Deductions drawn from the work of the army in the past 200 years,
which may serve as some guide for the line our military policy
should take in the beginning of the twentieth century.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the energies of the
country were mainly absorbed in expansion and consolidation. In the
prosecution of these objects we were engaged in many wars, and the
experience thereby gained should help to indicate what is in store
for the War Department in the future. The following appear to be the
principal deductions that can be drawn from the past:
1. The duties in connection with our movement towards the shores of the
Baltic and Black Seas, the expansion of Russian territory to the west
(White Russia, Little Russia, Poland), to the south (Caucasus), to the
east (Central Asia), were carried out by the army. From the analysis of
our frontiers already made in Chapter II., it will be seen that, thanks
to what has been done, _Russia is in no need of any further increase
of territory. This conclusion is in the highest degree important
and satisfactory. At the same time, our military position does not
now compare so favourably as formerly with that of our neighbours,
principally owing to our lack of railways, and our western frontiers
are exposed to great danger through the perfect state of preparation of
Germany and Austria._
2. For only seventy-two years in the preceding two centuries did
we enjoy peace; during the remaining time Russia was engaged in
thirty-three external and two internal wars. On an average, therefore,
wars occurred every six years. They were particularly frequent during
the first half of the nineteenth century, while in the latter portion,
if the campaigns in the Caucasus and in Asia be excepted, we were only
twice engaged in hostilities—in 1853–55 and in 1877–78. We entered the
present century after twenty-two years’ continuous peace, a longer
interval than had occurred for 200 years; but during this time many
possible causes for hostilities had arisen on all sides. Not only had
the Empire become oppressed with the burden of armed peace, but the
strain was so tense that there were grounds for fearing lest “guns
should begin to shoot of their own accord.” The commencement of each of
the three past centuries are full enough of sad memories for Russia;
it might, therefore, have been expected, taking into consideration the
military forces which were straining at the leash, that the beginning
of the twentieth century would not be free from war clouds. It only
needed a spark on one part of the frontier to kindle conflagration
everywhere. Serious potential causes for hostilities existed on the
western, Turkish, and Afghan frontiers, and in 1895 there was an
actual _casus belli_ on the Chinese border. In such circumstances
international affairs required the most delicate handling, in order to
avoid creating any additional excuses for war.
3. If the Caucasus be excluded, we were engaged on our own soil in
only six campaigns, lasting for six and a half years, out of all the
struggles during this period, the remainder being waged beyond our
frontiers. This conferred great advantages on us, and showed the high
state of our preparation in those days as compared with that of our
enemies. The offensive has such immense advantage over the defensive
that we should always strive, by being as ready as our neighbours, to
be in a position to attack.
4. In the twenty-six battles of the nineteenth century, the casualties
out of 1,500,000 combatants amounted to 323,000—_i.e._, almost 22 per
cent. The heaviest were at Austerlitz—21,000 out of 75,000 engaged; at
Borodino—40,000 out of 120,000 engaged; and at Sevastopol—85,000 out of
235,000 engaged. The following table shows our total losses in the two
centuries:
+----------+---------+------------------------------+
| |Numbers | Casualties. |
| |Engaged. | |
| | +----------+---------+---------+
| | |Killed and| Sick. | Total. |
| | | Wounded. | | |
+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
|Eighteenth| | | | |
| century |4,910,000| 350,000 |1,030,000|1,380,000|
|Nineteenth| | | | |
| century |4,900,000| 610,000 | 800,000|1,410,000|
+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
| Total |9,810,000| 960,000 |1,830,000|2,790,000|
+----------+---------+----------+---------+---------+
While the numbers engaged, therefore, were practically the same in both
centuries, the losses in killed and wounded in the nineteenth were
almost double those in the eighteenth; this indicates the more deadly
character of war in the former period, and shows also that the losses
became greater as weapons became perfected.[41] If we assume that
Russia will probably have to put the same number of men in the field in
the twentieth century as in the past, and that the growth of casualties
will be in the same proportion, we must be prepared to face losses
amounting to 2,000,000 killed and wounded—_i.e._, 40 per cent. of those
engaged.
5. To keep pace with our neighbours’ continually improving preparation,
there is no doubt Russia will be compelled to increase her war
establishment. In our victorious combat with Turkey in 1827–29, the
greatest strength to which our army ever rose in one campaign was
155,000 men, while in 1877–78 the highest figure reached was 850,000.
Our maximum in the Prussian War of 1756–62 was only 130,000. I am
thankful to say we have lived at peace with our western neighbour for
150 years; but if we were to fight in the west without allies now, ten
times that number would be insufficient to defeat the German army,
and—what is the main thing—crush the patriotism of the armed nation
behind it. It follows, therefore, that we must not only be prepared
in the present century to take the field with forces that are huge in
comparison with those of former days, but also to face the colossal
initial expenditure and recurrent cost demanded by their creation and
maintenance.
6. In the eighteenth and in the first half of the nineteenth century
our army was a long-service one, formed on the European model, well
armed, and in spite of its lack of training, quite equal to the forces
of Sweden, France, or Prussia, while we were superior in organization,
armament, and training to our chief foe—Turkey. About the middle
of the last century we began to fall behind the western nations in
equipment and in all the technical means of destruction. At the battle
of Borodino our firearms were not inferior to those of the French, but
at Sevastopol we had only smooth-bore muskets, excellent for making
a noise, for performing rifle exercises or bayonet fighting, but
inaccurate, and of short range.
7. It became only too clear during our last wars—in 1853–55 and
1877–78—that many of our senior officers were unfit for their work
under modern and complicated conditions. The juniors were brave and
active within the limits of their duties, but insufficiently educated.
Officers commanding units were, with some brilliant exceptions, quite
incapable of making the most out of the fighting qualities of their
troops; but weakest of all were our generals—our brigade, division, and
army corps commanders. The majority were incapable of commanding all
three arms in action, and knew neither how to insure cohesion among the
units under them, nor to keep touch with the forces on either side.
The feeling of mutual support was therefore with us quite undeveloped.
Indeed, it often happened that while one of our forces was being
destroyed, the commander of some other force close by remained inactive
under the plea of not having received any orders.
8. Generally speaking, at the time of the Crimea and Turkish War (of
1877–78) our troops had practically no tactical training, and we did
not know how to attain the best results with the minimum of loss. In
the attack we advanced almost in column, and suffered heavily; while
very little use was ever made of the auxiliary arms—cavalry, artillery,
and sappers—indeed, they were almost forgotten. But we had one strong
point: we were not afraid to die, and only asked to be shown in which
direction sacrifice was required of us.
9. Judging by the experiences of the wars of these two centuries,
in order to insure success in the future we must be prepared to
concentrate a superior force. Without superiority in numbers our troops
were unable, especially in the attack, to defeat Swedes, Frenchmen, or,
in the last war, Turks.
10. But, quite apart from the grave question of how best to make ready
to oppose the armies of our western neighbours, 2 millions strong, the
War Department has to take into account the 40,000,000 of non-Russian
subjects, many of whom live in our Asiatic frontier districts and in
the Caucasus, for their attitude really determines the number of men we
must leave for the defence of those frontiers in case of a European war.
11. Finally, the work of the Department became still more complicated
in the concluding years of the last century, owing to the greater
frequency of the calls upon the troops to take part in the suppression
of civil disorder in Russia itself. The discontent of all grades of the
population has increased of recent years, and revolutionary propaganda
have found in this dissatisfaction their most favourable soil; even
the army has not escaped infection. It therefore appears that the
maintenance of order in the interior of our country will not be the
smallest task of the War Department in the coming century.
12. In the last twenty-five years not only Germany and Austria, but our
other neighbours, have perfected the organization of their forces, and
have arrived at a pitch of excellence which will enable them either
to take up a strong defensive, or rapidly to carry the war into our
territory; consequently, we have to face greater expenditure, and
arrange for larger concentrations also on the Roumanian, Turkish, and
Afghan frontiers. We were at peace for nearly two hundred years on the
Chinese border, but events occurred within the last fifteen years of
the last century which forced us to begin increasing our insignificant
forces then in the Far East, although we quite realized that our best
policy was to keep peace with China, and to avoid rupture with Japan.
_Thus the chief duty of the War Department in the first years of the
present century is the defence of our frontiers. Of these, our Austrian
and German borders, being the most dangerous, should receive our
particular attention._
There is no doubt that to carry on an energetic offensive is our best
protection. But our power to do this does not depend upon the action
of our War Department alone: it depends upon the relative national
efficiencies. The more fully developed and efficient a nation is, the
more numerous are its war resources of every sort. But the one factor
which nowadays determines more than all else the nature and direction
of operations is the railways. In this connection we have noted the
large number of lines at the disposal of our neighbours in the west,
and that is precisely the front upon which we are handicapped almost to
actual impotence by our backwardness. There are so many other urgent
calls for the expenditure of money that the construction of purely
strategic and economically unremunerative lines seems wasteful and the
cost prohibitive. For this reason our strategy on this side calls for
the greatest care and thought in order that we may conduct as active a
defence as possible. The next thing to do after admitting our present
disadvantages is to realize that it is upon this frontier that the
largest portion of the funds available for military purposes should be
spent, while the remainder can be apportioned between all our other
frontiers. It is clear that we were in no position to spend money on
the Far East, and after the forward moves made in that direction from
1896–1900, it was realized that in that quarter the purely defensive
was our best policy. The _communiqué_ of our Government of June 24,
1900, informed the whole world of our intention not to annex the
territory we were then occupying in Manchuria, and gave us every reason
to suppose that if we kept our engagements no trouble with China and
Japan was likely.
13. Even in the concluding years of the last century Russia was not
preparing for any further advance in the Far East, but was fully
occupied with the defence of her western front and with the maintenance
of internal order. Thus, our unexpected forward movement, first in
Manchuria and then to the shores of the Pacific Ocean, found the War
Department as surprised as it was unprepared. In such circumstances our
promise not to annex Manchuria was a very necessary one, not only on
account of our desire not to disturb our friendly relations with China,
but because we were aware of our military unreadiness in that part of
the world. In the report I submitted in 1900 regarding the duties of
the Department in the early future, I said:
“While we must be prepared to defend our interests upon the Pacific
Ocean, in Afghanistan, Persia, and Turkey, and also to fight at
sea, we cannot afford either the men or the money to be at the same
time equal in power to our western neighbours. We have given to
Germany and Austria a decided advantage by directing our attention
to the Far East. This disturbance of the balance of power menaces
the integrity of the Empire, and I sincerely believe that it will
not be permitted to continue by the Tsar. As the War Department’s
first task, therefore, I propose to develop the efficiency of our
forces on the western frontier, and to formulate a definite plan of
operations for them.”
From our Ally’s point of view, also, it was only right to attend to
this at once, for our comparative weakness on this side would in case
of war allow the Powers of the Triple Alliance to contain us with quite
a small force on our frontier and to crush France by overwhelming
numbers.
14. Our land forces bore the brunt of the national struggles during
this period. After Peter the Great’s time the rôle of the Russian
fleet in all the wars in which we were engaged was insignificant. In
the last two great wars of the last century we particularly needed
the co-operation of the fleet, but our sailors at Sevastopol fought
on land, owing to our naval inefficiency. In the war of 1877–78 the
Turks had no fleet on the Black Sea. Russia is undoubtedly a land
Power; the small part played in the past by the fleet, therefore, was
not accidental, but natural. If we had spent large sums in this period
on our navy, we should only have made our position worse, for it was
only by immense expenditure on the army that we were able to win.
History has taught us that we should follow in our fathers’ footsteps,
and, considering the army as Russia’s right arm, spend upon it the
larger part of the sums allotted by the Ministry of Finance for general
military needs. But our active ventures in the Far East forced us into
naval expenditure, which was arranged for in the last years of last
century by starving the army finances. The result is alarming. On this
point I wrote in my report of 1900:
“If in the future the fleet is to be increased at the expense of
the army, and if the increase of our forces on the eastern frontier
is to be made at the expense of those stationed on the western,
then our already weak position in regard to Germany and Austria
will become still worse. With the growth of our navy will arise
questions of coaling stations and ports, and as our expenditure
on these as well as on our ships grows heavier, it will entail
retrenchment on our most important frontier—that in Europe. Once
our fleet had destroyed the Turkish sailing fleet at Sinope, it
became impotent, despite its high _moral_, for it then had to
contend against steam, against which it was powerless.”
15. In the war of 1877–78 we had an unfortunate experience. The Turks,
whom we had conquered previously, although we had to fight against
huge odds, were on this occasion organized on the European system
by European instructors, and were better armed than we were. Their
firearms had been made in the workshops of Germany and England, and
were far superior to ours.[42] Now, other conditions being equal,
not only does the better weapon tend to victory, because it causes
greater loss, but because—and this is far more important—the knowledge
of being better armed bestows confidence. Possessed of a weapon even
but little inferior to that of an enemy, men are inclined to ascribe
their own faults to the superiority of the enemy’s armament. There
was in this respect no such difference between us and the Turks
in 1877–78 as had existed in 1853–55; but still, after our first
misfortune at Plevna, our army lost confidence in its rifles and guns,
and ascribed its misfortunes to the superior armament of the Turks.
Everything, therefore, points to the necessity of keeping up to date in
armament. In the past our difficulty in keeping pace with the various
improvements so rapidly introduced was increased by the fact that we
not only had to re-arm the regular army, but had to create an immense
stock of weapons for the reserve troops, militia, depôt troops, and
again as a reserve for the whole of the forces.
16. In our wars with minor enemies (such as Turks, Caucasians, and
Central Asians) we were victorious, owing to our great numerical
superiority. In meeting nations of a higher civilization than our
own (such as the Swedes and the French), we generally suffered very
heavily at first, but won in the end, in spite of our comparative lack
of skill, owing to our dogged bravery and determination. Peter the
Great carried on the struggle for nine years from Narva to Poltava,
and Alexander I. fought for the same period between Austerlitz and
the entry of our troops into Paris. The objects of these wars were
clear to our troops, and the men were inspired to fight on to the end
at all costs. As a result, our troops did win. In the Crimea, and in
1877–78, not only was our object in fighting vague, but the wars were
prematurely finished before the army or the nation had really put out
their strength, and in spite of our sacrifices and losses, we were in
both cases unsuccessful. Every war brings in its train much unhappiness
to both sides, and the loss of a campaign is for a great nation a
supreme misfortune and one overwhelming the machinery of government.
Therefore, strive as it may against commencing hostilities, when once
a country takes up arms it should continue to fight until it wins;
otherwise it will lose the right to be considered a great nation, and
will become a “collection of mere ethnographical material,” from which
other nationalities may be strengthened. The following words of my
report of 1900 are as applicable to-day as when I wrote them:
“Crises of world-wide importance arise suddenly, and are not
prevented by the unpreparedness of a nation for war. On the
contrary, the knowledge of unreadiness in any quarter only leads to
a desire to take advantage of it in others. Therefore a struggle
such as has never been seen in the world may come sooner than we
think. It may burst forth even contrary to the wish of the Tsar,
and against the interests of Russia. This would be a great calamity
for the whole world. But particularly calamitous for Russia would
be any cessation by her, before complete victory was achieved, of a
war once started.
“_In the event of disaster in the first campaign,
and after the first and serious consequences of war—famine,
disease, paralysis of trade, and, above all, heavy losses—have made
themselves felt, the Russian monarch’s character will need to be
of iron to enable him to resist the universal clamour that will be
raised to accept defeat and make peace._”
FOOTNOTES:
[41] [This is not the generally accepted view.—ED.]
[42] We had three rifles—the Berdan, the Krink, and the Karl; most
of them were Krink, converted from the “six-line rifle.” The Turks’
Peabody was a far more perfect weapon.