TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE
* Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_.
* Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.
* Letter spaced Greek text is enclosed in tildes as in ~καὶ τὰ
λοιπά~.
* Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after
comparison with a later edition of this work. Greek text has
also been corrected after checking with this later edition and
with Perseus, when the reference was found.
* Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept,
but variant spellings were made consistent when a predominant
usage was found.
* Some inconsistencies in the use of accents over proper nouns
(like “Alkibiades” and “Alkibiadês”) have been retained.
* The following changes were also made, after checking with
Perseus and other editions:
note 337: “Thucyd. vi, 69” → “Thucyd, i, 69”
note 573: “vii, 73” → “viii, 73”
HISTORY OF GREECE.
BY
GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.
VOL. VII.
REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION
NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS
329 AND 331 PEARL STREET.
CONTENTS.
VOL. VII.
PART II.
CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.
CHAPTER LV.
FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE OLYMPIC FESTIVAL OF
OLYMPIAD 90.
Negotiations for peace during the winter after the battle
of Amphipolis.—Peace called the Peace of Nikias—concluded
in March 421 B.C. Conditions of peace.—Peace accepted at
Sparta by the majority of members of the Peloponnesian
alliance.—The most powerful members of the alliance refuse
to accept the truce—Bœotians, Megarians, Corinthians, and
Eleians.—Position and feelings of the Lacedæmonians—their
great anxiety for peace—their uncertain relations with
Argos.—Steps taken by the Lacedæmonians to execute the
peace—Amphipolis is not restored to Athens—the great
allies of Sparta do not accept the peace.—Separate
alliance for mutual defence concluded between Sparta and
Athens.—Terms of the alliance.—Athens restores the Spartan
captives.—Mismanagement of the political interests of
Athens by Nikias and the peace party.—By the terms of
the alliance Athens renounced all the advantages of her
position in reference to the Lacedæmonians—she gained none
of those concessions upon which she calculated, while
they gained materially.—Discontent and remonstrances
of the Athenians against Sparta in consequence of the
non-performance of the conditions—they repent of having
given up the captives—excuses of Sparta.—New combinations
in Peloponnesus—suspicion entertained of concert between
Sparta and Athens—Argos stands prominently forward—state
of Argos—aristocratical regiment of one thousand formed
in that city.—The Corinthians prevail upon Argos to stand
forward as head of a new Peloponnesian alliance.—Congress
of recusant Peloponnesian allies at Corinth—the Mantineians
join Argos—state of Arcadia—rivalship of Tegea and
Mantineia.—Remonstrances of Lacedæmonian envoys at the
congress at Corinth—redefence of the Corinthians—pretence
of religious scruple.—The Bœotians and Megarians refuse
to break with Sparta, or to ally themselves with Argos—the
Corinthians hesitate in actually joining Argos.—The
Eleians become allies of Argos—their reasons for doing
so—relations with Lepreum—the Corinthians now join Argos
also.—Refusal of Tegea to separate from Sparta.—The
Corinthians are disheartened—their application through
the Bœotians to Athens.—The Lacedæmonians emancipate the
Arcadian subjects of Mantineia—they plant the Brasidean
Helots at Lepreum.—Treatment of the Spartan captives after
their liberation from Athens and return to Sparta—they are
disfranchised for a time and in a qualified manner.—The
Athenians recapture Skiônê—put to death all the adult
males.—Political relations in Peloponnesus—change of ephors
at Sparta—the new ephors are hostile to Athens.—Congress
at Sparta—Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian deputies,
present—long debates, but no settlement attained of any
one of the disputed points—intrigues of the anti-Athenian
ephors—Kleobulus and Xenarês.—These ephors try to bring
about underhand an alliance between Sparta and Argos,
through the Bœotians—the project fails.—The Lacedæmonians
conclude a special alliance with the Bœotians, thereby
violating their alliance with Athens—the Bœotians raze
Panaktum to the ground.—Application from the Argeians
to Sparta to renew the expiring treaty. Project of
renewed treaty agreed upon. Curious stipulation about
combat by champions, to keep the question open about
the title to Thyrea.—Lacedæmonian envoys go first to
Bœotia, next to Athens—they find Panaktum demolished—they
ask for the cession of Pylos from Athens.—The envoys
are badly received at Athens—angry feeling against
the Lacedæmonians.—Alkibiadês stands forward as a
party-leader. His education and character.—Great energy
and capacity of Alkibiadês in public affairs—his
reckless expenditure—lawless demeanor—unprincipled
character, inspiring suspicion and alarm—military
service.—Alkibiadês—Sokratês—the Sophists.—Conflicting
sentiments entertained towards Alkibiadês—his great energy
and capacity. Admiration, fear, hatred, and jealousy, which
he inspires.—Alkibiadês tries to renew the ancient but
interrupted connection of his ancestors with Lacedæmon,
as proxeni.—The Spartans reject his advances—he turns
against them—alters his politics, and becomes their enemy
at Athens.—He tries to bring Athens into alliance with
Argos.—He induces the Argeians to send envoys to Athens—the
Argeians eagerly embrace this opening, and drop their
negotiations with Sparta.—Embassy of the Lacedæmonians
to Athens, to press the Athenians not to throw up the
alliance. The envoys are favorably received.—Trick by which
Alkibiadês cheats and disgraces the envoys, and baffles
the Lacedæmonian project. Indignation of the Athenians
against Sparta.—Nikias prevails with the assembly to
send himself and others as envoys to Sparta, in order to
clear up the embarrassment.—Failure of the embassy of
Nikias at Sparta—Athens concludes the alliance with Argos,
Elis, and Mantineia.—Conditions of this convention and
alliance.—Complicated relations among the Grecian states
as to treaty and alliance.—Olympic festival of the 90th
Olympiad, July 420 B.C., its memorable character.—First
appearance of Athens at the Olympic festival since the
beginning of the war. Immense display of Alkibiadês in
the chariot-race.—The Eleians exclude the Spartan sacred
legation from this Olympic festival, in consequence of
alleged violation of the Olympic truce.—Alarm felt at the
festival lest the Spartans should come in arms.—Depressed
estimation of Sparta throughout Greece—Herakleia. 1-61
CHAPTER LVI.
FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD 90, DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF
MANTINEIA.
New policy of Athens, attempted by Alkibiadês.—Expedition
of Alkibiadês into the interior of Peloponnesus.—Attack
upon Epidaurus by Argos and Athens.—Movements of the
Spartans and Argeians.—The sacred month Karneius—trick
played by the Argeians with their calendar—Congress
at Mantineia for peace—the discussions prove
abortive.—Athenian lordship of the sea—the alliance between
Athens and Sparta continues in name, but is indirectly
violated by both.—Invasion of Argos by Agis and the
Lacedæmonians, Bœotians, and Corinthians.—Approach of the
invaders to Argos by different lines of march.—Superior
forces and advantageous position of the invaders—danger
of Argos—Agis takes upon him to grant an armistice to
the Argeians, and withdraws the army—dissatisfaction of
the allies.—Severe censure against Agis on his return
to Sparta.—Tardy arrival of Alkibiadês, Lachês, etc.,
with the Athenian contingent at Argos—expedition of
Athenians, Eleians, Mantineians, and Argeians, against
the Arcadian town of Orchomenus.—Plans against Tegea—the
Eleians return home.—Danger of Tegea—Agis and the
Lacedæmonians march to its relief.—Manœuvres of Agis
to bring on a battle on fair ground.—Forward march
and new position of the Argeians.—The Lacedæmonians
are surprised: their sudden and ready formation into
battle order.—Gradation of command and responsibility
peculiar to the Lacedæmonian army.—Lacedæmonian line:
privileged post of the Skiritæ on the left.—Uncertain
numbers of both armies.—Preliminary harangues to the
soldiers.—Battle of Mantineia.—Movement ordered by Agis,
on the instant before the battle; his order disobeyed.
His left wing is defeated.—Complete ultimate victory
of the Lacedæmonians.—Great effects of the victory in
reëstablishing the reputation of Sparta.—Operations
of Argeians, Eleians, etc., near Epidaurus.—Political
change at Argos, arising out of the battle of
Mantineia.—Oligarchical conspiracy of the Thousand-regiment
at Argos, in concert with the Lacedæmonians.—Treaty of
peace between Sparta and Argos.—Treaty of alliance between
Sparta and Argos—dissolution of the alliance of Argos with
Athens, Mantineia, and Elis.—Submission of Mantineia to
Sparta.—Oligarchical revolution effected at Argos by the
Thousand, in concert with the Lacedæmonians.—Oligarchy in
Sikyôn and the towns in Achaia.—Violences of the Thousand
at Argos: counter-revolution in that town: restoration of
the democracy.—Proceedings of the restored Argeian Demos:
tardiness of Sparta.—Alkibiadês at Argos: measures for the
protection of the democracy.—Nominal peace, but precarious
relations, between Athens and Sparta.—Relations of Athens
with Perdikkas of Macedonia.—Negligence of Athens about
Amphipolis: improvidence of Nikias and the peace-party:
adventurous speculations of Alkibiadês.—Projected
contention of ostracism between Nikias and Alkibiadês.
Proposition supported by Hyperbolus.—Gradual desuetude of
the ostracism, as the democracy became assured.—Siege of
Mêlos by the Athenians.—Dialogue set forth by Thucydidês,
between the Athenian envoys and the Executive Council
of Mêlos.—Language represented by Thucydidês as having
been held by the Athenian envoys—with the replies of
the Melians.—Refusal of the Melians to submit.—Siege and
capture of Mêlos.—Remarks upon the event.—View taken by
Thucydidês of this incident.—Place which it occupies in the
general historical conception of Thucydidês. 61-118
CHAPTER LVII.
SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXTINCTION OF THE GELONIAN
DYNASTY.
Expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty from Syracuse, and
of other despots from the other Sicilian towns.—Large
changes of resident inhabitants—effects of this
fact.—Relative power and condition of the Sicilian
cities. Political dissensions at Syracuse. Ostracism
tried and abandoned.—Power and foreign exploits
of Syracuse.—Sikels in the interior of Sicily—the
Sikel prince Duketius—he founds the new Sikel town
of Palikê.—Exploits of Duketius—he is defeated and
becomes the prisoner of the Syracusans, who spare him,
and send him to Corinth.—Duketius breaks his parole
and returns to Sicily.—Conquests of Syracuse in the
interior of Sicily—death of Duketius.—Prosperity
and power of Agrigentum.—Intellectual movement in
Sicily—Empedoklês—Tisias—Korax—Gorgias.—Sicilian
cities—their condition and proceedings at the first
breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, 431 B.C.—Relations
of Sicily to Athens and Sparta—altered by the quarrel
between Corinth and Korkyra and the intervention of
Athens.—Expectations entertained by Sparta of aid from the
Sicilian Dorians, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian
war. Expectations not realized.—The Dorian cities in
Sicily attack the Ionian cities in Sicily.—The Ionic
cities in Sicily solicit aid from Athens—first Athenian
expedition to Sicily under Lachês.—Second expedition
under Pythodôrus.—Indecisive operations near Messênê and
Rhegium.—Defeat of the Messenians by the Naxians and
Sikels, near Naxos.—Eurymedon and Sophoklês, with a larger
Athenian fleet, arrive in Sicily.—Congress of the Sicilian
cities at Gela. Speech of Hermokratês.—General peace made
between the Sicilian cities. Eurymedon accedes to the
peace, and withdraws the Athenian fleet.—Displeasure of the
Athenians against Eurymedon and his colleagues.—Intestine
dissension in Leontini—expulsion of the Leontine Demos,
by the aid of Syracuse.—Application of the Leontine
Demos for help to Athens. The Athenians send Phæax
to make observations.—Leontini depopulated—the Demos
expelled—Leontine exiles at Athens.—War between Selinus and
Egesta—the latter applies to Athens for aid.—Promises of
the Egestæans: motives offered to Athens for intervention
in Sicily.—Alkibiadês warmly espouses their cause, and
advises intervention.—Inspecting commissioners despatched
by the Athenians to Egesta—frauds practised by the
Egestæans to delude them.—Return of the commissioners to
Athens—impression produced by their report. Resolution
taken to send an expedition to Sicily.—Embarrassment of
Nikias as opposer of the expedition.—Speech of Nikias
at the second assembly held by the Athenians.—Reply
of Alkibiadês.—The assembly favorable to the views
of Alkibiadês—adheres to the resolution of sailing
to Sicily.—Second speech of Nikias—exaggerating the
difficulties and dangers of the expedition, and demanding a
force on the largest scale.—Effect of this speech—increased
eagerness of the assembly for the expedition—order and
unanimity in reference to the plan.—Excitement in the city
among all classes—great increase in the scale on which the
expedition was planned.—Large preparations made for the
expedition.—Review of these preliminary proceedings to the
Sicilian expedition.—Advice and influence of Nikias.—Advice
and influence of Alkibiadês.—Athens believed herself
entitled to be mistress of the islands as well as of the
sea. 118-162
CHAPTER LVIII.
FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE ATHENIANS TO ATTACK SYRACUSE,
DOWN TO THE FIRST WINTER AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN SICILY.
Preparations for the expedition against Sicily—general
enthusiasm and sanguine hopes at Athens.—Abundance in
the Athenian treasury—display of wealth as well as of
force in the armament.—Mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens.
Numbers and sanctity of the Hermæ.—Violent excitement
and religious alarm produced by the act at Athens.—The
authors of the act unknown—but it was certainly done by
design and conspiracy.—Various parties suspected—great
probability beforehand that it would induce the Athenians
to abandon or postpone the expedition.—The political
enemies of Alkibiadês take advantage of the reigning
excitement to try and ruin him.—Anxiety of the Athenians
to detect and punish the conspirators—rewards offered for
information.—Informations given in—commissioners of inquiry
appointed.—First accusation of Alkibiadês, of having
profaned and divulged the Eleusinian mysteries.—Violent
speeches in the assembly against Alkibiadês unfavorably
received.—He denies the charge and demands immediate
trial—his demand is eluded by his enemies.—Departure of
the armament from Peiræus—splendor and exciting character
of the spectacle.—Solemnities of parting, on shipboard
and on the water’s edge.—Full muster of the armament
at Korkyra.—Progress to Rhegium—cold reception by the
Italian cities.—Feeling at Syracuse as to the approaching
armament—disposition to undervalue its magnitude,
and even to question its intended coming.—Strenuous
exhortations of Hermokratês, to be prepared.—Temper and
parties in the Syracusan assembly.—Reply of Athenagoras,
the popular orator.—Interposition of the stratêgi to
moderate the violence of the debate.—Relative position
of Athenagoras and other parties at Syracuse.—Pacific
dispositions of Athenagoras.—His general denunciations
against the oligarchical youth were well founded.—Active
preparations at Syracuse on the approach of the
Athenian armament.—Discouragement of the Athenians at
Rhegium on learning the truth respecting the poverty
of Egesta.—The Athenian generals discuss their plan of
action—opinion of Nikias.—Opinion of Alkibiadês.—Opinion
of Lamachus.—Superior discernment of Lamachus—plan of
Alkibiadês preferred.—Alkibiadês at Messênê—Naxos joins
the Athenians. Empty display of the armament.—Alkibiadês
at Katana—the Athenians masters of Katana—they establish
their station there. Refusal of Kamarina.—Alkibiadês is
summoned home to take his trial.—Feelings and proceedings
at Athens since the departure of the armament.—Number of
citizens imprisoned on suspicion—increased agony of the
public mind.—Peisander and Chariklês the commissioners
of inquiry.—Information of Diokleidês.—More prisoners
arrested—increased terror in the city—Andokidês
among the persons imprisoned.—Andokidês is solicited
by his fellow-prisoners to stand forward and give
information—he complies.—Andokidês designates the
authors of the mutilation of the Hermæ—consequence of
his revelations.—Questionable authority of Andokidês, as
to what he himself really stated in information.—Belief
of the Athenians in his information—its tranquillizing
effects.—Anxiety and alarm revived, respecting
the persons concerned in the profanation of the
Eleusinian mysteries.—Revival of the accusation against
Alkibiadês.—Indictment presented by Thessalus, son
of Kimon, against Alkibiadês.—Resolution to send for
Alkibiadês home from Sicily to be tried.—Alkibiadês quits
the army, as if to come home: makes his escape at Thurii,
and retires to Peloponnesus.—Conduct of the Athenian public
in reference to Alkibiadês—how far blamable. Conduct of
his enemies.—Mischief to Athens from the banishment of
Alkibiadês. Languid operations of the Sicilian armament
under Nikias.—Increase of confidence and preparations at
Syracuse, arising from the delays of Nikias.—Manœuvre of
Nikias from Katana—he lands his forces in the Great Harbor
of Syracuse.—Return of the Syracusan army from Katana to
the Great Harbor—preparations for fighting Nikias.—Feelings
of the ancient soldier.—Harangue of Nikias.—Battle near the
Olympieion—victory of the Athenians.—Unabated confidence
of the Syracusans—they garrison the Olympieion—Nikias
reembarks his army, and returns to Katana.—He determines
to take up his winter quarters at Katana, and sends
to Athens for reinforcements of horse.—His failure at
Messênê, through the betrayal by Alkibiadês.—Salutary
lesson to the Syracusans, arising out of the recent
defeat—mischiefs to the Athenians from the delay of
Nikias.—Confidence of the Athenians at home in Nikias—their
good temper—they send to him the reinforcements
demanded.—Determined feeling at Syracuse—improved measures
of defence—recommendations of Hermokratês.—Enlargement
of the fortifications of Syracuse. Improvement of
their situation. Increase of the difficulties of
Nikias.—Hermokratês and Euphêmus—counter-envoys at
Kamarina.—Speech of Euphêmus.—The Kamarinæans maintain
practical neutrality.—Winter proceedings of Nikias from
his quarters at Katana.—Syracusan envoys sent to solicit
aid from Corinth and Sparta.—Alkibiadês at Sparta—his
intense hostility to Athens.—Speech of Alkibiadês in the
Lacedæmonian assembly.—Great effect of his speech on
the Peloponnesians.—Misrepresentations contained in the
speech.—Resolutions of the Spartans.—The Lacedæmonians send
Gylippus to Syracuse. 163-243
CHAPTER LIX.
FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE BY NIKIAS,
DOWN TO THE SECOND ATHENIAN EXPEDITION UNDER DEMOSTHENES,
AND THE RESUMPTION OF THE GENERAL WAR.
Movements of Nikias in the early spring.—Local condition
and fortifications of Syracuse, at the time when Nikias
arrived.—Inner and Outer City.—Localities without the wall
of the outer city—Epipolæ.—Possibilities of the siege when
Nikias first arrived in Sicily—increase of difficulties
through his delay.—Increased importance of the upper
ground of Epipolæ. Intention of the Syracusans to occupy
the summit of Epipolæ.—The summit is surprised by the
Athenians.—The success of this surprise was essential
to the effective future prosecution of the siege.—First
operations of the siege.—Central work of the Athenians
on Epipolæ, called The Circle.—First counter-wall of
the Syracusans.—Its direction, south of the Athenian
circle—its completion.—It is stormed, taken, and destroyed
by the Athenians.—Nikias occupies the southern cliff—and
prosecutes his line of blockade south of the Circle.—Second
counter-work of the Syracusans—reaching across the marsh,
south of Epipolæ, to the river Anapus.—This counter-work
attacked and taken by Lamachus—general battle—death
of Lamachus.—Danger of the Athenian circle and of
Nikias—victory of the Athenians.—Entrance of the Athenian
fleet into the Great Harbor.—The southern portion of the
wall of blockade, across the marsh to the Great Harbor,
is prosecuted and nearly finished.—The Syracusans offer
no farther obstruction—despondency at Syracuse—increasing
closeness of the siege.—Order of the besieging operations
successively undertaken by the Athenians.—Triumphant
prospects of the Athenians. Disposition among the Sikels
and Italian Greeks to favor them.—Conduct of Nikias—his
correspondents in the interior of Syracuse.—Confidence of
Nikias—comparative languor of his operations.—Approach
of Gylippus—he despairs of relieving Syracuse.—Progress
of Gylippus, in spite of discouraging reports.—Approach
of Gylippus is made known to Nikias. Facility of
preventing his farther advance—Nikias despises him, and
leaves him to come unobstructed. He lands at Himera in
Sicily.—Blindness of Nikias—egregious mistake of letting
in Gylippus.—Gylippus levies an army and marches across
Sicily from Himera to Syracuse.—The Corinthian Goggylus
reaches Syracuse before Gylippus—just in time to hinder
the town from capitulating.—Gylippus with his new-levied
force enters Syracuse unopposed.—Unaccountable inaction
of Nikias.—Vigorous and aggressive measures of Gylippus,
immediately on arriving.—Gylippus surprises and captures
the Athenian fort of Labdalum.—He begins the construction
of a third counter-wall, on the north side of the Athenian
circle.—Nikias fortifies Cape Plemmyrium.—Inconveniences
of Plemmyrium as a maritime station—mischief which ensues
to the Athenian naval strength.—Operations of Gylippus in
the field—his defeat.—His decisive victory—the Athenians
are shut up within their lines. The Syracusan counter-wall
is carried on so far as to cut the Athenian line of
blockade.—Farther defences provided by Gylippus, joining
the higher part of Epipolæ with the city wall.—Confidence
of Gylippus and the Syracusans—aggressive plans against
the Athenians, even on the sea.—Discouragement of Nikias
and the Athenians.—Nikias sends home a despatch to
Athens, soliciting reinforcements.—Despatch of Nikias
to the Athenian people.—Resolution of the Athenians to
send Demosthenês with a second armament.—Remarks upon the
despatch of Nikias.—Former despatches of Nikias.—Effect
of his despatch upon the Athenians.—Treatment of
Nikias by the Athenians.—Capital mistake committed by
the Athenians.—Hostilities from Sparta certain and
impending.—Resolution of Sparta to invade Attica forthwith,
and to send farther reinforcements to Sicily. 243-286
CHAPTER LX.
FROM THE RESUMPTION OF DIRECT HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS
AND SPARTA, DOWN TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN
ARMAMENT IN SICILY.
Active warlike preparations throughout Greece during
the winter of 414-413 B.C.—Invasion of Attica by
Agis and the Peloponnesian force—fortification of
Dekeleia.—Second expedition from Athens against Syracuse,
under Demosthenês.—Operations of Gylippus at Syracuse. He
determines to attack the Athenians at sea.—Naval combat in
the harbor of Syracuse—the Athenians victorious.—Gylippus
surprises and takes Plemmyrium.—Important consequences
of the capture.—Increased spirits and confidence of the
Syracusans, even for sea-fight.—Efforts of the Syracusans
to procure farther reinforcements from the Sicilian
towns.—Conflicts between the Athenians and Syracusans
in the Great Harbor.—Defeat of a Sicilian reinforcement
marching to aid Syracuse—Renewed attack by Gylippus
on the Athenians.—Disadvantages of the Athenian fleet
in the harbor. Their naval tactics impossible in the
narrow space.—Improvements in Syracusan ships suited to
the narrow space.—The Syracusans threaten attack upon
the Athenian naval station.—Additional preparations
of Nikias—battle renewed.—Complete defeat of the
Athenians.—Danger of the Athenian armament—arrival of
Demosthenês with the second armament.—Voyage of Demosthenês
from Korkyra.—Imposing effect of his entry into the Great
Harbor.—Revived courage of the Athenians. Judicious
and decisive resolutions of Demosthenês.—Position and
plans of Demosthenês.—Nocturnal march of Demosthenês
to surprise Epipolæ, and turn the Syracusan line of
defence.—Partial success at first—complete and ruinous
defeat finally.—Disorder of the Athenians—great loss
in the flight.—Elate spirits, and renewed aggressive
plans, of the Syracusans.—Deliberation and different
opinions of the Athenian generals.—Demosthenês insists
on departing from Sicily—Nikias opposes him.—Demosthenês
insists at least on removing out of the Great
Harbor.—Nikias refuses to consent to such removal.—The
armament remains in the Great Harbor, neither acting nor
retiring.—Infatuation of Nikias.—Increase of force and
confidence in Syracuse.—Nikias at length consents to
retreat. Orders for retreat privately circulated.—Eclipse
of the moon—Athenian retreat postponed.—Eclipses
considered as signs—differently interpreted—opinion of
Philochorus.—Renewed attacks of the Syracusans—defeat of
the Athenian fleet in the Great Harbor.—Partial success
ashore against Gylippus.—The Syracusans determine to block
up the mouth of the harbor, and destroy or capture the
whole Athenian armament.—Large views of the Syracusans
against the power of Athens—new hazards now opened to
endanger that power.—Vast numbers, and miscellaneous
origin, of the combatants now engaged in fighting for
or against Syracuse.—The Syracusans block up the mouth
of the harbor.—The Athenians resolve to force their way
out—preparations made by the generals.—Exhortations of
Nikias on putting the crews aboard.—Agony of Nikias—his
efforts to encourage the officers.—Bold and animated
language of Gylippus to the Syracusan fleet.—Syracusan
arrangements. Condition of the Great Harbor—sympathizing
population surrounding it.—Attempt of the Athenian fleet
to break out—battle in the Great Harbor.—Long-continued
and desperate struggle—intense emotion—total defeat of the
Athenians.—Military operations of ancient times—strong
emotions which accompanied them.—Causes of the defeat of
the Athenians.—Feelings of the victors and vanquished after
the battle.—Resolution of Demosthenês and Nikias to make
a second attempt—the armament are too much discouraged
to obey.—The Athenians determine to retreat by land—they
postpone their retreat, under false communications from
Syracuse.—The Syracusans block up the roads, to intercept
their retreat.—Retreat of the Athenians—miserable condition
of the army.—Wretchedness arising from abandoning the
sick and wounded.—Attempt of the generals to maintain
some order—energy of Nikias.—Exhortations of Nikias to
the suffering army.—Commencement of the retreat—harassed
and impeded by the Syracusans.—Continued conflict—no
progress made by the retreating army.—Violent storm—effect
produced on both parties—change of feeling in the last
two years.—Night march of the Athenians, in an altered
direction, towards the southern sea.—Separation of
the two divisions under Nikias and Demosthenês. The
first division under Nikias gets across the river
Erineus.—The rear division under Demosthenês is pursued,
overtaken, and forced to surrender.—Gylippus overtakes
and attacks the division of Nikias.—Nikias gets to the
river Asinarus—intolerable thirst and suffering of the
soldiers—he and his division become prisoners.—Total
numbers captured.—Hard treatment and sufferings of
the Athenian prisoners at Syracuse.—Treatment of
Nikias and Demosthenês—difference of opinion among the
conquerors.—Influence of the Corinthians—efforts of
Gylippus—both the generals are slain.—Disgrace of Nikias
after his death, at Athens—continued respect for the memory
of Demosthenês.—Opinion of Thucydidês about Nikias.—How
far that opinion is just.—Opinion of the Athenians about
Nikias—their steady over-confidence and over-esteem
for him, arising from his respectable and religious
character.—Over-confidence in Nikias was the greatest
personal mistake which the Athenian public ever committed. 287-352
CHAPTER LXI.
FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY,
DOWN TO THE OLIGARCHICAL CONSPIRACY OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT
ATHENS.
Consequences of the ruin of the Athenian armament in
Sicily.—Occupation of Dekeleia by the Lacedæmonians—its
ruinous effects upon Athens.—Athens becomes a
military post—heavy duty in arms imposed upon the
citizens.—Financial pressure.—Athens dismisses her
Thracian mercenaries—massacre at Mykalêssus.—The Thracians
driven back with slaughter by the Thebans.—Athenian
station at Naupaktus—decline of the naval superiority of
Athens.—Naval battle near Naupaktus—indecisive result.—Last
news of the Athenians from Syracuse—ruin of the army
there not officially made known to them.—Reluctance of
the Athenians to believe the full truth.—Terror and
affliction at Athens.—Energetic resolutions adopted by
the Athenians—Board of Probûli.—Prodigious effect of the
catastrophe upon all Greeks—enemies and allies of Athens
as well as neutrals—and even on the Persians.—Motions
of king Agis.—The Eubœans apply to Agis for aid in
revolting from Athens—the Lesbians also apply, and
are preferred.—The Chians, with the same view, make
application to Sparta.—Envoys from Tissaphernês and
Pharnabazus come to Sparta at the same time.—Alkibiadês
at Sparta—his recommendations determine the Lacedæmonians
to send aid to Chios.—Synod of the Peloponnesian allies
at Corinth—measures resolved.—Isthmian festival—scruples
of the Corinthians—delay about Chios—suspicions of
Athens.—Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth to Chios—it
is defeated by the Athenians.—Small squadron starts
from Sparta under Chalkideus and Alkibiadês, to go to
Chios.—Energetic advice of Alkibiadês—his great usefulness
to Sparta.—Arrival of Alkibiadês at Chios—revolt of the
island from Athens.—General population of Chios was
disinclined to revolt from Athens.—Dismay occasioned at
Athens by the revolt of Chios—the Athenians set free
and appropriate their reserved fund.—Athenian force
despatched to Chios under Strombichidês.—Activity of
the Chians in promoting revolt among the other Athenian
allies—Alkibiadês determines Milêtus to revolt.—First
alliance between the Peloponnesians and Tissaphernês,
concluded by Chalkideus at Milêtus.—Dishonorable and
disadvantageous conditions of the treaty.—Energetic efforts
of Athens—democratical revolution at Samos.—Peloponnesian
fleet at Kenchreæ—Astyochus is sent as Spartan admiral
to Ionia.—Expedition of the Chians against Lesbos.—Ill
success of the Chians—Lesbos is maintained by the
Athenians.—Harassing operations of the Athenians against
Chios.—Hardships suffered by the Chians—prosperity
of the island up to this time.—Fresh forces from
Athens—victory of the Athenians near Milêtus.—Fresh
Peloponnesian forces arrive—the Athenians retire, pursuant
to the strong recommendation of Phrynichus.—Capture of
Iasus by the Peloponnesians—rich plunder—Amorgês made
prisoner.—Tissaphernês begins to furnish pay to the
Peloponnesian fleet. He reduces the rate of pay for the
future.—Powerful Athenian fleet at Samos—unexpected
renovation of the navy of Athens.—Astyochus at Chios and
on the opposite coast.—Pedaritus, Lacedæmonian governor at
Chios—disagreement between him and Astyochus.—Astyochus
abandons Chios and returns to Milêtus—accident whereby
he escaped the Athenian fleet.—The Athenians establish a
fortified post in Chios, to ravage the island.—Dorieus
arrives on the Asiatic coast with a squadron from Thurii,
to join Astyochus—maritime contests near Knidus.—Second
Peloponnesian treaty with Tissaphernês, concluded by
Astyochus and Theramenês.—Comparison of the second
treaty with the first.—Arrival of a fresh Peloponnesian
squadron under Antisthenês at Kaunus—Lichas comes out as
Spartan commissioner.—Astyochus goes with the fleet from
Milêtus to join the newly-arrived squadron—he defeats
the Athenian squadron under Charmînus.—Peloponnesian
fleet at Knidus—double dealing of Tissaphernês—breach
between him and Lichas.—Peloponnesian fleet masters
Rhodes, and establishes itself in that island.—Long
inaction of the fleet at Rhodes—paralyzing intrigues of
Tissaphernês—corruption of the Lacedæmonian officers. 353-402
HISTORY OF GREECE.
PART II.
CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.