The work before the War Department in the concluding years of
the last, and the early years of the present, century—Money
allotted to it from 1898–1903—Inadequacy of these sums to meet the
demands—Measures which it was possible to undertake—Steps taken to
improve and consolidate our position in the Far East.
In the _Russki Invalid_ (No. 143 of 1895) an article appeared in
reply to one by Demchinski, which had been published in the _Slovo_
under the title of “Were we Ready for War?” Demchinski endeavoured
to prove that we spend more than other countries on national defence;
that the amounts allotted for this purpose in Russia are ample;
that the measures brought forward as necessary in order to prepare
our army for war are merely a cloak for extortion; and that lack of
financial control in our administration allows great openings for the
misappropriation of funds. In replying, the article in the _Russki
Invalid_ quoted from the standard works of Professor Maksheeff upon
the army estimates of Germany and Russia from 1888 to 1900. During
these thirteen years the expenditure amounted to £358,100,000 in
Germany, and £347,900,000 in Russia. Therefore Germany, with half our
peace strength, spent in that period £10,000,000 more than we did.
The enormous length of our frontiers, amongst other things, forces us
to maintain twice as many men in peace as Germany. Even of the lesser
sum for greater numbers that we spend, we are obliged to allot almost
the whole to meet maintenance charges (food, uniform, etc.). So that
not only do we spend less money than Germany on the whole, but we can
afford proportionately less on “special or extraordinary services,”
which include those of preparing the army for war. On this important
question the writer of the article in the _Russki Invalid_ expresses
himself much to the point:
“As the ordinary expenditure is urgent, and cannot be postponed, it
calls for no comment, being allotted, in fact, to measures to which
we are already committed. With regard to the measures which come
under the head of extraordinary expenditure, the case is different.
They are not urgent in the sense that we are absolutely committed
to them, and they are, therefore, as a matter of course, not urgent
in the opinion of those unversed in military matters. Consequently
these persons are inclined to refuse sanction to such measures,
to postpone them, or, under the most favourable circumstances,
to spread their execution over a considerable period. The result
is bad for national defence and for the preparation of the army
for war. Our forces might suddenly be called upon to take the
field with inferior armament, with insufficient and unserviceable
supplies, and without well-organized communications. Upon analyzing
the German army estimates, one is struck with the comparative
magnitude of the initial and extraordinary expenditure, which shows
that, although her army is half the strength of ours, she spends
vastly more money on it than we do on ours.”
Our comparative unreadiness for war, in spite of our possessing a
large standing army, first became evident, as I have mentioned, as
far back as 1870, when the Germans were able to throw an immense army
across the French frontier in a fortnight, and conduct a victorious
campaign with extraordinary speed. The Turkish War of 1877–78, again,
exposed our weak points in organization and mobilization, and profiting
by its lessons, many measures towards improvement were undertaken
during Count Milutin’s régime at the Ministry of War. The new grouping
of the Powers and the formation of the Triple Alliance, also, were
events which emphasized the necessity for us to set our house in order
as regards defence. During the sixteen years from 1882 to 1898 Generals
Vannovski and Obrucheff, guided by the opinions of the leading generals
in command of troops, managed to increase the efficiency of the army
and at the same time to strengthen our defences. On the western
frontier a system of fortified positions was organized, and reserves of
supplies collected at strategic points; but, owing to the inadequate
development of our railway system, it became necessary, in addition,
to increase the number of troops permanently stationed in the western
military districts. Steps were also taken for the defence of the Baltic
and Black Sea coasts. But our attention was chiefly, and quite rightly,
confined to the west, and as small appropriations as possible were
made for the Caucasus, Turkestan, and the Siberian Military Districts.
Thus, in Siberia, from the Pacific to the Ural Mountains, we only
had a few battalions, and not a single fortress; nor did we have any
fortified posts in Turkestan. To strengthen the troops on the western
frontier, indeed, we took troops from the Caucasus, and to find money
for the formation of new units, we had to reduce the strength of those
in Turkestan. This was done on the supposition that if we were strong
on the German side, no one would attack us in the Caucasus or in Asia.
In other words, our efforts were concentrated upon the most dangerous
frontier. But even then, taking into consideration the many wants
of the army, the sum available for our western side, though large,
was insufficient to place us in all respects on a level with both
Germany and Austria. Though great results were obtained as regards the
acceleration of our mobilization, and some very useful strategic lines
of railway were constructed, our speed of concentration could not be
compared to that of our neighbours, with their better-developed railway
systems. However economically the War Ministry treated those measures
which were unessential, and could therefore be shelved temporarily,
progress with the urgent services was not as rapid as could be desired.
Confronted as it was, therefore, with many demands of the western
frontier still unsatisfied, the Department, on the whole, could not
but be a convinced opponent of a forward policy in the Far East, in
Afghanistan, or in Persia. This practically represents the state of
affairs and the feeling of the Department right up to the outbreak of
the Chino-Japanese War in 1894.
In 1898 I succeeded General Vannovski as War Minister, General
Sakharoff taking the place of General Obrucheff.[43] We fully
recognized the necessity, when framing the estimates, of pursuing the
same policy as our predecessors, and of placing first and foremost
the improvement of our military position on the west, but we had by
this time taken steps in the Far East which made it impossible to
confine our expenditure in that quarter to the small amount of previous
years. Events out there had moved rapidly, and were such as called
for expenditure of men and money in Kuan-tung, Manchuria, and in the
Pri-Amur region.
A schedule is drawn up for the allocation of the expenditure of the
sum allotted to the War Ministry. In this, with the previous consent
of the Finance Branch, the War Minister frames a general estimate for
five years, in which the services are divided up according as the
expenditure is to be capital or recurring. The estimates for new and
important services entailing initial expenditure are, after being
examined by the Military Council, scrutinized by a special committee
before being approved. This committee is presided over by the President
of the Department of State Economy, and the Finance Minister and
the State Comptroller are members. The final list of measures to be
undertaken during the five-year period are then submitted to the Tsar
for sanction. The exposition of all the army’s requirements constitutes
one of the most important duties of the War Minister. Firstly, all
general officers in command of districts[44] submit to the Tsar
statements as to their requirements for the troops under their command,
as well as those for works, such as fortresses, railways, etc. The
heads of the chief departments—commissariat, artillery, engineers,
etc.—draw up their estimates as to buildings, mobilization, and
educational requirements, etc. These are classified according as they
demand initial or recurring expenditure, and many of the more important
items are examined in the Military Council or by special committees.
This was the complicated procedure necessary in 1897 and 1898 to fix
the total sum required by the War Department during the five years 1898
to 1903 for the maintenance of the army and the improvement of its
military efficiency. The very limited amount allotted during the twenty
years preceding this period had literally been doled out, not according
to the needs of the army, but according to the amount available in
the Treasury; consequently the need of money had gone on increasing
cumulatively, until in 1898 we were face to face with a situation which
demanded greater sacrifices than ever.
Early in 1898 a general statement had been drawn up by my predecessor’s
orders to show our urgent requirements. By this it was clear that,
in order to satisfy all our wants, a _supplementary_ allotment of
£56,500,000 was absolutely necessary beyond the sum required for the
five-year schedule. This amount included expenditure on two items of
a very special nature: the re-armament of the field artillery with
quick-firing guns (£9,000,000), and the increase of house allowances
(£2,000,000). It must be remembered that the measures now put forward
by General Vannovski did not even dispose of our many really important
needs, for in his supplementary statement were included only those
things that could not be postponed, or which had long ago been
sanctioned, but not carried out for want of funds. Amongst the most
important of these were the following:
1. The improvement of the organization of the army and increases to
its establishment, including additions to the troops in the Asiatic
districts, especially in Pri-Amur.
2. The betterment of the conditions of service of all ranks,
particularly as to an increase to the officers’ pay and house
allowance, and the introduction of field kitchens.
3. The augmentation of reserve supplies in the Pri-Amur and Turkestan
districts.
4. An increase in the artillery in the Siberian Military District.
5. The formation of extra engineer units and strengthening of
fortresses.
The Finance Minister, to whom this demand for a further allotment of
£45,500,000[45] additional to the schedule for the period of 1898 to
1902 was submitted, replied that the state of the country’s finances
would not permit of the money being given. After much discussion he
agreed to grant £16,000,000 instead of £45,500,000, and this lesser sum
was finally approved. So we actually received for this five-year period
about £30,000,000 less than was required, or a deficit of £6,000,000
per annum. Such a policy could have only one result, that of placing
us further behind our western neighbours in the military race, as
in many directions it compelled the cessation of work necessary for
the strengthening of our position both on our European and Asiatic
frontiers. Besides this, large sums were required for the general
improvement of the status of our troops on the peace establishment.
In the first place, in order to obtain greater efficiency among the
senior officers, it was essential to treat the whole body of officers
in a more liberal spirit, so that zealous and capable men should be
content to remain in the Service, and not wish to leave; to modernize
and add to the number of our military educational establishments, so
that as large a number of officers as possible should receive a general
training of a standard equivalent to that given in the middle-class
educational establishments. Our private soldiers were decidedly worse
off than those of other armies as regards ready-money, food, dress,
and equipment, and the expenditure required to improve their condition
would of course be heavy. Again, our horses were not of a sufficiently
good class, especially in the Cossack regiments and the transport.
These were only the most pressing of the army’s many needs.
Thus the legacy left to me when I assumed the duty of War Minister
on January 1, 1898, was no pleasing one. The immense needs of the
army were clear at a glance, but not clearer than the lack of funds
wherewith they might be met. Consequently I had to examine all
proposals most carefully in order to settle which could be carried out,
and which must be indefinitely postponed. I have already expressed
my views on the importance of our western frontier, but to carry
out what was necessary for our military position on that side would
have absorbed the whole of the additional £16,000,000 allowed on the
supplementary estimate for all purposes during five years. Meanwhile
there was the long list of almost equally pressing demands for the
improvement in the senior ranks and for the consolidation of our
position in the Far East, etc. The housing of our troops was in many
cases so extremely bad that it was difficult to train the men, and
this necessitated the construction of barracks at various stations.
Finally, those services which had been started in the preceding five
years had to be completed, particularly those touching the organization
of reserve units. The Tsar investigated the relative urgency of these
matters, and approved a scheme for 1899 to 1903, which, with the
exception of the reorganization of the reserve troops and the further
increase to our troops in European Russia, was carried out completely.
The services approved by the Tsar were noted by the War Ministry. The
following are a few, and show the form in which they were officially
recorded:
1. With a view to possible complications in the Far East, the Tsar gave
orders that our military position there should be strengthened.
2. The War Minister’s recommendations as to the necessity of improving
the general conditions under which officers served, in order to get
greater efficiency among the seniors, were warmly supported by the
Tsar, who issued orders that the matter should be taken in hand at once.
3. The Tsar was also pleased to order that the conditions of service
of the soldiers should be made more liberal. Better quarters were to
be constructed, and the issue of a tea ration was to be gradually
introduced.
4. The Tsar was pleased to recognize the particular importance of the
re-armament of the artillery, and instructed the Minister of Finance to
provide funds for it by a supplementary grant.
The measures carried out by the War Department from 1899 to 1903 can be
described in a few words:
The Pri-Amur Military District as at present defined had only been
formed in 1883. Its garrison originally consisted of 12 battalions, 10
squadrons, 2–1/2 Cossack battalions, 5 batteries, a sapper company, and
1 company of fortress artillery. Ten years later, in 1894, it had risen
to 20 battalions of infantry. From 1895 we began to increase the troops
in the Far East with some rapidity. Between 1898 and 1902 they were
increased by 840 officers, 37,000 men, and 2,600 horses. Altogether
in that period our forces had grown to 31 battalions, 15 squadrons,
32 guns, 1 sapper battalion, and 3 battalions of fortress artillery.
Moreover, 5 railway battalions had been formed for work on the Eastern
Chinese Railway, and the Frontier and other guards had been increased
from 8,000 to 25,000. The general total increase in numbers in the
Pri-Amur district, in Manchuria and in Kuan-tung, amounted to 60,000
men. The idea of the scheme of 1899 was to enable us to bring as soon
as possible the establishment of the troops in these districts of the
Far East up to 48 Rifle and 48 reserve battalions, 57 squadrons, 236
guns, and 3–3/4 sapper battalions, organized in three corps. Compared
with the few battalions in Siberia and the Pri-Amur district only a
short time before, this was a large force, and its organization at so
great a distance was most difficult. It depended to a great extent on
the amount of money available and local conditions, and took some years
to complete. As this force could be rapidly concentrated, the idea
was that it should constitute a strong advance-guard, under cover of
which the reinforcements from Russia would be able to concentrate. The
fate of a first campaign must obviously depend to a great extent on
the rapidity with which these reinforcements could be transported, and
yet in 1900 the Siberian Railway was not constructed as a first-class
line, and the Eastern Chinese line was not finished. I reported in 1900:
“To bring our forces up to the total specified[46] will take six to
seven years. This fact, coupled with the incapacity of our railways
to cope with any heavy traffic, calls for the greatest care in our
external relations, lest we permit ourselves to be drawn into war
at a disadvantage, with an insufficient number of troops which
could be only very slowly concentrated.”
For various reasons, too complicated to explain, this advice was not
acted on; the necessity for extreme care was not appreciated, and we
were suddenly plunged into war when we were not ready. In 1902 our
military position was good, and having begun to carry out our promises
as to the evacuation of Manchuria, we had every reason to count on a
continuance of peace in the Far East. But towards the end of that year
there were signs of a possible rupture with Japan. The War Department
was not blind to these, and the measures enumerated above, which, with
the money then available, were to have been completed by 1906 or 1907,
were, by the aid of a supplementary allotment, carried out within a
year.
While hoping for peace, we steadily prepared for hostilities, and
increased our troops in the Far East in 1903 by 38 battalions, and in
the same year formed 32 new battalions in European Russia; so that by
adding one to each of the East Siberian two-battalion[47] regiments,
and thereby converting them into three-battalion regiments, all the 9
East Siberian Brigades could be expanded into 9 East Siberian Rifle
Divisions, with 12 battalions apiece. The allotment of artillery and
sappers to these divisions was carried out under a special scheme.
Thus the force of 19 battalions which we had in the Pri-Amur district
at the time of the Chino-Japanese War should have swollen in 1903
into one of 108 rifle and 20 reserve battalions. Behind these stood
40 more reserve battalions, held in reserve in the Siberian Military
District. Altogether our Siberian possessions were to have contained
in 1903 an army of 168 battalions of infantry, with a due proportion
of other arms. The railway, however, did not permit us to transport
these additional units until the spring of 1904, when hostilities
had commenced. Yet they were eventually received, and the force in
the Pri-Amur—which was practically defenceless at the time of the
Chino-Japanese War—had grown into an army of four Siberian corps
and two independent divisions, which received the first blows in
the Japanese War. Though hastily improvised between 1895 and 1903,
thanks to the great efforts made to render them reliable, to the
fortunate selection of their commanders, and to their strong peace
establishments, they proved to be our best troops. The principle
upon which they were formed was the transference to them of complete
companies chosen by ballot from the corps in Europe, and only under
exceptional circumstances were the company officers permitted to
be transferred from these new units. Each of the 32 battalions was
formed from one of the army corps in Russia, one company being taken
from each brigade, and picked officers were placed in command of each
battalion. The soundness of the scheme upon which these units were
created is borne out by the fact that at the Ya-lu the 3rd Battalions
of the 11th and 12th Regiments, which had only just arrived to join
their regiments, fought most gallantly. The 3rd Battalion of the
11th Regiment in particular, by making a counter-attack with the
bayonet, inflicted severe loss on the enemy. In the spring of 1905
the regiments of all 7 East Siberian Rifle Divisions were turned into
four-battalion regiments. In the 1st Manchurian Army, which I had the
honour to command, were 5 of these East Siberian Rifle Divisions, and
their 90[48] battalions were acknowledged to be the pick of all three
armies. But to form all these new units we had to denude our German
frontier to an alarming extent.
Besides increasing the number of men in the Far East between 1896 and
1903, we formed supply depôts, and hastily fortified Vladivostok and
Port Arthur. Indeed, one quarter of the total sum allotted to all our
fortress construction and maintenance from 1898 to 1902 was spent
upon these two fortresses. Only on Kronstadt,[49] of all our land and
sea strongholds, was more money spent than on Port Arthur. Many other
difficulties besides those of finance confronted us in the provision
of armament. It was vitally necessary that both Vladivostok and Port
Arthur should have coast guns of the latest pattern, but it took a
long time to get them delivered by the factories owing to the heavy
orders already being executed for the Navy Department. As a temporary
measure we were obliged to mount old-pattern guns. In a short time more
than 1,000 pieces of ordnance were transported from European Russia
to these two places. Progress was greatly delayed when the railway
was interrupted during the rising in Manchuria in 1900, while work at
Port Arthur itself was for a long time stopped by Admiral Alexeieff’s
order. Had it not been for these delays, the place would have been
much better prepared in 1904 than it was. But to appreciate properly
what was accomplished there in a short time two circumstances should be
remembered:
_A._ Owing to our fleet being shut up in Port Arthur, the Japanese
possessed the command of the sea, and were able to remove the armament
from several of their naval fortresses to Kuan-tung for the siege
operations; against these coast guns even masonry defences were of
little use.
_B._ The delivery of these heavy howitzers and the landing of other
siege material was greatly facilitated by the existence of Dalny, a
place which had been created entirely at the instance of M. de Witte,
without any reference having been made to the War Ministry or the
officer commanding the Kuan-tung district, under whose control the
locality actually was.
A large quantity of food-supplies was collected in Port Arthur, and
even at the time of its premature surrender there was enough in the
place to last for one and a half months. Moreover, the authorities
on the spot were empowered to purchase locally, and as the resources
of flour, barley, rice, and cattle in the district were unlimited,
there was nothing to prevent them doing this. Many unreasonable
reproaches have been hurled upon the War Department on account of the
inadequate strength of the fortifications, but in the creation of
this fortress great difficulties had to be overcome in a very short
time. In estimating the ultimate strength of the place, it must not
be forgotten that we only took possession of it at the end of 1897;
that during 1898 and 1899 we had a very weak temporary armament on
the sea-front; and that the cumbrous official procedure then in force
made it impossible to spend quickly large sums on new fortress works.
Firstly, the scheme had to be drawn up by the engineers on the spot,
then it had to be sent to St. Petersburg to be examined by the Engineer
Committee, and afterwards to be approved by the Tsar. In the case of
Port Arthur, in order to accelerate this routine, special authority
was deputed to the local authorities; while Major-General Velichko,
a gifted and energetic Engineer officer, was sent to the Far East as
the representative of the Headquarter Engineer Administration. Indeed,
when the scheme of fortifications at Port Arthur was put before the
Emperor for his approval, a large portion of the works had, contrary
to the usual procedure, been commenced in anticipation of sanction. As
everything was stopped by Admiral Alexeieff, who was commanding the
Kuan-tung district, during the rising in Manchuria in 1900, we only had
three years (1901, 1902, and 1903) to finish these tremendous permanent
works. Considering the time available and the rocky soil, much indeed
was done.
The armament, also, could not well have been provided more quickly. The
ordnance had first to be made, and the orders for coast guns could only
be executed slowly, as the Obukhoff factory was full of work for the
Navy Department. The 10-inch and 11-inch Canet guns and large-calibre
mortars ordered by the War Department were required simultaneously in
all the Russian naval fortresses, especially in Libau, Kronstadt, and
Vladivostok; but, as a matter of fact, Port Arthur and Vladivostok
received most of them at the expense of our strength in the Baltic
and Black Seas. While awaiting the demands for new ordnance to be
complied with, we robbed other places, so as to bring up the Port
Arthur armament to some hundreds of guns. In the first years of its
occupation, also, everything for this place had to be sent round by
sea. Notwithstanding all these difficulties, in four years (1899 to
1903) we succeeded in making Port Arthur so strong that the armament of
its sea-front kept the whole Japanese fleet at a respectful distance,
while the batteries on the land side withstood a severe test under the
most unfavourable conditions. Not only were the enemy numerous and
possessed of technical troops and material for the destruction of our
defences, but being presented with a ready-made base in Dalny, they
were able to land monster siege-guns. Once again, as at Sevastopol,
our fleet was more useful on land than on its proper element. Yet the
enemy lost twice as many men as the garrison, and Port Arthur held out
almost twelve months from the commencement of the war. Even then its
fall was premature.
Much attention was also paid to economy, and Treasury interests were
by no means overlooked. The rapid concentration of troops, the large
number of buildings that had to be constructed and the collection of
supplies and stores for the commissariat and engineer departments,
afforded ample scope for malpractices; but the appointment of selected
officers at the head of these two great branches of the army, and
of picked men as their assistants, was naturally productive of good
results, and the reputation of these branches in no way suffered in the
war.
I am confident that if future historians take into consideration the
enormous distance of the theatre of war from the centre of Russia, they
will not only be amazed at the results achieved by the War Department
in strengthening our position there between the years 1895 and 1903,
but will see how unfounded was the accusation that adequate steps
were not taken to prepare for war. I repeat that, with such money as
was available, and with the limited time at our disposal, a great
and responsible work was accomplished, so much so that the Pri-Amur
district, which was defenceless in 1895, was in 1903 so strong that a
whole armed nation, in spite of its own great efforts and the entire
uselessness of our fleet, was unable to touch our territory anywhere,
with the exception of Saghalien. In 1900 I recorded my opinion that
the Japanese would be able, in the event of war, to put into the field
about 400,000 men with 1,100 guns. Of course, it was not possible for
us to pour such a number of men into Manchuria and Pri-Amur. This would
have necessitated many years, and the expenditure of millions, as well
as the earlier construction of railway connection with the Far East.
The extent to which our strength in the Far East directly depended
on railway efficiency is apparent from the fact that in our schemes
of July, 1903, for the transport of troops, we could only count on
two short military trains per diem. When instructions were given to
carry four Rifle and one sapper battalions, two batteries, and 1,700
tons of military stores as quickly as possible to Port Arthur, it
was calculated, according to the mobilization schemes, that it could
not be done in less than twenty-two days, and we were unable to make
use of the full carrying capacity of the newly built Eastern Chinese
line for six months after the opening of the war. To improve it an
immense amount of work in laying sidings and crossings, arranging for
water-supply, ballasting the track, and the construction of buildings,
was necessary. All this implied railing up a large number of sleepers,
rails, building materials, and rolling-stock; construction trains
were also required. During 1902 and 1903 the greater the number of
troop-trains that ran, the less was the progress in the construction
and improvement of the line. During the latter year the War Department
took every advantage of the railway in order to increase our forces
in the Far East, and it was only owing to the immense exertions of
all the railway personnel that it was possible to transport the
troops and military stores without stopping construction altogether.
Notwithstanding the danger of such a course, we used the sea for the
transport of troops as well as stores, and the great risk that we ran
in doing so during the second half of 1903, after the viceroyalty had
been formed, is illustrated by the fact that some of the consignments
of preserved meat sent for Port Arthur fell into the hands of the
enemy a few days before war was declared. It is clear, therefore, to
what extent Bezobrazoff’s project for the rapid concentration of an
army of 75,000 men in Southern Manchuria [sent to me in the summer
of 1903] could be carried out. The scanty population and the absence
of local resources in the Pri-Amur prohibited the maintenance of a
large force there in peace-time. Over the wide stretch of territory
from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok there are only about a million souls,
and of this total only 400,000 are in the Amur and Maritime districts.
From this can be gathered what an impossible burden to the State it
would have been to attempt to maintain a large army in such a desert.
Consequently we endeavoured to keep in Siberia and Pri-Amur only such
a number as would be sufficient, in the first instance, to contain the
enemy, and to form a screen, under cover of which the reinforcements
could be concentrated. The conditions are the same on the western,
Caucasian, and Afghanistan frontiers: the local troops form, so to
speak, an impenetrable veil, under cover of which the main forces can
be concentrated.
Though this screen consisted, in the Far East, of 172[50] battalions,
of which more than 100 could take the field, it was never, of course,
intended that the issue of the war should hang upon their efforts
alone; but our difficulty lay in bringing up our main forces soon
enough, for, as the enemy could concentrate quicker than we could,
our reinforcements might be destroyed in detail as they arrived. So
poor was the traffic capacity of the railway that we were neither able
to send drafts to the advanced troops nor to support them in time
with adequate reinforcements. If the arrangements had been such as I
shall detail later on, we should have had double the number of men at
Liao-yang and Mukden that we did have, and the issue of the battles
must have been different. But the Ministries of Ways and Communications
and of Finance were unable to carry out their promises, and our army
only succeeded in concentrating eight months later than it should have
done. By September, 1905, we were at last able to collect an army
1,000,000 strong, ready in every respect to commence a second campaign,
with troops and material of a nature to guarantee success. We had
received machine-guns, howitzers, shells, small-arm ammunition, field
railways, wireless telegraphy, and technical stores of all sorts, and
the senior officers were mostly fresh. The War Department had, with
the co-operation of other departments, successfully accomplished a
most colossal task. What single military authority would have admitted
a few years ago the possibility of concentrating an army of a million
men 5,400 miles away from its bases of supply and equipment by means of
a poorly constructed single-line railway? Wonders were effected, but
it was too late. Affairs in the interior of Russia for which the War
Department could not be held responsible were the causes of the war
being brought to an end at a time when decisive military operations
should really have only just been beginning.
The re-armament of the artillery was accomplished as follows. Owing
to the introduction of the quick-firing gun in other armies, we were
compelled to adopt it. The superiority of the quick-firer over the old
pattern was obvious, for, apart from its greater range and accuracy,
each quick-firing battery, by reason of the greater number of shells
it fires, can cause destruction equal to that of a much larger number
of non-quick-firing guns. After prolonged and exhaustive trials of
different patterns, amongst which were those submitted by the French
factories of St. Chamond and Schneider, the German firm of Krupp, and
the Russian Putiloff, preference was given to the Russian design, and
in the beginning of 1900 the first lot of 1,500 guns was ordered,
further trials being also arranged for. Not everybody was convinced
of the undoubted superiority of the new type of weapon, and General
Dragomiroff, who had always been opposed to quick-firing artillery,
still remained a strong opponent of its adoption. In 1902 an order for
a second lot of guns of a modified and improved pattern was given. To
test the weapon thoroughly and under war conditions, the 2nd Battery
of the Guards Rifle Artillery Division, armed with this new 3-inch
quick-firer, was sent, in August, 1900, to the Far East, where the
Boxer campaign was then in progress. The division took part in four
expeditions, two in the valley of the Pei-chih-li, one in the hills and
sandy steppes of Mongolia, and one in the hills of Eastern Manchuria.
It covered altogether about 2,400 miles of different sorts of country,
under variations in temperature of from 35° to 22° Réaumur. Most of
the marches were as much as forty miles in length. The battery came
into action eleven times, and fired 389 rounds at cavalry, infantry,
buildings, and fortifications at ranges from point-blank to 2,500
yards. The results attained were quite satisfactory, particularly
if the arduous nature of the campaign, the season of the year, and
the haste with which the battery was formed, be taken into account.
Unfortunately, the test of shelling houses and field works was made
against an enemy who made little resistance, so that faults in the
ammunition which have recently come to light were not then discovered.
Wishing to have as simple an equipment as possible, we adopted one
pattern of shell, which was efficient with time-fuze against troops
in the open, and could be used with percussion-fuze against troops
under cover; but we omitted to take into account the weakness of the
explosive employed as burster. The projectile which did splendidly
against exposed targets was of little use for destroying such cover as
buildings, timber, or breastworks. In March, 1902, the necessary grant
was made for re-arming batteries of the 2nd Category, and the orders
were carried out in our arsenals. The re-armament made such progress
that at the time of the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War the whole
of our artillery, with the exception of some Siberian batteries, was
armed with quick-firers. At this time a quick-firing mountain-gun was
also invented, which proved very effective. Generally speaking, the
re-armament of the artillery was quickly and skilfully carried out.
But besides the four points above mentioned,[51] to which the Tsar was
pleased to give his particular attention, the War Ministry had to make
great efforts in other directions connected both with the life of the
army and its efficiency. Amongst these tasks was that of improving
our communications by building strategical roads and railways. These
were constructed in order of urgency, according to a special scheme,
as funds became available. Great efforts were made to push on with
both the Bologoe-Siedlce and Orenberg-Tashkent lines, which were of
particular strategic importance; and in 1899 considerable improvements
were carried out in the Krasnovodsk-Kushk line.
In 1902 we began to consider what would be required in the five
years 1904 to 1909, and in 1903 I submitted to the Finance Minister
a demand for a supplementary grant of £82,500,000 in addition to the
ordinary Budget for these five years. He only found it possible to
grant £13,000,000. Numerous pressing measures which had been already
postponed in 1899 had again to be put off with a hope that perhaps in
1910 Russia would be able to find means for the safeguarding of her
most vital interests—in other words, for the defence of the Empire.
In submitting his annual report on the War Ministry in 1904—the first
year of the new five-year period—Lieutenant-General Rediger, in his
capacity of War Minister and as an acknowledged authority, made the
following true and important observations:
“The existing defects in organization and equipment of our army
are the direct result of the inadequate financial grants made ever
since the war with Turkey. The sum allotted has never corresponded
either to the actual requirements of the army or to the work it
has had to do, but has been fixed entirely by the amount of money
which seemed available. It has been made clear, in drawing up
the scheme for the coming five years, that to satisfy only the
most pressing needs a supplementary sum of £82,500,000[52] is
required. Only £13,000,000 has been allotted. Thus the estimates
for the current five years afford no hope of improving the existing
situation.”
Owing to the large requirements of a peace army of 1,000,000, and the
necessity for protecting frontiers stretching for over 11,000 miles,
the Ministry of Finance had undoubtedly great difficulty in meeting
the demands of the War Department. The requirements of the navy were
also continually growing, with the result that less was available
for the land forces. But if the Minister of Finance[53] had confined
himself to his rôle of collector of revenue whereby to satisfy all the
needs of the State, it could never have been suggested that the money
so collected was spent except in accordance with actual requirements,
for the decision as to which demands were the most urgent would not
have been within this official’s province. As a matter of fact, our
finances were managed in so curious a manner that the Finance Minister
was not only the collector, but also the greatest expender of State
moneys! Besides having to bear the ever-increasing outlay in his
own department—for establishment, for expenses connected with the
collection of taxes and the sale of Government liquor—he formed in
his own Ministry subsections of the other Ministries, such as Ways
and Communications, War, Navy, Education, Interior, Agriculture, and
Foreign Affairs. So equipped, he planned, built, and administered the
great Eastern Chinese Railway without any reference to the Minister
of Ways and Communications; organized and commanded two army corps,
one of Frontier Guards, and the other of guards for the railway, and
actually chose the type of gun for their armament without reference
to the Minister of War; initiated and managed a commercial fleet on
the Pacific Ocean, and ran a flotilla of armed river steamboats, which
might be regarded as the duty of the Naval Ministry. As regards the
work of the Department of Education, the Finance Minister founded the
higher technical institutions; as regards the sphere of Ministries of
Interior and Agriculture, the Finance Minister had the most important
administration—the so-called “alienated” strip of land set aside for
the Eastern Chinese Railway—and the building of towns and villages,
and the decision of questions concerning the taking up of land and its
cultivation; as regards the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Finance
Minister conducted negotiations with the highest representatives of
the Chinese Administration, concluded treaties, and maintained his
commercial and diplomatic agents in different parts of China and Korea.
There is, I believe, a proverb to the effect that “charity begins at
home.”[54] Is it to be wondered at, therefore, that the grants for
the pet projects of the Finance Minister were more liberal than those
for corresponding services required by the other Ministries? The
appropriations for public education were cut down, but many millions
were spent in constructing huge buildings for polytechnic institutes in
St. Petersburg and Kieff, magnificent blocks for the Excise Department,
and perfect palaces for officials. Immense sums were spent on the
creation of the town of Dalny, on the Eastern Chinese Railway and its
palatial offices in Harbin, and on the services connected with it.
For this latter enterprise, which was both a commercial and State
proposition (private as regards management, and official as regards
the supply of funds), the money was mostly obtained from the so-called
“surpluses.” These “surpluses” expanded in a manner unprecedented in
the financial records, not only of our own country, but probably of
the world, and in our case much to the detriment of the most pressing
needs of all departments. The idea underlying the creation of a
surplus was simplicity itself. While all demands for money made by
the different departments were cut down, the estimated receipts from
revenue were also reduced. The results were amazing. The excess of
receipts over expenditure at a time when the most pressing requirements
for national defence could not be met for lack of funds amounted in
some years to over £20,000,000. The following table gives the “errors”
in estimating made by the Finance Minister in calculating the revenue
between 1894–1905:
+-----+-----------------------+-----------+
| | The Revenue. | Actual |
| +-----------+-----------+Excess over|
| | Estimated.| Actual. | Estimate. |
| +-----------+-----------+-----------+
| | £ | £ | £ |
|1894 |100,482,327|115,378,581| 14,896,253|
|1895 |114,295,700|125,581,878| 11,286,177|
|1896 |123,947,169|136,871,935| 12,924,765|
|1897 |131,836,649|141,638,609| 9,801,960|
|1898 |136,445,821|158,485,444| 22,039,622|
|1899 |146,912,820|167,331,306| 20,418,485|
|1900 |159,374,568|170,412,850| 11,038,282|
|1901 |173,009,600|179,945,715| 6,936,114|
|1902 |180,078,448|190,540,444| 10,461,995|
|1903 |189,703,267|203,180,081| 13,476,813|
|1904 |198,009,449|201,826,131| 3,816,682|
|1905 |197,704,561|202,443,193| 4,738,631|
+-----+-----------+-----------+-----------+
This shows—
(_a_) That the difference between the estimated and actual receipts
amounted in 1898 and 1899 to more than £20,000,000 _per annum_.
(_b_) That in eight years out of twelve the actual income exceeded the
estimates by £10,000,000 _per annum_.
(_c_) That the revenue was little affected by the war, and that for
1904 and 1905 the excess of income over estimates was more than
£8,000,000. Had the calculations as to receipts, therefore, been
more accurate, it would have been quite possible to grant to the War
Ministry the supplementary sum asked for, and thus to enable our
preparations to have been more complete in east and west.
In conclusion, the main reason for our military inefficiency was the
inadequate funds granted by the Treasury. Funds for the War Department
were stinted—
(_a_) Owing to the greatly increased expenditure on the fleet.
(_b_) Owing to the large expenditure upon the projects of the Minister
of Finance in the Far East, and owing to the underestimation of
revenue. But in spite of this, I think it will be allowed that from
1898–1903, during which time it distributed its money according to
a strictly defined plan, the War Department attained, on the whole,
remarkable results in the strengthening of our military position in the
Far East. The results in this direction of the ten years preceding the
Russo-Japanese War can be gauged from the following figures. We had in
the Pri-Amur district, Manchuria, and in Kuan-tung:
In 1884 … … 12 battalions
In 1894 … … 20 „
In 1903 … … 63 „
In 1904 … … 140 „
[Illustration: SKETCH MAP OF EASTERN ASIA, SHOWING POSITION OF THEATRE
OF WAR WITH REFERENCE TO NEIGHBOURING TERRITORIES.]
FOOTNOTES:
[43] [As chief of the Headquarter Staff.—ED.]
[44] [Russia is divided into thirteen military districts.—ED.]
[45] Besides the allotments for artillery re-armament and house
allowance.
[46] 96 battalions, 57 squadrons, and 236 guns.
[47] [Of the thirty-six East Siberian Rifle Regiments in the Far East
when war broke out, all had two battalions except those of one brigade,
which had three.—ED.]
[48] [_Sic._—ED.]
[49] The proposals as to Kronstadt were approved before I became War
Minister.
[50] Of this number, 8 East Siberian Rifle Divisions, 96 battalions;
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Siberian Reserve Divisions, 48 battalions;
independent reserve battalions, 12; 2 brigades, 31st and 35th
Divisions, 16 battalions—total, 172 battalions. All these troops were
in April, 1904, in Siberia, in the Pri-Amur district, and in Manchuria.
Of them, 27 battalions constituted the garrison of Port Arthur; 21
battalions the garrison of Vladivostok and the South Ussuri district;
the 1st Siberian Division was kept in rear; while the independent
reserve battalions guarded the railway. In April, 1904, of these 172
battalions, there were only 108 in the Manchurian army, distributed
from the Ya-lu to Newchuang, and from Ta-shih-chiao along the railway
to Omsk, as the 4th Siberian Corps was still on the way out.
[51] [See p. 121.—ED.]
[52] [In addition to the ordinary Quinquennial Budget.—ED.]
[53] [M. Sergius de Witte.—ED.]
[54] [Literally, “A man’s own shirt is nearest his own skin.”—ED.]