ASSAYE AND ARGAUM
1803-1804
Capture of Ahmednuggur--Battle of Assaye--Death of Lieut.
Colonel Maxwell--Honorary Colour granted to 19th--Battle of
Argaum--Capture of Gawilghur--Berar Rajah makes peace--Scindia
makes peace--March against banditti--Their dispersal--Grant of
badges for Assaye.
Wellesley reached Ahmednuggur on the 8th August. The fort was an
exceedingly strong one, and the pettah or fortified town was also
strongly held. An immediate assault on the pettah was ordered, which
was completely successful. The town was taken, at a cost of 27 killed
and 92 wounded: the 19th Light Dragoons had one man wounded. This
was a brilliant opening to the campaign, which impressed friends and
enemies alike. A Mahratta Chief, commanding a body of the Peishwa’s
horse in Wellesley’s camp, wrote to his friends in Poona: “These
English are a strange people, and their General a wonderful man: they
came here in the morning, looked at the pettah wall, walked over it,
killed all the garrison and returned to breakfast!” In attacking
fortified places that did not require regular siege operations,
Wellesley successfully followed the plan, both in 1800 and on this
occasion, of attacking by escalade directly he appeared before the
place.
At daybreak on the 10th, a battery was opened against the fort, which
surrendered on the 12th.
After arranging for the settlement of the Ahmednuggur district,
Wellesley crossed the Godavery at Toka, and advanced to Aurungabad,
which he reached on the 29th August. The crossing of the Godavery
took seven days to complete. Scindia’s force meanwhile had entered
the Nizam’s territory by the Ajunta Pass, and had taken Jaulna. The
Mahratta army then moved southwards, as if intending to cross the
Godavery and attack Hyderabad, but were baffled by Wellesley moving
southward along the left bank of the Godavery. They therefore turned
northward again, from Partoor, towards the Ajunta Pass, and encamped
in the neighbourhood of Bokerdun and Assaye. In the interval,
Stevenson, who had been operating to the north-eastward, returned and
retook Jaulna on the 2nd September. On the 6th, and again on the 9th,
he surprised the camps of two parties of Mahratta horse, after which
he halted at Budnapore, near Jalgaum. Wellesley was delayed on the
Godavery till the 18th, pending the arrival of a large convoy.
On the 21st, he reached Jalgaum, where he concerted a plan of
operation with Stevenson. According to the best information, the
enemy was believed to be at Bokerdun and Jaffirabad, about thirty
miles distant, but the enormous numbers of the enemy’s cavalry made
it impossible to procure trustworthy information by reconnoissance.
It was agreed that the two forces should advance next day by
separate roads, and fall on the enemy on the 24th. At the end of
the first day’s march, on the 22nd, news was brought to Wellesley,
at Paugri, that the enemy was moving westward, and was making for
the Ajunta Pass. The news was false. Stevenson’s line of march lay
about fifteen miles westward of Wellesley’s. On the 23rd, Wellesley
made a fourteen-mile march to Naulniah. On arriving there, he found
that, instead of being ten or twelve miles from the enemy, as he had
anticipated, he was only half that distance from them. He was also
told that their cavalry had moved off, and the infantry were about to
follow. It was necessary to ascertain the truth at once. The baggage
was accordingly left at Naulniah, under charge of a battalion of
Native Infantry and the rearguard picquets,[44] and the rest of the
force moved forwards. The General, at the same time, pushed on ahead
with the Cavalry. Without counting the force detached to guard the
baggage in Naulniah, Wellesley’s force consisted of nearly 6000 men
(of whom about 1600 were Europeans), and 14 guns, of which eight were
the 6 Pr. galloper guns of the Cavalry. There were also contingents
of the Mysore and Peishwa’s horsemen. After going about three miles,
he suddenly, about one o’clock, came in sight of the enemy’s camp
beyond the Kaitna, near the village of Assaye, in a peninsula formed
by the junction of the Kaitna and Juah rivers. The Kaitna was only
passable at certain points; the Juah had less water in it, but had
very steep banks. Along both rivers the ground was much broken by
ravines.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF ASSAYE
23rd. September 1803.
_Walker & Boutall sc._]
Wellesley’s position was a difficult one. He had unexpectedly come
into close contact with a vastly superior force ready to receive
him, instead of being in the act of moving off, as he had been led
to expect. Stevenson’s force, in co-operation with which he had
intended to fight the action, was ten or twelve miles away. Should
he retreat to Naulniah and wait for Stevenson, he would be followed
and forced to fight under disadvantageous circumstances, and, owing
to the enemy’s great superiority in cavalry, would probably lose a
portion of his baggage. He resolved to cross the river and attack
at once. He saw that if he could carry his force across the Kaitna
anywhere near its junction with the Juah, the great superiority in
numbers of the Mahrattas would be to a certain extent neutralized by
the narrower front on which they would be obliged to engage. At the
same time, should his attack fail, Wellesley was liable to be forced
back into the acute angle formed by the two rivers, and be destroyed,
like Charles XII. at Pultava. It was a choice of risks, and Wellesley
chose the smaller one. The direct ford was commanded by the powerful
Mahratta artillery, which made crossing at that point extremely
hazardous. Examining the ground with his glasses, Wellesley noticed
the two villages of Peepulgaon and Waroor close together on opposite
sides of the river, and, in spite of the denial of his guides,
jumped to the conclusion that there must be a ford there. A search
showed that he was right, and word was sent back for the infantry to
direct their march on Peepulgaon. Meanwhile the Cavalry (A. in plan)
remained facing a large body of the enemy’s Cavalry (B. in plan),
that had crossed the river. By this time, the Mahratta camp had been
struck, and their army appeared drawn up in a long line (C. in plan),
covered by the Kaitna, with a great mass of cavalry on the right, and
the guns on the left.
As the British force moved across the enemy’s front, part of it came
within range of the Mahratta Artillery, but beyond a Staff Officer
being slightly wounded, and the General’s orderly dragoon having
his head carried off by a round shot, no loss was incurred. The
crossing of the Kaitna was effected without opposition, and the
British force was drawn up across the fork between the two rivers
in three lines (F. in plan). The first two lines, with an interval
of about 300 paces between them, were composed of infantry, H.M.’s
78th Regiment being on the left of the first line, and H.M.’s 74th
on the right of the 2nd line. The cavalry formed the third line.
The Peishwa’s and Mysore cavalry remained on the south side of the
Kaitna (D. in plan), to keep in check a large body of the enemy’s
cavalry. There was a good deal of delay in crossing the Kaitna, which
was taken advantage of by the enemy to change front to the left of
their first line, and they now occupied a long line (E. in plan),
with its left resting on the village of Assaye, and defended along
the whole front by upwards of one hundred guns. The village of Assaye
was occupied with infantry, and had a number of guns disposed in
front of it. The Mahratta line of battle, exclusive of a large body
of troops detailed to guard stores and baggage, consisted of thirteen
battalions of disciplined infantry, one hundred and fifteen guns, and
over thirty-five thousand horsemen. There were also a large number of
undisciplined infantry.
While the British lines were forming, the movement was covered by
artillery fire. This was quickly responded to by the Mahratta guns,
which caused such severe losses among the British gun bullocks, that
the guns had to be left behind when the advance was made.
Wellesley had not given the enemy credit for being able to change
their front with so large a force, without falling into disarray. On
perceiving the alteration in the enemy’s position, he saw that it was
necessary to extend his front. He accordingly ordered the picquets,
which formed the right of the first line, to move obliquely to the
right, so as to allow the native infantry battalions in the second
line to come up on the right of the first line, H.M.’s 74th being
directed to take the right of the whole. Wellesley’s intention was to
force back the enemy from their guns, then, operating by his left, to
throw them back on the Juah, and complete their destruction with his
cavalry. Wellesley himself led the left of the line, while Lieutenant
Colonel Maxwell and the cavalry were ordered to support the right,
which was still greatly outflanked. Particular orders were given to
the officer in command of the picquets, which formed the battalion
of direction, to keep out of gunshot of Assaye. But the losses
caused by the Mahratta artillery were so severe, that the advance
became necessary before the formation was complete. Every shot told,
knocking over men, horses, and bullocks, and putting several of
the British guns out of action. Wellesley on the left, impatient
to advance, sent repeated messages to the officer commanding the
picquets. He was told that the guns were disabled, to which he
replied “Well, tell him to get on without them.”
As the line advanced, the Mahratta infantry gave ground, abandoning
their guns. By mistake, the officer commanding the picquets continued
his oblique movement too far, and led direct on Assaye, masking the
74th; a mistake that had an important influence on the course of
the battle. This caused a great gap in the British line, separated
the picquets and H.M. 74th from the rest of the line, and brought
them under a tremendous fire of artillery and small arms. They
were further impeded in their advance and thrown into disarray, by
having to pass some cactus hedges. The Mahratta infantry, as they
fell back from their guns, separated into two distinct bodies. The
greater number threw back their right, forming a second line (H. in
plan), with the Juah river at its back, and its left still resting
on Assaye; while one whole Brigade, under a German named Pohlman,
continued to retreat directly to its rear (M. in plan). At the same
time, great numbers of the enemy threw themselves down, pretending to
be dead, and allowed the British line to pass over them. The British
line swung round to its right (I. in plan), to attack the enemy’s
second line, and, here the first critical period of the battle
occurred. The picquets and H.M. 74th Foot were no longer able to
advance under the terrible fire to which they were exposed. Numbers
fell at every step; all formation was lost, and a body of Mahratta
horse, wheeling round the village of Assaye, charged the 74th in
flank, sabreing numbers of them. They also recaptured some of their
own guns, and gained possession of some of the British guns that had
not been able to keep up with the advance, killing the gunners and
turning the guns against the British rear. It was a critical moment,
and, with a soldier’s instinct, Maxwell saw that the time for action
had come. Advancing with his brigade, Maxwell charged the enemy’s
left, driving them into the Juah with great slaughter: then, as the
rest of the line advanced and drove the enemy into the nullah, the
Cavalry crossed the Juah, and charged the broken masses of the enemy
(J. in plan), making a horrid slaughter of them, and driving them off
the field.
“The 19th Light Dragoons, who only drew 360 swords, received the
intimation with one loud huzza! Accompanied by the 4th native
cavalry who emulated their conduct throughout this arduous day,
the 19th passed through the broken but invincible 74th, whose
very wounded joined in cheering them as they went on, cut in and
routed the horse, and dashed on at the infantry and guns. Never
did cavalry perform better service or contribute more to the
success of a battle.”[45]
But the battle was not yet over. A great body of the enemy still
remained, holding Assaye and the ground between the village and the
Juah, while the guns they had got possession of in different parts
of the field played on the rear of the exhausted British troops.
Pohlman’s brigade also was unbroken, and threatened an attack. Two
sepoy battalions sent successively against Assaye were repulsed.
Maxwell’s cavalry were still across the Juah in pursuit of the broken
Mahratta battalions, and, had the Mahratta horsemen behaved at this
juncture with the same spirit that had led them to charge the 74th,
the day might have been theirs. At this crisis, Maxwell with the
cavalry returned from across the Juah, and formed up on the left of
the British line. Directing Maxwell with the 19th Light Dragoons and
two of his native regiments to face Pohlman’s brigade, Wellesley
took H.M.’s 78th and a regiment of Native Cavalry, and moved against
Assaye. The enemy did not await the attack, but retreated across
the Juah in tolerable order. In this movement, the General had his
horse killed by a cannon shot. Then, moving along the whole line
first occupied by the enemy (E. in plan), he recaptured all the
guns, not without some severe fighting. Meanwhile, Maxwell led the
19th Light Dragoons and the two native regiments (L. in plan),
to charge Pohlman’s brigade. Both men and horses were exhausted
with the efforts they had made, and the attack, instead of being
delivered perpendicular to the enemy’s front, was made obliquely
against Pohlman’s left. The well disciplined Mahrattas reserved their
fire till they could deliver it with good effect, and Maxwell fell
dead pierced by a grape shot. The fall of their leader checked the
squadrons almost at the moment of contact, and the British horsemen
swept to the left, receiving the fire of the Mahratta infantry as
they passed, at so close a distance, that several of the squadron
officers had their horses wounded with bayonets. No further effort
was made, the squadrons “halted, and then walked, and then trotted
back.”[46] The British troops were so few in numbers, so weakened and
fatigued by their exertions, as to be incapable of farther efforts,
and Pohlman marched off the field without farther molestation.
Thus ended the conflict. The Mysore and friendly Mahratta horse,
who throughout the contest had only one casualty, would not pursue
without the British cavalry, and the British cavalry were too
exhausted to give them a lead. Out of the small British force, there
were, among the Europeans, 198 killed, 442 wounded, and 4 missing;
among the Natives, 230 killed, 696 wounded, and 14 missing. The
19th Light Dragoons, who had the greatest share of casualties among
the cavalry, lost two officers killed, Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell
and Captain Boyle, four officers wounded, Captains Cathcart and
Sale, and Lieutenants Wilson and Young; fifteen Rank and File and
eighty-seven horses killed, thirty-six Rank and File and thirty-six
horses wounded, two horses missing. Of the enemy, it was computed
that twelve hundred lay dead on the field, and four thousand eight
hundred were wounded. One hundred and two guns,[47] seven stands of
colours, and a vast quantity of ammunition and stores remained in the
hands of the victors.
It was eight o’clock in the evening before the field was entirely
clear of the enemy. The cavalry were then sent back to Naulniah
to bring on the camp equipage, &c., which they did the following
morning. The rest of the force bivouacked as best they could on the
bloody field. Wellesley, who had had one horse killed, and another
wounded with a spear, passed the night on the ground, close to an
officer whose leg was shot off, and within five yards of a dead
officer.
“The General was so overcome by his great and gallant exertions
throughout the day, so overpowered both in mind and body, that
during the greater part or whole of the following night he sat on
the ground with his head bent down between his knees, and said
not a word to any one!”[48]
Long after his victorious career was ended, he spoke of Assaye as
the bloodiest battle for the number engaged that he ever saw. Of
the ten officers forming the General’s staff eight were wounded
or had their horses shot. The 74th and the picquet battalion were
almost annihilated; one picquet half company alone had 21 killed, 22
wounded, and three missing. The 74th lost 401 of all ranks, killed
and wounded. Two of the native cavalry regiments, being newly raised,
were not as forward as they should have been, so that the brunt of
the cavalry work was borne by the 19th Light Dragoons and the 4th
Native Cavalry. Much of the heavy loss suffered by the British troops
was due to the misunderstanding of Wellesley’s orders by the officer
commanding the picquets, though, as Wellesley generously said, in a
letter written a month later, “I must acknowledge that it was not
possible for a man to lead a body into a hotter fire than he did the
picquets on that day against Assaye.” The early use of the cavalry,
however, prevented the total destruction of the enemy that he had
intended. The exhaustion caused by their efforts too early in the
battle, prevented them from entirely breaking up and routing the
disciplined Mahratta infantry.
A singular circumstance is said to have occurred after the battle.
Each of the Commanders of the three armies, put to death his head spy.
“Colonel Stevenson, because he suspected or believed his own
to have led him intentionally astray from the road: General
Wellesley, by reason of his own having given him false
intelligence respecting the march of the Mahratta Army to pass
the Ajunta Ghaut; and Scindia, from his man not having made
him acquainted with the separation of the two divisions of the
British Army.”[49]
Ample testimony has been borne to the conspicuous gallantry of the
19th in this hard fought field.
“Nothing could exceed the zeal of some of the cavalry,
particularly the 19th dragoons; every officer and man fought
as if on his arm depended the victory. As instances may be
mentioned, Lieutenant Nathan Wilson, who with his arm shattered
by a grape shot, and dangling by his side, charged on at the
head of his troop. Lieutenant Alex. Grant of the Madras Native
Infantry, Major of brigade to Colonel Maxwell, observing a gun
pointed ready to discharge on the flank of the 19th dragoons,
the match suspended on the touch-hole, with a noble impulse, in
hopes of preventing it, darted forward almost on its muzzle, and
with such force, that his horse stuck between the cannon and its
wheel: in this situation the gun went off, as he was in the act
of endeavouring to prevent it, by cutting down the artillery man.
Captain George Sale was attacking a man who defended himself
with a pike or short spear, a weapon with which all Scindia’s
Artillery men were armed; the man’s comrade standing on a gun,
made a thrust from above at Captain Sale, but it was turned off
by the breastbone and glanced off diagonally across his chest;
his covering serjeant named Strange, laid the man dead who
wounded his officer, but in the act was himself speared through
the lungs, by another man from below the gun. Captain Sale went
on but begged the serjeant to fall in the rear; this however he
gallantly refused, and rode out the day. Captain Sale and others
afterwards saw him when in hospital, blow out a candle from his
lungs--the reader will be pleased to learn that the gallant
serjeant recovered.”[50]
Among other incidents may be mentioned the case of Cornet Serle of
the 19th who was under arrest at the time of the action, for some
disagreement with his commanding officer. At the commencement of the
battle he broke his arrest, and joined his corps, and, by his gallant
behaviour throughout the day, regained permission to wear his sword
again.
Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell’s splendid service was fittingly
recognized by the East India Company, who granted a pension of £300
to his widow, “although we find that there is no example of the
Company’s making any allowance to the widow of a King’s Officer.”[51]
“As long as the word Assaye exists, and has a meaning will the
valiant deeds and reckless bravery of the old 19th Light Dragoons
the 74th and 78th Highlanders be remembered.”[52]
In his dispatch to the Governor General, dated the day after the
battle, Wellesley wrote: “I have also to draw your Excellency’s
notice to the conduct of the Cavalry commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
Maxwell, particularly that of the 19th Dragoons”: and, in a General
Order published in Calcutta on the 30th October, it was said, “The
Governor General in Council has remarked with great satisfaction
the gallant and skilful conduct of the Cavalry, commanded by Lt.
Colonel Maxwell and particularly of His Majesty’s nineteenth regiment
of Light Dragoons, a corps distinguished in India by a long and
uninterrupted course of arduous service and of progressive honour.”
Honorary colours in commemoration of the battle were granted to
the 19th Light Dragoons, the 74th and 78th “to be used by those
corps while they shall continue in India, or until His Majesty’s
most gracious pleasure be signified through his Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief.”
The damage inflicted on the Mahratta host was far in excess of that
indicated by their loss in men and material. Many of the disciplined
battalions had been destroyed, and hearty co-operation between the
leaders was at an end. They fled northwards through the Ajunta Pass,
abandoning some guns which were afterwards picked up by Stevenson,
and then separated. Scindia, who believed that he had not been
loyally supported by the Berar Rajah, retreated to Thalnair in
Khandesh; the Berar Rajah retired to his fortress at Gawilghur, while
five battalions belonging to the Begum Somroo, four of which had
been employed to guard the Mahratta camp, and therefore took no part
in the action, retreated to Burhanpore, whence they made their way
back to Sirdhana in the North West, and took no further part in the
campaign.
The sound of Wellesley’s guns at Assaye was heard by Stevenson, who
at once broke up camp and attempted to join him; but being without
information, and misled by his guides, he marched first on Bokerdun,
which he did not reach till next day, being entangled in a nullah
during the night. His force was greatly harassed by night marching
and want of rest, so that he did not join Wellesley till the evening
of the 24th. All the 25th he remained at Assaye, in order that his
surgeons might assist the wounded, and, on the 26th, marched in
pursuit of the enemy. Wellesley remained encamped near the field of
battle till the 8th October, to make arrangements for the care of
his numerous wounded, and for the captured guns and stores. Nor was
there urgent necessity for an immediate move, till something was
known of the movements of the enemy. The General’s first movements
after the battle were in the direction of Aurungabad, as Scindia
showed an intention of marching on Poona. Then, learning that
Scindia had turned back towards Burhanpore, on which place Stevenson
was advancing, Wellesley turned northwards to Ajunta. Stevenson
meanwhile had occupied Burhanpore on the 15th, and attacked the
fortress of Asseerghur, which surrendered on the 21st. Wellesley,
hearing that Scindia and the Berar Rajah had joined forces again, and
were threatening Stevenson, descended the Ajunta Pass on the 18th,
and moved northwards; but, on receiving news that Asseerghur had
fallen, and that the confederates had again separated, he retraced
his steps, ascended the Pass on the 25th, and marched to Aurungabad
to protect some convoys which were threatened by the Berar Rajah.
From Aurungabad he made several attempts to surprise the Bhonslay’s
camp without success, although he forced him to move his camp five
times between the 29th and the 31st.
Wellesley continued moving slowly eastwards, to cover the Nizam’s
territory, till the 11th November, when he struck northwards from
Patree to Rajoora, which he reached on the 23rd. For some days,
Scindia, under the influence of his defeat at Assaye in conjunction
with bad news from his forces in the North West, had made overtures
for a cessation of hostilities, and, on the 23rd, an armistice was
agreed on; the principal condition of which was that Scindia should
separate himself from the Berar Rajah, and take up a position fifty
miles east of Ellichpore.
The agreement was not however faithfully observed by Scindia, some
of whose troops took part in the subsequent battle. The Berar Rajah,
meanwhile, had entered his own territories, and was encamped at
Argaum. On the 27th, Wellesley reached Akola, and, about 2 o’clock
in the afternoon on the 29th, he joined Stevenson at Parterly, for
the purpose of undertaking the siege of Gawilghur with their united
forces.
The Berar Rajah, who was encamped at Argaum about six miles from
Parterly, had meanwhile opened negotiations with Stevenson for a
suspension of hostilities, so preparations were made for encamping at
Parterly. On putting out the picquets to take up the ground, they
were molested by parties of the enemy, and, a reconnoissance showed
the Mahratta army drawn up in battle array, on an extensive plain
in front of the village of Argaum. The troops were at once ordered
to fall in, and the two divisions moved to the front in parallel
columns. At about 1000 yards in front of the enemy was the village
of Sirsoni. It was Wellesley’s intention to pass by the left of the
village, and then, wheeling to the right, to form line in front of
it, parallel with the Mahratta line of battle. The column was led
by the native infantry picquets, accompanied by some field pieces
drawn by bullocks, followed by two native infantry battalions, all
of whom had taken part in the battle of Assaye. On the head of the
column clearing the village, the Mahratta guns opened fire with
great effect. The bullock drivers lost their presence of mind and
the management of their cattle, which turned round and threw into
confusion the ranks behind them. The troops coming up in rear, not
knowing the cause of the confusion, and suffering from the cannonade,
were seized with panic, and fell back in disorder, to seek shelter
behind the village. Wellesley, who was close by, giving orders to the
brigadiers, seeing what had happened,
“stepped out in front hoping by his presence to restore the
confidence of the troops; but seeing that this did not produce
the desired effect, he mounted his horse, and rode up to the
retreating battalions; when, instead of losing his temper,
upbraiding them and endeavouring to force them back to the spot
from which they had fled, as most people would have done, he
quietly ordered the officers to lead their men under cover of the
village, and then to rally and get them into order as quickly as
possible. This being done, he put the column again in motion,
and leading these very same runaways round the other side of the
village, formed them up on the very spot he originally intended
them to occupy, the remainder of the column following and
prolonging the line to the right.”[53]
The lesson is one to be borne in mind by those to whose lot it may
fall to rally troops thrown into disorder under fire.
In order to cover the formation, some guns were brought into action
on each side of the village, and, as each battalion came into
position, it was made to lie down, which further helped to steady the
troops. The infantry were formed into a single line, with Stevenson’s
division on the left, while the six cavalry regiments of the two
divisions, under command of Lieutenant Colonel the Honble. Arthur St
Leger, were formed in two lines in rear of the right. The British
left was covered by the native auxiliary horse. The Mahratta line was
about five miles in length, the infantry and guns in the centre, with
cavalry on both flanks.
It was half past four in the afternoon before the British line
advanced. On the signal being given, the British cavalry moved
rapidly forward, and brought their galloper guns into action against
a great body of the enemy’s cavalry and rocket men. Meanwhile, the
infantry advanced steadily against the Mahratta centre. When almost
within musket shot, a body of the enemy’s infantry, nearly a thousand
strong, composed of Arabs or Pathans, dashed forward against the
74th and 78th, and perished almost to a man under the Highland
musket and bayonet. Almost at the same moment, a body of Scindia’s
cavalry charged the British left, and were repulsed with loss, while
the 19th and the five native regiments on the right charged the
cavalry in front of them. The Mahrattas did not stand the shock,
but broke and fled, and at once the whole of the enemy’s force was
dissolved in flight. The cavalry pursued for many miles, killing
great numbers, and capturing many elephants and camels, and much
baggage. Thirty-eight guns and many standards fell into the hands of
the victors. The British loss amounted to 46 killed, 308 wounded
and 7 missing. As at Assaye, the principal loss fell on the 74th and
78th, who, between them, lost 13 killed, and 84 wounded. The 19th
Light Dragoons had 6 men wounded. The battle of Argaum was fought on
a perfectly level plain intersected by small water courses, without
any buildings or other natural obstacles between the two lines, after
they had been formed, and was carried out exactly like a field day as
then practised. The pursuit of the enemy by the British cavalry was
maintained for six miles, and was then taken up and continued by the
allied Mysore and Nizam’s horse for another twenty miles. The loss
of the enemy, in the battle and subsequent pursuit, was estimated at
five thousand men. At Assaye, the principal Mahratta loss fell on
Scindia’s troops; at Argaum the loss fell chiefly on the Berar forces.
The victory at Argaum effected a complete separation of the Mahratta
confederate chiefs. Scindia still had a considerable force in the
field, but it had ceased to be formidable after Assaye. The Berar
Rajah’s field army had disappeared, and his territories lay open to
the invading British force. Scindia’s capital was far off, and he
might yet give trouble, so Wellesley determined to finish once for
all with the Berar Rajah, in order that he might be able to devote
undivided attention to Scindia afterwards.
The day following the battle, Stevenson marched in pursuit of the
enemy: Wellesley followed a day later, and the two divisions were
re-united at Ellichpore on the 5th December. Thence they marched on
Gawilghur, a fortress of great strength, regarded as the key of the
Deccan, in which the defeated infantry from Argaum had taken refuge.
The place was taken by assault on the 15th, with the loss of 13
killed, no wounded, and three missing. Fifty-two guns, together with
a great quantity of small arms and military stores, fell into the
hands of the victors. Nagpore, the Berar Rajah’s capital, now lay
open to the British troops, and the Rajah hastened to sue for peace.
The negotiation was conducted with the decision that characterized
all Wellesley’s actions, and peace was concluded at Deogam, on the
17th, two days after the fall of Gawilghur. His hands being now free
on this side, Wellesley gave notice to Scindia, that, on the 27th, he
should regard the agreement for suspension of hostilities at an end,
unless that Chief came to definite terms. Left without an ally, with
his armies defeated both in the North-West and in the Deccan, Scindia
had no hope of continuing the struggle with success, and peace was
signed in Wellesley’s camp on the 30th December, at Surjee Anjengaum.
Thus triumphantly ended a war which for boldness of conception of
campaign, rapidity of execution, the great extent over which it was
waged, and the hard fighting that characterized it both in the North
and South, stands in marked contrast to any war we had previously
waged in India.
“The seat of war, extending over the continent of India exhibited
in the short space of four months as many general battles, eight
regular sieges and storming of fortresses, without including
that of Gwalior, which was not captured till the beginning of
the next year; in all of which British valour prevailed over
accumulated obstacles, the combination of formidable powers, and
every advantage arising from local position, military means and
numerical strength.... Their (the Mahratta) numerous armies,
amounting on an average to two hundred and fifty thousand men,
were defeated in every engagement; while the corps organized
by their French auxiliaries, consisting at the least of forty
thousand more, and upon whom the fullest reliance was placed,
were completely destroyed; in all which reverses the confederates
left in the hands of the victors upwards of one thousand
pieces of cannon, with ammunition, treasure and stores in
proportion.”[54]
But the most valuable result to England was that she learned from the
Assaye campaign that she had in her army a General who was fit to
cope with the best Generals of Europe.
The war was over, and arrangements were made for the return of the
troops to their quarters. Leaving Stevenson’s division, Wellesley
turned southwards to Jaulna, which he reached on the 19th January
1804. A few days before the conclusion of peace, in writing to the
Commander-in-Chief, Wellesley remarked: “The 19th Dragoons have now
better horses than I have ever seen with them.” It was well that it
was so, for a severe effort was still required of them. The Nizam’s
dominions were at that time infested with banditti, mostly disbanded
soldiers, who plundered the country in all directions, and had become
so daring that they had not hesitated to attack detachments of
British troops. On reaching Jaulna, news was brought to Wellesley of
a large body of freebooters who were plundering the country to the
southward. Crossing the Godavery, he marched to Neemgaum, where, on
the 2nd February, he received information of the whereabouts of the
marauders. He accordingly made up a light flying column consisting
of the 19th Light Dragoons and the rest of the cavalry that had
been with him at Assaye, the remnants of the gallant 74th, a sepoy
battalion, and details from other sepoy regiments, 150 pioneers, and
four guns,[55] and marched on the 3rd, reaching Sailgaon on the 4th,
a distance of about thirty miles in a direct line. Marching again the
same night, he came up with the freebooters about 9 A.M. on the 5th.
The cavalry charged at once, slaying great numbers and dispersing
them, at the same time capturing their guns, camp, and stores. An
unfortunate mishap occurred on this occasion. The 19th mistook
some of the allied Mahratta horse for the enemy, and charged them,
cutting down two or three of them, and having one of their own number
cut down, before the mistake was discovered. The achievement was
remarkable for the long and rapid marching performed by the troops.
Writing of it, two days later, Wellesley says:
“The exertion made by the troops is the greatest I ever
witnessed. Everything was over by 12 o’clock on the 5th, and, I
think that, by that time, the infantry must have marched 60 miles
from six in the morning of the 4th. We halted from 12 in the day
till 10 at night on the 4th, so that we marched 60 miles with
infantry in twenty hours.”
Well might he add:
“I think we now begin to beat the Mahrattas in the celerity of
our movements.”
The force then marched for Poona.
Hardly had peace been secured, when Holkar, who had hitherto held
aloof, took the field. The 19th Light Dragoons took, however, no part
in the campaign that followed, but remained encamped at Panwell near
Bombay till the end of 1804, when they marched for Arcot.
In 1807, the royal permission was given to the regiment to wear
a badge of the Elephant with the word “Assaye,” on colours and
appointments, in commemoration of the gallantry displayed by the
regiment in the battle and during the campaign. Nothing can be traced
of the honorary standard presented to the regiment for Assaye There
can be no doubt that it was given to the 19th as it was to the 74th
and 78th.
HORSE GUARDS,
_15th April 1807_.
MY LORD
I have received the Commander in Chief’s directions to inform
you, that the Marquis of Wellesley and Major General the Honble.
Sir Arthur Wellesley have represented to H.R.H. the distinguished
services of the 19th Light Dragoons in the course of the arduous
Campaigns which occurred during the period of his Lordship’s
Government in India, and have earnestly solicited permission,
that the Regiment may be distinguished by some emblematical Badge.
The Commander in Chief has with great satisfaction submitted this
representation to the King, and His Majesty has in consequence
thereof been most graciously pleased to approve of the “Elephant”
being used in Colours and Appointments of the 19th Light Dragoons
with the word “_Assaye_” superscribed, in Commemoration of the
Gallantry and good Conduct displayed in the Action fought at that
place on the 23rd of September 1803.
I have the honour to be &c.
HARRY CALVERT,
A.G.
General Visct. HOWE, K.B.
or O.C. 19th Light Dragoons.