The War Minister’s opinion on the Manchurian and Korean questions
from the year 1900 to 1903—What he did to avoid a rupture with
Japan.
Not only was the war unexpected; it was against our interests, and
contrary to the wishes of the Emperor. Had it ended victoriously,
those who were responsible for it would have found themselves national
heroes for having laid the train for our success in the Far East with
such sagacity; but the premature peace forced on us by our internal
troubles prevented a continuation of the struggle till victory was
ours. All classes of society were convulsed by our misfortunes, and
are now insistent in a desire to hear the truth as to the causes of
the war, and to learn the names of those who turned a deaf ear to the
Emperor’s expressed wish for peace, and, by sins of commission or
omission, so steered the ship of State as to bring about a rupture. The
existing freedom of the Press has already permitted the publication of
various opinions on these subjects, and amongst much fiction certain
facts have now been revealed, the publication of which could only have
been possible with the knowledge and permission of interested persons
holding high appointments in the different Ministries.
The most important of many newspaper articles touching upon the
causes of the war is one by M. Gurieff, entitled “The Outbreak of the
Russo-Japanese War,” and published in the _Russki Viedomost_ in May,
1905. M. Gurieff evidently had access to many official documents, and
the article reads as an _ex parte_ statement, in which the author
holds a brief for the defence of the Finance Minister, M. Sergius de
Witte. As this lucubration must have been widely read, having been
reprinted in foreign as well as in Russian newspapers and magazines;
as it is still being quoted; and as the statements contained in it
concerning the Ministry of War are not correct, and have led to a wrong
construction being placed upon the actions of that Department, I feel
constrained to state in as few words as possible the part played by the
War Minister in Far Eastern affairs between 1898 and 1903.
The question of obtaining an outlet on the Pacific Ocean was discussed
in Russia some time ago. It was thought that an exit to ice-free seas
would eventually be a necessity in view of the immense growth of our
population; but as two centuries had shown us the cost of moving
towards the Baltic and Black Seas, it was felt that particular care
must be exercised lest, in our desire to get access to the Pacific
coast, we should be drawn prematurely into war. Our possessions in the
Far East and Baikalia are inaccessible wastes, where everything in the
way of development remains still to be done. Our trade with the Far
East was in every way so insignificant, that not only did access to the
Pacific Ocean appear unnecessary for the present generation, but it
actually seemed that the expense and sacrifices entailed in obtaining
this access would be a burden of a nature to hinder our national
development in other quarters. During the latter half of the last
century the War Ministry—in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs—systematically opposed any extension of our frontiers in Asia
in view of what was going on in Europe. Consequently the successive
steps of our advance into the heart of Central Asia often took place in
defiance of the opinions of and the orders issued from St. Petersburg.
The occupation of Tashkent by Cherneff in 1864–65 was considered
premature, for it brought us into direct touch with the Khanates of
Bokhara and Khokand, and after the expedition to Samarkand in 1868,
not only was Kaufmann not permitted to conquer the Bokhara Khanate
completely, but Shaar and Kitab, which had been captured by us after
severe fighting, were returned to the Emir. In 1873, after conquering
the Khiva Khanate, we confined ourselves to taking only the right bank
of the Oxus, while we preserved the Khan’s authority. In 1875, when
traversing the whole Khanate of Khokand, we deliberately confined
ourselves to occupying the town of Namangan, leaving the rest of the
Khanate in the possession of its feeble ruler. In 1881 the War Minister
did not assent to our retention of the Kuldja province, which we had
captured ten years before; and in 1882, after Skobeleff had seized Geok
Tepe, he was strictly forbidden to advance on Merv. This consistent
policy on the part of the War Ministry was in every case born of a fear
of greater expenditure and fresh responsibilities which could only
weaken our existing position on the western and Turkish frontiers.
Above all was the Department opposed to starting complications with
China or Japan. It accordingly viewed with alarm, and strongly opposed,
the theory that “Russia is the most western of Asiatic States, not the
most eastern of European,” and that her future lies entirely in Asia.
As has been explained, twenty years ago we were practically defenceless
in the Far East. An enormous extent of country such as Saghalien was
garrisoned by only three local detachments, totalling 1,000 men.
Vladivostok had no defences, and its main communication with Russia—a
trunk road 6,000 miles long—was in a military sense absolutely
useless. It was only after 1882, when we yielded to China over Kuldja,
and when Japan began increasing her army, that we began to augment the
number of our troops in that quarter.
The Department was all the time keenly alive to the precarious nature
of our communications between the Pri-Amur and Russia, and recruits
and a large proportion of supplies were sent to Vladivostok by sea.
Under such conditions it was, of course, quite out of the question to
dream of any offensive operations or even schemes of offence; but the
awakening of China and Japan caused much uneasiness for our safety
east of Lake Baikal, and the project for the construction of the
Siberian Railway through our own territory was welcomed as facilitating
communication. The question of the construction of this railway-line
was first discussed by a committee of Ministers in 1875, but the scheme
was then confined to a line within the limits of European Russia as far
as Tumen. In 1880 a resolution was passed sanctioning this portion. In
1882 the Emperor Alexander II., dissatisfied with this partial scheme,
decided that the line should be laid right through Siberia. Surveys
were accordingly made, and three alternative routes were put forward.
In 1885, after examining these alternatives, the committee were unable
to come to any conclusion as to the most advantageous, but they
decided to set to work at once to construct the first portion of the
railway. In 1886, upon receipt of a report by the Governor-General of
Eastern Siberia, the Emperor wrote:
“So far as I have read the report of the Governor-General, I
am grieved to observe that the Government has up till now done
practically nothing to meet the requirements of this rich but
neglected country. And it is time—indeed time—that something should
be done.”
Notwithstanding such a strongly worded animadversion on the part of
the Emperor, it was only in February, 1891, that the committee put on
record its decision to build simultaneously the Ussuri Railway and the
portion of the Siberian line from Mias to Cheliabinsk. In a rescript
to the Tsarevitch, who was then on his voyage round the world, it was
explained that the line would run “right across the whole of Siberia,”
and be called the Great Siberian Railway. The idea underlying this
scheme was as simple as it was bold, and the line would undoubtedly
have put life into a very slowly developing country, would have
attracted a large number of colonists, and would thus have secured to
us an important region. Of course, as it ran along the Chinese frontier
for the greater part of its length, it would not have been free from
danger; but the risk was diminished by the comparative inaccessibility
of the part of Northern Manchuria adjacent to the railway and the
weakness of China. Moreover, it was covered by the mighty Amur River.
After the Chino-Japanese War we, in conjunction with other Powers,
compelled Japan to abandon Port Arthur and the Kuan-tung Peninsula,
which she had just conquered. This, the first of the acts of Russia
to excite Japan’s hostility, was also by far the most decisive. A new
state of affairs now arose in the Far East which made our complete
military unreadiness seem alarming, especially as the Pri-Amur was at
that time practically defenceless against an offensive movement by the
Japanese. Throughout the immense expanse of this military district
there were only nineteen infantry battalions, and we were at once
obliged to start increasing our troops in the Far East and turning
Vladivostok into a naval fortress; but the most urgent question was
that of establishing railway communication.
Before the Chino-Japanese War no one imagined that the Siberian line
would be laid anywhere but through our own territory. The weakness
displayed by China at that time, however, formed an inducement to carry
it through Manchuria, and thus shorten the distance by over 300 miles.
In vain did General Dukhovski, Governor-General and Commander of the
troops in the Pri-Amur district, protest and point out the risks of
such a course. He argued that, if the rail passed through Chinese
territory, not only would it be of advantage to the Chinese instead of
to the Russian settler population, but it would be insecure. His views
did not find acceptance, and this great artery of communication—of
incalculable importance to us—was laid through a foreign country. The
temptation to give as far as possible an international importance to
this line by attracting all trans-continental through-traffic proved
too strong for the modest claim for consideration of the Pri-Amur
district, though it was one that concerned us very deeply. General
Dukhovski’s fears were soon justified. Part of the line was destroyed
by a rising of the people in 1900, and our troops in Harbin were
forced upon the defensive. We lost a whole year, wasted millions of
money, and only too soon began to realize that, except a very limited
quantity of the most perishable freight, no goods would be sent by
rail. Sea transport was cheaper and safer. We were forced to abandon
our dreams of international importance for the line, and to confess
that it merely constituted a portion of the Siberian Railway, which, as
it ran for 800 miles through a foreign country, would require special
protection at great cost. Moreover, the Finance Minister’s estimate
of the saving—£1,500,000—to be effected by taking the line through
Manchuria, instead of through Siberia, proved entirely misleading, as
the mileage cost of the line worked out to a much larger figure than
that of any railway undertaking in Russia! Not only was all idea of
the line’s international importance very quickly abandoned, but it
soon became only too clear that its economic value, though important
to the local Chinese population, would be very slight for Russia. Its
_raison d’être_ must then have been mainly strategic. But, if built on
strategic grounds, surely a route through our own territory would have
been preferable? This unfortunate enterprise, which turned out so badly
for Russia, was the first outward sign of an active policy which was to
have such great results. The occupation of Port Arthur, the creation
of Dalny, the construction of the southern branch of the line, the
maintenance of a commercial fleet in the Far East, and our business
enterprises in Korea, were all links in the chain which was to bind
these distant tracts so securely to Russia.
It is thought in some quarters that if we had confined ourselves to
the construction of the northern line through Manchuria, there would
have been no war; that it was the occupation of Port Arthur and Mukden
and, in particular, our activity in Korea which caused it. In the
opinion of others, the railway through Manchuria cannot be looked upon
as merely the commencement of our activity, but must be regarded as
the foundation of it all; for if we had run the line along the banks
of the Amur in our own territory, it would never have occurred to us
to occupy Southern Manchuria and Kuan-tung. It is quite true that the
northern portion of the line passing through Manchuria could never
have disturbed our friendly relations with China, and I am personally
convinced that if we had been satisfied with this, Japan would never
have started a war with us for the sake of Northern Manchuria. In any
case, the line through Manchuria was built neither in the interests
nor at the instance of the War Department, and was carried through in
spite of the opposition of General Dukhovski, its representative on the
spot. The Boxer rebellion in Manchuria showed up our military weakness,
and the hope of the Finance Minister that the local guards raised by
him would be able to protect the line without the assistance of troops
supplied by the War Department was not realized. Even when the rising
became general, he begged us not to despatch to Manchuria the troops
which General Grodekovi and Admiral Alexeieff were holding in readiness
in Pri-Amur and the Kuan-tung district. His advice was taken, but this
delay in sending reinforcements to the railway cost us dear. Almost
the whole of the line north of the Eastern Chinese main line, with the
exception of the section near Harbin, as well as a great length of
the southern branch, together with the stations of Kuang-cheng-tzu,
Mukden, and Liao-yang, were seized by the rebels. The local railway
guards, commanded by Generals Gerngros and Mischenko, behaved with
gallantry, but, overcome by superior numbers, they were forced to
retire from almost all the points they had occupied, and the greater
part of them were concentrated at Harbin, where they were besieged
by the insurgents. Finally, it was by direct order of the Emperor
that the War Ministry took action in concentrating troops to put down
the rising. Railway communication with Trans-Baikalia was then in
existence, and the sea was also open to us, and by the autumn of 1900
we had collected by land and water an army of 100,000 men, and rapidly
quelled the rebellion. The capture of Peking,[55] the headquarters of
the Boxer movement, by the Allied troops under General Linievitch was
also instrumental in restoring order in Manchuria, while the energy
with which General Grodekovi organized and despatched columns into
Manchuria itself, and so relieved General Gerngros in Harbin, is worthy
of notice. Tsitsihar and Kirin were captured by General Rennenkampf;
Mukden, by General Subotin.
Once order was restored, the War Department set to work to withdraw
our troops from the province of Pei-chih-li as quickly as possible,
and succeeded in doing so in spite of the disapproval of Count
Waldersee;[56] all the reinforcements from Siberia and European Russia
returned. The damage done to the railway was considerable, and all
idea of its completion during 1900 was abandoned, and a whole year—the
importance of which has been little realized—was lost. Had we been
in sufficient strength to maintain order on the line in 1900, the
railway would have been in a far greater state of readiness in 1904;
the transport of reinforcements in 1903, and the concentration in
1904, would have been accomplished far more rapidly than it was, and
we should in all probability have had two or three more army corps at
Liao-yang than we actually had. The rising in 1900 clearly showed that
it was impossible, with our main line of railway running for 800 miles
through Chinese territory, to count on maintaining secure communication
with Russia in the future. To insure our position it was necessary to
build a line rapidly within our own territory along the left bank of
the Amur, and at the same time to place Northern Manchuria in such a
condition that it would not, with the aid of the line we had already
built, continue to be a source of weakness to us in the Far East.
[Illustration: H.I.M. THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II.]
As the Manchurian and Korean questions were the causes of the war,
it is necessary to touch on the War Minister’s views with regard to
them in some detail. The duties which Russia of her own accord took
upon herself in Manchuria are based on the Government _communiqué_ of
September 1, 1900, in which a circular telegram from the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, dated August 25, 1900, was quoted. In this telegram
it was stated that our Government was mainly guided by the following
axiom, amongst others, with regard to Chinese affairs:
“The _status quo ante_ in China must be preserved, and everything
that may tend to a partition of the Celestial Empire is to be
avoided.”
It continued that if, owing to any action of the Chinese, we should
be forced to send troops into Manchuria and to occupy Newchuang, such
temporary measures were on no account to be taken as evidence of any
self-interested schemes outside the general policy of the Imperial
Government, and that, as soon as order was permanently restored in
Manchuria and the railway protected—
“—Russia would not fail to withdraw her forces, provided that no
difficulty were placed in the way of such withdrawal by the action
of the other Powers.”
This announcement appeared at a time when we had over 100,000 men in
arms in Asia. There can, therefore, be no question of our sincere
intention—at that time—to evacuate Manchuria. In 1901 these promises
were repeated by our Government in a similar _communiqué_ of April 5.
Neither the opposition of China nor the Anglo-Japanese Treaty concluded
in 1902, which was unmistakably directed against us, were at the moment
considered sufficient to warrant our abandoning all hope of fulfilling
our promise to withdrew from Manchuria.
But so long ago as 1900 it had seemed doubtful whether we should be
able to carry out this promise. In the first place, it was impossible
to ignore entirely the advice of the authorities on the spot, who did
not consider a withdrawal was either desirable or possible in our
own interests. The action of the Chinese officials in Manchuria, the
existence of bands of Hun-huses, and the serious military expeditions
we had been forced to make in 1901—all strengthened the opinion of our
commanders out there that we had been in too great haste to promise
the evacuation of the country. Notwithstanding these doubts, a treaty
was concluded with China in April, 1902. This was but the logical
development of the official pronouncements made in 1900 and 1901. At
first it was supposed that this agreement would lead to a definite
settlement of our position in the Far East, but it soon became apparent
that there was little ground for such hope. The immense expenditure
from 1900 to 1903 on the railway, the army, and the fleet, gave birth
to and nourished the fixed idea that our most vital interests would
not be sufficiently guarded if we strictly observed the treaty made in
April. China viewed us with suspicion, and was almost openly hostile;
Japan was openly hostile; while all the other Powers distrusted us. Our
foothold in Manchuria also seemed precarious, and in spite of hurrying
on the construction and increasing its guards, the railway was by no
means secure. Trains had to be escorted on account of the frequent
raids by Hun-huses, and no trust could be placed in either the natives
or their officials. All this showed that if we confined ourselves
merely to protecting the line itself, it would be destroyed in many
places at the first rising. Our position would then be serious in the
extreme if we should be attacked on the western frontier while carrying
on a war in the east. There is no doubt whatever that, if trouble had
arisen in the west, and our troops had been withdrawn from Manchuria, a
repetition of the Chinese disorders of 1900 might easily have occurred;
our communications with the Pri-Amur would again have been interrupted,
and we should have had to reconquer Manchuria.[57] With each month
that passed the doubt as to our ability to carry out the terms of the
treaty of April increased, and this difficult period of uncertainty
turned to one of acute anxiety on account of the increasing hostility
to us of China and Japan. Officially, we continued to give assurances
that we should keep to our engagement, and we even carried out the
first portion of it by withdrawing our troops from that part of the
Mukden province up to the River Liao; but we were, as a matter of fact,
already taking steps essential to our own interests, but absolutely at
variance with the treaty.
Before the Boxer rising of 1900 I had expressed the opinion that
Northern and Southern Manchuria possessed entirely different values
for us, the greater importance of the former being due to the various
considerations. In the first place, the country through which the
main Siberian line passed was of special importance, because upon it
depended the security of our communication, and because the experience
of 1900 had shown the extreme weakness of its protection as organized
by the Finance Minister. I therefore asked that a small force of four
infantry battalions, one battery, and one squadron of Cossacks might
be stationed on the line as a mobile reserve at Harbin, in addition
to the local railway guards. Barracks for a force of this size were
built, and were ready for occupation in 1903; but placing troops merely
along the line itself—and a small number at that—would have been of
no use if China had intended to make things unpleasant for us in
Manchuria. The line would have been cut, and the culprits would never
have been discovered, for the officials, who outwardly _kow-towed_
to us, were all the time acting in accordance with instructions from
Peking. The only thing we could expect was an influx of Chinese into
Northern Manchuria, and the crowding of the tracts bordering on the
Chinese frontier. Against this, even complete annexation of Northern
Manchuria did not appear to me desirable, or likely to serve any
useful purpose, as the Chinese population so annexed, possessing
the rights of citizenship and settling along the left bank of the
Amur, would have swamped the native population of the Amur and coast
districts.[58] During the whole of the last century we had only
succeeded in colonizing very sparsely with our own people that part
of Siberia east of Trans-Baikalia to the sea, which means that the
bonds binding it to Russia were extremely weak. In the Amur and coast
districts, with a frontier of 1,600 miles bordering on China (from
Trans-Baikalia to the sea), the whole population only consisted of
400,000. Northern Manchuria, of about 450,000 square miles in extent,
includes the whole of the Kheilutsianski and the northern part of the
Kirin provinces. According to available information, it had before the
war only 1,500,000 inhabitants. This works out at three persons per
square mile. The Boxer rising of 1900 indicated that, so long as the
affairs of the people in Northern Manchuria continued to be controlled
from Peking, we must expect risings and attempts to destroy the line,
for the Chinese Government always had a ready reply to our protests:
“It is the Hun-huses who are the culprits.” Nor could we regard without
apprehension the increases to the Chinese forces in Northern Manchuria,
and the settling of Chinese on the waste lands adjacent to the Rivers
Amur and Argun, where our people had for a long time been settled. It
was necessary, therefore, that we should have, in some form or other,
the right of control and of generally making our own arrangements in
Northern Manchuria. Without this our weakly guarded railway might be a
positive disadvantage, as it added to the vulnerability of our frontier
line, which makes a large bend to the north between Trans-Baikalia and
the Ussuri region, the whole of the Kheilutsianski and the northern
part of the Kirin province running wedgewise into our territory. Only
by the security of Northern Manchuria could we feel sufficiently at
ease about the Pri-Amur region to start its development.
Now, Northern Manchuria is not next to Korea, and our permanent
occupation of it would consequently not have threatened complications
with Japan, nor were there in it important European interests which
might have been disturbed. It was, however, undoubtedly important
to China, with whom its forcible annexation by us might lead to
complications. It therefore devolved upon us to find some method of
consolidating our position in this region which would not cause a
rupture with China. Thus I was strongly in favour of including Northern
Manchuria in some way or the other within our sphere of influence; but
I was at the same time absolutely opposed to any quasi-political or
military enterprise in Southern Manchuria.
This region, up to the Kuan-tung district, includes the whole of
the Mukden and the southern part of the Kirin province. Though only
one-quarter the size of Northern Manchuria, the population was more
than 8,000,000. This works out at more than seventy souls per square
mile, as compared with about three for the latter. Mukden, sacred to
the Chinese dynasty, might always be a source of misunderstanding with
China, and our contact with Korea for 533 miles might easily lead to
complications with Japan.
Southern Manchuria, contracting in a wedge-shape, borders on Kuan-tung,
and has only 530 odd miles on the Korean frontier. The occupation
of it, therefore, would necessitate having two fronts, one towards
Korea and one towards China. If an enemy were superior at sea, he
could threaten a landing along the 400-mile-long coast of Southern
Manchuria. A landing in Newchuang,[59] for example, would have taken
all our troops south of that place in the rear. In discussing possible
solutions of this problem, it might be suggested—in the event of any
unfriendly action on the part of China—that we should obtain possession
of Manchuria in the same way as we had secured the Kuan-tung Peninsula.
If we did, this would secure our communication with the latter. Being
convinced, as I have said, that the inclusion of Northern Manchuria
within our sphere followed as the natural consequence of running the
Siberian main line through Manchuria, I felt equally sure that any kind
of annexation of Southern Manchuria would be dangerous.
In a special memorandum upon the Manchurian question which I submitted
to the Tsar in October, 1903, I expressed myself as follows:
“If we do not touch the boundary of Korea, and do not garrison the
country between it and the railway, we shall really prove to the
Japanese that we have no intention of seizing Korea as well as
Manchuria. They will then in all probability confine themselves to
the peaceful furtherance of their interests in the Peninsula, and
will neither enter into a military occupation of it nor greatly
increase the strength of their home army. This will relieve us of
the necessity of augmenting our numbers in the Far East, and of
supporting the heavy burden otherwise necessary even should there
be no war. If, on the other hand, we annex Southern Manchuria,
all the questions that now trouble us and threaten to set the
two nations by the ears will become more critical. Our temporary
occupation of certain points between the railway and Korea will
become permanent, our attention will be more and more attracted to
the Korean frontier, and our attitude will confirm the Japanese in
their suspicions that we intend to seize that peninsula.
“That our occupation of Southern Manchuria will lead to a Japanese
occupation of Southern Korea there cannot be the slightest doubt;
but beyond that all is uncertain. One thing, however, is certain.
If Japan takes this step, she will be compelled rapidly to increase
her military strength, and we, in turn, shall have to reply by
enlarging our Far Eastern force. Thus two nations whose interests
are so different that they would seem destined to live peaceably,
will begin a contest in time of peace, in which each will try to
surpass the other in preparations for war. We Russians can only do
this at the expense of our strength in the west, and of the vital
interests of the people at large—all for the sake of portions of a
country which really has no serious importance for us. Moreover, if
other Powers take part in this rivalry, the struggle for military
supremacy is liable at any moment to change into a deadly conflict,
which may not only retard the peaceful development of our Far
Eastern possessions for a long time, but may result in a set-back
to the whole Empire.
“Even if we should defeat Japan on the mainland—in Korea and
Manchuria—we could not destroy her, nor obtain decisive results,
without carrying the war into her territory. That, of course,
would not be absolutely impossible, but to invade a country
with a warlike population of 47,000,000, where even the women
participate in wars of national defence, would be a serious
undertaking even for a Power as strong as Russia. And if we do not
utterly destroy Japan—if we do not deprive her of the right and the
power to maintain a navy—she will wait for the first convenient
opportunity—till, for instance, we are engaged in war in the
west—to attack us, either single-handed or in co-operation with our
European enemies.
“It must not be forgotten that Japan can not only quickly throw a
well-organized and well-trained army of from 150,000 to 180,000
men into Korea or Manchuria, but can do this without drawing at
all heavily upon her population. If we accept the German ratio of
regular troops to population—namely, 1 per cent.[60]—we shall see
that she can, with her 47,000,000 of people, maintain, instead of
120,000, a force of 400,000 men in time of peace, and 1,000,000 in
time of war. Even if we reduce this estimate by one-quarter, Japan
will be able to oppose us on the mainland with a regular army of
from 300,000 to 350,000 men. If we mean to annex Manchuria, we
shall be compelled to bring up our numbers to a point which will
enable our troops in the Far East alone to withstand a Japanese
attack.”
From the above lines it will be seen how seriously the War Department
regarded such an antagonist as Japan, and how much anxiety it felt
concerning possible complications with that Power on account of Korea.
Still, so long as we adhered to our decision to evacuate Southern
Manchuria, and not to interfere in Korean affairs, the danger of a
rupture was removed. In 1900 our Government had been obliged to respect
the territorial integrity of China, and the question of evacuating
Manchuria had been in principle decided in the affirmative; and if we
were preparing to leave the country, we certainly could not at the same
time be preparing it as a theatre of military operations.
As regards the evacuation, there was a difference of opinion between
Admiral Alexeieff (the Commander of the Kuan-tung district) and
myself as to the importance to us of Southern Manchuria. I believed
that the occupation of Manchuria would bring us no profit, and
would involve us in trouble with Japan on the one side, through our
nearness to Korea, and with China on the other side, through our
possession of Mukden. I therefore regarded the speedy evacuation of
Southern Manchuria and Mukden as a matter of absolute necessity. The
Commander of the Kuan-tung district, on the other hand, whose duty it
was to defend that district, thought fit to contend that a permanent
occupation of Southern Manchuria would be the best guarantee of our
communications with Russia. There was also a minor difference of
opinion between the Finance Minister and myself with regard to the
withdrawal of our troops from Northern Manchuria. He thought that it
would suffice to leave the Frontier Guards only for the protection
of the railway. Guided by our experience in quelling the Boxer rising
in 1900, I considered it necessary, after withdrawing our troops as
quickly as possible from Southern Manchuria, to remove them from all
populated places in Northern Manchuria which were off the line of
rail, including Kirin and Tsitsihar, and to station a small reserve
at Harbin on the line itself in case of disorder. This reserve need
not have been stronger than two to four infantry battalions and one
battery of artillery. Moreover, I thought we ought to continue to
guard communication between Harbin and Khabarovsk along the Sungari,
and between Tsitsihar and Blagovieschensk, by the maintenance of a few
small military posts. These differences of opinion, however, ceased to
exist with the ratification of the Russo-Chinese Treaty of April 1,
1902. By the terms of that convention our troops—with the exception
of those guarding the railway—were to be removed from all parts of
Manchuria, Southern as well as Northern, within specified periods. This
settlement of the question was a great relief to the War Department,
because it held out the hope of a “return to the west” in our military
affairs. In the first period of six months we were to evacuate the
western part of Southern Manchuria, from Shan-hai-kuan to the River
Liao; this we punctually did. In the second period of six months
we were to remove our troops from the rest of the province of Mukden,
including the cities of Mukden and Newchuang. The Department regarded
the arrangement to evacuate the province of Mukden with approval, and
made energetic preparations to carry it into effect. Barracks were
hastily erected between Khabarovsk and Vladivostok for the soldiers to
be withdrawn into the Pri-Amur country; the scheme of transportation
was drawn up and approved; the movement of troops had begun, and
Mukden had actually been evacuated, when suddenly everything was
stopped by order of Admiral Alexeieff, the Commander of the Kuan-tung
district. His reasons for taking such action have not, to this day,
been sufficiently cleared up. It is definitely known, however, that the
change in policy which stopped the withdrawal of troops from Southern
Manchuria corresponded in time with the first visit to the Far East of
State Councillor Bezobrazoff (retired). Mukden, which we had already
evacuated, was reoccupied, as was also the city of Newchuang. The Ya-lu
timber concession[61] assumed more importance than ever, and in order
to give support to it and our other undertakings in Northern Korea,
Admiral Alexeieff sent a mounted force with guns to Feng-huang-cheng.
Thus, far from completing the evacuation of Southern Manchuria, we
actually moved into parts of it that we had never before occupied. At
the same time, we allowed operations in connection with the Korean
timber concession to go on, despite the fact that the promoters of
this enterprise were striving to give to it a political and military
character contrary to instructions from St. Petersburg.
[Illustration: VICE-ADMIRAL ALEXEIEFF.]
This unexpected change of policy alarmed both China and Japan, and
there is good reason to believe that the stoppage of the evacuation of
the province of Mukden was an event of supreme importance. So long as
we held to our intention of withdrawing all our troops from Manchuria,
confined ourselves to the protection of the line by the Frontier
Guards and a small reserve at Harbin, and refrained from intruding
in Korea, there was little danger of a break with Japan; but we were
brought alarmingly near a rupture with that Power when, contrary to
our agreement with China, we left our troops in Southern Manchuria,
and entered Northern Korea in pursuit of our timber enterprise. The
uncertainty as to our intentions, moreover, alarmed not only China and
Japan, but even England, America, and other Powers.
In the early part of 1903 our position became extremely involved.
The interests of the Pri-Amur were by this time pushed completely
into the background; even General Dukhovski, its Governor-General and
Commander-in-Chief, was not consulted upon the most important points
concerning the Far East. Meanwhile, immense enterprises involving many
millions of pounds were being created and controlled on independent
lines in Manchuria, on Chinese territory. The Minister of Finance (M.
de Witte) was building and managing over 1,300 miles of railway. The
alignment of the northern portion was, as I have explained, fixed
in direct opposition to the opinion of General Dukhovski, our chief
authority in those parts, while under the orders of the Finance
Minister an army corps was organized for the protection of the line. So
independent, indeed, was the latter in his conduct of purely military
matters that a pattern of gun for the railway guard was settled, and
the gun purchased abroad without reference to the War Ministry. To
assist in the economic development of the railway, M. de Witte started
a fleet of sea-going merchant ships; for work on the Manchurian
rivers he ran a flotilla of river steamers, some of which were armed.
Vladivostok was no longer considered suitable as a terminus for a
trans-continental trunk line, so, regardless of the fact that the
Kuan-tung district was under the War Department and immediately under
the officer commanding the troops in it (Admiral Alexeieff), Dalny was
selected and created as a great port without reference to either. Huge
sums were spent on this place, which adversely affected the military
importance and strength of Port Arthur, as it was necessary either
to fortify Dalny or be prepared for its seizure and employment by an
enemy as a base of operations against us—a thing which afterwards
happened. I should add that the Russo-Chinese Bank was also in the
Finance Minister’s hands. Finally, M. de Witte maintained his own
representatives in Peking, Seoul, etc. (Pokotiloff in Peking). It so
happened, therefore, that in this year our Minister of Finance was
managing in the Far East railways, a flotilla of merchant steamers,
a certain number of armed vessels, the port of Dalny, and the
Russo-Chinese Bank. He also had under his command an army corps. At the
same time Bezobrazoff and his company were developing their concessions
in Manchuria and Korea, and promoting by every possible means their
timber speculation on the Ya-lu in Northern Korea. One incredible
scheme of Bezobrazoff’s followed another. His idea was to utilize the
Timber Company as a sort of “screen” or barrier against a possible
attack upon us by the Japanese, and during 1902 and 1903 his activity
and that of his adherents assumed a very alarming character. Among
requests that he made of Admiral Alexeieff were to send into Korean
territory 600 soldiers in civilian dress, to organize for service in
the same locality a force of 3,000 Hun-huses, to support the agents of
the Timber Company by sending 600 mounted rifles to Sha-ho-tzu on the
Ya-lu, and to occupy Feng-huang-cheng with a detached force. Admiral
Alexeieff refused some of these requests, but unfortunately consented
to send 150 mounted rifles to Sha-ho-tzu, and to move a Cossack
regiment with guns to the latter place. This action was particularly
harmful to us, as it was taken just at the time when we were under
obligations to evacuate the province of Mukden altogether. As has
already been stated, instead of withdrawing, we advanced towards Korea.
The Ministers of Finance, Foreign Affairs, and War (de Witte,
Lamsdorff, and myself), all recognized the danger that would threaten
us if we continued to defer fulfilment of the promised evacuation, and,
more especially, if we failed to put an end to Bezobrazoff’s activity
in Korea. We three Ministers, therefore, procured the appointment of
a special council, which assembled in St. Petersburg on April 18,
1903, to consider certain propositions which Bezobrazoff had made to
its members in a special memorandum. These proposals had for their
object the strengthening of Russia’s strategic position in the basin
of the Ya-lu. We three Ministers on the committee expressed ourselves
firmly and definitely in opposition to Bezobrazoff’s proposals, and all
agreed that if his enterprise on the Ya-lu was to be sustained, it must
be upon a strictly commercial basis. The Minister of Finance showed
conclusively that, for the next five or ten years, Russia’s task in the
Far East must be to tranquillize the country, and bring to completion
the work already undertaken there. He said, furthermore, that although
the views of the different departments of the Government were not
always precisely the same, there had never been—so far as the Ministers
of War, Foreign Affairs, and Finance were concerned—any conflict of
action. The Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out particularly the
danger involved in Bezobrazoff’s proposal to stop the withdrawal of
troops from Manchuria.
It pleased His Imperial Majesty to say, after he had listened to
these expressions of opinion, that war with Japan was extremely
undesirable, and that we must endeavour to restore in Manchuria a state
of tranquillity. The company formed for the purpose of exploiting the
timber on the River Ya-lu must be a strictly commercial organization,
must admit foreigners who desired to participate, and must exclude
all ranks of the army. I was then ordered to proceed to the Far
East, for the purpose of acquainting myself, on the spot, with our
needs, and ascertaining what the state of mind was in Japan. In the
latter country, where I met with the most cordial and kind-hearted
reception, I became convinced that the Government desired to avoid a
rupture with Russia, but that it would be necessary for us to act in a
perfectly definite way in Manchuria, and to refrain from interference
in the affairs of Korea. If we permitted the schemes of Bezobrazoff
and Company to continue, we should be in danger of a conflict. These
conclusions I telegraphed to St. Petersburg. After my departure from
that city, however, the danger of a rupture with Japan, on account
of Korea, had increased considerably, especially when, on May 20,
1903, the Minister of Finance announced that, “after having had an
explanation from State Councillor Bezobrazoff, he (the Minister) was
not in disagreement with him so far as the essence of the matter was
concerned.”
In the council held at Port Arthur, when I arrived, Admiral Alexeieff,
Lessar,[62] Pavloff,[63] and I cordially agreed that the Ya-lu
enterprise should have a purely commercial character; and I added,
moreover, that, in my opinion, it ought to be abandoned altogether. I
brought about the recall of several army officers who were taking part
in it, and suggested to Lieutenant-Colonel Madritoff, who was managing
the military and political side of it, that he should either resign
his commission or give up employment which, in my judgment, was not
suitable for an officer wearing the uniform of the General Staff. He
chose the former alternative.
All the military requests made by Admiral Alexeieff, after consulting
with the senior officers in the Kuan-tung district, were carried
out with great promptitude. My recommendations and orders were made
in Port Arthur, and issued by despatch. In the autumn of 1903 I was
thanked by him for acting on his recommendations so promptly. In view
of the repeated assurances given me by Admiral Alexeieff that he was
wholly opposed to Bezobrazoff’s schemes, that he was holding them back
with all his strength, and that he was a firm advocate of a peaceful
Russo-Japanese agreement, I left Port Arthur for St. Petersburg in
July, 1903, fully believing that the avoidance of a rupture with Japan
was a matter entirely within our control. The results of my visit
to the Far East were embodied in a special report to the Emperor,
submitted August 6, 1903, in which I expressed with absolute frankness
the opinion that if we did not put an end to the uncertain state of
affairs in Manchuria, and to the adventurous activity of Bezobrazoff in
Korea, we must expect a rupture with Japan. Copies of this report were
sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance,
and met with their approval. By some means unknown to me, this report
was given publicity, and on June 24, 1905, the newspaper _Razsvet_
printed an article, by a certain M. Roslavleff, entitled “Which is the
Greater?” the object of which was to prove that I ought to be included
amongst those responsible for the rupture with Japan, because, through
fear of Bezobrazoff, I signed a paper drawn up in Port Arthur, which
put the Ya-lu enterprise under the protection of Russian troops,
and thus stopped the evacuation of Manchuria. This article has been
reprinted by many Russian and foreign journals, and there has never
been any refutation of the misstatements that it contains with regard
to my alleged action in signing this imaginary memorandum.
In view of the special publicity this effusion received, and of the
gravity of the accusations levelled against me, I will give a few
extracts from it. M. Roslavleff quotes from my report to the Emperor
the following sentences and paragraphs:
“Our actions in the basin of the Ya-lu, and our behaviour in
Manchuria, have excited in Japan a feeling of hostility which,
upon our taking any incautious step, may lead to war.... State
Secretary Bezobrazoff’s plan of operations, if carried out, will
inevitably lead to a violation of the agreement that we made
with China on April 8, 1902, and will also, as inevitably, cause
complications with Japan.... The actions of State Secretary
Bezobrazoff toward the end of last, and at the beginning of this,
year have already practically caused a violation of the treaty with
China and a breach with Japan.... At the request of Bezobrazoff,
Admiral Alexeieff sent a force of mounted rifles to Sha-ho-tzu (on
the Ya-lu), and kept a body of troops in Feng-huang-cheng. These
measures put a stop to the evacuation of the province of Mukden....
Among other participants in the Ya-lu enterprise who have given
trouble to Admiral Alexeieff is Acting State Councillor Balasheff,
who has a disposition quite as warlike as that of Bezobrazoff.
If Admiral Alexeieff had not succeeded in stopping a despatch
from Balasheff to Captain Bodisco with regard to ‘catching all
the Japanese,’ ‘punishing them publicly,’ and ‘taking action with
volleys,’ there would have been a bloody episode on the Ya-lu
before this. Unfortunately, it is liable to happen even now any
day.... During my stay in Japan, I had opportunities of seeing
with what nervous apprehension the people regarded our activity on
the Ya-lu, how they exaggerated our intentions, and how they were
preparing to defend by force their Korean interests. Our active
operations there have convinced them that Russia is now about to
proceed to the second part of her Far Eastern programme—that,
having swallowed Manchuria, she is preparing to gulp down Korea.
The excitement in Japan is such that if Admiral Alexeieff had
not shown wise caution—if he had allowed all the proposals of
Bezobrazoff to be put in train—we should probably be at war with
Japan now. There is no reason whatever to suppose that a few
officers and reservists, cutting timber on the Ya-lu, will be of
any use in a war with Japan. Their value is trifling in comparison
with the danger that the timber enterprise creates by keeping up
the excitement among the Japanese people.... Suffice it to say
that, in the opinion of Admiral Alexeieff, and of our Ministers in
Peking, Seoul, and Tokio, the timber concession may be the cause of
hostilities, and in this opinion I fully concur.”
After quoting the above extracts from my report, M. Roslavleff says:
“Thus warmly, eloquently, and shrewdly did Kuropatkin condemn the
Ya-lu adventure, and thus clearly did he see on the political
horizon the ruinous consequences that it would have for Russia.
But why did this bold and clear-sighted censor not protest against
the decision of the Port Arthur council? Why, after making a few
caustic remarks about Bezobrazoff, did he sign the paper which
put the Ya-lu adventure under the protection of Russian troops,
and thus stop the evacuation of Manchuria? Why did not the other
members, who shared Kuropatkin’s opinion as to the great danger
of Bezobrazoff’s adventurous schemes, and expected a rupture with
Japan to be imminent, prevent, on the authority of those July
councils at Port Arthur, Bezobrazoff’s political and economic
escapades? Why did they, on the contrary, with Kuropatkin, put
their signatures to a document which admitted Bezobrazoff’s
enterprises as useful Government undertakings, ratify a treacherous
policy in China, Korea, and Japan, and so lay the first stone in
the monument of indelible shame erected by the war? Why? Simply
because at that time everybody was afraid of Bezobrazoff.”
Such accusations, which have had wide publicity, require an explanation.
The council held at Port Arthur, in June, 1903, was called for the
purpose of finding, if possible, some means of settling the Manchurian
question without lowering the dignity of Russia. There were present at
this council, in addition to Admiral Alexeieff and myself, Acting State
Councillor Lessar, Russian Minister in China; Chamberlain Pavloff,
Russian Minister in Seoul; Major-General Vogak; State Councillor
Bezobrazoff; and M. Plancon, an officer of the diplomatic service. We
were all acquainted with the wish of the Emperor, that our enterprises
in the Far East should not lead to war, and we had to devise means of
carrying the Imperial will into effect. With regard to these means
there were differences of opinion, but upon fundamental questions there
was complete agreement. Among these were—
1. _The Manchurian Question._—On July 3 the council expressed its
judgment with regard to this question as follows: “In view of the
extraordinary difficulties and enormous administrative expenses
that the annexation of Manchuria would involve, all the members of
the council agree that it is, in principle, undesirable; and this
conclusion applies not only to Manchuria as a whole, but also to its
northern part.”
2. _The Korean Question._—On July 2 the council decided that the
occupation of the whole of Korea, or even of the northern part, would
be unprofitable to Russia, and therefore undesirable. Our activity
in the basin of the Ya-lu, moreover, might give Japan reason to
fear a seizure by us of the northern part of the Peninsula. On July
7 the council called upon Acting State Councillor Balasheff, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Madritoff of the General Staff, to appear before it,
and explain the status of the Ya-lu enterprise. From their testimony it
appeared that the concern was legally organized, the company holding
permits from the Chinese authorities to cut timber on the northern
side, and a concession from the Korean Government covering the southern
side of the Ya-lu. Although the enterprise had lost, to a great extent,
its provocative character after the conclusions of the St. Petersburg
council of April 18, 1903, became known in the province of Kuan-tung,
its operations could not yet be regarded as purely commercial. On
July 7 the company had in its employ 9 senior agents, of whom one was
an officer of the army; 97 or 98 reservists, who went down the river
in charge of rafts from Sha-ho-tzu to its mouth; some 200 Chinamen
(from Chifu), and about 900 Koreans. Its affairs were managed by
Lieutenant-Colonel Madritoff, although that officer was not officially
in the company’s service.
After consideration of all the facts put forward, the members of the
council came to the unanimous conclusion that, “although the Ya-lu
Timber Company really appears to be a commercial organization, its
employment of military officers of the active list to do work that
has military importance undoubtedly gives to it a politico-military
aspect.” The council, therefore, in order to deprive Japan of a
pretext for looking upon the Timber Company as an enterprise of a
military-political character, acknowledged the necessity of “at once
taking measures to give the affair an exclusively commercial character,
to exclude from it officers of the regular army, and to commit the
management of the timber business to persons not employed in the
service of the Empire.” On July 7 these conclusions were signed by all
the members of the council, including State Councillor Bezobrazoff. I
declined to go personally into any of the economic questions concerning
Manchuria, and said that the proper person to do this was the Minister
of Finance. State Secretary Bezobrazoff was asked to work out the
following points with the assistance of experts selected by him:
1. “What action should be taken and what economic policy should be
followed in Manchuria in order to reduce the deficit on the Eastern
Chinese Railway.”
2. “To what extent the measures for increasing the revenue of the line
and the economic policy in Manchuria, recommended by the experts, would
affect the economic situation of the Pri-Amur region.”
Another duty entrusted to this sub-committee was the compilation
of a list of all the private enterprises which were being carried
on in Manchuria. At the last meeting of the council on July 11 the
sub-committee’s report on the economic question was read out, and it
was decided “to take note of its conclusions without discussion, and to
attach them to the council’s proceedings.” Admiral Alexeieff suggested
that to this should be added the words, “so that when considering the
question of the further economic development in Manchuria, we should
endeavour not to invest more State moneys in it.” This addition was
supported by all the members of the council, excepting State Councillor
Bezobrazoff, who did not feel himself able to offer an opinion on the
subject.[64] No other conclusions on economic questions generally or
any other enterprises in Manchuria were signed by the members of the
council at Port Arthur, and matters of an economic nature were not
looked into.
It is evident, from the facts above set forth, that the statement
in which M. Roslavleff charges the members of the council with
signing minutes of proceedings that gave the Bezobrazoff adventure
a place among useful Imperial enterprises is fiction. Upon what it
was based we do not know. The duty of immediately carrying into
effect the conclusions of the council—to put an end immediately to
the military-political activity of the timber enterprise on the
Ya-lu—rested upon Admiral Alexeieff, by virtue of the authority given
to him. The thing that he had to do, first of all, and that he was
fully empowered to do, was to recall our force from Feng-huang-cheng,
and the mounted rifles from the Ya-lu. Why this was not done I do not
know. Personally, I did not allow Lieutenant-Colonel Madritoff, of the
General Staff, to continue his connection with the Timber Company, and
I may add that he and other officers who had associated themselves with
the enterprise did so without my knowledge. But no matter how effective
might be the measures taken by Admiral Alexeieff to give the Ya-lu
enterprise a purely commercial character, I still feared that this
undertaking, which had obtained world-wide notoriety, would continue
to have important political significance. In my report of August 6,
1903, which was presented to the Emperor upon my return from Japan,
I therefore expressed the opinion that an immediate end must be put
to the operations of the Timber Company, and that the whole business
should be sold to foreigners. The thought that our interests in Korea,
which were of trifling importance, might bring us into conflict with
Japan caused me incessant anxiety during my stay in the latter country.
On June 26, 1903, when I was passing through the Sea of Japan on my way
to Nagasaki, I made the following note in my diary:
“If I were asked to express an opinion, from a military point of
view, upon the comparative importance of Russian interests in
different parts of the Empire, and on different frontiers, I should
put my judgment into the form of a pyramidal diagram, placing the
least important of our interests at the top and the most important
at the bottom, as follows:
Our interests in
Korea.
Our interests in Manchuria.
Military District of the Pri-Amur.
Safe-guarding of this
territory for Russia. Defence
against China and Japan.
Securing the safety of Russia against
Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Great Britain,
and China. Military Districts of the
Caucasus, Turkestan, and Siberia.
Maintenance of domestic peace and order by
the forces of all Military Districts.
Maintenance of the territorial integrity of Russia
against the Powers of the Triple Alliance. The foundation
of Russia’s safety in her western boundary.
“This diagram shows clearly where the principal energies of the
Ministry of War should hereafter be concentrated, and in what
direction in future Russia’s main powers and resources should be
turned. The interests that lie at the foundation of our position
as a nation are: (1) The defence of the territorial integrity of
the Empire against the Powers of the Triple Alliance; and (2) the
employment of the forces of all our military districts for the
preservation of internal peace and order. In comparison with these
tasks all the others have secondary importance. The diagram shows,
furthermore, that our interests in the Pri-Amur region must be
regarded as more important than our interests in Manchuria, and
that the latter must take precedence of our interests in Korea.
I am afraid, however, that, for a time at least, our national
activity will be based on affairs in the Far East, and, if so, the
pyramid will then be turned bottom upwards, and made to stand on
its narrow Korean top. But such a structure on such a foundation
will fall. Columbus solved the problem of making an egg stand on
its end by breaking the egg. Must we, in order to make our pyramid
stand on its narrow Korean end, break the Russian Empire?”
Upon my return from Japan I showed the above diagram to M. de Witte,
who agreed that it was correct. Notwithstanding the disastrous
conclusion to the recent war, we did not adopt Columbus’s method.
Russia is not yet broken; but undoubtedly, now that the war is over,
the above diagram must be considerably altered.
The establishment of the Viceroyalty in the Far East was for me a
complete surprise. On August 15, 1903, I asked the Emperor to relieve
me of my duty as Minister of War, and after the great manœuvres I was
granted long leave of absence, of which I availed myself, expecting
that my place would be filled by the appointment of some other person.
In September, 1903, the state of affairs in the Far East began to be
alarming, and Admiral Alexeieff was definitely ordered to take all
necessary measures to avoid war. The Emperor expressed his wish to
this effect with firmness, and did not, in any way, limit or restrict
the concessions that should be made in order to avoid a rupture with
Japan. All that had to be done was to find a method of making these
concessions as little injurious as possible to Russian interests.
During my stay in Japan, I became satisfied that the Japanese
Government was disposed to consider Japanese and Korean affairs calmly,
with a view to arriving at an agreement upon the basis of mutual
concessions. The Emperor’s definitely expressed desire that war should
not be allowed to take place had, for a short time, a tranquillizing
effect on Far Eastern affairs. In view of the disturbing situation in
the Far East, I cut short my leave of absence, and, in reporting to the
Emperor for duty, I gave this threatening state of affairs as my reason
for returning. On October 23, 1903, the Emperor made the following
marginal note upon my letter: “The alarm in the Far East is apparently
beginning to subside.” In October I recommended that the garrison
at Vladivostok should be strengthened, but permission to reinforce
it was not given. Meanwhile there was really no re-establishment of
tranquillity in the Far East, and our relations with Japan and China
were becoming more and more involved. On October 28, 1903, I presented
to the Emperor a special report on the Manchurian question, in which I
showed that, in order to avoid complications with China and a rupture
with Japan, we must put an end to our military occupation of Southern
Manchuria, and confine our activity and our administrative supervision
to the northern part of that territory.
At the time when this report was presented, and later—in November—the
negotiations that Admiral Alexeieff was carrying on with Japan not only
made no progress, but became more critical, the Admiral still believing
that to show a yielding disposition would only make matters worse.
Bearing in mind the clearly expressed will of the Emperor that all
necessary measures should be taken to avoid war, and not expecting
favourable results from Alexeieff’s negotiations, I submitted to His
Majesty, on December 6, 1903, a second memorandum on the Manchurian
question, in which I proposed that we should restore Port Arthur
and the province of Kuan-tung to China, and sell the southern branch
of the Eastern Chinese Railway, securing, in lieu thereof, certain
special rights in the northern part of Manchuria. In substance, this
proposition was that we should admit the untimeliness of our attempt to
get an outlet on the Pacific, and abandon it altogether. The sacrifice
might seem a heavy one to make, but I showed the necessity for it
by emphasizing two important considerations. In the first place, by
surrendering Port Arthur (which had been taken away from the Japanese),
and by giving up Southern Manchuria (with the Ya-lu enterprise), we
should escape the danger of a rupture with Japan and China; in the
second place, we should avoid the possibility of internal disturbances
in European Russia. A war with Japan would be extremely unpopular,
and would increase the feeling of dissatisfaction with the ruling
authorities.
At the end of this memorandum occurred the following passage:
“The economic interests of Russia in the Far East are negligible.
We have as yet, thank God, no overproduction in manufactures,
because our domestic markets are not yet glutted. There may be
some export of articles from our factories and foundries, but it
is largely bounty-fed, and will cease—or nearly cease—when such
artificial encouragement is withheld. Russia, therefore, has not
yet arrived at the pitiable necessity of waging war in order to
obtain markets for her products. As for our other interests in that
quarter, the success or failure of a few coal or timber enterprises
in Manchuria and Korea is not a matter of sufficient importance to
justify the risk of war. The railway-lines built through Manchuria
cannot change the situation quickly, and the hope that these lines
will have world-wide importance as arteries of international
commerce is not likely to be soon realized. Travellers, mails, tea
and possibly some other merchandise will go over them, but the
great masses of heavy international freight, which alone can give
such importance to a railway, must still go by sea, on account of
the heavy railway rates. Such is not the case, however, with local
freight to supply local needs. This the railroad—and especially the
southern branch—will carry in increasing amount, thus deriving most
of its revenue, and, at the same time, stimulating the growth of
the country, and, in Southern Manchuria particularly, benefiting
the Chinese population. But if we do not take special measures
to direct even local freight to Dalny, that port is likely to
suffer from the competition of Newchuang. Port Arthur has no value
for Russia as the defence and terminus of a railway, unless that
railway is part of an international transit route. The southern
branch of the Eastern Chinese road has commercially only—or
chiefly—local importance, and Russia does not need to protect it by
means so costly as the fortifications of Port Arthur, a fleet of
warships, and a garrison of 30,000 men. It thus appears that the
retention of a forward position in Kuan-tung is no more supported
by economic than it is by political and military considerations.
What, then, are the interests that may involve us in war with Japan
and China? Are such interests important enough to justify the great
sacrifices that war will demand?
* * * * *
“The Russian people are powerful, and their faith in Divine
Providence, as well as their devotion to their Tsar and country,
is unshaken. We may trust, therefore, that if Russia is destined
to undergo the trial of war at the beginning of the twentieth
century, she will come out of it with victory and glory. But she
will have to make terrible sacrifices—sacrifices that may long
retard the natural growth of the Empire. In the wars that we waged
in the early years of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth
centuries, the enemy invaded our territory, and we fought for our
very existence—marched forth in defence of our country and died
for faith, Tsar, and Fatherland. If, in the early years of the
twentieth century, war breaks out as the result of Far Eastern
complications, the Russian people and the Russian army will execute
the will of their monarch with as much devotion and self-sacrifice
as ever, and will give up their lives and property for the sake
of attaining complete victory; but they will have no intelligent
comprehension of the objects for which the war is waged. For that
reason there will be no such exaltation of spirit, no such outburst
of patriotism, as that which accompanied the wars that we fought
either in self-defence or for objects dear to the hearts of the
people.
“We are now passing through a critical period. Internal enemies,
aiming at the destruction of the dearest and most sacred
foundations of life, are invading even the ranks of our army.
Large groups of the population have become dissatisfied, or
mentally unsettled, and disorders of various sorts—mostly created
by revolutionary propaganda—are increasing in frequency. Cases in
which troops have to be called out to deal with such disorders
are much more common than they were even a short time ago. Secret
revolutionary publications directed against the Government are
being more frequently found, even in the barracks.... We must hope,
however, that this evil has not yet taken deep root in Russian
soil, and that by strict and wise measures it may be eradicated.
If Russia were attacked from without, the people, with patriotic
fervour, would undoubtedly repudiate the false teaching of the
revolutionary propaganda, and show themselves as ready to answer
the call of their revered monarch, and to defend their Tsar and
country, as they were in the early years of the eighteenth and
particularly in the nineteenth century. If, however, they are
asked to make great sacrifices in order to carry on a war whose
objects are not clearly understood by them, the leaders of the
anti-Government party will take advantage of the opportunity to
spread sedition. Thus there will be introduced a new factor which,
if we decide on war in the Far East, we must take into account.
The sacrifices and dangers that we have experienced, or that we
anticipate, as results of the position we have taken in the Far
East, ought to be a warning to us when we dream of getting an
outlet on the warm waters of the Indian Ocean at Chahbar.[65] It is
already evident that the British are preparing to meet us there.
The building of a railroad across Persia, the construction of a
defended port and the maintenance of a fleet, etc., will simply be
a repetition of our experience with the Eastern Chinese Railway and
Port Arthur. In the place of Port Arthur we shall have Chahbar, and
instead of war with Japan, we shall have a still more unnecessary
and still more terrible war with Great Britain.
“In view of the considerations above set forth, the questions
arise: Ought we not to avoid the present danger at Port Arthur,
as well as the future danger in Persia? Ought we not to restore
Kuan-tung, Port Arthur, and Dalny to China, give up the southern
branch of the Eastern Chinese Railway, and get from China, in
place of it, certain rights in Northern Manchuria and a sum of,
say, £25,000,000 as compensation for expenses incurred by us in
connection with the railway and Port Arthur?”
Copies of this report were sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
the Minister of Finance, and Admiral Alexeieff. Unfortunately, my
views were not approved, and meanwhile the negotiations with Japan had
been dragging along and becoming more and more involved. The future
historian, who will have access to all the documents, may be able,
from a study of them, to determine why the will of the Russian monarch
to avoid war with Japan was not carried into effect by his principal
subordinates. At present it is only possible to state definitely that,
although neither the Emperor nor Russia desired war, we did not
succeed in escaping it. The reason for the failure of the negotiations
is evidently to be found in our ignorance of Japan’s readiness for war,
and her determination to support her contentions with armed force. We
ourselves were not ready to fight, and resolved that it should not
come to fighting. We made demands, but we had no intention of using
weapons to enforce them—and, it may be added, they were not worth going
to war about. We always thought, moreover, that the question whether
there should be war or peace depended upon us, and we wholly overlooked
Japan’s stubborn determination to enforce demands that had for her such
vital importance, and also her reliance upon our military unreadiness.
Thus the negotiations were not carried on by the respective parties
under equal conditions.
Again, our position at this period was made worse by the form that
Admiral Alexeieff gave to the negotiations entrusted to him. Japanese
pride was offended, and the whole correspondence became strained and
difficult as a result of the Admiral’s unfamiliarity with diplomatic
procedure and his lack of competent staff assistance. He proceeded,
moreover, upon the mistaken assumption that it was necessary to display
inflexibility and tenacity. His idea was that one concession would
inevitably lead to another, and that a yielding policy would be more
likely to bring about a rupture in the end than a policy of firmness.
The paper _Nasha Jizn_, on July 4, 1905, published an article entitled
“The Viceroy Alexeieff’s Firm Policy,” which was circulated all over
the world. It ran as follows:
“Now, when the disasters which have befallen our operations by land
and sea, together with all the terrible, incredible sufferings of
our soldiers and sailors, are turning our thoughts to the persons
responsible for the wretched war, we must remember, in deciding the
extent to which different departments and persons were responsible
for the ‘preliminary events,’ that Russian interests in the Far
East were represented by the Viceroy, who was intimately acquainted
with all the political circumstances, and who must be considered an
authority on Far Eastern affairs.
“Admiral Alexeieff’s policy was ‘firm,’ and all his endeavours were
directed to prevent Russia’s political position in those regions
being weakened, and it was on this account that he did not feel
able to recommend the evacuation of Manchuria after it had been
occupied for three years. Notwithstanding the absolute necessity
for making concessions, he reported in September, 1903, that the
Japanese proposal was ‘quite an impossible pretension,’ that it
must be definitely laid down as a preliminary to any negotiations
with Japan that we should continue in occupation of Manchuria, and
that he ‘was firmly convinced’ that this was the only settlement in
accordance with our position in the Far East.
“The opinion of the late Viceroy, ‘based’ on the general political
situation, was such that a successful issue to the negotiations
could only be ‘expected’ if the Japanese Government were clearly
given to understand that Russia was determined to support her
rights and interests in Manchuria by force of arms. With this idea,
and owing to the ‘provocative action of the Japanese,’ Alexeieff
proposed a whole series of measures, amongst which was one that we
should at once attack them on the sea in the event of a landing
at Chemulpo, Chinampo, or the mouth of the Ya-lu. He was ‘deeply
convinced’ that, in order to arrive at an agreement with Japan,
the most important thing was ‘an inflexible resolution and timely
action, which alone can prevent Japan realizing her extraordinarily
ambitious intentions.’
“When, in December, 1903, the Japanese Government presented their
proposals in reply to the draft agreement drawn up by Alexeieff,
and described by him as ‘an honourable retreat for her from a
position which she has herself created by her arrogant behaviour,’
he characterized these as being ‘equivalent to a demand that the
Russian Government should formally acknowledge Japan’s protectorate
over Korea.’ Indeed, he considered the requests made by her ‘so
presumptuous that we should at once reject them.’ In presenting
such requests, he said, ‘Japan exceeds the limit of all reason,’
and he consequently felt that no concession was possible, and
that it would be better to break off negotiations, after clearly
explaining that in her proposals Russia ‘had reached the extreme
limit of concession.’ Then, when the Japanese began to occupy
Korea at the end of December, 1903, Alexeieff represented most
strongly that ‘for self-defence corresponding steps should be
taken to maintain the balance of power upset by the occupation
of Korea’—_i.e._, that the lower reaches of the Ya-lu should be
occupied, and the mobilization of the Far Eastern districts and
the province of Siberia should be carried out. He was of opinion
that Japan’s final proposals, received in the middle of January,
1904, were ‘in tone and substance still more pretentious and bold
than before,’ and he insisted on the negotiations being broken off,
asserting that their continuation ‘could not lead to a settlement
of mutual interests,’ and that ‘any display of yielding on our
part would lead to a great loss of dignity to Russia and to a
corresponding augmentation of the prestige of Japan in the eyes of
the whole East.’
“This was three weeks before the diplomatic negotiations were
broken off. Has Russia’s dignity not yet suffered in full measure?
“Finally, our last answer to Japan—despatched only a few days
before the declaration of war—which contained a refusal to consider
a neutral zone, and admitted Japan’s right to predominate in Korea,
was stated to be ‘an exhibition of generosity beyond which Russia
could scarcely go.’
“After three or four days—_i.e._, on February 6, 1904—diplomatic
relations were broken off by Japan, and so began that awful war
which might have been prevented without loss of dignity to us if
the Viceroy’s policy had been a little less ‘firm,’ and—it must be
added—a little less eccentric.”
My opinions with regard to the relative importance of the tasks which
confronted our War Department made me a convinced opponent of an active
Asiatic policy.
Realizing our military unreadiness on our western frontier, and taking
into account the urgent need of devoting our resources to the work of
internal reorganization and reform, I thought that a rupture with Japan
would be a national calamity, and did everything in my power to prevent
it. Throughout my long service in Asia I had not only been an advocate
of an agreement with Great Britain on that continent, but I was also
certain that a peaceable delimitation of spheres of influence between
us and Japan was possible.
In my opinion, the carrying of the main line of the Trans-Siberian
Railway through Manchuria was a mistake. I had nothing to do with the
adoption of that route, as I was then Commander of the Trans-Caspian
Military District; it was also contrary to the opinion of General
Dukhovski, representative of the War Department in the Far East.
FOOTNOTES:
[55] [August, 1900.—ED.]
[56] [The German Field-Marshal commanding the Allied Forces of the
Peking Relief Expedition.—ED.]
[57] Which the occupation of Port Arthur had made of considerable
military importance to us.
[58] [The Maritime Province.—ED.]
[59] Ying-kou.
[60] [This ratio hardly seems correct.—ED.]
[61] [The Royal Timber Company. For fuller details of this undertaking
and Bezobrazoff’s connection with it, see Appendix I., p. 615.—ED.]
[62] [The Russian Minister in China.—ED.]
[63] [The Russian Minister in Korea.—ED.]
[64] “Decisions of the Council on the Manchurian Question,” No. 10,
July 11, 1903 (Port Arthur).
[65] [On the Mekran Coast of Persia.—ED.]