, _and propose to
fight it out on this line if it takes all summer_."(17)
The italics are mine, to emphasize the origin of the most frequently
quoted phrase of General Grant.
The Union Army was moving by its left flank on the 19th, when Ewell
attempted to turn its right flank and get possession of the
Fredericksburg road, but he met a new division under General R. O.
Tyler, later, two divisions of the Second Corps, and Ferrero's
division of colored troops (twelve companies, 2000 strong, recently
from the defences of Washington), and was handsomely beaten back.
The 9th New York Heavy Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
William H. Seward, son of Secretary Seward, joined the Second
Brigade at North Anna River, the 26th of May.(18)
The army, by the 26th, had crossed the North Anna at various fords,
and by the 28th it was across the Pamunkey at Hanoverton and Hundley
Fords, sharp engagements ensuing constantly. The 29th the enemy
was driven into his works behind the Totopotomy, the Sixth Corps
occupying Hanover Court-House. Warren was attacked, but repulsed
the enemy at Bethesda Church, and Barlow of the Sixth carried a
line of rifle-pits south of the river. The cavalry was engaged
during these movements in many affairs, and Sheridan with two
divisions occupied Cold Harbor the 31st, but was hard pressed until
Wright with the Sixth and General W. F. Smith (recently arrived
with the Eighteenth Corps from Butler on the James) relieved him.
These corps, June 1st, attacked and took part of the enemy's
intrenched line.
At 6 P.M., in a general assault upon the enemy's works, Ricketts'
division (Third of Sixth) captured many prisoners and the works in
its front, and handsomely repulsed repeated efforts to retaken
them. In this assault the Second Brigade moved in the following
order: 6th Maryland and 138th Pennsylvania in the first line, 9th
New York in the second and third lines, and the 122d and 126th Ohio
in the fourth line, all preceded by the 110th Ohio on the skirmish
line.
General Meade addressed this note to General Wright:
"Please give my thanks to Brigadier-General Ricketts and his gallant
command for the very handsome manner in which they have conducted
themselves to-day. The success attained by them is of the greatest
importance, and if followed up will materially advance our
operations."
The morning of the 3d, the division charged forward about two
hundred yards under a heavy fire and intrenched, using bayonets,
tin cups, and plates for the purpose.(19) At 4 A.M., June 3d, by
Grant's order, the Sixth and Eighteenth Corps and Barlow's division
of the Second assaulted the strongly fortified works of the enemy,
but suffered a most disastrous repulse--the bloodiest of the war.
Approximately 10,000 Union men fell. The number and strength of
the enemy's position was not well understood. He did not suffer
correspondingly. There were found to be deep ravines and a morass
in front of his fortifications.
The assault was suspended about 7 A.M. and not renewed. Grant says
in his _Memoirs:_(20)
"I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was
ever made."
Other indecisive fighting occurred at Cold Harbor to the 12th, when
Lee's army having retired in consequence of further flank movements,
the last of the Union Army was withdrawn, and by June 13th, its
several corps crossing the Chickahominy at Long and Jones' Bridges,
reached the James River at Charles City Court-House. Sheridan,
meantime, with two cavalry divisions, was ordered to Gordonsville
to destroy the Central Railroad, and to communicate, if practicable,
with Hunter's expedition, then in progress in the Shenandoah Valley.
Sheridan fought a successful battle at Trevilian Station, June
11th, overthrowing Hampton and Fitz Lee's cavalry divisions.
The Union Army soon crossed the James.
Excluding captured and missing, the casualties in the Union Army
during the operations mentioned, shown by revised lists, are given
in the summary table following:(21)
Killed. Wounded. Aggregate.
Officers. Men. Officers. Men.
Wilderness, May 5-7 143 2013 569 11,468 14,193
Spotsylvania Court-House, May 8-21
174 2551 672 12,744 16,141
North Anna, Pamunkey, and Totopotomoy, May 21-June 1
41 550 159 2,575 3,325
Cold Harbor, Bethesda Church, etc., June 2-15
143 1702 433 8,644 10,922
Todd's Tavern to James River (Cavalry, Sheridan), May 9-24
7 57 16 321 401
Trevilian raid (Cavalry, Sheridan), June 7-24
14 136 43 695 888
------ ------ ------ ------ ------
Totals 522 7009 1892 36,447 45,870.(22)
There do not seem to exist any lists, at all complete, by which a
summary of casualties of killed and wounded in the Confederate Army
during the Wilderness campaign can be made up, but, barring Cold
Harbor, they were, doubtless, approximately as great as in the
Union Army. During the campaign the Union Army captured 22 field
guns and lost 3. It captured at least 67 colors. And reports show
the Army of the Potomac, from May 1 to 12, 1864, took 7078 prisoners,
and from May 12 to July 31, 1864, 6506; total, 13,584.
The Union reports show the "captured and missing [Union], May 4th
to June 24th," to be 8966.(23)
The killed and wounded in the Sixth Army Corps, May 5 to June 15,
1864, were 10,614; in the Third Division thereof, 1993, and in the
Second Brigade of this division, 1246.
( 1) _War Records_, vol. xxxiii., p. 827.
( 2) _War Records_, vol. xxxiii., p. 664.
( 3) _Ibid_., p. 827-9.
( 4) _Ibid_., p. 1017.
( 5) _War Records_., vol. xxxiii., p. 1022.
( 6) _Manassas to Appomattox_ (Longstreet), p. 544-5.
( 7) _War Records_, vol. xxxvi., Part II., p. 370.
( 8) _Ibid_., Part I., p. 189 (Meade's Report).
( 9) _Ibid_., Part II., p. 331.
(10) _War Records_, vol. xxxvi., Part II., pp. 729, 742, 745, 748.
(11) _Twelve Sermons_, p. 302.
(12) _Manassas to Appomattox_, p. 564.
(13) _Memoirs of Lee_, A. L. Long, p. 330.
(14) _War Records_, vol. xxxvi., Part I., pp. 193, 776-792.
(15) _War Records_, vol. xxxvi., Part I., p. 749.
(16) _Ibid_., pp. 188-195 (Meade's Report).
(17) _War Records_, vol. xxxvi., Part I., p. 627.
(18) _Ibid_., pp. 734, 740.
(19) _War Records_, vol. xxxvi., Part I., p. 734-5 (Keifer's
Report).
(20) Vol. ii., p. 276.
(21) _War Records_, vol. xxxvi., Part I., p. 188 (119-198).
(22) It is interesting to note that the ratio of killed to wounded,
shown by this table is almost exactly 1 to 5, that is 16.6 per
cent. of the whole number were killed; that of the killed, 1 out
of every 14.6 was an officer; of the wounded, 1 out of 20 was an
officer; of the whole number killed and wounded, 1 officer was
killed out of every 88, 1 officer was wounded out of every 24.3,
and 1 enlisted man was killed out of every 6.5, and one officer
was killed or wounded out of every 19.
(23) _War Records_, vol. xxxvi., Part I., pp. 188, 196.