Advance of Lee's Army, October, 1863 and Retreat of the Army of
the Potomac to Centreville--Battle of Bristoe Station--Advance of
the Union Army, November, 1863--Assault and Capture of Rappahannock
Station, and Forcing the Fords--Affair near Brandy Station and
Retreat of Confederate Army Behind the Rapidan--Incidents, etc.
Events occurred elsewhere that affected the aspect of affairs in
Virginia.
General Rosecrans, early in September, commenced to move the Army
of the Cumberland across the Tennessee River into Georgia, his
objective being Chattanooga. Burnside at about the same time began
a movement towards Knoxville, and on the way recaptured Cumberland
Gap. The Confederate authorities, fearing Bragg was in danger,
decided to send large reinforcements to his army, and, on September
9, 1863, Longstreet, with two divisions of his corps and a complement
of artillery, was dispatched by rail from Lee to reinforce Bragg.
The sanguinary battle of Chickamauga was fought on the 19th and
20th of September. It resulted in Rosecrans and his army gaining
possession of Chattanooga, and Bragg and his army being left in
possession of the battlefield. Rosecrans held Chattanooga in little
less than a state of siege; his communications were in danger of
being effectively cut off, and to aid his imperilled forces the
Eleventh and Twelfth Corps of the Army of the Potomac were, on
September 24th, ordered west, in command of General Joseph Hooker.
The loss of these corps reduced the relative strength of Meade's
army to Lee's materially below what it was before Longstreet's two
divisions were detached from the latter's army.
Elliott was relieved of the command of the Third Division, Third
Corps of the Army of the Potomac, October 3, 1863, and ordered to
report to Rosecrans. General Joseph B. Carr (Troy, N. Y.) succeeded
him. Carr was a charming man socially, of fine appearance, amiable
and lovable, but not strong as a soldier. He was understood to be
a favorite of the President, who appointed him Brigadier-General
September 7, 1862; the Senate, however, failing to confirm him,
the President reappointed him in March, 1863, with rank from date
of first appointment, thus giving him high rank in spite of the
Senate. He was finally confirmed, on a third appointment in 1864,
through some compromise, after a sharp controversy between the
President and the Senate, but with junior rank, and then ordered
to Butler's army.( 1)
For a time active operations were not contemplated by Meade. But
Lee, about the 9th of October, crossed the Rapidan and commenced
a movement around Meade's right, threatening his rear. This
compelled Meade to retire across the Rappahannock, and by the 14th
to Centreville and Union Mills, near the first Bull Run battle-
field.
On the 13th, while my brigade, with a New York battery temporarily
attached to it, was holding "Three Mile Station," near Warrenton,
and skirmishing with the enemy, ballot-boxes were opened, and a
_regular_ election was held for the Ohio troops, both the boxes
and ballots being carried to the voters along the battle-line so
they might vote without breaking it.( 2)
The Third Corps was encamped that night at Greenwich. The next
morning I was ordered with my brigade and Captain McKnight's battery
(N. Y.) to cover, as a rear-guard, the retreat of the Third Corps
to Manassas Heights _via_ Bristoe Station. My orders were to avoid
anything like a general engagement, but to beat back the advancing
enemy whenever possible, prevent captures, and baffle him in his
endeavors to delay or reach the main column. The successful conduct
of a rear-guard of a retreating army, when pursued by an energetic
foe, requires not only bravery but skill and tact. After the main
body of my corps had left camp on its march towards Bristoe, and
soon after daylight, the head of Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill's
corps appeared from the direction of Warrenton. I displayed my
troops with as much show of strength as possible, and with a few
shots from the battery forced the enemy to halt his head of column
and form line of battle. I thereupon retired by column quickly,
and resumed the march until the enemy again pushed forward by the
flank too near for my safety, when, in a chosen position, my troops
were again speedily brought into line and a fire opened, which
necessarily compelled him to halt and again make disposition for
battle. This movement was frequently repeated. At each such halt
the enemy necessarily consumed much time, thus giving the main body
of the corps ample opportunity to proceed leisurely towards its
destination. The weak or broken-down men of the rear-guard were
not required to halt and fight, but were allowed to make such speed
as they could. The day was almost spent when a courier reached me
from French with the information that the corps had passed Bristoe
Station, and was on the north side of Broad Run. Having now no
further responsibility than for the safety of my own command, I
moved more rapidly, and by 4 P.M. I had safely passed Bristoe
Station to the high ground north of Broad Run, from whence I could,
from a distance of less than a mile, see Bristoe, and, for a
considerable distance, the line of railroad running, in general
direction, north and south. The Third Corps had moved on out of
sight towards the heights at Manassas. My command was much wearied,
and I halted it for a short rest, but I soon ordered it forward
where it took position in obedience to an order of General Meade
to cover a blind road over which he feared the enemy might march
to seize the heights.
General A. P. Hill, in his report of the day, says:
"From this point (Greenwich) to Bristoe we followed close upon the
rear of the Third Corps, picking up about 150 [?] stragglers. Upon
reaching the hills this side of Broad Run, and overlooking the
plain on the north side, the Third Corps was discovered resting,
a portion of it just commencing the march toward Manassas. I
determined that no time must be lost, and hurried up Heth's division,
forming it in line of battle along the crest of the hills and
parallel to Broad Run. Poague's battalion was brought to the front
and directed to open on the enemy. They were evidently taken by
surprise, and retired in the utmost confusion [?]. Seeing this,
General Heth was directed to advance his line until he reached the
run, and then to move by the left flank, cross at the ford, and
press the enemy. This order was being promptly obeyed, when I
perceived the enemy's skirmishers making their appearance on this
side of Broad Run, and on the right and rear of Heth's division.
Word was sent to General Cooke, commanding the right brigade of
Heth's division, to look out for his right flank, and he promptly
changed front of one of his regiments and drove the enemy back. . . .
In the meantime I sent back General Anderson to send McIntosh's
battalion to the front, and to take two brigades to the position
threatened and protect the right flank of Heth. . . . The three
brigades advanced in beautiful order and quite steadily, Cooke's
brigade, upon reaching the crest of the hill in their front, came
within full view of the enemy's line of battle behind the railroad
embankment (the Second Corps), and of whose presence I was unaware."( 3)
Hill was unexpectedly caught in a fatal trap. He was mistaken
about seeing any considerable portion of the Third Corps north of
Broad Run, or as to any of it being taken by surprise and retiring
in confusion. But for my halting my command to rest he would have
seen little of it. We had baffled the head of his column all day,
and had passed beyond danger for the time, and, according to his
report, we had killed and wounded many more than we had lost. The
stragglers he reported captured could not have been of my command,
as it left no men behind.
The fortuitous circumstance of Warren arriving at Bristoe with the
head of the Second Corps moving on a road paralleling the railroad,
just at the moment Hill was deploying his forces for an attack on
the Third Corps, led to a serious and bloody battle. When the rear-
guard of the Third Corps passed Bristoe Station, no part of the
Second was in sight. I saw no part of it until after Hill commenced
arraying his troops on the crest of the hills south of Broad Run.
Seeing a battle was on, and my own command too far on its way and
too much exhausted to be recalled in time to participate in it, I
dismounted from a tired horse and, with a single staff officer,
ate a lunch from my orderly's haversack ( 4) and watched the progress
of the engagement. It is a rare occurrence that any person has an
opportunity to quietly witness the whole of a considerable battle.
From my position I could see between the lines of the opposing
forces; I could note the manoeuvres of each separate organization;
and I could almost anticipate to a certainty the result of the
attacks and counter attacks. It was at first plainly evident that
each commander knew little of what he had to meet. Lieutenant-
General Hill's formation, as described by him in his report, was
arranged with reference to a supposed force north of Broad Run,
and was consequently very faulty. Warren had no notice of the
presence of an enemy until Hill ran unexpectedly into his line of
march. Hill seemed to be eager for a fight with the Third Corps,
then far beyond his reach, and found one with the Second Corps,
which was quietly marching to a concentration near Centreville.
General Warren's command was strung out upon the road, and he had
no order of battle. Hill, with two divisions, and others soon to
arrive, was better prepared, though his formation was bad, to meet
the Second Corps. Warren wisely used the slightly raised railroad
bed for a breastwork, and promptly opened the battle without giving
the enemy time for a change of position or for new formations.
The battle was at first with musketry, but artillery soon arrived
on both sides and opened fire at short range. Warren, in his
report, after describing the preliminary movements of his command
for position, says:
"A more inspiring scene could not be imagined. The enemy's line
of battle boldly moving forward, one part of our own steadily
awaiting it, and another moving against it at double-quick, while
the artillery was taking up a position at a gallop and going into
action. . . . Under our fire the repulse of the enemy soon became
assured, and Arnold's battery arrived in time to help increase the
demoralization and reach the fugitives.
"The enemy was gallantly led, as the wounding of three of his
general officers in this attack shows, and even in retiring many
retired but sullenly. An advance of a thin line along our front
secured 450 prisoners, two stand of colors, and five field pieces."( 5)
The battle was of short duration, but owing to the exposed position
of the Confederates their losses were great, and out of proportion
to short engagements generally. General Warren and his officers
justly won honors for meeting the emergency so handsomely.
Hill's command was so signally defeated that the Second Corps
remained in possession of the field until 9 P.M., when it pursued
its march unmolested to a junction with the main army. Hill reported
his loss, killed, wounded, and missing, at 1378,( 6) but it was
claimed on good authority to have been much larger. The loss in
the Second Corps at Bristoe is not given separately, but its total
losses in two engagements of the day, including Bristoe, were 546.( 6)
Hill's conduct was criticised, and his report bears, of dates in
November, 1863, the following indorsements:
"General Hill explains how, in his haste to attack the Third Army
Corps of the enemy, he overlooked the presence of the Second, which
was the cause of the disaster that ensued.
"R. E. Lee, General."
"The disaster at Bristoe Station seems due to a gallant but over-
hasty pressing on of the enemy.
"J. A. Seddon, Secretary of War."
"There was a want of vigilance, by reason of which it appears the
Third Army Corps of the enemy got a position, giving great advantage
to them.
"J. D." (Davis) ( 7)
The last two indorsements do not show that Seddon and Davis clearly
comprehended the real situation.
Lee by continued flank movements indicated a purpose to force the
Union Army back into its intrenchments at Alexandria, but this plan
was abandoned after the disaster at Bristoe. Soon the Confederates
commenced falling back towards the Rappahannock, destroying the
railroad track and bridges, and Lee finally put his army into camp
on the Botts plantation, near Brandy Station. He built winter
quarters there, keeping possession of the fords of the Rappahannock,
and strongly fortifying north of the river at Rappahannock Station.
The Union Army commenced a cautious forward movement on the 19th
of October, keeping close to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.
On the 21st I encamped on the battlefield of Bristoe, and we finished
the burial of the dead. On the 26th, about 9 P.M., an order came
advising me that General John Buford's cavalry division was threatened
and in peril near Catlett's Station, and directing me to go to his
relief. My brigade, with a battery attached, reached him about
midnight, and under his direction formed line of battle, my left
resting on the railroad, the cavalry on the flanks. He had been
attacked at dark by what seemed to be an overwhelming force of
infantry and cavalry, but he had stubbornly held his ground. Buford
was an accomplished soldier and a hard fighter. He it was who
opened the battle of Gettysburg on Seminary Hill.
When the best possible dispositions had been made for the expected
attack of the morning, he invited me to an excuse for a headquarters,
consisting of a tattered tent-fly. The night was dark and rainy,
and everybody was wet and uncomfortable. The bronzed old soldier,
from some hidden recess, had an orderly produce a bottle of whisky,
the corkage of which was perfect, and, in the absence of a corkscrew,
presented a problem. He said, "All right, you hold the candle."
He then held the bottle in his left hand, and with his sword in
the right struck the neck of it so skillfully as to cut it off
smoothly. The problem was solved. Further details are unnecessary.
I understood the art of making drinking-cups by cutting a bottle
in two with a strong string, but this feat of Buford's was new to
me.( 8)
John Buford died of disease, December 16, 1863, a Major-General of
Volunteers. He had won great renown as an able, fighting soldier.
Lee was not to be allowed to rest in his chosen winter quarters.
On the 7th of November the Army of the Potomac moved to the fords
on the Rappahannock, and preparation was made to pass then, although
they were strongly defended by the enemy. The Third Corps massed
at Kelly's Ford, some five miles below Rappahannock Station. This
corps forced a crossing about 5 P.M., and massed in battle order
on the bluffs near the river. My command did no fighting this day.
The Third Brigade, with some assistance from the Second Brigade of
the First Division of the Sixth Corps, at dusk, under the leadership
of the accomplished General David A. Russell, gallantly assaulted
and carried the strongly fortified _tête-de-pont_ on the north of
the river at Rappahannock Station. The principal parts of Hoke's
and Hays' brigades of Early's division of Ewell's corps were
captured, numbering, including killed and wounded, 1630. Russell's
loss in this affair, all told, was 327. He captured seven battle
flags and Green's battery of four rifled guns.( 9) Lee had intended
to hold this position as a centre, and then fall, alternately, on
the divided portions of the Army of the Potomac after they crossed
the river above and below it.(10) Its loss forced him to retire
from the river and take position in front of Culpeper Court-House,
with his right resting on Mount Pony.
The next day the principal part of Meade's army, having succeeded
in crossing the river, was moved forward to tender battle. Late
in the afternoon I was ordered to dislodge the enemy from a hill
(Miller's) about two miles in front of Brandy Station. The place
was held by artillery and infantry, flanked by cavalry. This was
Lee's most advanced position, and it was held firmly as a point of
observation. My command was disposed for the attack in the following
order: The 138th Pennsylvania (Colonel McClennan) was moved on
the left of the railroad to threaten the enemy on his right; the
122d Ohio (Colonel W. H. Ball) followed in support. The 110th Ohio
(Lieutenant-Colonel Foster) was put on the right of the railroad,
with orders to move directly on the height occupied by the enemy;
the 6th Maryland (Colonel John W. Horn) in support, but some distance
to the right. There was no artillery at hand, and the attack was
ordered at once. The distance to the hill was about one half mile.
The 138th drew the enemy's artillery fire, but continued its advance.
The 6th pushed forward into a wood on the right to make a demonstration,
and in person I led the 110th to the real work. Not a gun was
fired by my men as they advanced to the charge. I made every
exertion possible to hasten the troops, but when they reached the
foot of the hill the enemy's artillery was withdrawn, and his
infantry made a precipitate retreat. I was the first to gain the
crest, being mounted, and with pistol fired on the retiring troops
not two hundred feet away. A Confederate was reported wounded with
a pistol ball at this place. This is the nearest I can come to
having personally injured, in any way, any person in battle. We
pushed on to Brandy Station without further orders, driving the
enemy until we met a more formidable force, with several batteries
of artillery, which compelled us to halt. Night came on, and the
day's work ended by our going into bivouac at the Station. Captain
Andress of the 138th was the only officer of my command killed,
and my loss was otherwise light. We made the charge with the
commanding General--Meade--and much of his army looking on. It
was Meade's belief that behind the heights assaulted would be found
Lee's army arrayed for battle.
Though Lee had selected a strong position (as already stated) in
front of Culpeper Court-House, and fortified it somewhat, he decided
it was not a good one, and therefore declined battle north of the
Rapidan,(11) and, by the morning of the 9th of November, his army
was south of this historic stream.
The Army of Northern Virginia never again crossed the Rapidan or
Rappahannock. Henceforth it was to be confined to a narrower
theatre of operations, and a closer defence of the capital of the
Confederate States, but this defence was still to be most memorable
and bloody, even in comparison with what had gone before.
( 1) _War Records_, vol. xxxvi., Part II., p. 34.
( 2) This was in the famous Brough-Vallandigham Ohio election for
Governor.
( 3) _War Records_, vol. xxi., Part I., p. 426.
( 4) This lunch consisted of a box of sardines and "hardtack."
( 5) _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 242.
( 6) _Ibid_., pp. 250, 428.
( 7) _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 428.
( 8) A string tightly drawn around a bottle where the cut is
desired to be made, and then rapidly drawn back and forth until
the friction heats the glass, renders it easy to be separated by
a sharp jar against the hand or some hard substance.
( 9) Three of these had belonged to Randolph's battery, lost at
Winchester.--_War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 626.
(10) _Ibid_., pp. 613-616.
(11) _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., pp. 611, 616 (Lee's
Report).