WHY THE JAPANESE WERE SUCCESSFUL
The army we put in the field was unable to defeat the Japanese in the
time allotted to it. Many historians will probably essay to solve the
riddle of how a Power, which we regarded as belonging to the second
class, and one which not long ago possessed no army, was able to crush
us absolutely on the sea, and to defeat a strong force on land, and
doubtless we shall eventually be furnished with the reasons in full.
For the present I propose to mention only some general causes which
contributed to Japan’s success. Broadly speaking, we underestimated her
power, particularly her moral strength, and entered upon the war far
too lightly.
The Japanese first became our neighbours when we occupied Kamchatka in
the reign of Peter the Great. In 1860, after the peaceful occupation
of the extensive Ussuri region—by virtue of the Treaty of Peking—we
moved down to the frontier of Korea and the Sea of Japan. This sea,
which is almost completely enclosed by Korea and the Japanese Islands,
is of immense importance to the whole of the adjacent coasts, and
as the outlets from it into the ocean were in her hands, Japan might
have easily prevented our obtaining free access to the Pacific.
But, by our acquisition of Saghalien, we gained an outlet through
Tartar Strait.[66] This, however, was frequently and for long periods
icebound, and for about forty years the only spot developed on the
Ussuri coast was Vladivostok. Our new neighbour did not attract any
attention from us for a long time—so long, in fact, as her life
did not come into contact with ours—and we remained confident of
her military weakness. We knew the Japanese as skilful and patient
artisans; we were fond of their productions, of which the delicate
workmanship and brilliant colouring charmed us; our sailors spoke with
appreciation of the country and its inhabitants, and were full of
pleasant reminiscences of their visits, especially of Nagasaki, where
they appeared to be popular with the inhabitants; but as a military
factor Japan did not exist. Our sailors, travellers, and diplomats, had
entirely overlooked the awakening of an energetic, independent people.
[Illustration: H.I.M. THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN.]
In 1867 the armed forces of Japan consisted of 10,000 men, organized
in nine battalions, two squadrons, and eight batteries. This force,
which constituted the cadre of the standing army, was trained by French
instructors, from whom, also, the troops obtained the pattern of
their uniform. In 1872, as a result of the Franco-German War, Japan
was subjected to the law of universal service; the French instructors
were replaced by Germans, who organized the army according to German
ideas, and officers were sent every year to Europe to study their
profession. At the time of the Chino-Japanese War the army consisted
of seven infantry divisions; but, being prevented from enjoying the
fruits of her victories in this war by reason of her weakness both
on land and sea, the nation strained every nerve to create an army
and navy capable of protecting its interests. On April 1, 1896, the
Mikado issued a decree for the reorganization of the military forces,
by which the strength of the army would be doubled in seven years. In
1903 this reorganization was completed. Statistically the creation
and growth of this great naval and military force were not overlooked
by us; the construction of every warship and the formation of every
new division of infantry was mentioned in the reports of our Navy and
War Departments. But we did not properly appreciate the meaning of
these beginnings, and were unable to gauge the fighting value of the
mere numbers by any European standard. Detailed information as to the
organization and strength of the army, with an appreciation of its
technical preparedness and capability of mobilization, was compiled in
a handbook by the Headquarter Staff and revised annually. This book
contained the following figures as to the strength of the Japanese
troops which took part in the Chinese War of 1894–95, and in the
expedition in 1900 to the province of Pei-chih-li:
1. _War with China, 1894–95._—In this war Japan was forced to put
forward the whole of her military strength. Each of the seven divisions
which then existed were mobilized and despatched from Hiroshima to
the theatre of war as operations developed. Half of the 5th Division
was sent to Korea in the middle of June before war had actually been
declared, followed in August, after hostilities had commenced, by the
other half and the whole of the 3rd Division. These two divisions
constituted the 1st Army, which defeated the Chinese forces at Pingyang
in September, forced the passage of the Ya-lu in October, and moved on
Mukden through South-East Manchuria. After a naval engagement at the
mouth of the River Ya-lu, the 2nd Army, consisting of the 1st Division
and half of the 6th, was, by September 30, concentrated at Hiroshima.
This army landed north of Pi-tzu-wo, and fought its way into Port
Arthur. Towards the end of 1894, three and a half divisions, of a total
strength of 52,600 men, were in Southern Manchuria. In the beginning
of 1895, the 2nd Division and the other half of the 6th Division were
landed on the Shan-tung Peninsula; these troops composed the 3rd Army,
numbering about 24,000 men. Thus, by the beginning of 1895, more than
75,000 men had been landed in China. Thirty vessels of a steamship
company, subsidized by the Japanese Government, were chartered for
the conveyance of these troops. On account of the roughness of the
country in the theatre of war the land transport consisted mostly of
carriers organized into corps, the majority of whom were recruited in
Japan; the remainder were coolies collected in Korea and Manchuria.
For the preliminary expenses of the war the Japanese Treasury allotted
£4,500,000; later, an internal loan of £15,000,000 was raised. When the
whole of the extraordinary expenditure was totalled, it was estimated
that the war cost Japan about £20,000,000, of which £16,420,000 was
chargeable to the War Department and £3,580,000 to the Navy Department.
2. _The Expedition to China in 1900._—At first, a force of three
battalions, one squadron, and one company of sappers—total 3,000 men—of
the 5th and 11th Divisions was mobilized in July, followed about
a month later by the mobilization of the 5th Division. The troops
were conveyed to Ta-ku in twenty-one transports, chartered from the
Nippon-Yusen-Kaisha.[67] Excluding the first force, 19,000 men in all
were taken (the whole of the 5th Division, the Zopoleff batteries,
part of the railway battalion from Tokio, and 6,000 to 7,000 hired
coolies wearing uniform). Altogether, 22,000 men were transported—the
5th Division with its units and coolies—and all the supplies were sent
from Japan. During the whole time, about 6,000 sick and wounded were
returned to the base, while one-half of the cavalry and artillery
and three-quarters of the transport horses died. The cost of the
expedition, estimated at £3,800,000 to £4,000,000, was taken from the
fund of some £5,000,000 set aside for the construction of warships and
emergency expenditure. Within seven years of the war of 1894–95 Japan
had almost doubled her armed forces, and was very largely enabled to do
this by the war indemnity received from China, the payment of which was
made through our mediation.
The strength of the Japanese army, before the war with us, was
calculated by our Headquarter Staff to be as follows:
The peace strength of the standing army (excluding the garrison of
Formosa) was estimated at 8,116 officers and 133,457 men. For economy,
however, only 6,822 officers and 110,000 men were actually with the
colours in peace, and of these, about 13,500 were continually on
furlough. The war strength was fixed at 10,735 officers (without
depôt troops) and 348,074 men. Thus, to bring the peace numbers
up to the war establishment, about 3,900 officers and 240,000 more
men were required. On January 1, 1901, there were in the standing
army, reserve, and territorial forces a total of 2,098 staff and
general officers, 8,755 regimental and warrant officers, 35,248
non-commissioned officers, 6,964 second-lieutenants and _yunkers_, and
273,476 men, a total of 10,853 officers and 315,688 men.[68] Taking
the peace establishment of the standing army at 8,116 officers and
about 110,000 men, it is evident that on January 1, 1901, there were
2,737 officers and about 205,000 men in the reserve and territorial
forces. Comparing these numbers with those required to bring the peace
establishment up to war strength, we find that on January 1, 1901,
the numbers could not have been obtained; that there was a shortage
of officers equal to those required for the reserve troops,[69] and a
shortage of some 35,000 men. Taking into consideration the probable
yearly contingent of recruits (45,000 men), and also the periods of
service in the different classes of troops, it may be said that by
January 1, 1903, the number of men in the reserve and territorial
forces was approximately 265,000.[70] Finally, to complete the army
in an emergency, some 50,000 men were obtainable from the reserve of
recruits, the majority of whom were quite untrained. No mention has
been yet made of reserve troops, but preparations were made for their
formation, and, according to the number of battalions, they must have
increased the standing army by two-thirds of its establishment. The
latest information prior to the war which we had of the strength,
organization, and training of the Japanese army was based on the
reports of our military attaché in Japan, Colonel Vannovski, of the
General Staff. Colonel Adabash, who visited Japan in 1903, forwarded to
General Jilinski, of the Headquarter Staff, very important information
as to the reserve units, towards whose formation steps were then
being taken; but as this information differed completely from that
sent by Colonel Vannovski, Major-General Jilinski unfortunately did
not consider it reliable. Some months later, Captain Rusin, our naval
attaché in that country, an extremely able officer, forwarded to
the Headquarter Staff of the navy very much the same information as
that furnished by Adabash. His report was transmitted by the Navy
Department to General Sakharoff, Chief of the Headquarter Staff. It was
ascertained later that both these reports were quite accurate, but that
they had been pigeon-holed because neither General Jilinski nor General
Sakharoff believed them. Consequently, the information in the printed
handbooks as to the Japanese armed forces in 1903–04 did not include a
single word as to reserves. Similarly, we did not attach a proper value
to their numerous depôt troops. According to our calculations, based on
information sent in by our military attachés in Japan, the available
supply of men for the permanent and territorial armies and for the
depôt troops amounted only to a little over 400,000.
The official figures as to the Japanese War casualties have now been
published by the principal medical officer of the Japanese army,
Surgeon-General Kipke. From these it appears that their losses amounted
to: killed, 47,387; wounded, 172,425—total, 219,812. The total killed,
wounded, and sick amounted to 554,885 [a considerably greater number
than the total we thought they could put in the field against us], and
320,000 sick and wounded were sent back to Japan. From other sources
we now know that they buried 60,624 killed in the Cemetery of Honour
in Tokio, and that 74,545 besides died from wounds and sickness. They
must admit, therefore, to 135,000 killed and dead. As Surgeon-General
Kipke states that the killed and wounded amounted to 14·58 per cent. of
their total strength, it would appear that the total number of troops
put in the field against us was over 1,500,000, or was more than three
times the number anticipated by our Headquarter Staff. In view of these
facts, it is evident that our information as to their fighting strength
was incorrect. As an instance of the neglect, referred to in the
preceding paragraph, to take any account of the formation of reserve
units, a scheme drawn up in Port Arthur in November, 1903, for the
strategical distribution of our troops in the Far East in the event of
complications, estimated the numbers that Japan could place against us
as follows:
“At the beginning of hostilities, when her territorial army is
not completely organized, out of her 13 field divisions, she will
only be able to put 9 divisions of a strength of 120 infantry
battalions, 46 squadrons of cavalry, 10 engineer battalions, and 1
siege battalion—a total of 125,000 combatants—in the field.”
This calculation agrees with the reports furnished in 1903 by our
military attaché in Japan, Lieutenant-Colonel Samoiloff, of the General
Staff, who informed me, when I was in Japan, that they could only put
in the field 10 divisions out of 13; of the reserve troops he knew
nothing. Again, in a memorandum written in the Operations Branch of
the Headquarter Staff, and submitted to me by the Chief of the General
Staff on February 12, 1904, it was stated that, according to available
information, the Japanese could put 11 of their 13 divisions in the
field, leaving 2 in Japan. In this memorandum, again, no mention was
made of the reserve units.
The readiness of their army for mobilization, owing to their adoption
of a territorial system, and the consequent short distances the
depôt troops had to travel, was known to be very complete. We knew
that the troops could complete their mobilization in three or four
days, while the supply and other departments would require seven to
ten. Information as to transports available showed that even in 1902
they could have collected in seven days 86 ships with an aggregate
displacement of 224,000 tons, and in fourteen days 97 ships with a
displacement of 268,000. For a mobilized division about 40,000 tons are
required for a journey of more than forty-eight hours, while 20,000
tons would suffice for a journey of less than forty-eight hours.
Thus the tonnage available was sufficient to allow embarkation to be
commenced at once on completion of mobilization of six divisions for a
journey of not more than forty-eight hours, or of almost the whole army
for a lesser distance.
As regards the tactical readiness of the Japanese before the war, our
people in Manchuria did receive certain information. The operations of
large bodies of their troops of all arms had been commented upon by our
Headquarter Staff as follows:
“The most noticeable points in the operations of bodies consisting
of all three arms as seen at the manœuvres were—
“1. The inclination to take up too extended defensive positions.
“2. A hard-and-fast, inelastic form of attack independent of local
conditions.
“3. The absence of proper flank protection both on the march and in
action.
“4. The tendency, when on the move, to keep the main body too far
from the advance guard, which would in consequence have to fight
unsupported for a long time.
“5. The absence of a definite objective in the attack.
“6. The tendency to use up reserves too quickly. As a result, there
are frequently no troops with which to meet turning and enveloping
movements.
“7. The disbelief in cold steel.
“8. The inclination to avoid enclosed and, in particular, hilly
ground.
“9. The inclination to use direct frontal attacks without turning
movements.
“10. The neglect of field fortifications in the defence; infantry
fire trenches, gun-pits and epaulements alone are made.
“11. The complete absence of any idea of pursuit.
“12. The tendency to retire too rapidly: the infantry of the main
body withdraws first; this is followed by the whole of the guns,
and then the remaining infantry.
“13. The disinclination for night operations.
“14. The absence of contact between divisions: each division
operates independently without keeping in touch with others; this
is due to the lack of general control by the officer in chief
command.
“In reviewing their own operations against China in 1900, the
Japanese Press expressed the opinion that the operations of
small bodies were excellently carried out, but that the troops,
if operating in force, would probably be considerably inferior
to Europeans. In the last grand autumn manœuvres in 1903 it was
noticed that the troops were well trained. Considerable initiative
was observed amongst the junior officers, which was more than could
be said of the seniors; great interest was taken in the work, and
everything was very thoroughly done. The technical services were
excellent. The artillery and infantry manœuvred well; the cavalry
were learning to ride, and appeared keen, but the generals did not
know how to use cavalry, and employed it little; the instruction,
however, was good. The thing which most attracted attention was the
rapidity with which the mountain artillery came into action. On
being ordered out from column of route, they got into action and
opened fire in three and a half minutes.”
From the above remarks it may be gathered how badly the officers, to
whom was entrusted the duty of studying the Japanese troops on the
spot, carried out this duty; particularly faulty was their deduction
regarding the inability of the senior officers to command in war.
After the war with China, which ended in the expulsion of the Japanese
from the Liao-tung Peninsula and our occupation of Kuan-tung, they
began to prepare in haste for war with us. From a little more than
£2,000,000 in 1893, 1894, and 1895, their military Budget rose in 1896
to £7,300,000, in 1897 to £10,300,000, and in 1900 to £13,300,000. In
1902 all her preparations were apparently complete, and the Budget
again fell to £7,500,000. Of the expenses incurred from 1896 to 1902
on increases to the forces, the War Department spent £4,800,000, and
the Navy Department spent in nine years £13,800,000 [in building
ships for the fleet]. It should be added that, while developing her
forces, Japan was in other ways preparing for hostilities. A number of
officers were sent to study their profession in Europe, including our
own country, and the probable theatre of operations was investigated
with great care, reconnaissances being organized in every direction. At
great self-sacrifice also many officers were performing the most menial
duties in our employ in the Far East in order to study our ways at a
time when our military representatives in Japan were looking upon their
nation with immense condescension!
As regards the organization of their forces, our information was
sufficiently complete regarding everything which concerned the standing
army; we also knew the number of depôt troops and the supposed
dispositions of the territorial forces. But, while ourselves preparing
to fight the Japanese with an army half composed of reserve troops, we
never suspected that they, too, were organizing a great formation of
reserve units, and that, owing to our slow concentration, they would
be able to complete this formation. Amongst their reserve troops were
men of all classes, and while our “second category” men constituted,
according to our generals in the field, an element of particular
weakness, their reserve soldiers, thanks to the patriotism and the
martial spirit which permeated all ranks, fought not only no worse than
their regulars, but in some cases better.[71] The appearance of their
reserve units in the first battles was indeed a complete surprise for
us. Nor did we properly appreciate the organization of their strong
depôt units, which enabled every regiment of the standing army to
have its depôt battalion, from which its wastage was uninterruptedly
and quickly made good. Later, many of these battalions received extra
companies, which brought them up to a strength of over 1,500 men,
and some were moved into Manchuria and stationed close to the field
troops. I fancy, also, that they were occasionally even used in the
field—for instance, in protecting portions of positions which had been
vacated by the field army—but their main function, that of repairing
the wastage of men, was very successfully performed. The army possessed
fewer battalions than we had, but they were kept up to strength even
during a series of battles, and were usually superior in numbers to
ours. Generally speaking, each Japanese battalion, taking the number of
rifles, was equal to one and a half, and sometimes two and three, of
ours. With us, on the contrary, the replacement of casualties was very
fitful and unsatisfactory.
Though our information as to the material points of the
enemy’s strength can hardly be described as good, we very much
underestimated—if we did not entirely overlook—its moral side. We
paid no attention to the fact that for many years the education of
the Japanese people had been carried out in a martial spirit and on
patriotic lines. We saw nothing in the educational methods of a country
where the children in the elementary schools are taught to love their
nation and to be heroes. The nation’s belief in and deep respect
for the army, the individual’s willingness and pride in serving,
the iron discipline maintained among all ranks, and the influence
of the _samurai_ spirit, escaped our notice, while we attached no
importance to the intense feeling of resentment that we aroused when
we deprived the Japanese of the fruits of their victories in China.
We never recognized how vital the Korean question was to them, and
that the “Young Japanese” party had long ago determined to fight us,
and was only restrained by the wise action of their Government. True,
when hostilities began we did see all these things, but it was too
late. And at that time, when the war was neither popular with, nor
understood by, our nation, the whole manhood of Japan was responding
with unanimous enthusiasm to the call to arms. There were instances of
mothers committing suicide when their sons were rejected for the army
on medical grounds. A call for volunteers for a forlorn hope produced
hundreds ready to face certain death. While many officers and men
had their funeral rites performed before leaving for the front, to
show their intention of dying for their country, those who were taken
prisoners at the commencement of operations committed suicide. The one
idea of the youth of Japan was to serve in the army, and all the great
families tried to do something for their country either by giving their
children to it or by providing money. This spirit produced regiments
which hurled themselves upon our obstacles with a shout of “Banzai!”
broke through them, and throwing the corpses of their comrades into the
_trous de loup_,[72] climbed over them on to our works. The nation as
well as the soldiers felt the vital importance of the war, appreciated
the reasons for which it was being fought, and spared no sacrifices to
obtain victory. In this and in the co-operation of the nation with the
army and the Government lay the strength which brought Japan victory.
And it was with an army weakened by the feeling of opposition in its
own country that we had to face the armed might of such a nation!
While they had hundreds of secret as well as avowed agents studying our
military and naval forces in the Far East, we entrusted the collection
of information to one officer of the General Staff, and unfortunately
our selection was bad. One of the so-called “Japanese experts” declared
in Vladivostok before the war that we might count one Russian soldier
as being as good as three Japanese. After the first few fights he
modified his tone, and acknowledged that one Japanese soldier was as
good as one Russian. A month later he affirmed that if we meant to win,
we must put three men into the field for every Japanese! In May, 1904,
one of our late military attachés at Tokio predicted, as an expert,
that Port Arthur would very soon fall, and Vladivostok immediately
after it. I reprimanded this cowardly babbler, and threatened to send
him away from the front if he could not restrain his ill-timed and
mischievous remarks.
After the Chino-Japanese War, which I had studied with great care, I,
personally, was inspired with great respect for the Japanese army, and
I watched its growth with considerable alarm. The behaviour of their
troops which fought alongside ours in the Pei-chih-li province in 1900
only confirmed my opinion as to their value. In the short time I spent
in Japan itself I was unable to get to know the country and its troops,
but what I saw was sufficient to show me how astounding were the
results attained by the Japanese in the previous twenty-five to thirty
years. I saw a beautiful country filled with a numerous and industrious
people. Great activity was visible on all sides, and underlying
everything could be felt the national happy nature, love of country,
and belief in the future. The system of education I witnessed in the
Military School was of a Spartan nature, the physical exercises of the
future officers being like nothing I had ever seen in Europe; it was
really fighting of the fiercest kind. At the end of a bout with weapons
the competitors got to hand grips, and fought till the winner had got
his opponent down and could tear off his mask. The exercises themselves
were performed with the greatest possible keenness and determination,
the men hitting one another with wild shouts; but the moment the combat
was over or the signal to stop was given, the usual wooden, impassive
expression again came over the faces of the combatants. In all the
schools military exercises were very conspicuous, and the children
and boys were greatly interested in them. Even their walks out were
always enlivened by tactical tasks adapted to the localities; turning
movements as well as surprise attacks were practised and performed
at the double. The study of Japanese history in all the schools had
strengthened the people’s love for their native land, and filled them
with a deep-rooted conviction that it was invincible. Their successes
in war were everywhere sung, the heroes of those campaigns continually
extolled, and the children were taught that not one of Japan’s military
enterprises had ever failed. In the small-arm factories I saw large
quantities of rifles being turned out, and the work was carried on with
rapidity, accuracy, and economy. In Kobe and Nagasaki I inspected the
shipbuilding yards, in which the construction not only of ocean-going
destroyers, but of armoured cruisers, was proceeding; everything was
being done by Japanese workmen under their own foremen and engineers.
The trade of the whole country was most splendidly and instructively
represented at the Great Exhibition of Osaka, where there was a large
collection of manufactured articles of every sort, including textiles
and complicated instruments, such as grand-pianos, engines, and heavy
ordnance. These were all made in Japan with Japanese labour, and mainly
from Japanese materials, except in the case of raw cotton and iron,
which were imported from China and Europe. Not less impressive than
their progress in manufacture was the orderly and dignified demeanour
of the Japanese who thronged the Exhibition. Agriculture was still
carried on in a primitive manner, but it was very close. Though the
soil was most carefully cultivated, the keen competition for every plot
of ground, the struggle to make even the hills productive, and the
general scarcity of food-stuffs in the country (despite the intensive
culture), showed how crowded the population was becoming, and how
vital the Korean question was for the whole nation. After ten days
spent among the fisher class, I got an idea of the reverse side of
Japan’s rapid development according to European ideals, and many were
the complaints made to me of the heavy taxes, which had increased so
rapidly of late, and of the great cost of all the necessaries of life.
I saw some of their troops on parade (Guards Division, two regiments
of the 1st Division, several batteries, and two cavalry regiments).
Nearly everything was excellent, and the men marched well, and
looked like our _yunkers_ but the poor quality of the horses was very
noticeable. Even after such short acquaintance, many of the officers
and men gave the impression of being fitted by training and knowledge
of their profession to fill honourable posts in any army. Besides the
War Minister (General Terauchi), whom I had known in 1896, when we were
both attached to the 17th Army Corps at the great French manœuvres,
I met Generals Yamagata, Oyama, Kodama, Fukushima, Nodzu, Hasegawa,
Murata, Princes Fushima, Kanin, and others. I also met numerous leaders
in other spheres of life, among whom were Ito, Katsura, and Kamimura,
and, in spite of the sad war which has placed a barrier between two
nations that seem created to be friends and allies, I still feel
affectionately towards my Tokio acquaintances. I especially remember
the intense love of country and devotion to the Sovereign which
permeated all, and showed itself in their daily life. In the report
made after my visit, I stated my opinion that the Japanese army was
fully equal to the armies of Europe; that while one of our battalions
on the defensive could hold two Japanese battalions, we would require
to be twice as strong as they when attacking. The test of war has shown
that I was correct. There were, of course, regrettable instances when
the Japanese, with fewer battalions than were opposed to them, drove
our troops from their positions; but this was due to bad leadership
on our side, and to the inferior war-strength of our battalions. In
the latter phases of the Battle of Mukden, for instance, some of our
brigades[73] could muster little more than 1,000 rifles. To be superior
to such a brigade the Japanese only needed two to three battalions.
Everything that I saw and studied concerning the country—its armed
forces, and its work in the Far East—convinced me how necessary it
was to come to a peaceful agreement with Japan, even at the expense
of concessions which might at first sight appear to be derogatory to
our national self-esteem. As already stated (in Chapter V.), I did not
hesitate to recommend even the restoration of Kuan-tung and Port Arthur
to China, and the sale of the southern branch of the Eastern Chinese
Railway. I foresaw that a Japanese war would be most unpopular in
Russia, and that, as the reasons for it would not be understood by the
nation, it would find no support in national feeling, and I showed that
the anti-Government party would take advantage of it to increase the
disturbance in the interior. But even I did not give our enemy credit
for the activity, bravery, and intense patriotism which they exhibited,
and was, therefore, mistaken in the time I thought that such a
struggle would last. We ought to have allowed three years for the land
operations, owing to our very inferior railway communication, instead
of the one and a half years estimated by me. We did less than the world
expected of us, and the Japanese did more.
Major Emmanuel, of the German army, a lecturer at the Military Academy
at Berlin, gives the following appreciation of the Japanese military
forces in his work on the Russo-Japanese War:
“At the beginning of the war the Japanese possessed an army,
organized and trained according to the German ideal, but carefully
adapted to the national peculiarities. It was excellently armed,
in a high state of efficiency, and was commanded by a splendidly
trained corps of officers, worthy of the deepest respect. The fleet
is, however, the vital necessity of the country, and every Japanese
is a born sailor, and, thanks to his intelligence and the practice
he gets, handles the most modern ships admirably. Having adapted
modern methods to her national idiosyncrasies, Japan has put in the
field an army without nerves, and one that thoroughly understands
the conditions of modern war. To great natural intelligence and
aptitude for learning the Japanese soldier adds dash, a contempt
for death, and a preference for the attack.”
The British General, Sir Ian Hamilton, who was attached to the Japanese
during the war, states his opinion that a Japanese battalion has no
equal in European armies. Of their characteristics generally, he says:
“... and upon the patriotism which they have absorbed with their
mother’s milk, the Government has been careful to graft initiative,
quickness, and intelligence. This is accomplished in the schools,
which keep the soldierly virtues in the forefront of their
curriculum.”[74]
* * * * *
With all their strong points, however, the Japanese had weaknesses
which I need not enumerate here. There is a saying that “a conqueror
cannot be judged,” and we must bow to the victor. I will only add
that the issue of the fighting was often in doubt and nearly in our
favour, while in some cases we only escaped serious defeat owing to the
mistakes of their commanders.
It will be seen from the above that before the war we underestimated
Japan’s material, and particularly her moral strength. But I will add
some further reasons for her success. Without doubt the main rôle in
the war should have been played by our fleet. The Headquarter Staffs of
the navy and army did keep a detailed account of all Japanese warships,
but our naval representatives in the Far East made their calculations
in tons, and in the number and calibre of guns. Having thus arrived at
a statistical total, satisfactory to us in comparison with the same
figures for our Pacific Ocean squadron, they came to the conclusion in
1903 that
“Our plan of operations should be based on the assumption that it
is impossible for our fleet to be beaten, taking into consideration
the present relationship of the two fleets, and that a Japanese
landing at Newchuang, and in the Gulf of Korea, is impracticable.”
The number of men we would require on land depended on three things:
(_a_) The strength in which the Japanese might be able to move into
Manchuria and into our territory;
(_b_) The strength of our own fleet, and—
(_c_) The carrying capacity of our railway communication.
Of course, had our fleet gained an initial victory, land operations
would have been unnecessary. But, putting this aside, it was only by
actually gaining command of the sea that the Japanese were able to
denude their own coast of defenders, and, what is still more important,
risk a landing in the Liao-tung Peninsula. Had they been compelled to
move through Korea, we should have had time to concentrate. Having
gained a local superiority in armoured ships by their desperate attack
[before a declaration of war] on the fleet in Port Arthur, they
obtained the temporary command of the sea, and took advantage of it to
the full; while at this, the most crucial period of the war, our fleet
did nothing to prevent their concentration. This was especially the
case after the death of Admiral Makharoff, when even their operations
close to Port Arthur were not hindered at all. The consequences of
this inaction were most serious, for instead of being unable to land
in the Gulf of Korea, as had been assumed by our Navy Department, the
enemy were in a position to threaten the whole coast of the Liao-tung
Peninsula.
As our troops were so few in number, Admiral Alexeieff decided to
disperse, so as to be in a position to oppose landings at Newchuang,
at Kuan-tung, and on the Ya-lu. He also permitted a dispersion of the
fleet, with the result that we were scattered everywhere, and too weak
in any one spot. The Japanese transport facilities enabled them to land
three armies on the Liao-tung Peninsula and only one in Korea. Sending
one army to Port Arthur, they commenced with the other three their
advance against our Manchurian army, which was slowly concentrating in
the Hai-cheng, Liao-yang area. Having taken the initiative at sea, they
also seized it on land, and by their quick concentration and advance,
were enabled from the very first to place superior numbers against
us. Their consequent success in the first engagements also elevated
their spirits as much as it depressed our own. They possessed immense
advantages in communication, and the transport of supplies, which took
us months, was carried out by them quickly and easily. And, what was
not less important, a continuous stream of war materials and supplies
poured into their ports and arsenals from Europe and America, thanks
to the absolute inaction of our fleet. Owing to our inferior railway
communication, also, Japan was able to form a large number of new units
whilst we were slowly concentrating our army.
The theatre of operations in Manchuria had been known to the Japanese
since their war with China. They were perfectly acquainted with its
climate, its rains, its mud, its hills, and the peculiarities of
_kao-liang_.[75] In the hills, in which we were almost helpless,
they felt at home. Having been preparing for war for ten years, they
had not only studied the country, but had sown it with agents, who
were of immense service to them. In spite of their severe, almost
cruel attitude, the Chinese population assisted them greatly in their
operations; and, notwithstanding our superiority in cavalry, they
generally had good information as to our strength and dispositions.
We, on the contrary, often operated in the dark. They were greatly
superior to us in their high explosive artillery projectiles, their
numerous mountain and machine guns, and their abundance of explosives
and technical material, both for attack and defence, such as wire,
mines, and hand-grenades; while their organization, equipment, and
transport were better adapted to the local conditions than ours. They
also had a greater proportion of sapper troops than we had. Their
educational system was calculated to develop their initiative and
intelligence, and the battle instructions with which they commenced
the war were very materially altered as it proceeded. For instance,
their original regulations did not recommend night attacks; but they
soon became convinced of the advantages of this form of fighting,
and frequently resorted to it. Owing to the more advanced education
of their poorer classes, their non-commissioned officers were better
than ours, many being quite fitted to take the place of officers,
and their corps of officers exhibited the most determined bravery,
foresight, and knowledge, and wielded great authority. Even those in
the highest ranks lived simple and strict lives at the front. But
the principal thing which gave success to the Japanese was their
high moral tone. It made victory seem worth any sacrifice, and led
directly to that determination to win which characterized all ranks
from Commander-in-Chief to private soldier. In many cases their forces
found themselves in so desperate a plight that either to hold their
ground or to advance required the most extraordinary effort of will.
The officers possessed the strength to ask for this almost impossible
effort; did not hesitate to shoot men who tried to retire; the private
soldier, in response, made the effort, and thereby often robbed us of
victory. One thing is certain: that if the whole army had not been
saturated with patriotism, if it had not felt the friendly support of
the nation behind it, if it had not realized the supreme importance
of the struggle, the endeavours of its leaders would have been in
vain. The order to advance might have been given, but the soldiers,
unsupported by the feeling that the country was with them, would not
have had the strength to perform feats of heroism almost superhuman.
FOOTNOTES:
[66] [? Straits of La Pérouse.—ED.]
[67] [A Japanese steamship line.—ED.]
[68] In addition to these there were 2,716 departmental
officers—_i.e._, medical, veterinary, and supply, etc.
[69] By January 1, 1901, in the reserve and territorial army there were
2,737 officers, and it was necessary to add in war-time, without the
reserve troops, 2,619 officers; thus the establishment of officers of
the standing army and territorial forces could be fully completed, and
138 officers were left for reserve units. This was insufficient—_i.e._,
there were about 1,000 officers short.
[70] 145,000 in the reserve, and 120,000 in the territorial army.
[71] Some of the regulars were undersized recruits.
[72] [An obstacle formed of rows of conical pits, with a sharpened
stake in the centre, and usually a wire entanglement across the
top.—ED.]
[73] [A Russian brigade usually consists of eight battalions. Those of
the E. S. Rifle Divisions had six.—ED.]
[74] [“A Staff Officer’s Scrap-Book,” vol. i., p. 11.—ED.]
[75] [A species of millet, which grows very high.—ED.]