FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE OLYMPIC FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD NINETY.
My last chapter and last volume terminated with the peace called the
Peace of Nikias, concluded in March 421 B.C., between Athens and the
Spartan confederacy, for fifty years.
This peace—negotiated during the autumn and winter succeeding the
defeat of the Athenians at Amphipolis, wherein both Kleon and
Brasidas were slain—resulted partly from the extraordinary anxiety
of the Spartans to recover their captives who had been taken at
Sphakteria, partly from the discouragement of the Athenians, leading
them to listen to the peace-party who acted with Nikias. The general
principle adopted for the peace was, the restitution by both parties
of what had been acquired by war, yet excluding such places as had
been surrendered by capitulation: according to which reserve the
Athenians, while prevented from recovering Platæa, continued to hold
Nisæa, the harbor of Megara. The Lacedæmonians engaged to restore
Amphipolis to Athens, and to relinquish their connection with the
revolted allies of Athens in Thrace; that is, Argilus, Stageirus,
Akanthus, Skôlus, Olynthus, and Spartôlus. These six cities, however,
were not to be enrolled as allies of Athens unless they chose
voluntarily to become so, but only to pay regularly to Athens the
tribute originally assessed by Aristeidês, as a sort of recompense
for the protection of the Ægean sea against private war or piracy.
Any inhabitant of Amphipolis or the other cities, who chose to leave
them, was at liberty to do so, and to carry away his property.
Farther, the Lacedæmonians covenanted to restore Panaktum to Athens,
together with all the Athenian prisoners in their possession. As to
Skiônê, Torônê, and Sermylus, the Athenians were declared free to
take their own measures. On their part, they engaged to release all
captives in their hands, either of Sparta or her allies; to restore
Pylus, Kythêra, Methônê, Pteleon, and Atalantê; and to liberate all
the Peloponnesian or Brasidean soldiers now under blockade in Skiônê.
Provision was also made, by special articles, that all Greeks should
have free access to the sacred Pan-Hellenic festivals, either by
land or sea; and that the autonomy of the Delphian temple should be
guaranteed.
The contracting parties swore to abstain in future from all injury
to each other, and to settle by amicable decision any dispute which
might arise.[1]
[1] Thucyd. v, 17-29.
Lastly, it was provided that if any matter should afterwards occur
as having been forgotten, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians might by
mutual consent amend the treaty as they thought fit. So prepared, the
oaths were interchanged between seventeen principal Athenians and as
many principal Lacedæmonians.
Earnestly bent as Sparta herself was upon the peace, and ratified as
it had been by the vote of a majority among her confederates, still,
there was a powerful minority who not only refused their assent
but strenuously protested against its conditions. The Corinthians
were discontented because they did not receive back Sollium and
Anaktorium; the Megarians, because they did not regain Nisæa; the
Bœotians, because Panaktum was to be restored to Athens: the Eleians
also on some other ground which we do not distinctly know. All of
them, moreover, took common offence at the article which provided
that Athens and Sparta might, by mutual consent, and without
consulting the allies, amend the treaty in any way that they thought
proper.[2] Though the peace was sworn, therefore, the most powerful
members of the Spartan confederacy remained all recusant.
[2] Thucyd. v, 18.
So strong was the interest of the Spartans themselves, however,
that having obtained the favorable vote of the majority, they
resolved to carry the peace through, even at the risk of breaking
up the confederacy. Besides the earnest desire of recovering their
captives from the Athenians, they were farther alarmed by the fact
that their truce for thirty years concluded with Argos was just now
expiring. They had indeed made application to Argos for renewing it,
through Lichas the Spartan proxenus of that city. But the Argeians
had refused, except upon the inadmissible condition that the border
territory of Kynuria should be ceded to them: there was reason to
fear therefore that this new and powerful force might be thrown into
the scale of Athens, if war were allowed to continue.[3]
[3] Thucyd. v, 14, 22, 76.
Accordingly, no sooner had the peace been sworn than the Spartans
proceeded to execute its provisions. Lots being drawn to determine
whether Sparta or Athens should be the first to make the cessions
required, the Athenians drew the favorable lot: an advantage so very
great, under the circumstances, that Theophrastus affirmed Nikias to
have gained the point by bribery. There is no ground for believing
such alleged bribery; the rather, as we shall presently find Nikias
gratuitously throwing away most of the benefit which the lucky lot
conferred.[4]
[4] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.
The Spartans began their compliance by forthwith releasing all
the Athenian prisoners in their hands, and despatching Ischagoras
with two other envoys to Amphipolis and the Thracian towns. These
envoys were directed to proclaim the peace as well as to enforce
its observance upon the Thracian towns, and especially to command
Klearidas, the Spartan commander in Amphipolis, that he should
surrender the town to the Athenians. But on arriving in Thrace, these
envoys met with nothing but unanimous opposition: and so energetic
were the remonstrances of the Chalkidians, both in Amphipolis and out
of it, that even Klearidas refused obedience to his own government,
pretending that he was not strong enough to surrender the place
against the resistance of the Chalkidians. Thus completely baffled,
the envoys returned to Sparta, whither Klearidas thought it prudent
to accompany them, partly to explain his own conduct, partly in hopes
of being able to procure some modification of the terms. But he found
this impossible, and he was sent back to Amphipolis with peremptory
orders to surrender the place to the Athenians, if it could possibly
be done; if that should prove beyond his force, then to come away,
and bring home every Peloponnesian soldier in the garrison. Perhaps
the surrender was really impracticable to a force no greater
than that which Klearidas commanded, since the reluctance of the
population was doubtless obstinate. At any rate, he represented it to
be impracticable: the troops accordingly came home, but the Athenians
still remained excluded from Amphipolis, and all the stipulations of
the peace respecting the Thracian towns remained unperformed. Nor
was this all. The envoys from the recusant minority (Corinthians and
others), after having gone home for instructions, had now come back
to Sparta with increased repugnance and protest against the injustice
of the peace, so that all the efforts of the Spartans to bring them
to compliance were fruitless.[5]
[5] Thucyd. v, 21, 22.
The latter were now in serious embarrassment. Not having executed
their portion of the treaty, they could not demand that Athens should
execute hers: and they were threatened with the double misfortune of
forfeiting the confidence of their allies without acquiring any one
of the advantages of the treaty. In this dilemma they determined to
enter into closer relations, and separate relations, with Athens,
at all hazard of offending their allies. Of the enmity of Argos,
if unaided by Athens, they had little apprehension; while the
moment was now favorable for alliance with Athens, from the decided
pacific tendencies reigning on both sides, as well as from the
known philo-Laconian sentiment of the leaders Nikias and Lachês.
The Athenian envoys had remained at Sparta ever since the swearing
of the peace, awaiting the fulfilment of the conditions; Nikias
or Lachês, one or both, being very probably among them. When they
saw that Sparta was unable to fulfil her bond, so that the treaty
seemed likely to be cancelled, they would doubtless encourage, and
perhaps may even have suggested, the idea of a separate alliance
between Sparta and Athens, as the only expedient for covering the
deficiency; promising that under that alliance the Spartan captives
should be restored. Accordingly, a treaty was concluded between the
two, for fifty years; not merely of peace, but of defensive alliance.
Each party pledged itself to assist in repelling any invaders of
the territory of the other, to treat them as enemies, and not to
conclude peace with them without the consent of the other. This was
the single provision of the alliance, with one addition, however,
of no mean importance, for the security of Lacedæmon. The Athenians
engaged to lend their best and most energetic aid in putting down any
rising of the Helots which might occur in Laconia. Such a provision
indicates powerfully the uneasiness felt by the Lacedæmonians
respecting their serf-population: but at the present moment it was of
peculiar value to them, since it bound the Athenians to restrain, if
not to withdraw, the Messenian garrison of Pylos, planted there by
themselves for the express purpose of provoking the Helots to revolt.
An alliance with stipulations so few and simple took no long time
to discuss. It was concluded very speedily after the return of the
envoys from Amphipolis, probably not more than a month or two after
the former peace. It was sworn to by the same individuals on both
sides; with similar declaration that the oath should be annually
renewed, and also with similar proviso that Sparta and Athens might
by mutual consent either enlarge or contract the terms, without
violating the oath.[6] Moreover, the treaty was directed to be
inscribed on two columns: one to be set up in the temple of Apollo at
Amyklæ, the other in the temple of Athênê, in the acropolis of Athens.
[6] Thucyd. v, 23. The treaty of alliance seems to have been
drawn up at Sparta, and approved or concerted with the Athenian
envoys; then sent to Athens, and there adopted by the people;
then sworn to on both sides. The interval between this second
treaty and the first (οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον, v, 24), may have been
more than a month; for it comprised the visit of the Lacedæmonian
envoys to Amphipolis and the other towns of Thrace, the
manifestation of resistance in those towns, and the return of
Klearidas to Sparta to give an account of his conduct.
The most important result of this new alliance was something
not specified in its provisions, but understood, we may be well
assured, between the Spartan ephors and Nikias at the time when it
was concluded. All the Spartan captives at Athens were forthwith
restored.[7]
[7] Thucyd. v, 24.
Nothing can demonstrate more powerfully the pacific and acquiescent
feeling now reigning at Athens, as well as the strong philo-Laconian
inclinations of her leading men (at this moment Alkibiadês was
competing with Nikias for the favor of Sparta, as will be stated
presently), than the terms of this alliance, which bound Athens to
assist in keeping down the Helots, and the still more important
after-proceeding, of restoring the Spartan captives. Athens thus
parted irrevocably with her best card, and promised to renounce her
second best, without obtaining the smallest equivalent beyond what
was contained in the oath of Sparta to become her ally. For the last
three years and a half, ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the
possession of these captives had placed her in a position of decided
advantage in regard to her chief enemy; advantage, however, which
had to a certain extent been countervailed by subsequent losses.
This state of things was fairly enough represented by the treaty of
peace deliberately discussed during the winter, and sworn to at the
commencement of spring, whereby a string of concessions, reciprocal
and balancing, had been imposed on both parties. Moreover, Athens had
been lucky enough in drawing lots to find herself enabled to wait for
the actual fulfilment of such concessions by the Spartans, before
she consummated her own. Now the Spartans had not as yet realized
any one of their promised concessions: nay, more; in trying to do
so, they had displayed such a want either of power or of will, as
made it plain, that nothing short of the most stringent necessity
would convert their promises into realities. Yet, under these marked
indications, Nikias persuades his countrymen to conclude a second
treaty which practically annuls the first, and which insures to
the Spartans gratuitously all the main benefits of the first, with
little or none of the correlative sacrifices. The alliance of Sparta
could hardly be said to count as a consideration: for that alliance
was at this moment, under the uncertain relations with Argos, not
less valuable to Sparta herself than to Athens. There can be little
doubt that, if the game of Athens had now been played with prudence,
she might have recovered Amphipolis in exchange for the captives:
for the inability of Klearidas to make over the place, even if we
grant it to have been a real fact and not merely simulated, might
have been removed by decisive coöperation on the part of Sparta
with an Athenian armament sent to occupy the place. In fact, that
which Athens was now induced to grant was precisely the original
proposition transmitted to her by the Lacedæmonians four years
before, when the hoplites were first inclosed in Sphakteria, but
before the actual capture. They then tendered no equivalent, but
merely said, through their envoys, “Give us the men in the island,
and accept in exchange peace, together with our alliance.”[8] At that
moment there were some plausible reasons in favor of granting the
proposition: but even then, the case of Kleon against it was also
plausible and powerful, when he contended that Athens was entitled
to make a better bargain. But _now_, there were no reasons in its
favor, and a strong concurrence of reasons against it. Alliance with
the Spartans was of no great value to Athens: peace was of material
importance to her; but peace had been already sworn to on both sides,
after deliberate discussion, and required now only to be carried into
execution. That equal reciprocity of concession, which presented the
best chance of permanent result, had been agreed on; and fortune had
procured for her the privilege of receiving the purchase-money before
she handed over the goods. Why renounce so advantageous a position,
accepting in exchange a hollow and barren alliance, under the
obligation of handing over her most precious merchandise upon credit,
and upon credit as delusive in promise as it afterwards proved
unproductive in reality? The alliance, in fact, prevented the peace
from being fulfilled: it became, as Thucydidês himself[9] admits, no
peace, but a simple suspension of direct hostilities.
[8] Thucyd. iv, 19. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ὑμᾶς προκαλοῦνται ἐς
σπονδὰς καὶ διάλυσιν πολέμου, διδόντες μὲν εἰρήνην καὶ ξυμμαχίαν
καὶ ἄλλην φιλίαν πολλὴν καὶ οἰκειότητα ἐς ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχειν,
ἀνταιτοῦντες δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας.
[9] Thucyd. v, 26. οὐκ εἰκὸς ὂν εἰρήνην αὐτὴν κριθῆναι, etc.
Thucydidês states on more than one occasion, and it was the
sentiment of Nikias himself, that at the moment of concluding the
peace which bears his name, the position of Sparta was one of
disadvantage and dishonor in reference to Athens;[10] alluding
chiefly to the captives in the hands of the latter; for as to other
matters, the defeats of Delium and Amphipolis, with the serious
losses in Thrace, would more than countervail the acquisitions
of Nisæa, Pylus, Kythêra, and Methônê. Yet so inconsiderate and
short-sighted were the philo-Laconian leanings of Nikias and the
men who now commanded confidence at Athens, that they threw away
this advantage, suffered Athens to be cheated of all those hopes
which they had themselves held out as the inducement for peace, and
nevertheless yielded gratuitously to Sparta all the main points which
she desired. Most certainly there was never any public recommendation
of Kleon, as far as our information goes, so ruinously impolitic as
this alliance with Sparta and surrender of the captives, wherein
both Nikias and Alkibiadês concurred. Probably the Spartan ephors
amused Nikias, and he amused the Athenian assembly, with fallacious
assurances of certain obedience in Thrace, under alleged peremptory
orders given to Klearidas. And now that the vehement leather-dresser,
with his criminative eloquence, had passed away, replaced only by an
inferior successor, the lamp-maker[11] Hyperbolus, and leaving the
Athenian public under the undisputed guidance of citizens eminent for
birth and station, descended from gods and heroes, there remained
no one to expose effectively the futility of such assurances, or to
enforce the lesson of simple and obvious prudence: “Wait, as you are
entitled to wait, until the Spartans have performed the onerous part
of their bargain, before you perform the onerous part of yours. Or,
if you choose to relax in regard to some of the concessions which
they have sworn to make, at any rate stick to the capital point of
all, and lay before them the peremptory alternative—Amphipolis in
exchange for the captives.”
[10] Thucyd. v, 28. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἥ τε Λακεδαίμων
μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουσε καὶ ὑπερώφθη διὰ τὰς ξυμφορὰς.—(Νικίας)
λέγων ἐν μὲν τῷ σφετέρῳ καλῷ (Athenian) ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκείνων ἀπρεπεῖ
(Lacedæmonian) τὸν πόλεμον ἀναβάλλεσθαι, etc. (v, 46)—Οἷς πρῶτον
μὲν (to the Lacedæmonians) διὰ ξυμφορῶν ἡ ξύμβασις, etc.
[11] Aristophan. Pac. 665-887.
The Athenians were not long in finding out how completely they had
forfeited the advantage of their position, and their chief means of
enforcement, by giving up the captives; which imparted a freedom
of action to Sparta such as she had never enjoyed since the first
blockade of Sphakteria. Yet it seems that under the present ephors
Sparta was not guilty of any deliberate or positive act which
could be called a breach of faith. She gave orders to Klearidas
to surrender Amphipolis if he could; if not, to evacuate it, and
bring the Peloponnesian troops home. Of course, the place was not
surrendered to the Athenians, but evacuated; and she then considered
that she had discharged her duty to Athens, as far as Amphipolis was
concerned, though she had sworn to restore it, and her oath remained
unperformed.[12] The other Thracian towns were equally deaf to her
persuasions, and equally obstinate in their hostility to Athens. So
also were the Bœotians, Corinthians, Megarians, and Eleians: but the
Bœotians, while refusing to become parties to the truce along with
Sparta, concluded for themselves a separate convention or armistice
with Athens, terminable at ten days’ notice on either side.[13]
[12] Thucyd. v, 21-35.
[13] Thucyd. v, 32.
In this state of things, though ostensible relations of peace and
free reciprocity of intercourse between Athens and Peloponnesus were
established, the discontent of the Athenians, and the remonstrances
of their envoys at Sparta, soon became serious. The Lacedæmonians
had sworn for themselves and their allies, yet the most powerful
among these allies, and those whose enmity was most important
to Athens, continued still recusant. Neither Panaktum, nor the
Athenian prisoners in Bœotia, were yet restored to Athens; nor had
the Thracian cities yet submitted to the peace. In reply to the
remonstrances of the Athenian envoys, the Lacedæmonians affirmed
that they had already surrendered all the Athenian prisoners in
their own hands, and had withdrawn their troops from Thrace, which
was, they said, all the intervention in their power, since they were
not masters of Amphipolis, nor capable of constraining the Thracian
cities against their will. As to the Bœotians and Corinthians, the
Lacedæmonians went so far as to profess readiness to take arms
along with Athens,[14] for the purpose of constraining them to
accept the peace, and even spoke about naming a day, after which
these recusant states should be proclaimed as joint enemies, both
by Sparta and Athens. But their propositions were always confined
to vague words, nor would they consent to bind themselves by any
written or peremptory instrument. Nevertheless, so great was their
confidence either in the sufficiency of these assurances, or in the
facility of Nikias, that they ventured to require from Athens the
surrender of Pylus, or at least the withdrawal of the Messenian
garrison with the Helot deserters from that place, leaving in it none
but native Athenian soldiers, until farther progress should be made
in the peace. But the feeling of the Athenians was now seriously
altered, and they received this demand with marked coldness. None
of the stipulations of the treaty in their favor had yet been
performed, none even seemed in course of being performed: so that
they now began to suspect Sparta of dishonesty and deceit, and deeply
regretted their inconsiderate surrender of the captives.[15] Their
remonstrances at Sparta, often repeated during the course of the
summer, produced no positive effect: nevertheless, they suffered
themselves to be persuaded to remove the Messenians and Helots from
Pylus to Kephallenia, replacing them by an Athenian garrison.[16]
[14] Thucyd. v, 35. λέγοντες ἀεὶ ὡς μετ’ Ἀθηναίων τούτους,
ἢν μὴ θέλωσι, κοινῇ ἀναγκάσουσι· ~χρόνους δὲ προὔθεντο ἄνευ
ξυγγραφῆς~, ἐν οἷς χρῆν τοὺς μὴ ἐσιόντας ἀμφοτέροις πολεμίους
εἶναι.
[15] Thucyd. v, 35. τούτων οὖν ὁρῶντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν ἔργῳ
γιγνόμενον, ὑπετόπευον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μηδὲν δίκαιον
διανοεῖσθαι, ὥστε οὔτε Πύλον ἀπαιτούντων αὐτῶν ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἀλλὰ
~καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας μετεμέλοντο ἀποδεδωκότες~, etc.
[16] Thucyd. v, 35. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πολλῶν λόγων γενομένων ἐν τῷ
θέρει τούτῳ, etc.
The Athenians had doubtless good reason to complain of Sparta. But
the persons of whom they had still better reason to complain, were
Nikias and their own philo-Laconian leaders; who had first accepted
from Sparta promises doubtful as to execution, and next—though
favored by the lot in regard to priority of cession, and thus
acquiring proof that Sparta either would not or could not perform her
promises—renounced all these advantages, and procured for Sparta
almost gratuitously the only boon for which she seriously cared. The
many critics on Grecian history, who think no term too harsh for the
demagogue Kleon, ought in fairness to contrast his political counsel
with that of his rivals, and see which of the two betokens greater
forethought in the management of the foreign relations of Athens.
Amphipolis had been once lost by the improvident watch of Thucydidês
and Euklês: it was now again lost by the improvident concessions of
Nikias.
So much was the Peloponnesian alliance unhinged by the number of
states which had refused the peace, and so greatly was the ascendency
of Sparta for the time impaired, that new combinations were now
springing up in the peninsula. It has already been mentioned that
the truce between Argos and Sparta was just now expiring: Argos
therefore was free, with her old pretensions to the headship of
Peloponnesus, backed by an undiminished fulness of wealth, power,
and population. Having taken no direct part in the late exhausting
war, she had even earned money by lending occasional aid on both
sides;[17] while her military force was just now farther strengthened
by a step of very considerable importance. She had recently set apart
a body of a thousand select hoplites, composed of young men of wealth
and station, to receive constant military training at the public
expense, and to be enrolled as a separate regiment by themselves,
apart from the other citizens.[18] To a democratical government like
Argos, such an institution was internally dangerous, and pregnant
with mischief, which will be hereafter described. But at the present
moment, the democratical leaders of Argos seem to have thought only
of the foreign relations of their city, now that her truce with
Sparta was expiring, and that the disorganized state of the Spartan
confederacy opened new chances to her ambition of regaining something
like headship in Peloponnesus.
[17] Thucyd. v, 28. Aristophan. Pac. 467, about the Argeians,
δίχοθεν μισθοφοροῦντες ἄλφιτα.
He characterizes the Argeians as anxious for this reason to
prolong the war between Athens and Sparta. This passage, as well
as the whole tenor of the play, affords ground for affirming that
the Pax was represented during the winter immediately preceding
the Peace of Nikias, about four or five months after the battle
of Amphipolis and the death of Kleon and Brasidas; not two years
later, as Mr. Clinton would place it, on the authority of a date
in the play itself, upon which he lays too great stress.
[18] Thucyd. v, 67. Ἀργείων οἱ Χίλιοι λογάδες, οἷς ἡ πόλις ~ἐκ
πολλοῦ~ ἄσκησιν τῶν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον δημοσίᾳ παρεῖχε.
Diodorus (xii, 75) represents the first formation of this
Thousand-regiment at Argos as having taken place just about this
time, and I think he is here worthy of credit; so that I do not
regard the expression of Thucydidês ἐκ πολλοῦ as indicating a
time more than two years prior to the battle of Mantineia. For
Grecian military training, two years of constant practice would
be a _long_ time. It is not to be imagined that the Argeian
democracy would have incurred the expense and danger of keeping
up this select regiment during all the period of their long
peace, just now coming to an end.
The discontent of the recusant Peloponnesian allies was now inducing
them to turn their attention towards Argos as a new chief. They had
mistrusted Sparta, even before the peace, well knowing that she had
separate interests from the confederacy, arising from desire to get
back her captives: in the terms of peace, it seemed as if Sparta and
Athens alone were regarded, the interests of the remaining allies,
especially those in Thrace, being put out of sight. Moreover, that
article in the treaty of peace whereby it was provided that Athens
and Sparta might by mutual consent add or strike out any article that
they chose, without consulting the allies, excited general alarm, as
if Sparta were meditating some treason in conjunction with Athens
against the confederacy.[19] And the alarm, once roused, was still
farther aggravated by the separate treaty of alliance between Sparta
and Athens, which followed so closely afterwards, as well as by the
restoration of the Spartan captives.
[19] Thucyd. v, 29. μὴ μετὰ Ἀθηναίων σφᾶς βούλωνται Λακεδαιμόνιοι
δουλώσασθαι: compare Diodorus, xii, 75.
Such general displeasure among the Peloponnesian states at the
unexpected combination of Athenians and Lacedæmonians, strengthened
in the case of each particular state by private interests of its own,
first manifested itself openly through the Corinthians. On retiring
from the conferences at Sparta,—where the recent alliance between
the Athenians and Spartans had just been made known, and where the
latter had vainly endeavored to prevail upon their allies to accept
the peace,—the Corinthians went straight to Argos to communicate
what had passed, and to solicit interference. They suggested to the
leading men in that city, that it was now the duty of Argos to step
forward as saviour of Peloponnesus, which the Lacedæmonians were
openly betraying to the common enemy, and to invite for that purpose,
into alliance for reciprocal defence, every autonomous Hellenic state
which would bind itself to give and receive amicable satisfaction in
all points of difference. They affirmed that many cities, from hatred
of Sparta, would gladly comply with such invitation; especially if a
board of commissioners in small number were named, with full powers
to admit all suitable applicants; so that, in case of rejection,
there might at least be no exposure before the public assembly in the
Argeian democracy. This suggestion—privately made by the Corinthians,
who returned home immediately afterwards—was eagerly adopted both
by leaders and people at Argos, as promising to realize their
long-cherished pretensions to headship. Twelve commissioners were
accordingly appointed, with power to admit any new allies whom they
might think eligible, except Athens and Sparta. With either of those
two cities, no treaty was allowed without the formal sanction of the
public assembly.[20]
[20] Thucyd. v, 28.
Meanwhile, the Corinthians, though they had been the first to set the
Argeians in motion, nevertheless thought it right, before enrolling
themselves publicly in the new alliance, to invite a congress of
Peloponnesian malcontents to Corinth. It was the Mantineians who made
the first application to Argos under the notice just issued. And
here we are admitted to a partial view of the relations among the
secondary and interior states of Peloponnesus. Mantineia and Tegea,
being conterminous as well as the two most considerable states in
Arcadia, were in perpetual rivalry, which had shown itself only a
year and a half before in a bloody but indecisive battle.[21] Tegea,
situated on the frontiers of Laconia, and oligarchically governed,
was tenaciously attached to Sparta: while for that very reason, as
well as from the democratical character of her government, Mantineia
was less so, though she was still enrolled in and acted as a member
of the Peloponnesian confederacy. She had recently conquered for
herself[22] a little empire in her own neighborhood, composed of
village districts in Arcadia, reckoned as her subject allies, and
comrades in her ranks at the last battle with Tegea. This conquest
had been made even during the continuance of the war with Athens; a
period when the lesser states of Peloponnesus generally, and even
subject-states as against their own imperial states, were under
the guarantee of the confederacy, to which they were required to
render their unpaid service against the common enemy; so that she
was apprehensive of Lacedæmonian interference at the request and
for the emancipation of these subjects, who lay, moreover, near
to the borders of Laconia. Such interference would probably have
been invoked earlier; only that Sparta had been under pressing
embarrassments—and farther, had assembled no general muster of the
confederacy against Athens—ever since the disaster in Sphakteria. But
now she had her hands free, together with a good pretext as well as
motive for interference.
[21] Thucyd. iv, 134.
[22] Thucyd. v, 29. τοῖς γὰρ Μαντινεῦσι μέρος τι τῆς Ἀρκαδίας
κατέστραπτο ὑπήκοον, ἔτι τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πολέμου ὄντος, καὶ
ἐνόμιζον οὐ περιόψεσθαι σφᾶς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἄρχειν, ἐπειδὴ
καὶ σχολὴν ἦγον.
As to the way in which the agreement of the members of the
confederacy modified the relations between subordinate and
imperial states, see farther on, pages 25 and 26, in the case of
Elis and Lepreum.
To maintain the autonomy of all the little states, and prevent any
of them from being mediatized or grouped into aggregations under the
ascendency of the greater, had been the general policy of Sparta;
especially since her own influence as general leader was increased by
insuring to every lesser state a substantive vote at the meetings of
the confederacy.[23] Moreover, the rivalry of Tegea would probably
operate here as an auxiliary motive against Mantineia. Under such
apprehensions, the Mantineians hastened to court the alliance and
protection of Argos, with whom they enjoyed the additional sympathy
of a common democracy. Such revolt from Sparta[24] (for so it was
considered) excited great sensation throughout Peloponnesus, together
with considerable disposition, amidst the discontent then prevalent,
to follow the example.
[23] Thucyd. i, 125.
[24] Thucyd. v, 29. ~Ἀποστάντων δὲ τῶν Μαντινέων~, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη
Πελοπόννησος ἐς θροῦν καθίστατο ὡς καὶ σφίσι ποιητέον τοῦτο,
νομίζοντες πλέον τέ τι εἰδότας μεταστῆναι αὐτοὺς, καὶ τοὺς
Λακεδαιμονίους ἅμα δι’ ὀργῆς ἔχοντες, etc.
In particular, it contributed much to enhance the importance of
the congress at Corinth; whither the Lacedæmonians thought it
necessary to send special envoys to counteract the intrigues going
on against them. Their envoy addressed to the Corinthians strenuous
remonstrance, and even reproach, for the leading part which they
had taken in stirring up dissension among the old confederates, and
organizing a new confederacy under the presidency of Argos. “They
(the Corinthians) were thus aggravating the original guilt and
perjury which they had committed by setting at nought the formal
vote of a majority of the confederacy, and refusing to accept the
peace,—for it was the sworn and fundamental maxim of the confederacy,
that the decision of the majority should be binding on all,
except in such cases as involved some offence to gods or heroes.”
Encouraged by the presence of many sympathizing deputies, Bœotian,
Megarian, Chalkidian from Thrace,[25] etc., the Corinthians replied
with firmness. But they did not think it good policy to proclaim
their real ground for rejecting the peace, namely, that it had not
procured for themselves the restoration of Sollium and Anaktorium:
since, first, this was a question in which their allies present had
no interest; next, it did not furnish any valid excuse for their
resistance to the vote of the majority. Accordingly, they took their
stand upon a pretence at once generous and religious; upon that
reserve for religious scruples, which the Lacedæmonian envoy had
himself admitted, and which of course was to be construed by each
member with reference to his own pious feeling. “It _was_ a religious
impediment (the Corinthians contended) which prevented us from
acceding to the peace with Athens, notwithstanding the vote of the
majority; for we had previously exchanged oaths, ourselves apart from
the confederacy, with the Chalkidians of Thrace at the time when they
revolted from Athens: and we should have infringed those separate
oaths, had we accepted a treaty of peace in which these Chalkidians
were abandoned. As for alliance with Argos, we consider ourselves
free to adopt any resolution which we may deem suitable, after
consultation with our friends here present.” With this unsatisfactory
answer the Lacedæmonian envoys were compelled to return home. Yet
some Argeian envoys, who were also present in the assembly for the
purpose of urging the Corinthians to realize forthwith the hopes of
alliance which they had held out to Argos, were still unable on their
side to obtain a decided affirmative, being requested to come again
at the next conference.[26]
[25] Thucyd. v, 30. Κορίνθιοι δὲ παρόντων σφίσι τῶν ξυμμάχων,
ὅσοι οὐδ’ αὐτοὶ ἐδέξαντο τὰς σπονδάς (παρεκάλεσαν δὲ αὐτοὺς αὐτοὶ
πρότερον) ἀντέλεγον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ~ἃ μὲν ἠδικοῦντο, οὐ
δηλοῦντες ἄντικρυς~, etc.
[26] Thucyd. v, 30.
Though the Corinthians had themselves originated the idea of the new
Argeian confederacy and compromised Argos in an open proclamation,
yet they now hesitated about the execution of their own scheme.
They were restrained in part doubtless by the bitterness of
Lacedæmonian reproof; for the open consummation of this revolt,
apart from its grave political consequences, shocked a train of very
old feelings; but still more by the discovery that their friends,
who agreed with them in rejecting the peace, decidedly refused
all open revolt from Sparta and all alliance with Argos. In this
category were the Bœotians and Megarians. Both of these states—left
to their own impression and judgment by the Lacedæmonians, who did
not address to them any distinct appeal as they had done to the
Corinthians—spontaneously turned away from Argos, not less from
aversion towards the Argeian democracy than from sympathy with the
oligarchy at Sparta:[27] they were linked together by communion of
interest, not merely as being both neighbors and intense enemies of
Attica, but as each having a body of democratical exiles who might
perhaps find encouragement at Argos. Discouraged by the resistance of
these two important allies, the Corinthians hung back from visiting
Argos, until they were pushed forward by a new accidental impulse,
the application of the Eleians; who, eagerly embracing the new
project, sent envoys first to conclude alliance with the Corinthians,
and next to go on and enroll Elis as an ally of Argos. This incident
so confirmed the Corinthians in their previous scheme, that they
speedily went to Argos, along with the Chalkidians of Thrace, to join
the new confederacy.
[27] Thucyd. v, 31. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ καὶ Μεγαρῆς τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντες
ἡσύχαζον, ~περιορώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων~, καὶ νομίζοντες
σφίσι τὴν Ἀργείων δημοκρατίαν αὐτοῖς ὀλιγαρχουμένοις ἧσσον
ξύμφορον εἶναι τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας.
These words, περιορώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, are not clear,
and have occasioned much embarrassment to the commentators,
as well as some propositions for altering the text. It would
undoubtedly be an improvement in the sense, if we were permitted
(with Dobree) to strike out the words ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων as
a gloss, and thus to construe περιορώμενοι as a middle verb,
“waiting to see the event,” or literally, “keeping a look-out
about them.” But taking the text as it now stands, the sense
which I have given to it seems the best which can be elicited.
Most of the critics translate περιορώμενοι “slighted or despised
by the Lacedæmonians.” But in the first place, this is not true
as a matter of fact: in the next place, if it were true, we
ought to have an adversative conjunction instead of καὶ before
νομίζοντες, since the tendency of the two motives indicated would
then be in opposite directions. “The Bœotians, though despised
by the Lacedæmonians, still thought a junction with the Argeian
democracy dangerous.” And this is the sense which Haack actually
proposes, though it does great violence to the word καὶ.
Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold translate περιορώμενοι “feeling
themselves slighted;” and the latter says, “The Bœotians and
Megarians took neither side; not the Lacedæmonian, for they felt
that the Lacedæmonians had slighted them; not the Argive, for
they thought that the Argive democracy would suit them less than
the constitution of Sparta.” But this again puts an inadmissible
meaning on ἡσύχαζον, which means “stood as they were.” The
Bœotians were not called upon to choose between two sides or two
positive schemes of action: they were invited to ally themselves
with Argos, and this they decline doing: they prefer to _remain
as they are_, allies of Lacedæmon, but refusing to become parties
to the peace. Moreover, in the sense proposed by Dr. Arnold, we
should surely find an adversative conjunction in place of καὶ.
I submit that the word περιορᾶν does not necessarily mean “to
slight or despise,” but sometimes “to leave alone, to take
no notice of, to abstain from interfering.” Thus, Thucyd. i,
24. Ἐπιδάμνιοι—πέμπουσιν ἐς τὴν Κερκύραν πρέσβεις—δεόμενοι μὴ
σφᾶς ~περιορᾶν~ φθειρομένους, etc. Again, i, 69, καὶ νῦν τοὺς
Ἀθηναίους οὐχ ἑκάς ἀλλ’ ἐγγὺς ὄντας ~περιορᾶτε~, etc. The same
is the sense of περιϊδεῖν and περιόψεσθαι, ii, 20. In all these
passages there is no idea of _contempt_ implied in the word: the
“leaving alone” or “abstaining from interference,” proceeds from
feelings quite different from contempt.
So in the passage here before us, περιορώμενοι seems the
_passive_ participle in this sense. Thucydidês, having just
described an energetic remonstrance sent by the Spartans to
prevent Corinth from joining Argos, means to intimate (by the
words here in discussion) that _no_ similar _interference_ was
resorted to by them to prevent the Bœotians and Megarians from
joining her: “The Bœotians and Megarians remained as they were,
_left to themselves by the Lacedæmonians_, and thinking the
Argeian democracy less suitable to them than the oligarchy of
Sparta.”
The conduct of Elis, like that of Mantineia, in thus revolting from
Sparta, had been dictated by private grounds of quarrel, arising
out of relations with their dependent ally Lepreum. The Lepreates
had become dependent on Elis some time before the beginning of the
Peloponnesian war, in consideration of aid lent by the Eleians to
extricate them from a dangerous war against some Arcadian enemies.
To purchase such aid, they had engaged to cede to the Eleians half
their territory; but had been left in residence and occupation of it,
under the stipulation of paying one talent yearly as tribute to the
Olympian Zeus; in other words, to the Eleians as his stewards. When
the Peloponnesian war began,[28] and the Lacedæmonians began to call
for the unpaid service of the Peloponnesian cities generally, small
as well as great, against Athens, the Lepreates were, by the standing
agreement of the confederacy, exempted for the time from continuing
to pay their tribute to Elis. Such exemption ceased with the war; at
the close of which Elis became entitled, under the same agreement,
to resume the suspended tribute. She accordingly required that the
payment should then be recommenced: but the Lepreates refused, and
when she proceeded to apply force, threw themselves on the protection
of Sparta, by whose decision the Eleians themselves at first agreed
to abide, having the general agreement of the confederacy decidedly
in their favor. But it presently appeared that Sparta was more
disposed to carry out her general system of favoring the autonomy
of the lesser states, than to enforce the positive agreement of
the confederacy. Accordingly the Eleians, accusing her of unjust
bias, renounced her authority as arbitrator, and sent a military
force to occupy Lepreum. Nevertheless, the Spartans persisted in
their adjudication, pronounced Lepreum to be autonomous, and sent a
body of their own hoplites to defend it against the Eleians. The
latter loudly protested against this proceeding, and pronounced the
Lacedæmonians as having robbed them of one of their dependencies,
contrary to that agreement which had been adopted by the general
confederacy when the war began,—to the effect that each imperial city
should receive back at the end of the war all the dependencies which
it possessed at the beginning, on condition of waiving its title to
tribute and military service from them so long as the war lasted.
After fruitless remonstrances with Sparta, the Eleians eagerly
embraced the opportunity now offered of revolting from her, and of
joining the new league with Corinth and Argos.[29]
[28] Thucyd. v, 31. Καὶ μέχρι τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ πολέμου ἀπέφερον·
ἔπειτα παυσαμένων διὰ πρόφασιν τοῦ πολέμου, οἱ Ἠλεῖοι
ἐπηνάγκαζον, οἱ δ’ ἐτράποντο πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους.
For the _agreement_ here alluded to, see a few lines forward.
[29] Thucyd. v, 31. τὴν ξυνθήκην προφέροντες ἐν ᾗ εἴρητο, ἃ
ἔχοντες ἐς τὸν Ἀττικὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντό τινες, ταῦτα ἔχοντας
καὶ ἐξελθεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἴσον ἔχοντες ἀφίστανται, etc.
Of the agreement here alluded to among the members of the
Peloponnesian confederacy, we hear only in this one passage.
It was extremely important to such of the confederates as
were imperial cities; that is, which had subordinates or
subject-allies.
Poppo and Bloomfield wonder that the Corinthians did not appeal
to this agreement in order to procure the restitution of
Sollium and Anaktorium. But they misconceive the scope of the
agreement, which did not relate to captures made during the war
by the common enemy. It would be useless for the confederacy to
enter into a formal agreement that none of the members should
lose anything through capture made by the enemy. This would
be a question of superiority of force, for no agreement could
bind the enemy. But the confederacy might very well make a
covenant among themselves, as to the relations between their own
imperial _immediate_ members, and the _mediate_ or subordinate
dependencies of each. Each imperial state consented to forego
the tribute or services of its dependency, so long as the latter
was called upon to lend its aid in the general effort of the
confederacy against the common enemy. But the confederacy at the
same time gave its guarantee, that the imperial state should
reënter upon these suspended rights, so soon as the war should
be at an end. This guarantee was clearly violated by Sparta in
the case of Elis and Lepreum. On the contrary, in the case of
Mantineia, mentioned a few pages back, p. 19, the Mantineians had
violated the maxim of the confederacy, and Sparta was justified
in interfering at the request of their subjects to maintain the
autonomy of the latter.
That new league, including Argos, Corinth, Elis, and Mantineia, had
now acquired such strength and confidence, that the Argeians and
Corinthians proceeded on a joint embassy to Tegea to obtain the
junction of that city, seemingly the most powerful in Peloponnesus
next to Sparta and Argos. What grounds they had for expecting success
we are not told. The mere fact of Mantineia having joined Argos,
seemed likely to deter Tegea, as the rival Arcadian power, from doing
the same: and so it proved, for the Tegeans decidedly refused the
proposal, not without strenuous protestations that they would stand
by Sparta in everything. The Corinthians were greatly disheartened
by this repulse, which they had by no means expected, having been
so far misled by general expressions of discontent against Sparta
as to believe that they could transfer nearly the whole body of
confederates to Argos. But they now began to despair of all farther
extension of Argeian headship, and even to regard their own position
as insecure on the side of Athens; with whom they were not at peace,
while by joining Argos they had forfeited their claim upon Sparta
and all her confederacy, including Bœotia and Megara. In this
embarrassment they betook themselves to the Bœotians, whom they again
entreated to join them in the Argeian alliance: a request already
once refused, and not likely to be now granted, but intended to usher
in a different request preferred at the same time. The Bœotians were
entreated to accompany the Corinthians to Athens, and obtain for them
from the Athenians an armistice terminable at ten days’ notice, such
as that which they had contracted for themselves. In case of refusal,
they were farther entreated to throw up their own agreement, and to
conclude no other without the concurrence of the Corinthians. So far
the Bœotians complied, as to go to Athens with the Corinthians, and
back their application for an armistice, which the Athenians declined
to grant, saying that the Corinthians were already included in the
general peace, if they were allies of Sparta. On receiving this
answer the Corinthians entreated the Bœotians, putting it as a matter
of obligation, to renounce their own armistice, and make common cause
as to all future compact. But this request was steadily refused. The
Bœotians maintained their ten days’ armistice; and the Corinthians
were obliged to acquiesce in their existing condition of peace _de
facto_, though not guaranteed by any pledge of Athens.[30]
[30] Thucyd. v, 32. Κορινθίοις δὲ ἀνακωχὴ ἄσπονδος ἦν πρὸς
Ἀθηναίους.
Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks: “By ἄσπονδος is meant a mere
agreement in words, not ratified by the solemnities of religion.
And the Greeks, as we have seen, considered the breach of their
word very different from the breach of their oath.”
Not so much is here meant even as that which Dr. Arnold supposes.
There was no agreement at all, either in words or by oath. There
was a simple absence of hostilities, _de facto_, not arising out
of any recognized pledge. Such is the meaning of ἀνακωχὴ, i, 66;
iii, 25, 26.
The answer here made by the Athenians to the application of
Corinth is not easy to understand. They might, with much better
reason, have declined to conclude the ten day’s armistice with
the _Bœotians_, because these latter still remained allies of
Sparta, though refusing to accede to the general peace; whereas
the Corinthians, having joined Argos, had less right to be
considered allies of Sparta. Nevertheless, we shall still find
them attending the meetings at Sparta, and acting as allies of
the latter.
Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians were not unmindful of the affront which
they had sustained by the revolt of Mantineia and Elis. At the
request of a party among the Parrhasii, the Arcadian subjects of
Mantineia, they marched under king Pleistoanax into that territory,
and compelled the Mantineians to evacuate the fort which they had
erected within it; which the latter were unable to defend, though
they received a body of Argeian troops to guard their city, and
were thus enabled to march their whole force to the threatened
spot. Besides liberating the Arcadian subjects of Mantineia,
the Lacedæmonians also planted an additional body of Helots and
Neodamodes at Lepreum, as a defence and means of observation on
the frontiers of Elis.[31] These were the Brasidean soldiers, whom
Klearidas had now brought back from Thrace. The Helots among them had
been manumitted as a reward, and allowed to reside where they chose.
But as they had imbibed lessons of bravery under their distinguished
commander, their presence would undoubtedly be dangerous among the
serfs of Laconia: hence the disposition of the Lacedæmonians to
plant them out. We may recollect that not very long before, they
had caused two thousand of the most soldierly Helots to be secretly
assassinated, without any ground of suspicion against these victims
personally, but simply from fear of the whole body and of course
greater fear of the bravest.[32]
[31] Thucyd. v, 33, 34. The Neodamodes were Helots previously
enfranchised, or the sons of such.
[32] Thucyd. iv, 80.
It was not only against danger from the returning Brasidean Helots
that the Lacedæmonians had to guard, but also against danger—real
or supposed—from their own Spartan captives, liberated by Athens
at the conclusion of the recent alliance. Though the surrender of
Sphakteria had been untarnished by any dishonor, nevertheless these
men could hardly fail to be looked upon as degraded, in the eyes
of Spartan pride; or at least they might fancy that they were so
looked upon, and thus become discontented. Some of them were already
in the exercise of various functions, when the ephors contracted
suspicions of their designs, and condemned them all to temporary
disqualification for any official post, placing the whole of their
property under trust-management, and interdicting them, like minors,
from every act either of purchase or sale.[33] This species of
disfranchisement lasted for a considerable time; but the sufferers
were at length relieved from it, the danger being supposed to be
over. The nature of the interdict confirms, what we know directly
from Thucydidês, that many of these captives were among the first and
wealthiest families in the state, and the ephors may have apprehended
that they would employ their wealth in acquiring partisans and
organizing revolt among the Helots. We have no facts to enable
us to appreciate the situation; but the ungenerous spirit of the
regulation, as applied to brave warriors recently come home from a
long imprisonment—justly pointed out by modern historians—would not
weigh much with the ephors under any symptoms of public danger.
[33] Thucyd. v, 34. Ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν, ἀτιμίαν δὲ τοιαύτην, ὥστε
μήτε ἄρχειν, μήτε πριαμένους τι, ἢ πωλοῦντας, κυρίους εἶναι.
Of the proceedings of the Athenians during this summer we hear
nothing, except that the town of Skiônê at length surrendered to
them after a long-continued blockade, and that they put to death
the male population of military age, selling the women and children
into slavery. The odium of having proposed this cruel resolution two
years and a half before, belongs to Kleon; that of executing it,
nearly a year after his death, to the leaders who succeeded him,
and to his countrymen generally. The reader will, however, now be
sufficiently accustomed to the Greek laws of war not to be surprised
at such treatment against subjects revolted and reconquered. Skiônê
and its territory was made over to the Platæan refugees. The native
population of Delos, also, who had been removed from that sacred
spot during the preceding year, under the impression that they were
too impure for the discharge of the sacerdotal functions, were
now restored to their island. The subsequent defeat of Amphipolis
had created a belief at Athens that this removal had offended the
gods; under which impression, confirmed by the Delphian oracle,
the Athenians now showed their repentance by restoring the Delian
exiles.[34] They farther lost the towns of Thyssus on the peninsula
of Athos, and Mekyberna on the Sithonian gulf, which were captured by
the Chalkidians of Thrace.[35]
[34] Thucyd. v, 32.
[35] Thucyd. v, 35-39. I agree with Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold
in preferring the conjecture of Poppo, Χαλκιδῆς, in this place.
Meanwhile the political relations throughout the powerful Grecian
states remained all provisional and undetermined. The alliance still
subsisted between Sparta and Athens, yet with continual complaints on
the part of the latter that the prior treaty remained unfulfilled.
The members of the Spartan confederacy were discontented; some had
seceded, and others seemed likely to do the same; while Argos,
ambitious to supplant Sparta, was trying to put herself at the head
of a new confederacy, though as yet with very partial success.
Hitherto, however, the authorities of Sparta—king Pleistoanax as well
as the ephors of the year—had been sincerely desirous to maintain
the Athenian alliance, so far as it could be done without sacrifice,
and without the real employment of force against recusants, of which
they had merely talked in order to amuse the Athenians. Moreover,
the prodigious advantage which they had gained by recovering the
prisoners, doubtless making them very popular at home, would attach
them the more firmly to their own measure. But at the close of the
summer—seemingly about the end of September or beginning of October,
B.C. 421—the year of these ephors expired, and new ephors were
nominated for the ensuing year. Under the existing state of things
this was an important revolution: for out of the five new ephors,
two—Kleobûlus and Xenarês—were decidedly hostile to peace with
Athens, and the remaining three apparently indifferent.[36] And we
may here remark, that this fluctuation and instability of public
policy, which is often denounced as if it were the peculiar attribute
of a democracy, occurs quite as much under the constitutional
monarchy of Sparta, the least popular government in Greece, both in
principle and detail.
[36] Thucyd. v, 36.
The new ephors convened a special congress at Sparta for the
settlement of the pending differences, at which among the rest
Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian envoys were all present. But,
after prolonged debates, no approach was made to agreement; so that
the congress was on the point of breaking up, when Kleobûlus and
Xenarês, together with many of their partisans,[37] originated, in
concert with the Bœotian and Corinthian deputies, a series of private
underhand manœuvres for the dissolution of the Athenian alliance.
This was to be effected by bringing about a separate alliance between
Argos and Sparta, which the Spartans sincerely desired, and would
grasp at in preference, so these ephors affirmed, even if it cost
them the breach of their new tie with Athens. The Bœotians were
urged, first to become allies of Argos themselves, and then to bring
Argos into alliance with Sparta. But it was farther essential that
they should give up Panaktum to Sparta, so that it might be tendered
to the Athenians in exchange for Pylos; for Sparta could not easily
go to war with them while they remained masters of the latter.[38]
[37] Thucyd. v, 37. ἐπεσταλμένοι ἀπό τε τοῦ Κλεοβούλου καὶ
Ξενάρους καὶ ὅσοι φίλοι ἦσαν αὐτοῖς, etc.
[38] Thucyd. v, 36.
Such were the plans which Kleobûlus and Xenarês laid with the
Corinthian and Bœotian deputies, and which the latter went home
prepared to execute. Chance seemed to favor the purpose at once: for
on their road home, they were accosted by two Argeians, senators
in their own city, who expressed an earnest anxiety to bring about
alliance between the Bœotians and Argos. The Bœotian deputies, warmly
encouraging this idea, urged the Argeians to send envoys to Thebes
as solicitors of the alliance; and communicated to the bœotarchs, on
their arrival at home, both the plans laid by the Spartan ephors and
the wishes of these Argeians. The bœotarchs also entered heartily
into the entire scheme; receiving the Argeian envoys with marked
favor, and promising, as soon as they should have obtained the
requisite sanction, to send envoys of their own and ask for alliance
with Argos.
That sanction was to be obtained from “the Four Senates of the
Bœotians;” bodies, of the constitution of which nothing is known.
But they were usually found so passive and acquiescent that the
bœotarchs, reckoning upon their assent as a matter of course,
even without any full exposition of reasons, laid all their plans
accordingly.[39] They proposed to these four Senates a resolution
in general terms, empowering themselves in the name of the Bœotian
federation to exchange oaths of alliance with any Grecian city which
might be willing to contract on terms mutually beneficial: their
particular object being, as they stated, to form alliance with
the Corinthians, Megarians, and Chalkidians of Thrace, for mutual
defence, and for war as well as peace with others only by common
consent. To this specific object they anticipated no resistance on
the part of the Senates, inasmuch as their connection with Corinth
had always been intimate, while the position of the four parties
named was the same, all being recusants of the recent peace. But
the resolution was advisedly couched in the most comprehensive
terms, in order that it might authorize them to proceed farther
afterwards, and conclude alliance on the part of the Bœotians and
Megarians with Argos; that ulterior purpose being however for the
present kept back, because alliance with Argos was a novelty which
might surprise and alarm the Senates. The manœuvre, skilfully
contrived for entrapping these bodies into an approval of measures
which they never contemplated, illustrates the manner in which an
oligarchical executive could elude the checks devised to control
its proceedings. But the bœotarchs, to their astonishment, found
themselves defeated at the outset: for the Senates would not even
hear of alliance with Corinth, so much did they fear to offend Sparta
by any special connection with a city which had revolted from her.
Nor did the bœotarchs think it safe to divulge their communications
with Kleobûlus and Xenarês, or to acquaint the Senates that the whole
plan originated with a powerful party in Sparta herself. Accordingly,
under this formal refusal on the part of the Senates, no farther
proceedings could be taken. The Corinthian and Chalkidian envoys left
Thebes, while the promise of sending Bœotian envoys to Argos remained
unexecuted.[40]
[39] Thucyd. v, 38. οἰόμενοι τὴν βουλὴν, κἂν μὴ εἴπωσιν, οὐκ ἄλλα
ψηφιεῖσθαι ἢ ἃ σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παραινοῦσιν ... ταῖς τέσσαρσι
βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν, αἵπερ ἅπαν τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσι.
[40] Thucyd. v, 38.
But the anti-Athenian ephors at Sparta, though baffled in their
schemes for arriving at the Argeian alliance through the agency
of the Bœotians, did not the less persist in their views upon
Panaktum. That place—a frontier fortress in the mountainous range
between Attica and Bœotia, apparently on the Bœotian side of Phylê,
and on or near the direct road from Athens to Thebes which led
through Phylê[41]—had been an Athenian possession, until six months
before the peace, when it had been treacherously betrayed to the
Bœotians.[42] A special provision of the treaty between Athens
and Sparta, prescribed that it should be restored to Athens; and
Lacedæmonian envoys were now sent on an express mission to Bœotia,
to request from the Bœotians the delivery of Panaktum as well as
of their Athenian captives, in order that by tendering these to
Athens she might be induced to surrender Pylos. The Bœotians refused
compliance with this request, except on condition that Sparta should
enter into special alliance with them as she had done with the
Athenians. Now the Spartans stood pledged by their covenant with the
latter, either by its terms or by its recognized import, not to enter
into any new alliance without their consent. But they were eagerly
bent upon getting possession of Panaktum; while the prospect of
breach with Athens, far from being a deterring motive, was exactly
that which Kleobûlus and Xenarês desired. Under these feelings,
the Lacedæmonians consented to and swore the special alliance with
Bœotia. But the Bœotians, instead of handing over Panaktum for
surrender, as they had promised, immediately razed the fortress to
the ground; under pretence of some ancient oaths which had been
exchanged between their ancestors and the Athenians, to the effect
that the district round it should always remain without resident
inhabitants, as a neutral strip of borderland, and under common
pasture.
[41] See Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. ii, ch.
xvii, p. 370.
[42] Thucyd. v, 3.
These negotiations, after having been in progress throughout
the winter, ended in the accomplishment of the alliance and the
destruction of Panaktum at the beginning of spring or about the
middle of March. And while the Lacedæmonian ephors thus seemed to
be carrying their point on the side of Bœotia, they were agreeably
surprised by an unexpected encouragement to their views from another
quarter. An embassy arrived at Sparta from Argos, to solicit renewal
of the peace just expiring. The Argeians found that they made no
progress in the enlargement of their newly-formed confederacy, while
their recent disappointment with the Bœotians made them despair of
realizing their ambitious projects of Peloponnesian headship. But
when they learned that the Lacedæmonians had concluded a separate
alliance with the Bœotians, and that Panaktum had been razed, their
disappointment was converted into positive alarm for the future.
Naturally inferring that this new alliance would not have been
concluded except in concert with Athens, they interpreted the whole
proceeding as indicating that Sparta had prevailed upon the Bœotians
to accept the peace with Athens, the destruction of Panaktum being
conceived as a compromise to obviate disputes respecting possession.
Under such a persuasion,—noway unreasonable in itself, when the two
contracting governments, both oligarchical and both secret, furnished
no collateral evidence to explain their real intent,—the Argeians saw
themselves excluded from alliance not merely with Bœotia, Sparta,
and Tegea, but also with Athens; which latter city they had hitherto
regarded as a sure resort in case of hostility with Sparta. Without
a moment’s delay, they despatched Eustrophus and Æson, two Argeians
much esteemed at Sparta, and perhaps proxeni of that city, to press
for a renewal of their expiring truce with the Spartans, and to
obtain the best terms they could.
To the Lacedæmonian ephors this application was eminently acceptable,
the very event which they had been manœuvring underhand to bring
about: and negotiations were opened, in which the Argeian envoys
at first proposed that the disputed possession of Thyrea should
be referred to arbitration. But they found their demand met by a
peremptory negative, the Lacedæmonians refusing to enter upon such
a discussion, and insisting upon simple renewal of the peace now at
an end. At last the Argeian envoys, eagerly bent upon keeping the
question respecting Thyrea open, in some way or other, prevailed upon
the Lacedæmonians to assent to the following singular agreement.
Peace was concluded between Athens and Sparta for fifty years; but
if at any moment within that interval, excluding either periods
of epidemic or periods of war, it should suit the views of either
party to provoke a combat by chosen champions of equal number for
the purpose of determining the right to Thyrea, there was to be full
liberty of doing so; the combat to take place within the territory of
Thyrea itself, and the victors to be interdicted from pursuing the
vanquished beyond the undisputed border of either territory. It will
be recollected, that about one hundred and twenty years before this
date, there had been a combat of this sort by three hundred champions
on each side, in which, after desperate valor on both sides, the
victory as well as the disputed right still remained undetermined.
The proposition made by the Argeians was a revival of this old
practice of judicial combat: nevertheless, such was the alteration
which the Greek mind had undergone during the interval, that it now
appeared a perfect absurdity, even in the eyes of the Lacedæmonians,
the most old-fashioned people in Greece.[43] Yet since they hazarded
nothing, practically, by so vague a concession, and were supremely
anxious to make their relations smooth with Argos, in contemplation
of a breach with Athens, they at last agreed to the condition, drew
up the treaty, and placed it in the hands of the envoys to carry back
to Argos. Formal acceptance and ratification, by the Argeian public
assembly, was necessary to give it validity: should this be granted,
the envoys were invited to return to Sparta at the festival of the
Hyakinthia, and there go through the solemnity of the oaths.
Amidst such strange crossing of purposes and interests, the Spartan
ephors seemed now to have carried all their points; friendship with
Argos, breach with Athens, and yet the means—through the possession
of Panaktum—of procuring from Athens the cession of Pylos. But they
were not yet on firm ground. For when their deputies, Andromedês
and two colleagues, arrived in Bœotia for the purpose of going on
to Athens and prosecuting the negotiation about Panaktum, at the
time when Eustrophus and Æson were carrying on their negotiation at
Sparta, they discovered for the first time that the Bœotians, instead
of performing their promise to hand over Panaktum, had razed it to
the ground. This was a serious blow to their chance of success at
Athens: nevertheless, Andromedês proceeded thither, taking with him
all the Athenian captives in Bœotia. These he restored at Athens,
at the same time announcing the demolition of Panaktum as a fact:
Panaktum as well as the prisoners was thus _restored_, he pretended;
for the Athenians would not now find a single enemy in the place: and
he claimed the cession of Pylos in exchange.[44]
[43] Thucyd. v, 41. Τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐδόκει
μωρία εἶναι ταῦτα· ἔπειτα (ἐπεθύμουν γὰρ τὸ Ἄργος πάντως φίλιον
ἔχειν) ξυνεχώρησαν ἐφ’ οἷς ἠξίουν, καὶ ξυνεγράψαντο.
By the forms of treaty which remain, we are led to infer that
the treaty was not subscribed by any signatures, but drawn up by
the secretary or authorized officer, and ultimately engraved on
a column. The names of those who take the oath are recorded, but
seemingly no official signature.
[44] Thucyd. v. 42.
But he soon found that the final term of Athenian compliance had been
reached. It was probably on this occasion that the separate alliance
concluded between Sparta and the Bœotians first became discovered at
Athens; since not only were the proceedings of these oligarchical
governments habitually secret, but there was a peculiar motive for
keeping this alliance concealed until the discussion about Panaktum
and Pylos had been brought to a close. Both this alliance, and the
demolition of Panaktum, excited among the Athenians the strongest
marks of disgust and anger; aggravated probably rather than softened
by the quibble of Andromedês, that demolition of the fort, being
tantamount to restitution, and precluding any farther tenancy by the
enemy, was a substantial satisfaction of the treaty; and aggravated
still farther by the recollection of all the other unperformed
items in the treaty. A whole year had now elapsed, amidst frequent
notes and protocols, to employ a modern phrase; yet not one of the
conditions favorable to Athens had yet been executed, except the
restitution of her captives, seemingly not many in number; while she
on her side had made to Sparta the capital cession on which almost
everything hinged. A long train of accumulated indignation, brought
to a head by this mission of Andromedês, discharged itself in the
harshest dismissal and rebuke of himself and his colleagues.[45]
[45] Thucyd. v. 42.
Even Nikias, Lachês, and the other leading men, to whose improvident
facility and misjudgment the embarrassment of the moment was owing,
were probably not much behind the general public in exclamation
against Spartan perfidy, if it were only to divert attention from
their own mistake. But there was one of them—Alkibiadês son of
Kleinias—who took this opportunity of putting himself at the head of
the vehement anti-Laconian sentiment which now agitated the ekklesia,
and giving to it a substantive aim.
The present is the first occasion on which we hear of this remarkable
man as taking a prominent part in public life. He was now about
thirty-one or thirty-two years old, which in Greece was considered
an early age for a man to exercise important command. But such was
the splendor, wealth, and antiquity of his family, of Æakid lineage
through the heroes Eurysakês and Ajax, and such the effect of that
lineage upon the democratical public of Athens,[46] that he stepped
speedily and easily into a conspicuous station. Belonging also
through his mother Deinomachê to the gens of the Alkmæonidæ, he
was related to Periklês, who became his guardian when he was left
an orphan at about five years old, along with his younger brother
Kleinias. It was at that time that their father Kleinias was slain at
the battle of Koroneia, having already served with honor in a trireme
of his own at the sea-fight of Artemisium against the Persians. A
Spartan nurse named Amykla was provided for the young Alkibiadês, and
a slave named Zopyrus chosen by his distinguished guardian to watch
over him; but even his boyhood was utterly ungovernable, and Athens
was full of his freaks and enormities, to the unavailing regret of
Periklês and his brother Ariphron.[47] His violent passions, love of
enjoyment, ambition of preëminence, and insolence towards others,[48]
were manifested at an early age, and never deserted him throughout
his life. His finished beauty of person both as boy, youth, and
mature man, caused him to be much run after by women,[49] and even
by women of generally reserved habits. Moreover, even before the
age when such temptations were usually presented, the beauty of his
earlier youth, while going through the ordinary gymnastic training,
procured for him assiduous caresses, compliments, and solicitations
of every sort, from the leading Athenians who frequented the public
palæstræ. These men not only endured his petulance, but were
even flattered when he would condescend to bestow it upon them.
Amidst such universal admiration and indulgence, amidst corrupting
influences exercised from so many quarters and from so early an
age, combined with great wealth and the highest position, it was
not likely that either self-restraint or regard for the welfare of
others would ever acquire development in the mind of Alkibiadês. The
anecdotes which fill his biography reveal the utter absence of both
these constituent elements of morality; and though, in regard to the
particular stories, allowance must doubtless be made for scandal
and exaggeration, yet the general type of character stands plainly
marked and sufficiently established in all.
[46] Thucyd. v. 43. Ἀλκιβιάδης ... ἀνὴρ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν ὢν ἔτι τότε
νέος, ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος.
The expression cf Plutarch, however, ἔτι μειράκιον, seems an
exaggeration (Alkibiad. c. 10).
Kritias and Chariklês, in reply to the question of Sokratês, whom
they had forbidden to converse with or teach young men, defined a
_young man_ to be one under thirty years of age, the senatorial
age at Athens (Xenophon, Memor. i. 2. 35).
[47] Plato, Protagoras, c. 10, p. 320; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c.
2, 3, 4; Isokratês, De Bigis, Orat. xvi, p. 353, sect. 33, 34;
Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 1.
[48] Πέπονθα δὲ πρὸς τοῦτον (Σωκράτη) μόνον ἀνθρώπων, ~ὃ οὐκ ἄν
τις οἴοιτο ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐνεῖναι, τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι ὁντινοῦν~.
This is a part of the language which Plato puts into the mouth
of Alkibiadês, in the Symposion, c. 32, p. 216; see also Plato,
Alkibiad. i, c. 1, 2, 3.
Compare his other contemporary, Xenophon, Memor. i, 2, 16-25.
Φύσει δὲ πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μεγάλων πάθων ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ φιλόνεικον
ἰσχυρότατον ἦν καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστι τοῖς παιδικοῖς
ὑπομνήμασι (Plutarch, Alkib. c. 2).
[49] I translate, with some diminution of the force of the words,
the expression of a contemporary author, Xenophon, Memorab. i,
2. 24. Ἀλκιβιάδης δ’ αὖ διὰ μὲν κάλλος ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν
γυναικῶν ~θηρώμενος~, etc.