CHARLES III AND ENGLAND, 1759-1788
[Sidenote: Greatness of the reign of Charles III and principal factors
therein.]
Under Charles III, Spain reached the highest point she has attained
since the sixteenth century. In many respects the internal situation was
better at this time than in the great days of the _siglo de oro_, but
Spain’s relative authority in Europe was less, because of the striking
advances which had been made by the other powers. One of them, England,
was particularly dangerous, and it will be found that Spain’s foreign
policy in this reign was directed primarily toward meeting the
possibility of war with that country. Other difficulties, such as those
with Portugal and Morocco, particularly with the former, were cogent
factors because of the relations which England bore, or was believed to
bear, to them. Contrary to the impression usually to be derived from the
histories of the American Revolution, Spain was intensely hostile to
England throughout this reign. To oppose that country the Family Compact
with France was formed, and continued to be the basis of Spain’s foreign
policy, although it early became manifest that France would honor the
treaty only when it suited her purposes. In the end the policies of
Charles III were crowned with success,--not so great as Spain could have
wished, but sufficiently so to make this reign the most pleasingly
satisfactory to Spaniards of any since the days of Isabella, next to
whom Charles III has some claim to rank as the greatest Spanish monarch
of modern times. This becomes the more worthy of belief when one
investigates the sweeping character of and the success attained in the
social, political, and economic reforms of the period. These were at the
basis of Spain’s victories in European councils, for they provided the
sinews of war. Nevertheless there was one drawback. The reforms in the
Americas, following the precedent of nearly three centuries, were
undertaken more with a view to the production of revenues for Spain than
for the contented development of the colonies themselves. Spain also ran
counter to a new force in world history, which she herself was obliged
by circumstances to assist in establishing itself. The spirit of world
democracy was born with the American Revolution, and appeared in France
soon afterward. This meant that the autocratic basis of Spanish
greatness was presently to be destroyed. The success of the American
Revolution was to be related in no small degree to the loss of Spain’s
colonial empire. The failure of the French Revolution was to produce a
powerful despot who was to bring Spain, under Charles IV, to the lowest
point she had reached since the days of Charles II. Nevertheless, the
reign of Charles III is to be considered as something more than a
brilliant moment in history without ultimate effect. The internal
reforms were of permanent benefit to Spain and even to the Americas,
capable of utilization under the more democratic systems of the future.
Finally, the part played by Spain in the successful issue of the
American Revolution deserves to bulk large, even though she could not
look with sympathy upon a movement which, she clearly saw, might bring
about her own ruin.
[Sidenote: Causes of Charles III’s policy of opposition to England.]
Many writers have ascribed Charles III’s policy of opposition to England
to his hatred of that country, growing out of certain humiliations
forced upon him by an English fleet while he was king in Naples. There
is no reason to believe, however, that this feeling, if indeed it did
exist in unusual degree, dominated his political action, and in fact
Charles was always a partisan of peace; far from plunging into war he
had rather to be convinced of its necessity. There were reasons in
plenty to induce him to such a course, irrespective of any personal
spite he might have felt. Prior to the reign of Charles, Spain had
already engaged in four wars with England (1702-1713, 1718-1720,
1727-1729, 1739-1748) in the course of half a century, and at no time in
the Bourbon era had the two countries been on nearly cordial terms. The
gist of the trouble lay in the British ambition to possess the greatest
colonial empire and the richest commerce in the world. For the
realization of these aims it seemed necessary to destroy the colonial
importance of France and Spain, and any advances in wealth or military
power on the part of either of those countries was regarded as
detrimental to the imperialistic designs of England. With respect to
Spain, British contraband trade in the Americas under the cover of the
_asiento_ treaty had tended to break down the Spanish commercial
monopoly, and the annulment of the _asiento_ had not put an end to the
smuggling. While no territories in the Americas had been wrested from
Spain under the Bourbons, the previous century had recorded many
conquests by England in the Caribbean area, principal of which was that
of Jamaica, and along the Atlantic coast strip of North America, the
southern part of which had been not only claimed but also occupied by
Spain in earlier days. Meanwhile, the losses of France and the
aggressive character of English foreign policy under Pitt made it appear
that Spain might expect to be deprived of her colonies whenever the
opportunity to secure them should seem ripe to England.
[Sidenote: Continuance of England’s affronts to Spain.]
[Sidenote: The Family Compact and Spain’s entry into the Seven Years’
War.]
From the outset of the reign of Charles III there occurred many
incidents to heighten Spain’s suspicion or anger with respect to
England. The exigencies of the war with France led the English to adopt
many arbitrary measures against the as yet neutral power of Spain.
English vessels stopped Spanish ships on the high seas, claiming a right
of search, and seized many of them, often without justification in
international law; the English government occupied a bit of Spanish
territory, and did not abandon it with a good grace; and there were
instances when Spanish merchants in England were treated badly.
Meanwhile, British acts of aggression and smuggling in the Americas
continued to take place; the English placed difficulties in the way of
Spanish fishing off the coast of Newfoundland, though beyond the
territorial waters of the British domain; they founded establishments in
Honduras without authorization from Spain, and began to cut the valuable
dyewoods there; and Gibraltar and Minorca still remained in English
hands, a standing affront to Spanish pride and a danger to the
peninsula. Nevertheless, the underlying factor which influenced Spain
was the imperialism of England, backed up as it was by her vast
resources and her almost invincible navy. Charles did not wish to bring
Spain into the war, but it was clear that an overwhelming defeat for
France would be almost equally disadvantageous to Spain, who might
expect to receive the next shock from the English arms. France had
gotten much the worst of it in the Seven Years’ War when Charles III
ascended the Spanish throne, wherefore Charles endeavored to mediate
between that power and England. The British government’s arrogant
rejection of his proffer tended only to make him the more disposed to
consider an alliance with France. When, therefore, the French
authorities approached him with the proposal for an alliance he resolved
to join with them if England should refuse to meet Spain’s demands
relative to the release of captured Spanish ships, the free use of the
Newfoundland fisheries, and the abandonment of the English settlements
in Honduras. England not only refused to give satisfaction, but also
asked for an explanation of the naval preparations Spain was making.
Thereupon, Charles prepared for war. Two treaties, called jointly the
Family Compact, were made with the Bourbon king of France. The first of
these, signed in August, 1761, was a defensive alliance against such
powers as should attack either of the two crowns. The second, dated in
February, 1762, was an offensive and defensive alliance directed
specifically against England. War, meanwhile, had already been declared
in January.
[Sidenote: Spanish losses in the Seven Years’ War.]
In the ensuing campaign France and Spain were badly beaten. Manila and
Havana were taken by the English, although Spain won a notable success
in the capture of Sacramento, a Portuguese colony on the Río de la
Plata,--for Portugal had entered the war on the side of England.
Twenty-seven richly laden English boats were taken at
Sacramento,--significant of the profits which the English merchants were
making in contraband trade, using Sacramento as a base. In 1763 a peace
which was in many respects humiliating to Spain was signed at Paris.
England restored Manila and Havana, but required the cession of Florida
and all other Spanish territories east of the Mississippi; Sacramento
was returned to Portugal; Spain gave up all rights of her subjects to
fish in Newfoundland waters; questions arising out of the English
captures of Spanish ships prior to Spain’s entry into the war were to be
decided by the British courts of admiralty; and the English right to cut
dyewoods in Honduras was acknowledged, although England agreed to the
demolition of all the fortifications which British subjects might have
constructed there. France, who had lost practically all her other
colonies to England, now gave the scantily settled, ill-defined region
of French influence west of the Mississippi, all that remained of French
Louisiana, to Spain. According to the terms of the grant it was to
compensate Spain for her loss of Florida, but in fact it was in order to
ensure the continued alliance of Spain with France.
[Sidenote: Preparations for a renewal of the war.]
[Sidenote: Pretexts for war.]
[Sidenote: The Falkland Islands affair.]
The peace of 1763 was looked upon by France and Spain as a truce, for if
England had been dangerous before, she was doubly so now. France wished
revenge and the restoration of her overseas domains, while Spain’s
principal motive was a desire to save her colonies from conquest by
England. Both countries therefore bent their energies to preparations
for another war; in Spain the next decade and a half was a period of
remarkable economic reforms tending to the regeneration of the peninsula
as the basis for an army and navy. Meanwhile, steps were taken to avoid
the possibility of an English descent upon the Spanish West Indies,
which were regarded as the principal danger-point, both because of the
strength of England’s position in the Caribbean area, and because that
region was the key to the Spanish mainland colonies of the two Americas.
Pretexts for trouble were not lacking. The English dyewood cutters of
Honduras did not observe the restrictions placed upon them by the treaty
of Paris, and the British government neglected to satisfy Spain’s
complaints in that regard; the French settlers of Louisiana refused to
acknowledge their transfer to the Spanish crown, wherefore it was
necessary to employ force against them, and it was believed that
English agents had instigated them to resist; on the other hand England
repeatedly demanded the payment of a ransom which the English conquerors
of Manila had exacted from that city, but Spain refused to pay the
claim. The principal diplomatic interest down to 1771, however, was the
so-called question of the Falkland Islands (called Malouines by the
French, and Maluinas by Spaniards). This group, lying some 250 miles
east of the Strait of Magellan, seems to have been discovered by Spanish
navigators of the sixteenth century, for a description of the islands
was in the possession of the Spanish authorities at an early time. The
first English voyage to this group was that of Captain Cowley, as late
as 1686, but no claim could be made on this basis, for in 1748 England
formally recognized the rights of Spain. Not much attention was paid to
the Falklands until after the Seven Years’ War, although various
navigators visited them, but in 1763 a Spanish pilot, Mathei, made the
first of a series of voyages to these islands. In 1764 a French
expedition under Bougainville landed at one of them, and formed a
settlement, and in the next year the English captain, Biron, touched at
a place called Port Egmont by him, took formal possession for England,
applying the name Falkland to the group, and proceeded on his way to the
Pacific Ocean and around the world. Not long afterward an English
settlement was made at Port Egmont, and the governor no sooner heard of
the presence of the French than he ordered their withdrawal. Meanwhile,
the Spanish government had lodged a complaint at the French court
against the occupation of the islands by France, and an agreement was
reached, whereby the French should abandon the group and a Spanish
settlement there should be formed. This was done, and the English and
Spanish governors began mutually to demand each other’s withdrawal, the
Englishman setting a time limit of six months. The Spanish government
directed the captain-general of Buenos Aires to expel the English
settlers, and accordingly, though not until June, 1770, these orders
were carried out. When the news reached England the British Parliament
voted funds in preparation for war, and made excessive demands for
reparation for what was considered an insult to England as well as for
the restitution of the colony. Spain, in reliance upon the Family
Compact, was not inclined to avoid the issue, and matters even went so
far as the retirement of the Spanish and English ambassadors, when an
unforeseen event occurred, changing the whole aspect of affairs. This
was the fall of Choiseul, the French minister who had negotiated the
Family Compact and who was believed by Spain to be ready to bring France
into the war. It was on this occasion that Louis XV is reported to have
said “My minister wanted war, but I do not,” thus calmly disregarding
the treaty with Spain. Consequently, Spain had to yield, and in 1771 the
Spanish ambassador to London signed a declaration disapproving the
removal of the English colonists and promising to restore Port Egmont,
although without prejudice to Spain’s claim to the islands.[59]
[Sidenote: Revival of the Family Compact as a force in European
politics.]
Spain might justly have abandoned the Family Compact after the Falkland
incident, and for a time that treaty did suffer a partial eclipse.
Charles III felt that in future he could count only on his own forces,
but he continued to increase and equip them, for the danger from England
was as great as ever. Self-interest inevitably brought Spain and France
together, and with the appearance of the warlike Aranda in France, late
in the year 1773, as Spanish ambassador to that court, plans with a view
to meeting the common enemy were again discussed. The death of Louis XV,
in May, 1774, brought matters still more to a head, for it resulted in a
change of ministry in France, whereby Vergennes, believed to be an
enthusiastic partisan of the Family Compact, became minister of foreign
affairs. Vergennes was in fact an ardent supporter of the Franco-Spanish
alliance, although his enthusiasm was tempered in moments of crisis by a
clear view of what most favored France, and he did not fail to see that
he might employ it as the basis for trade concessions from Spain, the
better to build up the resources of France. Nevertheless, the opinion
was general that Vergennes intended to adhere to the Family Compact, and
consequently England planned to occupy Spain with other affairs, so as
to separate her from France, or at least divert her from pursuing a
common policy with the last-named country against England. Two matters
were at hand, of which they might avail themselves: Spain’s disputes
with the sultan of Morocco; and her quarrels with Portugal over
boundaries in South America.
[Sidenote: Relations with the Moslem states of the Barbary Coast.]
The never-ending wars with the Moslems of northern Africa were inherited
from the preceding era, and continued to occupy Spanish troops and
fleets down to the reign of Charles III. In 1767 satisfactory relations
between Spain and Morocco seemed to have been reached when the latter
agreed to abandon piracy and recognized Spain’s title to her
establishments on the North African coast. Late in 1774, however, the
sultan announced that he would no longer tolerate Christian posts in his
empire, and commenced a siege of Melilla. The attack was beaten off, and
it was decided to strike what was hoped might be a decisive blow against
the dey of Algiers, the ally of the Moroccan sultan. An expedition of
some 18,000 men was prepared, and placed under the command of General
O’Reilly, reformer of the Spanish army and a man of tremendous
reputation, but in the ensuing operations before Algiers O’Reilly was
crushingly defeated with a loss of several thousand men. Rightly or
wrongly, England was believed to have instigated the Moslem rulers to
attack Spain. Years later, Charles came to an understanding with the
Moslem states of the Barbary Coast. Between 1782 and 1786 treaties were
made, whereby the rulers of those lands agreed once again to give up
piracy and also the institution of slavery, besides granting certain
religious and commercial privileges to Spaniards in their lands. This
was not the last of piracy and warfare in North Africa, however; the
former endured for another generation, and the end of the latter, even
in the restricted Spanish area, is not yet.
[Sidenote: Disputes with Portugal over boundaries in South America.]
There was a much stronger case against England with regard to Portugal,
whose exaggerated claims were supported by the British government. The
boundaries between the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in South America
had been an unending source of dispute, ever since the treaty of
Tordesillas in 1494, and the question was complicated by that of British
and Portuguese smuggling into Spain’s colonies. The principal scene of
conflict was the Portuguese post of Sacramento, founded in 1679 on the
eastern bank of the Río de la Plata. The Spanish-owned region of
Paraguay was also a field for Portuguese aggressions. Domestic animals
to the number of hundreds of thousands were driven off from the Spanish
settlements, while thousands of Indian families were captured and sold
into slavery. Ferdinand VI endeavored to solve these problems through a
treaty which he made with Portugal, in 1750, according to which Spain
acquired Sacramento in exchange for territories in the Paraguayan
region. The treaty met with the spirited opposition of leading Spanish
ministers, and with that of the Jesuit missionaries, the Indians, and
the Spanish settlers in the regions affected, and after many
vicissitudes, including a war in Paraguay, it was annulled in 1761, but
the troubles on the border continued. One of the underlying difficulties
was the ambition of Portugal. Under the direction of the Marquis of
Pombal, Portuguese minister of state, she was desirous of making
conquests in South America, for which purpose Pombal was willing to go
to any length in bad faith to achieve his end, relying upon the support
of England in case Spain should declare war. Pombal secretly directed
the Portuguese officials in the Sacramento region to seize desirable
Spanish territories, and when reports of these captures came to Europe
pretended that they were false, or that they were nothing more than
inconsequential affrays between the Spanish and Portuguese soldiery. He
promised to order his troops to desist from such actions, and asked
Charles III to do the same. The Spanish king complied with his wishes,
while Pombal on the contrary continued to give orders for hostilities
and to send reinforcements, hoping that the Portuguese might secure
posts from which it would be impossible to dislodge them by the time his
duplicity should be found out. Not only did he deceive Charles III for
a while, but he also misled the English ministers, pretending that
Portugal was a victim of Spanish ambition when the facts were quite the
contrary. England supported Pombal with vigorous diplomatic action. By
the close of the year 1775, however, England was so busily engaged in
the disputes with her own colonies that she was far from desiring a war
in Europe. The British Cabinet announced that it would take no part in
the quarrel between Spain and Portugal, provided Charles III should make
no attempts on the territorial integrity of Portugal and Brazil. Pombal
now made peaceful overtures to Charles III, hoping to delay the sending
of Spanish troops to South America, but the proofs of Pombal’s perfidy
were by this time so clear that the king of Spain would not trust him.
In fact, a Portuguese fleet in South America attacked the Spanish fleet,
in February, 1776, and shortly afterward the Portuguese captured the
Spanish post of Santa Tecla. In November a Spanish expedition left
Cádiz, and on arrival in South America put a check to the Portuguese
aggressions, and captured Sacramento. Fortune played into Spain’s hands
in another respect when María Victoria, sister of Charles III, became
regent of Portugal on the death of the king in 1777. This occasioned the
dismissal of Pombal, and in October of that year a treaty was arranged
between Spain and Portugal entirely favorable to the former. The
much-disputed Sacramento colony was awarded to Spain, while Paraguay was
retained. This treaty, supplemented by another in 1778, put an end,
after nearly three centuries, to the disputes between Spain and Portugal
with regard to their American boundaries.
[Sidenote: Disputes of England with her American colonies as a factor in
Spain’s foreign policy.]
In the midst of Spain’s preparations for a war against England there
loomed up a new factor, the troubles between England and her American
colonies. Down to 1774 Spain had proceeded without reference to these
disputes, ardently desirous of war whenever France should be ready,
although Charles III himself was conservative with regard to a
declaration. Until late in the year 1774 France and Spain, together with
most Englishmen, believed that the colonial situation was merely a Whig
device against the Tories. The first inkling of the seriousness of the
situation seems to have come in a report of the French ambassador, in
June, 1774, quoting a remark of the British minister, Lord Rochford,
that the Boston rioters were descendants of Cromwell’s Puritans,
implying that they would fight. Both France and Spain welcomed the news,
believing that it would keep England engaged until the Bourbon powers
could get ready to strike. In December, 1774, Garnier, the French
_chargé d’affaires_ in London, had become convinced that the American
dispute was the most important event in English history since the
revolution of 1688, and he suggested that France should give secret aid
to the Americans. In January, 1775, he reported that an army of 9000 men
was being sent to the colonies, and sounded a warning lest they make a
descent upon the French West Indies, whether in the flush of victory, or
in order to gain a recompense in case of defeat. The Spanish court was
informed of this opinion, and in March, 1775, received a similar message
from Escarano, the Spanish minister in London, who stated that England
had 11,736 soldiers in America (a great force as colonial armies went)
and could easily attack Spain’s possessions, both because they were
near, and because the British had so many transports at hand. He was of
the opinion that England could not defeat America with her “three
million souls, guided by the enthusiasm of liberty, and accustomed to
live in a kind of independence,” a people “who had given so many proofs
of valor.” The danger of a return to power of William Pitt, the
imperialist, now Lord Chatham, was also alluded to. Spain at once
consulted with France whether it would not be advisable to break with
England immediately, but Vergennes was not ready. So the matter was
dropped, although a remark attributed to Lord Rochford that the
Americans could be won back to allegiance by an English declaration of
war against France did not tend to allay the Bourbon feeling of
insecurity.
[Sidenote: Disadvantages to Spain of a victory by either the United
States or England and effect on Spain’s policy.]
At about this time the Spanish authorities began to be impressed by the
idea, first expressed by Aranda in July, 1775, that the American
outbreak would endanger Spain’s colonial empire. According to Aranda an
independent America would be a menace, as her population was increasing,
and consequently she needed lands, which she would be apt to seek in a
region with a temperate climate like New Spain, rather than by expansion
northward. Thus the Anglo-Americans might eventually dominate North
America, or help Spain’s colonies to become independent. On the other
hand, if England should defeat the colonists, the latter would join with
her in her wars as in the past, and the danger would be equally great.
Thus Spain seemed to be between two horns of the dilemma. Up to this
time she had been ready for a declaration of war whenever France should
announce her willingness. Henceforth there was a more conservative note
in Spain’s attitude, while France, who had everything to gain and
nothing to lose, threw off her former conservatism and became
increasingly enthusiastic. Up to the close of the year 1776, however,
Spain still leaned toward war, and France remained undecided as to the
moment to strike. During this period Spain was influenced largely by the
question with Portugal. In September, 1776, Vergennes informed Aranda
that in his opinion the war ought soon to be begun, before England
herself should declare it and make an attack on France and Spain.
Spain’s attitude was expressed by Grimaldi, the Spanish minister of
state, in a letter to Aranda in October. The war was inevitable, he
said, and it would be an advantage to begin it several months before
England was ready to undertake it. Spain would leave it to the decision
of France whether the declaration should be made at once. Incidentally,
Spain hoped to conquer Portugal in course of the war. This frank
statement found Vergennes less enthusiastic. Moreover, he objected to
Spain’s designs on Portugal, lest other European powers should be
unfavorable to them. Once again the matter was dropped. Some of the
higher Spanish officials were disappointed over these continued refusals
by France, but Charles III said that for his part he believed the right
moment had not come. Meanwhile, since June, 1776, Spain had been aiding
the Americans secretly with money, arms, and ammunition, much of which
was made available through shipment to New Orleans by way of Havana,
and thence to destination. Nevertheless, Vergennes’ refusal, in
November, to begin the war marked the turning point in the attitude of
both France and Spain. The disadvantages, henceforth, loomed larger and
larger in the eyes of Spain, while the successful resistance of the
Americans to England made the way more and more easy for France.
[Sidenote: Spain’s divergence from France over the American Revolution.]
The new attitude of Spain was represented by both Charles III and
Floridablanca, who succeeded Grimaldi early in 1777. According to
Floridablanca the most immediate advantages which Spain might hope to
gain from the war were the recovery of Florida and the expulsion of the
English from Honduras. War ought not to be declared, however, until both
France and Spain should have considerable forces in the West Indies.
Furthermore, if the rebellious English colonies should establish their
independence, Spain ought to contrive to keep them divided in interests,
so that there might not grow up a formidable power near Spanish America.
Clearly there was no enthusiasm in Spanish governmental circles on
behalf of the Americans. This appears also from the cold reception
accorded Arthur Lee, the American representative, who at about this time
arrived in Spain, but was not received by the Spanish court. The breach
between the respective courses of France and Spain was still further
widened as a result of Burgoyne’s surrender to the Americans at
Saratoga. The British government began to make offers with a view to
conciliating the colonists. France acted quickly to prevent it, for it
was believed that a reconciliation would mean a loss of the commercial
favors France hoped to get and perhaps a war with England in which the
colonies would join on the English side. In December, 1777, therefore,
France declared herself ready to enter into a treaty of commerce and
alliance with the American government, specifically stating that her
willingness was due partially to a desire to diminish the power of
England by separating her from her colonies. In February, 1778, a treaty
was signed. All of this was done, in violation of the spirit of the
Family Compact, without any official notification to Spain. Spain’s
opinion of this procedure was voiced by Floridablanca, who recommended
to Charles III that Spain should continue her preparations, as if war
were inevitable, but should avoid a declaration as long as possible, for
under existing circumstances, one of which was the inconstancy of
Spain’s allies, the war could not result favorably for Spain.
Henceforth, Spain pursued an independent policy. The English government
was informed that Spain’s attitude would depend upon England; Spain
neither wished war nor feared it. France, meanwhile, had entered the
conflict.
[Sidenote: Failure of mediation and Spain’s entry into the war.]
Charles III now began to attempt the part of a mediator, in hopes that
he might get Gibraltar and Minorca as the price for bringing about
peace. In May, 1778, Escarano suggested to Lord Weymouth, a member of
the British ministry, that Gibraltar would be a fair equivalent for
Spain’s services, but was told that the price was too high, and that
affairs had probably gone beyond the point where mediation would serve;
England wanted no more from Spain than that she remain neutral. In
making this reply Lord Weymouth rather brusquely thanked Charles III for
the magnanimity of his offer,--a type of answer which was not calculated
to be pleasing to the Spanish ear, as Floridablanca very plainly
intimated to the English ambassador. To add to Spain’s displeasure
England’s conduct on the sea gave cause for complaint. Nevertheless,
Charles still hoped to serve as arbitrator,--all the more so, when news
came of French naval victories over the English. He prevailed upon Louis
XVI to submit the terms upon which he would make peace. The conditions,
which included an acknowledgment of American independence and the recall
of England’s land and sea forces, were presented to Lord Weymouth, who
haughtily rejected them. Late in the same year, 1778, Spain’s proposal
of a twenty-five or thirty year truce between England and her colonies
was also rejected. Nothing could exceed the patience of Charles III, who
then offered Weymouth an indefinite armistice, to be guaranteed by a
general disarmament. Again the Spanish king’s proposals were arrogantly
rejected. To make matters worse, England had delayed her reply from
January to March, 1779, and her ships had continued to attack those of
Spain. On April 3, Charles renewed his offer of a suspension of
hostilities, this time in the form of an ultimatum. England did not
answer for nearly two months, and in the meantime, seeing that war was
inevitable, planned attacks on the Spanish colonies. On May 28 the
ultimatum was rejected, and on June 23 war was declared.
[Sidenote: The war with England and its favorable issue.]
Spain was well prepared for the war, besides which the favorable state
of her relations with Portugal, and indeed with other countries, was a
source of strength. France and Spain planned an invasion of England
which did not materialize, but it did cause the retention of the English
fleet in British waters and a diminution in the military forces sent to
America,--a factor in the American war not to be overlooked. The
attempts to retake Gibraltar were unsuccessful, but in 1782 Minorca fell
into Spanish hands. In America, Florida was reconquered from the
British, the establishments in Honduras were taken, and the English were
expelled from the Bahama Islands of the West Indies. Meanwhile, England
displayed great eagerness to remove Spain from the list of her enemies.
Late in 1779 she offered to restore Gibraltar for the price of Spanish
neutrality, and to add Florida and the right to fish in Newfoundland
waters if Spain would aid her against the United States. Not only this
time but also on two other occasions when England endeavored to treat
separately with Spain her offers were rejected, even though they
embodied favorable terms for withdrawal from the war. In an age when
international faith was not very sacred, Spain preferred to remain true
to France, with whom she had renewed her alliance, although to be sure
England’s promises never equalled Spain’s hopes. It is also interesting
to note, not only that the Americans had a representative in Spain (John
Jay), but also that there were agents of Spain in the United States
(Miralles and Rendón), besides which Bernardo de Gálvez, the conqueror
of Florida, had dealings with American agents at New Orleans. The
general relations of the two governments cannot be said to have been
cordial, however, and at no time was there anything approaching a
veritable alliance; Bourbon Spain could not possibly approve of the
democratic United States. By the treaty of 1783, which ended the war,
Spain got Florida and Minorca, and limited the dyewood privileges of the
English in Honduras to a term of years. On the other hand Spain restored
the Bahamas to England. An interesting period of relations between Spain
and the United States, having to do primarily with the regions of the
lower Mississippi valley, began in the closing years of the reign of
Charles III, but the story belongs rather to the colonial side of the
history of Spain.
[Sidenote: Death of Charles III.]
In December, 1788, Charles III died. As will be made more clear in the
chapters dealing with institutions, he had brought Spain forward to the
position of a first rank power again,--even though her enjoyment of that
high station was to be of brief duration.