A dissolute life, and an immoderate love of pleasure in all its

forms, is what we might naturally expect from a young man so

circumstanced; and it appears that with him these tastes were

indulged with an offensive publicity which destroyed the comfort

of his wife Hipparetê, daughter of Hipponikus who was slain at the

battle of Delium. She had brought him a large dowry of ten talents:

when she sought a divorce, as the law of Athens permitted, Alkibiadês

violently interposed to prevent her from obtaining the benefit of

the law, and brought her back by force to his house even from the

presence of the magistrate. It is this violence of selfish passion,

and reckless disregard of social obligation towards every one,

which forms the peculiar characteristic of Alkibiadês. He strikes

the schoolmaster whose house he happens to find unprovided with a

copy of Homer; he strikes Taureas,[50] a rival chorêgus, in the

public theatre, while the representation is going on; he strikes

Hipponikus, who afterwards became his father-in-law, out of a wager

of mere wantonness, afterwards appeasing him by an ample apology;

he protects the Thasian poet Hêgêmon, against whom an indictment

had been formally lodged before the archon, by effacing it with

his own hand from the published list in the public edifice, called

Metrôon; defying both magistrate and accuser to press the cause on

for trial.[51] Nor does it appear that any injured person ever dared

to bring Alkibiadês to trial before the dikastery, though we read

with amazement the tissue of lawlessness[52] which marked his private

life; a combination of insolence and ostentation with occasional

mean deceit when it suited his purpose. But amidst the perfect legal,

judicial, and constitutional equality, which reigned among the

citizens of Athens, there still remained great social inequalities

between one man and another, handed down from the times preceding

the democracy: inequalities which the democratical institutions

limited in their practical mischiefs, but never either effaced or

discredited, and which were recognized as modifying elements in the

current, unconscious vein of sentiment and criticism, by those whom

they injured as well as by those whom they favored. In the speech

which Thucydidês[53] ascribes to Alkibiadês before the Athenian

public assembly, we find the insolence of wealth and high social

position not only admitted as a fact, but vindicated as a just

morality; and the history of his life, as well as many other facts

in Athenian society, show that if not approved, it was at least

tolerated in practice to a serious extent, in spite of the restraints

of the democracy.

[50] Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, c. 49; Thucyd. vi, 16; Antipho

apud Athenæum, xii, p. 525.

[51] Athenæus, ix, p. 407.

[52] Thucyd. vi, 15. I translate the expression of Thucydidês,

which is of great force and significance—φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ

πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα ~παρανομίας~ ἐς τὴν

δίαιταν, etc. The same word is repeated by the historian, vi, 28.

τὴν ἄλλην αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δημοτικὴν ~παρανομίαν~.

The same phrase is also found in the short extract from the

λοιδορία of Antipho (Athenæus, xii, p. 525).

The description of Alkibiadês, given in that Discourse called the

Ἐρωτικὸς Λόγος, erroneously ascribed to Demosthenês (c. 12, p.

1414), is more discriminating than we commonly find in rhetorical

compositions. Τοῦτο δ’, Ἀλκιβιάδην εὑρήσεις φύσει μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν

πολλῷ χεῖρον διακείμενον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπερηφάνως, τὰ δὲ ταπεινῶς,

τὰ δ’ ὑπεράκρως, ζῆν προῃρημένον· ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Σωκράτους ὁμιλίας

πολλὰ μὲν ἐπανορθωθέντα τοῦ βίου, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν

ἄλλων ἔργων ἐπικρυψάμενον.

Of the three epithets, whereby the author describes the bad

tendencies of Alkibiadês, full illustrations will be seen in his

proceedings, hereafter to be described. The improving influence

here ascribed to Sokratês is unfortunately far less borne out.

[53] Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 4; Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 2;

Plato, Protagoras, c. 1.

I do not know how far the memorable narrative ascribed to

Alkibiadês in the Symposium of Plato (c. 33, 34, pp. 216, 217)

can be regarded as matter of actual fact and history, so far as

Sokratês is concerned; but it is abundant proof in regard to the

general relations of Alkibiadês with others: compare Xenophon,

Memorab. i, 2, 29, 30; iv. 1-2.

Several of the dialogues of Plato present to us striking pictures

of the palæstra, with the boys, the young men, the gymnastic

teachers, engaged in their exercises or resting from them, and

the philosophers and spectators who came there for amusement

and conversation. See particularly the opening chapters of the

Lysis and the Charmidês; also the Rivales, where the scene is

laid in the house of a γραμματιστὴς, or schoolmaster. In the

Lysis, Sokratês professes to set his own conversation with

these interesting youths as an antidote to the corrupting

flatteries of most of those who sought to gain their good-will.

Οὕτω χρὴ, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, τοῖς παιδικοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, ταπεινοῦντα

καὶ συστέλλοντα, ἀλλὰ μὴ, ὥσπερ σὺ, χαυνοῦντα καὶ διαθρύπτοντα

(Lysis, c. 7, p. 210).

See, in illustration of what is here said about Alkibiadês as

a youth, Euripid. Supplic. 906 (about Parthenopæus), and the

beautiful lines in the Atys of Catullus, 60-69.

There cannot be a doubt that the characters of all the Greek

youth of any pretensions were considerably affected by this

society and conversation of their boyish years; though the

subject is one upon which the full evidence cannot well be

produced and discussed.

Amidst such unprincipled exorbitances of behavior, Alkibiadês stood

distinguished for personal bravery. He served as a hoplite in the

army under Phormion at the siege of Potidæa in 432 B.C. Though then

hardly twenty years of age, he was among the most forward soldiers

in the battle, received a severe wound, and was in great danger;

owing his life only to the exertions of Sokratês, who served in

the ranks along with him. Eight years afterwards, Alkibiadês also

served with credit in the cavalry at the battle of Delium, and

had the opportunity of requiting his obligation to Sokratês, by

protecting him against the Bœotian pursuers. As a rich young man,

also, choregy and trierarchy became incumbent upon him; expensive

duties, which, as we might expect, he discharged not merely with

sufficiency, but with ostentation. In fact, expenditure of this sort,

though compulsory up to a certain point upon all rich men, was so

fully repaid, to all those who had the least ambition, in the shape

of popularity and influence, that most of them spontaneously went

beyond the requisite minimum for the purpose of showing themselves

off. The first appearance of Alkibiadês in public life is said to

have been as a donor, for some special purpose, in the ekklesia, when

various citizens were handing in their contributions: and the loud

applause which his subscription provoked was at that time so novel

and exciting to him, that he suffered a tame quail which he carried

in his bosom to escape. This incident excited mirth and sympathy

among the citizens present: the bird was caught and restored to him

by Antiochus, who from that time forward acquired his favor, and in

after days became his pilot and confidential lieutenant.[54]

[54] Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 10.

To a young man like Alkibiadês, thirsting for power and preëminence,

a certain measure of rhetorical facility and persuasive power was

indispensable. With a view to this acquisition, he frequented the

society of various sophistical and rhetorical teachers,[55] Prodikus,

Protagoras, and others; but most of all that of Sokratês. His

intimacy with Sokratês has become celebrated on many grounds, and

is commemorated both by Plato and Xenophon, though unfortunately

with less instruction than we could desire. We may readily believe

Xenophon, when he tells us that Alkibiadês—like the oligarchical

Kritias, of whom we shall have much to say hereafter—was attracted

to Sokratês by his unrivalled skill of dialectical conversation, his

suggestive influence over the minds of his hearers, in eliciting

new thoughts and combinations, his mastery of apposite and homely

illustrations, his power of seeing far beforehand the end of a long

cross-examination, his ironical affectation of ignorance, whereby

the humiliation of opponents was rendered only the more complete,

when they were convicted of inconsistency and contradiction out

of their own answers. The exhibitions of such ingenuity were in

themselves highly interesting, and stimulating to the mental

activity of listeners, while the faculty itself was one of peculiar

value to those who proposed to take the lead in public debate;

with which view both these ambitious young men tried to catch the

knack from Sokratês,[56] and to copy his formidable string of

interrogations. Both of them doubtless involuntarily respected the

poor, self-sufficing, honest, temperate, and brave citizen, in whom

this eminent talent resided; especially Alkibiadês, who not only owed

his life to the generous valor of Sokratês at Potidæa, but had also

learned in that service to admire the iron physical frame of the

philosopher in his armor, enduring hunger, cold, and hardship.[57]

But we are not to suppose that either of them came to Sokratês with

the purpose of hearing and obeying his precepts on matters of duty,

or receiving from him a new plan of life. They came partly to gratify

an intellectual appetite, partly to acquire a stock of words and

ideas, with facility of argumentative handling, suitable for their

after-purpose as public speakers. Subjects moral, political, and

intellectual, served as the theme sometimes of discourse, sometimes

of discussion, in the society of all these sophists, Prodikus and

Protagoras not less than Sokratês; for in the Athenian sense of

the word, Sokratês was a sophist as well as the others: and to the

rich youths of Athens, like Alkibiadês and Kritias, such society

was highly useful.[58] It imparted a nobler aim to their ambition,

including mental accomplishments as well as political success:

it enlarged the range of their understandings, and opened to them

as ample a vein of literature and criticism as the age afforded:

it accustomed them to canvass human conduct, with the causes and

obstructions of human well-being, both public and private: it even

suggested to them indirectly lessons of duty and prudence, from which

their social position tended to estrange them, and which they would

hardly have submitted to hear except from the lips of one whom they

intellectually admired. In learning to talk, they were forced to

learn more or less to think, and familiarized with the difference

between truth and error: nor would an eloquent lecturer fail to

enlist their feelings in the great topics of morals and politics.

Their thirst for mental stimulus and rhetorical accomplishments had

thus, as far as it went, a moralizing effect, though this was rarely

their purpose in the pursuit.[59]

[55] See the description in the Protagoras of Plato, c. 8, p. 317.

[56] See Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 12-24, 39-47.

Κριτίας μὲν καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, οὐκ ἀρέσκοντος αὐτοῖς Σωκράτους

ὡμιλησάτην, ὃν χρόνον ὡμιλείτην αὐτῷ, ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς

ὡρμηκότε προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως. Ἔτι γὰρ Σωκράτει ξυνόντες

οὐκ ἄλλοις τισὶ μᾶλλον ἐπεχείρουν διαλέγεσθαι ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα

πράττουσι τὰ πολιτικά.... Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τάχιστα τῶν πολιτευομένων

ὑπέλαβον κρείττονες εἶναι, Σωκράτει μὲν οὐκ ἔτι προσῄεσαν, οὐδὲ

γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἄλλως ἤρεσκεν· εἴτε προσέλθοιεν, ὑπὲρ ὧν, ἡμάρτανον

ἐλεγχόμενοι ἤχθοντο· τὰ δὲ τῆς πóλεως ἔπραττον, ὧνπερ ἕνεκεν καὶ

Σωκράτει προσῆλθον. Compare Plato, Apolog. Sokrat. c. 10, p. 23;

c. 22, p. 33.

Xenophon represents Alkibiadês and Kritias as frequenting the

society of Sokratês, for the same reason and with the same

objects as Plato affirms that young men generally went to the

Sophists: see Plato, Sophist. c. 20, p. 232 D.

“Nam et Socrati (observes Quintilian, Inst. Or. ii, 16) objiciunt

comici, docere cum, quomodo pejorem causam meliorem reddat; et

contra Tisiam et Gorgiam similia dicit polliceri Plato.”

The representation given by Plato of the great influence acquired

by Sokratês over Alkibiadês, and of the deference and submission

of the latter, is plainly not to be taken as historical, even if

we had not the more simple and trustworthy picture of Xenophon.

Isokratês goes so far as to say that Sokratês was never known by

any one as teacher of Alkibiadês: which is an exaggeration in the

other direction. Isokratês, Busiris, Or. xi. sect. 6, p. 222.

[57] Plato, Symposium, c. 35-36, p. 220, etc.

[58] See the representation, given in the Protagoras of Plato,

of the temper in which the young and wealthy Hippokratês goes

to seek instruction from Protagoras, and of the objects which

Protagoras proposes to himself in imparting the instruction.

Plato, Protagoras, c. 2, p. 310 D.; c. 8, p. 316 C.; c. 9, p.

318, etc.: compare also Plato, Meno. p. 91, and Gorgias, c. 4. p.

449 E., asserting the connection, in the mind of Gorgias, between

teaching to speak and teaching to think—λέγειν καὶ φρονεῖν, etc.

It would not be reasonable to repeat, as true and just, all the

polemical charges against those who are called Sophists, even as

we find them in Plato, without scrutiny and consideration. But

modern writers on Grecian affairs run down the Sophists even more

than Plato did, and take no notice of the admissions in their

favor which he, though their opponent, is perpetually making.

This is a very extensive subject, to which I hope to revert.

[59] I dissent entirely from the judgment of Dr. Thirlwall, who

repeats what is the usual representation of Sokratês and the

Sophists, depicting Alkibiadês as “ensnared by the Sophists,”

while Sokratês is described as a good genius preserving him from

their corruptions (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, pp.

312, 313, 314). I think him also mistaken when he distinguishes

so pointedly Sokratês from the Sophists; when he describes

the Sophists as “pretenders to wisdom;” as “a new school;” as

“teaching that there was no real difference between truth and

falsehood, right and wrong,” etc.

All the plausibility that there is in this representation, arises

from a confusion between the original sense and the modern sense

of the word Sophist; the latter seemingly first bestowed upon the

word by Plato and Aristotle. In the common ancient acceptation

of the word at Athens, it meant not a _school_ of persons

professing common doctrines, but a _class_ of men bearing the

same name, because they derived their celebrity from analogous

objects of study and common intellectual occupation. The Sophists

were men of similar calling and pursuits, partly speculative,

partly professional; but they differed widely from each other,

both in method and doctrine. (See for example Isokratês, cont.

Sophistas, Orat. xiii; Plato, Meno. p. 87 B.) Whoever made

himself eminent in speculative pursuits, and communicated his

opinions by public lecture, discussion, or conversation, was

called a Sophist, whatever might be the conclusions which he

sought to expound or defend. The difference between taking money,

and expounding gratuitously, on which Sokratês himself was so

fond of dwelling (Xenoph. Memor. i, 6, 12), has plainly no

essential bearing on the case. When Æschinês the orator reminds

the dikasts, “Recollect that you Athenians put to death _the

Sophist Sokratês_, because he was shown to have been the teacher

of Kritias,” (Æschin. cont. Timarch. c. 34, p. 74,) he uses the

word in its natural and true Athenian sense. He had no point to

make against Sokratês, who had then been dead more than forty

years; but he describes him by his profession or occupation, just

as he would have said, _Hippokratês the physician_, _Pheidias

the sculptor_, etc. Dionysius of Halikarn. calls both Plato and

Isokratês sophists (Ars Rhetor. De Compos. Verborum, p. 208 R.).

The Nubes of Aristophanês, and the defences put forth by Plato

and Xenophon, show that Sokratês was not only called by the name

Sophist, but regarded just in the same light as that in which

Dr. Thirlwall presents to us what he calls “the new School of

the Sophists;” as “a corruptor of youth, indifferent to truth or

falsehood, right or wrong,” etc. See a striking passage in the

Politicus of Plato, c. 38, p. 299 B. Whoever thinks, as I think,

that these accusations were falsely advanced against Sokratês,

will be careful how he advances them against the general

profession to which Sokratês belonged.

That there were unprincipled and immoral men among the class of

Sophists—as there are and always have been among schoolmasters,

professors, lawyers, etc., and all bodies of men—I do not

doubt; in what proportion, we cannot determine. But the extreme

hardship of passing a sweeping condemnation on the great body

of intellectual teachers at Athens, and canonizing exclusively

Sokratês and his followers, will be felt, when we recollect that

the well-known Apologue, called the _Choice of Hercules_, was the

work of the Sophist Prodikus, and his favorite theme of lecture

(Xenophon, Memor. ii, 1, 21-34). To this day, that Apologue

remains without a superior, for the impressive simplicity with

which it presents one of the most important points of view of

moral obligation: and it has been embodied in a greater number of

books of elementary morality than anything of Sokratês, Plato,

or Xenophon. To treat the author of that Apologue, and the

class to which he belonged, as teaching “that there was no real

difference between right and wrong, truth and falsehood,” etc.,

is a criticism not in harmony with the just and liberal tone of

Dr. Thirlwall’s history.

I will add that Plato himself, in a very important passage of

the Republic (vi, c. 6, 7, pp. 492-493), refutes the imputation

against the Sophists of being specially the corruptors of youth.

He represents them as inculcating upon their youthful pupils that

morality which was received as true and just in their age and

society; nothing better, nothing worse. The grand corruptor, he

says, is society itself; the Sophists merely repeat the voice

and judgment of society. Without inquiring at present how far

Plato or Sokratês were right in condemning the received morality

of their countrymen, I most fully accept his assertion that the

great body of the contemporary professional teachers taught what

was considered good morality among the Athenian public: there

were doubtless some who taught a better morality, others who

taught a worse. And this may be said with equal truth of the

great body of professional teachers in every age and nation.

Xenophon enumerates various causes to which he ascribes the

corruption of the character of Alkibiadês; wealth, rank, personal

beauty, flatterers, etc.; but he does not name the Sophists among

them (Memorab. i, 2. 24, 25).

Alkibiadês, full of impulse and ambition of every kind, enjoyed

the conversation of all the eminent talkers and lecturers to be

found in Athens, that of Sokratês most of all and most frequently.

The philosopher became greatly attached to him, and doubtless lost

no opportunity of inculcating on him salutary lessons, as far as

could be done, without disgusting the pride of a haughty and spoiled

youth who was looking forward to the celebrity of public life.

But unhappily his lessons never produced any serious effect, and

ultimately became even distasteful to the pupil. The whole life

of Alkibiadês attests how faintly the sentiment of obligation,

public or private, ever got footing in his mind; how much the ends

which he pursued were dictated by overbearing vanity and love of

aggrandizement. In the later part of life, Sokratês was marked out

to public hatred by his enemies, as having been the teacher of

Alkibiadês and Kritias. And if we could be so unjust as to judge of

the morality of the teacher by that of these two pupils, we should

certainly rank him among the worst of the Athenian sophists.

At the age of thirty-one or thirty-two, the earliest at which it

was permitted to look forward to an ascendent position in public

life, Alkibiadês came forward with a reputation stained by private

enormities, and with a number of enemies created by his insolent

demeanor. But this did not hinder him from stepping into that

position to which his rank, connections, and club-partisans, afforded

him introduction; nor was he slow in displaying his extraordinary

energy, decision, and capacity of command. From the beginning to

the end of his eventful political life, he showed a combination

of boldness in design, resource in contrivance, and vigor in

execution, not surpassed by any one of his contemporary Greeks: and

what distinguished him from all was his extraordinary flexibility

of character[60] and consummate power of adapting himself to new

habits, new necessities, and new persons, whenever circumstances

required. Like Themistoklês, whom he resembled as well in ability and

vigor as in want of public principle and in recklessness about means,

Alkibiadês was essentially a man of action. Eloquence was in him a

secondary quality, subordinate to action; and though he possessed

enough of it for his purposes, his speeches were distinguished

only for pertinence of matter, often imperfectly expressed, at

least according to the high standard of Athens.[61] But his career

affords a memorable example of splendid qualities, both for action

and command, ruined and turned into instruments of mischief by

the utter want of morality, public and private. A strong tide of

individual hatred was thus roused against him, as well from middling

citizens whom he had insulted, as from rich men whom his ruinous

ostentation outshone. For his exorbitant voluntary expenditure in

the public festivals, transcending the largest measure of private

fortune, satisfied discerning men that he would reimburse himself

by plundering the public, and even, if opportunity offered, by

overthrowing[62] the constitution to make himself master of the

persons and properties of his fellow-citizens. He never inspired

confidence or esteem in any one; and sooner or later, among a public

like that of Athens, so much accumulated odium and suspicion was sure

to bring a public man to ruin, in spite of the strongest admiration

for his capacity. He was always the object of very conflicting

sentiments: “The Athenians desired him, hated him, but still

wished to have him,” was said in the latter years of his life by a

contemporary poet; while we find also another pithy precept delivered

in regard to him: “You ought not to keep a lion’s whelp in your city

at all; but, if you choose to keep him, you must submit yourself to

his behavior.”[63] Athens had to feel the force of his energy, as an

exile and enemy, but the great harm which he did to her was in his

capacity of adviser; awakening in his countrymen the same thirst for

showy, rapacious, uncertain, perilous aggrandizement which dictated

his own personal actions.

[60] Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 1; Satyrus apud Athenæum, xii,

p. 534; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23.

Οὗ γὰρ τοιούτων δεῖ, τοιοῦτος εἰμ’ ἐγώ, says Odysseus, in the

Philoktêtês of Sophoklês.

[61] I follow the criticism which Plutarch cites from

Theophrastus, seemingly discriminating and measured: much

more trustworthy than the vague eulogy of Nepos, or even of

Demosthenês (of course not from his own knowledge), upon the

eloquence of Alkibiadês (Plutarch, Alkib. c. 10); Plutarch,

Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. c. 8, p. 804.

Antisthenês, companion and pupil of Sokratês, and originator of

what is called the Cynic philosophy, contemporary and personally

acquainted with Alkibiadês, was full of admiration for his

extreme personal beauty, and pronounced him to be strong, manly,

and audacious, but unschooled, ~ἀπαίδευτον~. His scandals about

the lawless life of Alkibiadês, however, exceed what we can

reasonably admit, even from a contemporary (Antisthenês ap.

Athenæum, v, p. 220, xii, p. 534). Antisthenês had composed a

dialogue called Alkibiadês (Diog. Laërt. vi, 15).

See the collection of the Fragmenta Antisthenis (by A. G.

Winckelmann, Zurich, 1842, pp. 17-19).

The comic writers of the day—Eupolis, Aristophanês, Pherekratês,

and others—seem to have been abundant in their jests and libels

against the excesses of Alkibiadês, real or supposed. There was

a tale, untrue, but current in comic tradition, that Alkibiadês,

who was not a man to suffer himself to be insulted with impunity,

had drowned Eupolis in the sea, in revenge, for his comedy of the

Baptæ. See Meineke, Fragm. Com. Græ. Eupolidis Βάπται and Κόλακες

(vol. ii, pp. 447-494), and Aristophanês Τριφαλῆς, p. 1166:

also Meineke’s first volume, Historia Critica Comic. Græc. pp.

124-136; and the Dissertat. xix, in Buttmann’s _Mythologus_, on

the Baptæ and the Cotyttia.

[62] Thucyd. vi, 15. Compare Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præc. c. 4, p.

800. The sketch which Plato draws in the first three chapters of

the ninth Book of the Republic, of the citizen who erects himself

into a despot and enslaves his fellow-citizens, exactly suits the

character of Alkibiadês. See also the same treatise, vi, 6-8, pp.

491-494, and the preface of Schleiermacher to his translation of

the Platonic dialogue called Alkibiadês the first.

[63] Aristophan. Ranæ, 1445-1453; Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 16;

Plutarch, Nikias, c. 9.

Mentioning Alkibiadês now for the first time, I have somewhat

anticipated on future chapters, in order to present a general idea

of his character, hereafter to be illustrated. But at the moment

which we have now reached (March, 420 B.C.) the lion’s whelp was yet

young, and had neither acquired his entire strength nor disclosed his

full-grown claws.

He began to put himself forward as a party leader, seemingly not long

before the Peace of Nikias. The political traditions hereditary in

his family, as in that of his relation Periklês, were democratical:

his grandfather Alkibiadês had been vehement in his opposition

to the Peisistratids, and had even afterwards publicly renounced

an established connection of hospitality with the Lacedæmonian

government, from strong antipathy to them on political grounds. But

Alkibiadês himself, in commencing political life, departed from this

family tradition, and presented himself as a partisan of oligarchical

and philo-Laconian sentiment, doubtless far more consonant to his

natural temper than the democratical. He thus started in the same

general party with Nikias and Thessalus son of Kimôn, who afterwards

became his bitter opponents; and it was in part probably to put

himself on a par with them, that he took the marked step of trying to

revive the ancient family tie of hospitality with Sparta, which his

grandfather had broken off.[64]

[64] Thucyd. v, 43, vi, 90; Isokratês, De Bigis, Or. xvi, p. 352,

sect. 27-30.

Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14) carelessly represents Alkibiadês as

being actually proxenus of Sparta at Athens.

To promote this object, he displayed peculiar solicitude for the good

treatment of the Spartan captives, during their detention at Athens.

Many of them being of high family at Sparta, he naturally calculated

upon their gratitude, as well as upon the favorable sympathies of

their countrymen, whenever they should be restored. He advocated

both the peace and the alliance with Sparta, and the restoration

of her captives; and indeed not only advocated these measures, but

tendered his services, and was eager to be employed, as the agent

of Sparta for carrying them through at Athens. From these selfish

hopes in regard to Sparta, and especially from the expectation of

acquiring, through the agency of the restored captives, the title of

Proxenus of Sparta, Alkibiadês thus became a partisan of the blind

and gratuitous philo-Laconian concessions of Nikias. But the captives

on their return were either unable, or unwilling, to carry the point

which he wished; while the authorities at Sparta rejected all his

advances, not without a contemptuous sneer at the idea of confiding

important political interests to the care of a youth chiefly known

for ostentation, profligacy, and insolence. That the Spartans

should thus judge, is noway astonishing, considering their extreme

reverence both for old age and for strict discipline. They naturally

preferred Nikias and Lachês, whose prudence would commend, if it did

not originally suggest, their mistrust of the new claimant. Nor had

Alkibiadês yet shown the mighty movement of which he was capable.

But this contemptuous refusal of the Spartans stung him so to the

quick, that, making an entire revolution in his political course,[65]

he immediately threw himself into anti-Laconian politics with an

energy and ability which he was not before known to possess.

[65] Thucyd. v, 43. Οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονεικῶν

ἠναντιοῦτο, ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ Νικίου καὶ Λάχητος ἔπραξαν τὰς

σπονδὰς, αὐτὸν διὰ τὴν νεότητα ὑπεριδόντες καὶ κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν

προξενίαν ποτὲ οὖσαν οὐ τιμήσαντες, ἣν τοῦ πάππου ἀπειπόντος

αὐτὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους θεραπεύων διενοεῖτο

ἀνανεώσασθαι. ~Πανταχόθεν τε νομίζων ἐλασσοῦσθαι~ τό τε πρῶτον

ἀντεῖπεν, etc.

The moment was favorable, since the recent death of Kleon, for a new

political leader to espouse this side; and was rendered still more

favorable by the conduct of the Lacedæmonians. Month after month

passed, remonstrance after remonstrance was addressed, yet not one

of the restitutions prescribed by the treaty in favor of Athens had

yet been accomplished. Alkibiadês had therefore ample pretext for

altering his tone respecting the Spartans, and for denouncing them

as deceivers who had broken their solemn oaths, abusing the generous

confidence of Athens. Under his present antipathies, his attention

naturally turned to Argos, in which city he possessed some powerful

friends and family guests. The condition of that city, now free by

the expiration of the peace with Sparta, opened a possibility of

connection with Athens, and this policy was strongly recommended

by Alkibiadês, who insisted that Sparta was playing false with the

Athenians, merely in order to keep their hands tied until she had

attacked and put down Argos separately. This particular argument had

less force when it was seen that Argos acquired new and powerful

allies, Mantineia, Elis, and Corinth; but on the other hand, such

acquisitions rendered Argos positively more valuable as an ally to

the Athenians.

It was not so much, however, the inclination towards Argos, but the

growing wrath against Sparta, which furthered the philo-Argeian plans

of Alkibiadês; and when the Lacedæmonian envoy Andromedês arrived

at Athens from Bœotia, tendering to the Athenians the mere ruins of

Panaktum in exchange for Pylos; when it farther became known that

the Spartans had already concluded a special alliance with the

Bœotians without consulting Athens, the unmeasured expression of

displeasure in the Athenian ekklesia showed Alkibiadês that the time

was now come for bringing on a substantive decision. While he lent

his own voice to strengthen this discontent against Sparta, he at

the same time despatched a private intimation to his correspondents

at Argos, exhorting them, under assurances of success and promise of

his own strenuous aid, to send without delay an embassy to Athens

in conjunction with the Mantineians and Eleians, requesting to be

admitted as Athenian allies. The Argeians received this intimation

at the very moment when their citizens Eustrophus and Æson were

negotiating at Sparta for the renewal of the peace, having been sent

thither under great uneasiness lest Argos should be left without

allies to contend single-handed against the Lacedæmonians. But no

sooner was the unexpected chance held out to them of alliance with

Athens, a former friend, a democracy like their own, an imperial

state at sea, but not interfering with their own primacy in

Peloponnesus,—than they became careless of Eustrophus and Æson, and

despatched forthwith to Athens the embassy advised. It was a joint

embassy, Argeian, Eleian, and Mantineian:[66] the alliance between

these three cities had already been rendered more intimate by a

second treaty concluded since that treaty to which Corinth was a

party; but Corinth had refused all concern in the second.[67]

[66] Thucyd. v, 43.

[67] Thucyd. v, 48.

But the Spartans had been already alarmed by the harsh repulse of

their envoy Andromedês, and probably warned by reports from Nikias

and their other Athenian friends of the crisis impending respecting

alliance between Athens and Argos. Accordingly they sent off without

a moment’s delay three citizens extremely popular at Athens,[68]

Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius; with full powers to settle all

matters of difference. The envoys were instructed to deprecate all

alliance of Athens with Argos, to explain that the alliance of Sparta

with Bœotia had been concluded without any purpose or possibility of

evil to Athens, and at the same time to renew the demand that Pylos

should be restored to them in exchange for the demolished Panaktum.

Such was still the confidence of the Lacedæmonians in the strength

of assent at Athens, that they did not yet despair of obtaining

an affirmative, even to this very unequal proposition: and when

the three envoys, under the introduction and advice of Nikias, had

their first interview with the Athenian senate, preparatory to an

audience before the public assembly, the impression which they made,

on stating that they came with full powers of settlement, was highly

favorable. It was indeed so favorable, that Alkibiadês became alarmed

lest, if they made the same statement in the public assembly, holding

out the prospect of some trifling concessions, the philo-Laconian

party might determine public feeling to accept a compromise, and thus

preclude all idea of alliance with Argos.

[68] Thucyd. v, 44. Ἀφίκοντο δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις ~κατὰ

τάχος~, etc.

To obviate such a defeat of his plans, he resorted to a singular

manœuvre. One of the Lacedæmonian envoys, Endius, was his private

guest, by an ancient and particular intimacy subsisting between their

two families.[69] This probably assisted in procuring for him a

secret interview with the envoys, and enabled him to address them

with greater effect, on the day before the meeting of the public

assembly, and without the knowledge of Nikias. He accosted them in

the tone of a friend of Sparta, anxious that their proposition should

succeed; but he intimated that they would find the public assembly

turbulent and angry, very different from the tranquil demeanor of

the senate: so that if they proclaimed themselves to have come with

full powers of settlement, the people would burst out with fury, to

act upon their fears and bully them into extravagant concessions.

He therefore strongly urged them to declare that they had come,

not with any full powers of settlement, but merely to explain,

discuss, and report: the people would then find that they could gain

nothing by intimidation, explanations would be heard, and disputed

points be discussed with temper, and he (Alkibiadês) would speak

emphatically in their favor. He would advise, and felt confident

that he could persuade, the Athenians to restore Pylos, a step which

his opposition had hitherto been the chief means of preventing.

He gave them his solemn pledge—confirmed by an oath, according to

Plutarch—that he would adopt this conduct, if they would act upon his

counsel.[70] The envoys were much struck with the apparent sagacity

of these suggestions,[71] and still more delighted to find that the

man from whom they anticipated the most formidable opposition was

prepared to speak in their favor. His language obtained with them,

probably, the more ready admission and confidence, inasmuch as he

had volunteered his services to become the political agent of Sparta

only a few months before; and he appeared now to be simply resuming

that policy. They were sure of the support of Nikias and his party,

under all circumstances; if, by complying with the recommendation of

Alkibiadês, they could gain _his_ strenuous advocacy and influence

also, they fancied that their cause was sure of success. Accordingly,

they agreed to act upon his suggestion, not only without consulting

but without even warning Nikias, which was exactly what Alkibiadês

desired, and had probably required them to promise.

[69] Thucyd. viii, 6. Ἐνδίῳ τῷ ἐφορεύοντι πατρικὸς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα

φίλος—ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα Λακωνικὸν ἡ οἰκία αὐτῶν κατὰ τὴν ξενίαν

ἔσχεν· Ἔνδιος γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐκαλεῖτο.

I incline to suspect, from this passage, that the father of

Endius was not named Alkibiadês, but that Endius himself was

nevertheless named Ἔνδιος Ἀλκιβιάδου, in consequence of the

peculiar intimacy of connection with the Athenian family in

which that name occurred. If the father of Endius was really

named Alkibiadês, Endius himself would naturally, pursuant to

general custom, be styled Ἔνδιος Ἀλκιβιάδου: there would be

nothing in this denomination to call for the particular remark

of Thucydidês. But according to the view of the Scholiast and

most commentators, all that Thucydidês wishes to explain here is,

how the father of Endius came to receive the name of Alkibiadês.

Now if he had meant this, he surely would not have used the

terms which we read: the circumstance to be explained would then

have reference to the father of Endius, not to Endius himself,

nor to the family generally. His words imply that the family,

that is, each successive individual of the family, derived his

Laconian designation (not from the name of his father, but)

from his intimate connection of hospitality with the Athenian

family of Alkibiadês. Each successive individual attached to

his own personal name the genitive case Ἀλκιβιάδου, instead of

the genitive of his real father’s name. Doubtless this was an

anomaly in Grecian practice; but on the present occasion, we are

to expect something anomalous; had it not been such, Thucydidês

would not have stepped aside to particularize it.

[70] Thucyd. v, 45. Μηχανᾶται δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοῖονδέ τι ὁ

Ἀλκιβιάδης· τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους πείθει, ~πίστιν αὐτοῖς δοὺς~,

ἢν μὴ ὁμολογήσωσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ αὐτοκράτορες ἥκειν, Πύλον τε

αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν (~πείσειν γὰρ αὐτὸς Ἀθηναίους~, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν

ἀντιλέγειν) καὶ τἄλλα ξυναλλάξειν. Βουλόμενος δὲ αὐτοὺς Νικίου τε

ἀποστῆσαι ταῦτα ἔπραττε, καὶ ὅπως ~ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διαβαλὼν αὐτοὺς ὡς

οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἐν νῷ ἔχουσιν, οὐδὲ λέγουσιν οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ, τοὺς

Ἀργείους ξυμμάχους ποιήσῃ~.

[71] Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14). Ταῦτα δ’ εἰπὼν ~ὅρκους ἔδωκεν

αὐτοῖς~, καὶ μετέστησεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Νικίου παντάπασι πιστεύοντας

αὐτῷ, καὶ ~θαυμάζοντας ἅμα τὴν δεινότητα καὶ σύνεσιν~, ὡς οὐ τοῦ

τυχόντος ἀνδρὸς οὖσαν. Again, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

Next day, the public assembly met, and the envoys were introduced;

upon which Alkibiadês himself, in a tone of peculiar mildness, put

the question to them, upon what footing they came?[72] what powers

they brought with them? They immediately declared that they had

brought no full powers for treating and settlement, but only came

to explain and discuss. Nothing could exceed the astonishment with

which this declaration was heard. The senators present, to whom

these envoys a day or two before had publicly declared the distinct

contrary,—the assembled people, who, made aware of this previous

affirmation, had come prepared to hear the ultimatum of Sparta from

their lips,—lastly, most of all, Nikias himself,—their confidential

agent and probably their host at Athens,—who had doubtless announced

them as plenipotentiaries, and concerted with them the management

of their cases before the assembly,—all were alike astounded, and

none knew what to make of the words just heard. But the indignation

of the people equalled their astonishment: there was a unanimous

burst of wrath against the standing faithlessness and duplicity

of Lacedæmonians; never saying the same thing two days together.

To crown the whole, Alkibiadês himself affected to share all the

surprise of the multitude, and was even the loudest of them all in

invectives against the envoys; denouncing Lacedæmonian perfidy and

evil designs in language far more bitter than he had ever employed

before. Nor was this all:[73] he took advantage of the vehement

acclamation which welcomed these invectives to propose that the

Argeian envoys should be called in and the alliance with Argos

concluded forthwith. And this would certainly have been done, if a

remarkable phenomenon—an earthquake—had not occurred to prevent it;

causing the assembly to be adjourned to the next day, pursuant to a

religious scruple then recognized as paramount.

[72] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14. Ἐρωτώμενοι δ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου

~πάνυ φιλανθρώπως~, ἐφ’ οἷς ἀφιγμένοι τυγχάνουσιν, οὐκ ἔφασαν

ἥκειν αὐτοκράτορες.

[73] Thucyd. v, 45. Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ἠνείχοντο, ἀλλὰ

τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ~πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον καταβοῶντος τῶν

Λακεδαιμονίων~, ἐσήκουόν τε καὶ ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐθὺς παραγαγεῖν

τοὺς Ἀργείους, etc.

Compare Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14; and Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

This remarkable anecdote comes in all its main circumstances from

Thucydidês. It illustrates forcibly that unprincipled character which

will be found to attach to Alkibiadês through life, and presents

indeed an unblushing combination of impudence and fraud, which we

cannot better describe than by saying that it is exactly in the vein

of Fielding’s Jonathan Wild. In depicting Kleon and Hyperbolus,

historians vie with each other in strong language to mark the

impudence which is said to have been their peculiar characteristic.

Now we have no particular facts before us to measure the amount

of truth in this, though as a general charge it is sufficiently

credible. But we may affirm, with full assurance, that none of

the much-decried demagogues of Athens—not one of those sellers of

leather, lamps, sheep, ropes, pollard, and other commodities, upon

whom Aristophanês heaps so many excellent jokes—ever surpassed, if

they ever equalled, the impudence of this descendant of Æakus and

Zeus in his manner of overreaching and disgracing the Lacedæmonian

envoys. These latter, it must be added, display a carelessness of

public faith and consistency, a facility in publicly unsaying what

they have just before publicly said, and a treachery towards their

own confidential agent, which is truly surprising, and goes far to

justify the general charge of habitual duplicity so often alleged

against the Lacedæmonian character.[74]

[74] Euripid. Andromach. 445-455; Herodot. ix, 54.

The disgraced envoys would doubtless quit Athens immediately: but

this opportune earthquake gave Nikias a few hours to recover from

his unexpected overthrow. In the assembly of the next day, he still

contended that the friendship of Sparta was preferable to that of

Argos, and insisted on the prudence of postponing all consummation

of engagement with the latter until the real intentions of Sparta,

now so contradictory and inexplicable, should be made clear. He

contended that the position of Athens, in regard to the peace and

alliance, was that of superior honor and advantage; the position

of Sparta, one of comparative disgrace: Athens had thus a greater

interest than Sparta in maintaining what had been concluded. But he

at the same time admitted that a distinct and peremptory explanation

must be exacted from Sparta as to her intentions, and he requested

the people to send himself with some other colleagues to demand it.

The Lacedæmonians should be apprised that Argeian envoys were already

present in Athens with propositions, and that the Athenians might

already have concluded this alliance, if they could have permitted

themselves to do wrong to the existing alliance with Sparta. But

the Lacedæmonians, if their intentions were honorable, must show it

forthwith: 1. By restoring Panaktum, not demolished, but standing. 2.

By restoring Amphipolis also. 3. By renouncing their special alliance

with the Bœotians, unless the Bœotians on their side chose to become

parties to the peace with Athens.[75]

[75] Thucyd. v, 46.

The Athenian assembly, acquiescing in the recommendation of Nikias,

invested him with the commission which he required: a remarkable

proof, after the overpowering defeat of the preceding day, how strong

was the hold which he still retained upon them, and how sincere their

desire to keep on the best terms with Sparta. This was a last chance

granted to Nikias and his policy; a perfectly fair chance, since all

that was asked of Sparta was just; but it forced him to bring matters

to a decisive issue with her, and shut out all farther evasion. His

mission to Sparta failed altogether: the influence of Kleobûlus and

Xenarês, the anti-Athenian ephors, was found predominant, so that

not one of his demands was complied with. And even when he formally

announced that unless Sparta renounced her special alliance with the

Bœotians or compelled the Bœotians to accept the peace with Athens,

the Athenians would immediately contract alliance with Argos, the

menace produced no effect. He could only obtain, and that too as a

personal favor to himself, that the oaths as they stood should be

formally renewed; an empty concession, which covered but faintly the

humiliation of his retreat to Athens. The Athenian assembly listened

to his report with strong indignation against the Lacedæmonians, and

with marked displeasure even against himself, as the great author and

voucher of this unperformed treaty; while Alkibiadês was permitted

to introduce the envoys—already at hand in the city—from Argos,

Mantineia, and Elis, with whom a pact was at once concluded.[76]

[76] Thucyd. v, 46; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

The words of this, which Thucydidês gives us doubtless from the

record on the public column, comprise two engagements; one for peace,

another for alliance.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, have concluded a

treaty of peace by sea and by land, without fraud or mischief, each

for themselves and for the allies over whom each exercise empire.[77]

[The express terms in which these states announce themselves as

imperial states and their allies as dependencies, deserve notice. No

such words appear in the treaty between Athens and Lacedæmon. I have

already mentioned that the main ground of discontent on the part of

Mantineia and Elis towards Sparta, was connected with their imperial

power.]

[77] Thucyd. v, 47. ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν

ἑκάτεροι.

Neither of them shall bear arms against the other for purposes of

damage.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, shall be allies

with each other for one hundred years. If any enemy shall invade

Attica, the three contracting cities shall lend the most vigorous aid

in their power at the invitation of Athens. Should the forces of the

invading city damage Attica and then retire, the three will proclaim

that city their enemy and attack it: neither of the four shall in

that case suspend the war, without consent of the others.

Reciprocal obligations imposed upon Athens, in case Argos, Mantineia,

or Elis, shall be attacked.

Neither of the four contracting powers shall grant passage to troops

through their own territory, or the territory of allies over whom

they may at the time be exercising command, either by land or sea,

unless upon joint resolution.[78]

[78] Thucyd. v, 48. καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ~ὧν ἂν ἄρχουσιν~ ἕκαστοι.

The tense and phrase here deserve notice, as contrasted with the

phrase in the former part of the treaty—τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ~ἄρχουσιν~

ἑκάτεροι.

The clause imposing actual obligation to hinder the passage of

troops, required to be left open for application to the actual

time.

In case auxiliary troops shall be required and sent under this

treaty, the city sending shall furnish their maintenance for the

space of thirty days, from the day of their entrance upon the

territory of the city requiring. Should their services be needed for

a longer period, the city requiring shall furnish their maintenance,

at the rate of three Æginæan oboli for each hoplite, light-armed or

archer, and of one Æginæan drachma or six oboli for each horseman,

per day. The city requiring shall possess the command, so long as the

service required shall be in her territory. But if any expedition

shall be undertaken by joint resolution, then the command shall be

shared equally between all.

Such were the substantive conditions of the new alliance. Provision

was then made for the oaths,—by whom? where? when? in what words?

how often? they were to be taken. Athens was to swear on behalf of

herself and her allies; but Argos, Elis, and Mantineia, with their

respective allies, were to swear by separate cities. The oaths were

to be renewed every four years; by Athens, within thirty days before

each Olympic festival, at Argos, Elis, and Mantineia; by these three

cities, at Athens, ten days before each festival of the greater

Panathenæa. “The words of the treaty of peace and alliance, and the

oaths sworn, shall be engraven on stone columns, and put up in the

temples of each of the four cities; and also upon a brazen column, to

be put up by joint cost at Olympia, for the festival now approaching.”

“The four cities may, by joint consent, make any change they please

in the provisions of this treaty, without violating their oaths.”[79]

[79] Thucyd. v, 47.

The conclusion of this new treaty introduced a greater degree of

complication into the grouping and association of the Grecian cities

than had ever before been known. The ancient Spartan confederacy,

and the Athenian empire still subsisted. A peace had been concluded

between them, ratified by the formal vote of the majority of the

confederates, yet not accepted by several of the minority. Not

merely peace, but also special alliance had been concluded between

Athens and Sparta; and a special alliance between Sparta and Bœotia.

Corinth, member of the Spartan confederacy, was also member of a

defensive alliance with Argos, Mantineia, and Elis; which three

states had concluded a more intimate alliance, first with each other

(without Corinth), and now recently with Athens. Yet both Athens and

Sparta still retained the alliance[80] concluded between themselves,

without formal rupture on either side, though Athens still complained

that the treaty had not been fulfilled. No relations whatever

subsisted between Argos and Sparta. Between Athens and Bœotia there

was an armistice terminable at ten days’ notice. Lastly, Corinth

could not be prevailed upon, in spite of repeated solicitation from

the Argeians, to join the new alliance of Athens with Argos: so

that no relations subsisted between Corinth and Athens; while the

Corinthians began, though faintly, to resume their former tendencies

towards Sparta.[81]

[80] Thucyd. v, 48.

[81] Thucyd. v, 48-50.

The alliance between Athens and Argos, of which particulars have

just been given, was concluded not long before the Olympic festival

of the 90th Olympiad, or 420 B.C.: the festival being about the

beginning of July, the treaty might be in May.[82] That festival

was memorable, on more than one ground. It was the first which had

been celebrated since the conclusion of the peace, the leading

clause of which had been expressly introduced to guarantee to all

Greeks free access to the great Pan-Hellenic temples, with liberty

of sacrificing, consulting the oracle, and witnessing the matches.

For the last eleven years, including two Olympic festivals, Athens

herself, and apparently all the numerous allies of Athens, had been

excluded from sending their solemn legation, or theôry, and from

attending as spectators, at the Olympic games.[83] Now that such

exclusion was removed, and that the Eleian heralds (who came to

announce the approaching games and proclaim the truce connected with

them) again trod the soil of Attica,—the Athenian visit was felt

both by themselves and by others as a novelty. Some curiosity was

entertained to see what figure the theôry of Athens would make as

to show and splendor. Nor were there wanting spiteful rumors, that

Athens had been so much impoverished by the war, as to be prevented

from appearing with appropriate magnificence at the altar and in the

presence of Olympic Zeus.

[82] Καταθέντων δὲ καὶ Ὀλυμπίασι στήλην χαλκῆν κοινῇ ~Ὀλυμπίοις

τοῖς νυνί~ (Thucyd. v, 47), words of the treaty.

[83] Dorieus of Rhodes was victor in the Pankration, both in

Olymp. 88 and 89, (428-424 B.C.). Rhodes was included among the

tributary allies of Athens. But the athletes who came to contend

were privileged and (as it were) sacred persons, who were never

molested or hindered from coming to the festival, if they chose

to come, under any state of war. Their inviolability was never

disturbed even down to the harsh proceeding of Aratus (Plutarch,

Aratus, c. 28).

But this does not prove that Rhodian visitors generally, or a

Rhodian theôry, could have come to Olympia between 431-421 in

safety.

From the presence of individuals, even as spectators, little

can be inferred: because, even at this very Olympic festival of

420 B.C., Lichas the Spartan was present as a spectator, though

all Lacedæmonians were formally excluded by proclamation of the

Eleians (Thucyd. v, 50).

Alkibiadês took pride in silencing these surmises, as well as in

glorifying his own name and person, by a display more imposing than

had ever been previously beheld. He had already distinguished himself

in the local festivals and liturgies of Athens by an ostentation

surpassing Athenian rivals: but he now felt himself standing

forward as the champion and leader of Athens before Greece. He had

discredited his political rival Nikias, given a new direction to

the politics of Athens by the Argeian alliance, and was about to

commence a series of intra-Peloponnesian operations against the

Lacedæmonians. On all these grounds he determined that his first

appearance on the plain of Olympia should impose upon all beholders.

The Athenian theôry, of which he was a member, was set out with

first-rate splendor, and with the amplest show of golden ewers,

censers, etc., for the public sacrifice and procession.[84] But when

the chariot-races came on, Alkibiadês himself appeared as competitor

at his own cost,—not merely with one well-equipped chariot and four,

which the richest Greeks had hitherto counted as an extraordinary

personal glory, but with the prodigious number of seven distinct

chariots, each with a team of four horses. And so superior was their

quality, that one of his chariots gained a first prize, and another

a second prize, so that Alkibiadês was twice crowned with sprigs of

the sacred olive-tree, and twice proclaimed by the herald. Another of

his seven chariots also came in fourth: but no crown or proclamation,

it seems, was awarded to any after the second in order. We must

recollect that he had competitors from all parts of Greece to contend

against, not merely private men, but even despots and governments.

Nor was this all. The tent which the Athenian theôrs provided for

their countrymen, visitors to the games, was handsomely adorned;

but a separate tent, which Alkibiadês himself provided for a public

banquet to celebrate his triumph, together with the banquet itself,

was set forth on a scale still more stately and expensive. The rich

allies of Athens—Ephesus, Chios, and Lesbos—are said to have lent him

their aid in enhancing this display. It is highly probable that they

would be glad to cultivate his favor, as he had now become one of

the first men in Athens, and was in an ascendent course. But we must

farther recollect that they, as well as Athens, had been excluded

from the Olympic festival, so that their own feelings on first

returning might well prompt them to take a genuine interest in this

imposing reappearance of the Ionic race at the common sanctuary of

Hellas.

[84] Of the taste and elegance with which these exhibitions were

usually got up in Athens, surpassing generally every other city

in Greece, see a remarkable testimony in Xenophon, Memorabil.

iii, 3, 12.

Five years afterwards, on an important discussion which will be

hereafter described, Alkibiadês maintained publicly before the

Athenian assembly that his unparalleled Olympic display had produced

an effect upon the Grecian mind highly beneficial to Athens;[85]

dissipating the suspicions entertained that she was ruined by the

war, and establishing beyond dispute her vast wealth and power. He

was doubtless right to a considerable extent; though not sufficient

to repel the charge from himself, which it was his purpose to do,

both of overweening personal vanity, and of that reckless expenditure

which he would be compelled to try and overtake by peculation

or violence at the public cost. All the unfavorable impressions

suggested to prudent Athenians by his previous life, were aggravated

by this stupendous display; much more, of course, the jealousy and

hatred of personal competitors. And this feeling was not the less

real, though as a political man he was now in the full tide of public

favor.

[85] Thucyd. vi, 16. Οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν μείζω ἡμῶν

τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν τῷ ἐμῷ διαπρεπεῖ τῆς Ὀλυμπίαζε θεωρίας,

~πρότερον ἐλπίζοντες αὐτὴν καταπεπολεμῆσθαι~· διότι ἅρματα

μὲν ἑπτὰ καθῆκα, ὅσα οὐδείς πω ἰδιώτης πρότερον, ἐνίκησά τε,

καὶ δεύτερος καὶ τέταρτος ἐγενόμην, καὶ τἄλλα ἀξίως τῆς νίκης

παρεσκευασάμην.

The full force of this grandiose display cannot be felt unless

we bring to our minds the special position both of Athens and

the Athenian allies towards Olympia,—and of Alkibiadês himself

towards Athens, Argos, and the rest of Greece,—in the first half

of the year 420 B.C.

Alkibiadês obtained from Euripidês the honor of an epinikian

ode, or song of triumph, to celebrate this event; of which a few

lines are preserved by Plutarch (Alkib. c. 11). It is curious

that the poet alleges Alkibiadês to have been first, second, and

_third_, in the course; while Alkibiadês himself, more modest

and doubtless more exact, pretends only to first, second, and

_fourth_. Euripidês informs us that Alkibiadês was crowned twice

and proclaimed twice—δὶς στεφθέντ’ ἐλαίᾳ κάρυκι βοᾷν παραδοῦναι.

Reiske, Coray, and Schäfer, have thought it right to alter this

word δὶς to τρὶς, without any authority, which completely alters

the asserted fact. Sintenis in his edition of Plutarch has

properly restored the word δὶς.

How long the recollection of this famous Olympic festival

remained in the Athenian public mind, is attested partly by the

Oratio de Bigis of Isokratês, composed in defence of the son

of Alkibiadês at least twenty-five years afterwards, perhaps

more. Isokratês repeats the loose assertion of Euripidês,

πρῶτος, δεύτερος, and τρίτος (Or. xvi, p. 353, sect. 40). The

spurious Oration called that of Andokidês against Alkibiadês

also preserves many of the current tales, some of which I

have admitted into the text, because I think them probable in

themselves, and because that oration itself may reasonably be

believed to be a composition of the middle of the fourth century

B.C. That oration puts all the proceedings of Alkibiadês in a

very invidious temper and with palpable exaggeration. The story

of Alkibiadês having robbed an Athenian named Diomêdês of a fine

chariot, appears to be a sort of variation on the story about

Tisias, which figures in the oration of Isokratês; see Andokid.

cont. Alkib. sect. 26: possibly Alkibiadês may have left one of

the teams not paid for. The aid lent to Alkibiadês by the Chians,

Ephesians, etc., as described in that oration, is likely to be

substantially true, and may easily be explained. Compare Athenæ.

i, p. 3.

Our information about the arrangements of the chariot-racing at

Olympia is very imperfect. We do not distinctly know how the

seven chariots of Alkibiadês ran,—in how many races,—for all the

seven could not, in my judgment, have run in one and the same

race. There must have been many other chariots to run, belonging

to other competitors: and it seems difficult to believe that ever

a greater number than ten can have run in the same race, since

the course involved going _twelve_ times round the goal (Pindar,

Ol. iii, 33; vi, 75). Ten competing chariots run in the race

described by Sophoklês (Electr. 708), and if we could venture to

construe strictly the expression of the poet,—~δέκατον ἐκπληρῶν~

ὄχον,—it would seem that ten was the extreme number permitted to

run. Even so great a number as ten was replete with danger to

the persons engaged, as may be seen by reading the description

in Sophoklês (compare Demosth. Ἐρωτ. Λογ. p. 1410), who refers

indeed to a Pythian and not an Olympic solemnity: but the main

circumstances must have been common to both; and we know that the

twelve turns (δωδεκάγναμπτον δωδεκάδρομον) _were_ common to both

(Pindar, Pyth. v, 31).

Alkibiadês was not the only person who gained a chariot victory

at this 90th Olympiad, 420 B.C. Lichas the Lacedæmonian also

gained one (Thucyd. v, 50), though the chariot was obliged to be

entered in another name, since the Lacedæmonians were interdicted

from attendance.

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 316)

says: “We are not aware that the Olympiad, in which these

chariot-victories of Alkibiadês were gained, can be distinctly

fixed. But it was probably Olymp. 89, B.C. 424.”

In my judgment, both Olymp. 88 (B.C. 428) and Olymp. 89 (B.C.

424) are excluded from the possible supposition, by the fact that

the general war was raging at both periods. To suppose that in

the midst of the summer of these two fighting years, there was an

Olympic truce for a month, allowing Athens and her allies to send

thither their solemn legations, their chariots for competition,

and their numerous individual visitors, appears to me contrary

to all probability. The Olympic month of B.C. 424, would occur

just about the time when Brasidas was at the Isthmus levying

troops for his intended expedition to Thrace, and when he rescued

Megara from the Athenian attack. This would not be a very quiet

time for the peaceable Athenian visitors, with the costly display

of gold and silver plate and the ostentatious theôry, to pass

by, on its way to Olympia. During the time when the Spartans

occupied Dekeleia, the solemn processions of communicants at the

Eleusinian mysteries could never march along the Sacred Way from

Athens to Eleusis. Xen. Hell. i, 4, 20.

Moreover, we see that the very first article both of the Truce

for one year and of the Peace of Nikias, expressly stipulate

for liberty to all to attend the common temples and festivals.

The first of the two relates to Delphi expressly: the second is

general, and embraces Olympia as well as Delphi. If the Athenians

had visited Olympia in 428 or 424 B.C. without impediment, these

stipulations in the treaties would have no purpose nor meaning.

But the fact of their standing in the front of the treaty, proves

that they were looked upon as of much interest and importance.

I have placed the Olympic festival wherein Alkibiadês contended

with his seven chariots, in 420 B.C., in the peace, but

immediately after the war. No other festival appears to me at all

suitable.

Dr. Thirlwall farther assumes, as a matter of course, that there

was only _one_ chariot-race at this Olympic festival, that all

the seven chariots of Alkibiadês ran in this one race, and that

in the festival of 420 B.C., Lichas gained _the_ prize: thus

implying that Alkibiadês could not have gained the prize at the

same festival.

I am not aware that there is any evidence to prove either of

these three propositions. To me they all appear improbable and

unfounded.

We know from Pausanias (vi, 13, 2) that even in the case of the

stadiodromi, or runners who contended in the stadium, all were

not brought out in one race. They were distributed into sets, or

batches, of what number we know not. Each set ran its own heat,

and the victors in each then competed with each other in a fresh

heat; so that the victor who gained the grand final prize was

sure to have won two heats.

Now if this practice was adopted with the foot-runners, much

more would it be likely to be adopted with the chariot-racers in

case many chariots were brought to the same festival. The danger

would be lessened, the sport would be increased, and the glory

of the competitors enhanced. The Olympic festival lasted five

days, a long time to provide amusement for so vast a crowd of

spectators. Alkibiadês and Lichas may therefore both have gained

chariot-victories at the same festival: of course only one of

them can have gained the grand final prize, and which of the two

that was it is impossible to say.

If the festival of the 90th Olympiad was peculiarly distinguished

by the reappearance of Athenians and those connected with them, it

was marked by a farther novelty yet more striking, the exclusion of

the Lacedæmonians. This exclusion was the consequence of the new

political interests of the Eleians, combined with their increased

consciousness of force arising out of the recent alliance with Argos,

Athens, and Mantineia. It has already been mentioned that since the

peace with Athens, the Lacedæmonians, acting as arbitrators in the

case of Lepreum, which the Eleians claimed as their dependency,

had declared it to be autonomous, and had sent a body of troops to

defend it. Probably the Eleians had recently renewed their attacks

upon the district, since the junction with their new allies; for

the Lacedæmonians had detached thither a fresh body of one thousand

hoplites immediately prior to the Olympic festival. Out of the

mission of this fresh detachment the sentence of exclusion arose. The

Eleians were privileged administrators of the festival, regulating

the details of the ceremony itself, and formally proclaiming by

heralds the commencement of the Olympic truce during which all

violation of the Eleian territory by an armed force was a sin against

the majesty of Zeus. On the present occasion they affirmed that the

Lacedæmonians had sent the one thousand hoplites into Lepreum, and

had captured a fort called Phyrkus, both Eleian possessions, after

the proclamation of the truce. They accordingly imposed upon Sparta

the fine prescribed by the “Olympian law,” of two minæ for each man,

two thousand minæ in all; a part to Zeus Olympius, a part to the

Eleians themselves. During the interval between the proclamation of

the truce and the commencement of the festival, the Lacedæmonians

sent to remonstrate against this fine, which they alleged to have

been unjustly imposed, inasmuch as the heralds had not yet proclaimed

the truce at Sparta when the hoplites reached Lepreum. The Eleians

replied that the truce had already at that time been proclaimed among

themselves (for they always proclaimed it first at home, before

their heralds crossed the borders), so that _they_ were interdicted

from all military operations; of which the Lacedæmonian hoplites

had taken advantage to commit their last aggressions. To which the

Lacedæmonians rejoined, that the behavior of the Eleians themselves

contradicted their own allegation, for they had sent the Eleian

heralds to Sparta to proclaim the truce after they knew of the

sending of the hoplites, thus showing that they did not consider the

truce to have been already violated. The Lacedæmonians added, that

after the herald reached Sparta, they had taken no farther military

measures. How the truth stood in this disputed question, we have no

means of deciding. But the Eleians rejected the explanation, though

offering, if the Lacedæmonians would restore to them Lepreum, to

forego such part of the fine as would accrue to themselves, and to

pay out of their own treasury on behalf of the Lacedæmonians the

portion which belonged to the god. This new proposition being alike

refused, was again modified by the Eleians. They intimated that they

would be satisfied if the Lacedæmonians, instead of paying the fine

at once, would publicly on the altar at Olympia, in presence of the

assembled Greeks, take an oath to pay it at a future date. But the

Lacedæmonians would not listen to the proposition either of payment

or of promise. Accordingly the Eleians, as judges under the Olympic

law, interdicted them from the temple of Olympic Zeus, from the

privilege of sacrificing there, and from attendance and competition

at the games; that is, from attendance in the form of the sacred

legation called theôry, occupying a formal and recognized place at

the solemnity.[86]

[86] Thucyd. v, 49, 50.

As all the other Grecian states—with the single exception of

Lepreum—were present by their theôries[87] as well as by individual

spectators, so the Spartan theôry “shone by its absence” in a

manner painfully and insultingly conspicuous. So extreme, indeed,

was the affront put upon the Lacedæmonians, connected as they were

with Olympia by a tie ancient, peculiar, and never yet broken; so

pointed the evidence of that comparative degradation into which

they had fallen, through the peace with Athens coming at the back

of the Sphakterian disaster,[88] that they were supposed likely

to set the exclusion at defiance; and to escort their theôrs into

the temple at Olympia for sacrifice, under the protection of an

armed force. The Eleians even thought it necessary to put their

younger hoplites under arms, and to summon to their aid one thousand

hoplites from Mantineia as well as the same number from Argos, for

the purpose of repelling this probable attack: while a detachment

of Athenian cavalry were stationed at Argos during the festival,

to lend assistance in case of need. The alarm prevalent among the

spectators of the festival was most serious, and became considerably

aggravated by an incident which occurred after the chariot racing.

Lichas,[89] a Lacedæmonian of great wealth and consequence, had a

chariot running in the lists, which he was obliged to enter, not in

his own name, but in the name of the Bœotian federation. The sentence

of exclusion hindered him from taking any ostensible part, but it did

not hinder him from being present as a spectator; and when he saw

his chariot proclaimed victorious under the title of Bœotian, his

impatience to make himself known became uncontrollable. He stepped

into the midst of the lists, and placed a chaplet on the head of

the charioteer, thus advertising himself as the master. This was a

flagrant indecorum and known violation of the order of the festival:

accordingly, the official attendants with their staffs interfered at

once in performance of their duty, chastising and driving him back to

his place with blows.[90] Hence arose an increased apprehension of

armed Lacedæmonian interference. None such took place, however: the

Lacedæmonians, for the first and last time in their history, offered

their Olympic sacrifice at home, and the festival passed off without

any interruption.[91] The boldness of the Eleians in putting this

affront upon the most powerful state in Greece is so astonishing,

that we can hardly be mistaken in supposing their proceeding to have

been suggested by Alkibiadês and encouraged by the armed aid from the

allies. He was at this moment not less ostentatious in humiliating

Sparta than in showing off Athens.

[87] Thucyd. v, 50. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν εἴργοντο τοῦ ἱεροῦ, θυσίας

καὶ ἀγώνων, καὶ οἴκοι ἔθυον· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ἐθεώρουν, πλὴν

Λεπρεατῶν.

[88] Thucyd. v, 28. Κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἥ τε Λακεδαίμων

μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουσε, καὶ ὑπερώφθη διὰ τὰς ξυμφορὰς, οἵ τε

Ἀργεῖοι ἄριστα ἔσχον τοῖς πᾶσι, etc.

[89] See a previous note, p. 56.

[90] Thucyd. v, 50. Λίχας ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι

ὑπὸ τῶν ῥαβδούχων πληγὰς ἔλαβεν, ὅτι νικῶντος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ζεύγους,

καὶ ἀνακηρυχθέντος Βοιωτῶν δημοσίου κατὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐξουσίαν τῆς

ἀγωνίσεως προελθὼν ἐς τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀνέδησε τὸν ἡνίοχον, βουλόμενος

δηλῶσαι ὅτι ἑαυτοῦ ἦν τὸ ἅρμα.

We see by comparison with this incident how much less rough and

harsh was the manner of dealing at Athens, and in how much more

serious a light blows to the person were considered. At the

Athenian festival of the Dionysia, if a person committed disorder

or obtruded himself into a place not properly belonging to him

in the theatre, the archon or his officials were both empowered

and required to repress the disorder by turning the person out,

and fining him, if necessary. But they were upon no account to

strike him. If they did, they were punishable themselves by the

dikastery afterwards (Demosth. cont. Meidiam, c. 49).

[91] It will be seen, however, that the Lacedæmonians remembered

and revenged themselves upon the Eleians for this insult twelve

years afterwards during the plenitude of their power (Xenoph.

Hellen. iii, 2, 21; Diodor. xiv, 17).

Of the depressed influence and estimation of Sparta, a farther

proof was soon afforded by the fate of her colony, the Trachinian

Herakleia, established near Thermopylæ, in the third year of the

war. That colony—though at first comprising a numerous body of

settlers, in consequence of the general trust in Lacedæmonian power,

and though always under the government of a Lacedæmonian harmost—had

never prospered. It had been persecuted from the beginning by

the neighboring tribes, and administered with harshness as well

as peculation by its governors. The establishment of the town had

been regarded from the beginning by the neighbors, especially

the Thessalians, as an invasion of their territory; and their

hostilities, always vexatious, had, in the winter succeeding the

Olympic festival just described, been carried to a greater point of

violence than ever. They had defeated the Herakleots in a ruinous

battle, and slain Xenarês the Lacedæmonian governor. But though the

place was so reduced as to be unable to maintain itself without

foreign aid, Sparta was too much embarrassed by Peloponnesian enemies

and waverers to be able to succor it; and the Bœotians, observing her

inability, became apprehensive that the interference of Athens would

be invoked. Accordingly they thought it prudent to occupy Herakleia

with a body of Bœotian troops, dismissing the Lacedæmonian governor

Hegesippidas for alleged misconduct. Nor could the Lacedæmonians

prevent this proceeding, though it occasioned them to make indignant

remonstrance.[92]

[92] Thucyd. v, 51, 52.

History of Greece, Volume 07 (of 12) · 第 3 / 13 章