CHARLES IV AND FRANCE, 1788-1808
[Sidenote: Dominating character of relations with France and their
effects upon Spain]
IF the reign of Charles III, despite the close union of the Bourbon
crowns, had been characterized mainly in its external manifestations by
the hostility of Spain to England, that of Charles IV (1788-1808) was
dominated by relations with France. Unaffected for a while by the
principles underlying the French Revolution, Spain was toppled from her
position as a first-rate power by the Emperor Napoleon, whose designs
for world power and whose methods in seeking it were not unlike those
followed over a century later by William II of Germany. Meanwhile, the
ideas of the American and the French revolutions were permeating the
Spanish colonies, and as the wars with England continued during much of
this reign, shutting off effective communication between the colonies
and Spain, a chance was offered for putting them into effect in the new
world. The way was well prepared in the reign of Charles IV, though the
outbreak was postponed until after his fall. The blow struck by Napoleon
was not without its compensations, which in the long run may be
considered to have outweighed the loss of prestige. Napoleon, quite
without intention, gave Spain an impulse to national feeling, in the
uprising against French domination, which was greater than any she had
formerly experienced, and of sufficient force to endure to the present
day. In the same roundabout way Napoleon gave the Spain of the _Dos de
Mayo_, or Second of May (the date of the revolt against Napoleon, and
the national holiday of Spain), her first opportunity to imbibe
democratic ideas.
[Sidenote: The Nootka affair and the virtual repudiation of the Family
Compact.]
To cope with the great forces of the French Revolution and the
Napoleonic Empire, Spain had to rely on the leadership of the weak,
timid, vacillating Charles IV. His predecessor had left him a legacy of
able ministers, but these were not long sustained by the king. At the
outset Floridablanca still ruled as first minister of state. He was
liberal-minded as concerned social and economic institutions, but was
profoundly royalist in his political ideas and an enemy of anything
which represented a diminution in the prerogatives of the crown. He was
alarmed by the ideas which were being spread broadcast in France, and
took steps to prevent their introduction into Spain, becoming recognized
as an opponent of the French Revolution. In the midst of this situation,
there occurred the Nootka affair, which obliged him for a time to change
his policy. A Spanish voyage of 1789 to the northwest coast of North
America had resulted in the discovery and capture of two English ships
at Nootka, on the western shore of Vancouver Island. Floridablanca
informed the English government of this event, in January, 1790,
complaining of the frequent usurpations of Spanish colonial territories
by British subjects, and asking for the recognition of Spain’s ownership
of Nootka, which had been discovered by a Spanish voyage of 1774. What
followed was very nearly a duplicate of the Falkland incident, twenty
years before. England claimed that the British flag had been insulted,
and demanded satisfaction, which Floridablanca refused to give, as it
involved the acknowledgment of a doubt concerning Spain’s ownership of
Nootka. War seemed imminent, and the French government was invoked to
stand by the Family Compact. The National Assembly, then in actual
control in France, acknowledged the obligation, but attached conditions
(having to do with the revolution) to their willingness to declare
war,--with the result that Charles IV and Floridablanca decided that it
was better to avoid a rupture with England. A series of three treaties,
from 1790 to 1794, arranged for the payment of an indemnity by Spain,
and among other matters agreed that the ships of both nations should
have a right to sail the waters and make landings freely in regions not
already settled by either power. In effect, therefore, the lands north
of the Spanish settlements were thrown open to the entry of England.
These treaties had a significance which was wider than that of the
matters directly involved. They marked a new spirit in the direction of
colonial affairs. In the early years of the conquest Spain had played an
aggressive part, followed soon by the adoption of what might be termed
an aggressive defensive, or a willingness to fight for the retention of
what she had, leading also to further conquests in order to ward off
foreign attack. The Nootka affair was the beginning of a spiritless,
waiting kind of defensive, the inevitable outcome of which was
disintegration.
[Sidenote: Floridablanca and Spanish opposition to the French
Revolution.]
The Nootka treaties left Spain free, however, to stand in opposition to
the French Revolution. Louis XVI of France had written secretly to
Charles IV, in 1789, that he had been compelled to agree to measures of
which he did not approve. Other European monarchs were also acquainted
with the perils of Louis XVI’s position, and in the general interests of
kingship, all desired to save him, although in the case of Spain there
was the strong bond of family ties as well. In 1790 Floridablanca
directed a note to the French Assembly requesting greater freedom of
action for Louis XVI, making thinly veiled threats in case of a refusal
to comply. This action only served to enrage the French government. In
1791 Floridablanca ordered the taking of a census of all foreigners in
Spain, about half of whom were Frenchmen, compelling them to swear
allegiance to the king, the laws, and the religion of the peninsula. A
subsequent order prohibited the entry of any literature of a
revolutionary bearing, even going so far as to forbid foreigners to
receive letters. When Louis XVI accepted the constitution of 1791
Floridablanca announced that Charles IV refused to recognize that the
French king had signed the document of his own free will, and asked that
Louis XVI and his family be allowed to go to a neutral land, threatening
war if the French government should fail to accede to Charles’ wishes.
Here was a direct challenge to the revolution, but instead of accepting
the gauntlet France sent an agent to Spain who was able to persuade
Charles IV that Floridablanca’s policy was in fact contributing to the
dangerous position of Louis XVI. Floridablanca was therefore relieved
from power early in 1792, and Aranda became first minister in Spain.
[Sidenote: Brief ministry of Aranda.]
Aranda, who sympathized to some extent with the revolutionary ideas,
placed the relations with France on a more cordial basis, although
without relinquishing the efforts which were being made in company with
other European sovereigns to save Louis XVI. When the news came of the
revolutionary excesses of the summer of 1792 Aranda, who had not
expected such a turn of affairs, became more stern, and began to
consider the advisability of joint military action with Austria,
Prussia, and Sardinia. Meanwhile, the French government demanded the
alliance of Spain or offered the alternative of war. Induced in part by
a doubt with regard to the best policy to pursue for the sake of Louis
XVI, Spain hesitated, and suggested a treaty of neutrality. France
imposed conditions which it was impossible for Spain to accept, among
them the recognition of the French Republic, which had just been
proclaimed. Before Aranda could meet the problem in a decisive manner he
was dispossessed of his post as the result of a palace plot in favor of
Manuel Godoy.
[Sidenote: Godoy and the significance of his relations with the queen.]
At the time of his accession to the headship of the Spanish ministry in
1792 Godoy was a mere youth, twenty-five years of age. Formerly a
soldier of the royal guard, he had been selected by Charles IV with the
specific idea of training him to be his leading minister, for the king
believed that the plebeian Godoy would, out of necessity, be devotedly
attached to the royal interests. The queen, María Luisa, was influential
in the choice of Godoy, for there is little doubt that she was already
the mistress of this upstart youth. Godoy’s abilities have perhaps been
condemned too harshly. He was a man of ambition and some talent, and had
studied assiduously to fit himself for his eventual post. Nevertheless,
his sudden rise to high rank in the nobility (for he had been made Duke
of Alcudia) and in political office, together with the notoriety of his
relations with the queen, caused an indignation in Spain which was to
result in the forming of a party opposed to him,--a group which the
enemies of Spain were able to manipulate to advantage.
[Sidenote: War with France and the treaty of Basle.]
[Sidenote: Difficulties with England and alliance with France.]
Godoy continued the efforts of his predecessors to save Louis XVI,
without more success than they, and when he declined to accede to the
conditions imposed by the French Convention, then ruling in France, that
body early in 1793 declared war on Spain. The war against France was
joined by most of the countries of western Europe. One by one, however,
the continental princes fell away, and urged Spain to do the same. The
war itself, so far as Spain was concerned, was not decisive either way,
although France had a little the better of it. In 1795 negotiations were
undertaken which resulted in the treaty of Basle. The Pyrenean boundary
was maintained, but Spain ceded that portion of the island of Hayti, or
Santo Domingo, which still belonged to her, thus acknowledging the
French title to the whole island.[60] The government of England, with
which Spain had allied for the war with France, was exceedingly annoyed
by Spain’s acceptance of peace, and very soon began to act in a
threatening manner. Even as an ally in the recent war England had not
been altogether cordial toward Spain. On one occasion a Spanish treasure
ship which had been captured by the French was retaken by the English,
and retained as a prize; Englishmen had continued to engage in
contraband trade, not only in Spanish America, but also in the peninsula
itself; they had been responsible for encouraging separatist feelings in
Spanish America, well knowing that the independence of Spain’s colonies
would result in advantages to British commerce; and England had refused
to grant Spain a subsidy for the 1795 campaign,--a factor with a bearing
on Spain’s action, whatever the merits of the case. The resentment of
the Spanish court was now provoked by insults which were offered to the
Spanish ambassador to London and by attacks on Spanish ships, just as
formerly in the reign of Charles III. The natural effect was to drive
Spain into the arms of France. An alliance was formed in 1796 which was
followed by a declaration of war against England. It is highly probable
that Charles IV was induced to form this union by a belief, fostered
perhaps by French intrigue, that the French Republic was about to
collapse, in which event it seemed likely that a Spanish Bourbon might
be called to the throne of France.
[Sidenote: Unsatisfactory results from the French Alliance.]
Spain’s experience as an ally of France was not more happy than her
previous union with England. France excluded her from representation at
several conferences looking to treaties of peace between France and her
enemies, and made slight efforts to secure the interests of Spain, going
so far as to refuse her sanction to many of the pretensions of her
Bourbon ally. Most annoying of all was the dispossession of the Duke of
Parma, a relative of Charles IV by descent from Isabel Farnesio. The
French government endeavored to calm Spanish feelings on this point by
offering to make Godoy the Grand Master of the Knights of Malta,--an
honor he was disposed to accept, subject to certain conditions, one of
which was that he be absolved from the vow of chastity. In fact,
however, the French authorities were suspicious of Godoy, believing that
he was secretly plotting with England, because he did not insist on
Portugal’s refusing to allow the English fleets to remain in Portuguese
ports. A French representative was sent to Spain in 1797, and the
dismissal of Godoy was procured from Charles IV. Nevertheless, Godoy
continued to be the principal force at the Spanish court, backed as he
was by the powerful influence of the queen. The policy of truculence to
France went on, however, due in part perhaps to Charles’ continued hopes
of acquiring the Bourbon crown, but even more, very likely, to his
pusillanimity in the face of the threats of the French Directory. In
1799 his hopes were dashed when Napoleon Bonaparte overthrew the
Directory and became first consul of France, a title which a few years
later he converted into that of emperor.
[Sidenote: Early relations with Napoleon and the war with Portugal.]
The change of government in France was welcomed at the Spanish court,
for it was believed that Spain would receive more consideration at the
hands of Napoleon than she had obtained from the Directory. Events
proved that Spain was to be even more an instrument in French hands than
formerly, and that Napoleon was to be more powerful and despotic and
less courteous and faithful in international affairs than the French
rulers who had preceded him. One of his earliest acts was an attempt to
employ the Spanish fleet to conserve French ends. When the Spanish
admiral refused to carry out the wishes of Napoleon, a matter in which
he was sustained by his government, the French ruler brought about the
dismissal of Urquijo, at that time first minister of state in Spain, and
shortly afterward the offending admiral was relieved from his command.
Meanwhile, a treaty had been arranged in 1800 whereby Napoleon agreed to
enlarge the dominions of the Duke of Parma (who had regained his duchy)
in exchange for the recession of Louisiana to France and the gift of six
ships of war. By a treaty of 1801 Tuscany was granted to the family of
the Duke of Parma, whose whole domains were now called the kingdom of
Etruria. It was provided that in case of a lack of succession of the
reigning house a Spanish prince of the royal family should inherit the
Etrurian throne, and this was to be the rule forever. Another treaty of
1801 required Spain to issue an ultimatum to Portugal demanding an
abandonment of the English alliance. The name of Godoy was signed to the
later treaties in the series of which the above have been mentioned. He
had not ceased to be influential during his absence from power, but
henceforth until 1808 he was definitely in the saddle. Though his
military experience was slight he was appointed general of the Spanish
army which was to invade Portugal, and when war was presently declared
he entered that country. The campaign, although comparatively
insignificant, resulted in victory. Portugal agreed to close her ports
in return for the Spanish king’s guarantee of the territorial integrity
of Portugal. A celebration was held at Badajoz, at which the soldiers
presented the queen with branches of orange trees taken from Portuguese
groves, resulting in the application of the name “war of the
oranges,”--which fittingly described its inconsequential character.
Napoleon was furious over such a termination of the war, and went so far
as to threaten the end of the Spanish monarchy unless the campaign were
pursued. At length he decided to accept the result, after Portugal had
consented to increase the indemnity which she had originally agreed to
pay to France. This marked a beginning, however, of the French ruler’s
distrust of Godoy. Shortly afterward it suited Napoleon’s purposes to
make peace. In 1802 a treaty was signed with England, and, naturally,
Spain too made peace. Minorca, which had been occupied by the English,
was restored to Spain, but the island of Trinidad was surrendered to
England,--another bit chipped off Spain’s colonial empire.
[Sidenote: Difficulties of neutrality and declaration of war against
England.]
Godoy had emerged from the Portuguese campaign as general-in-chief of
the armies of the land and sea, and was again the dominating power at
court. By this time a strong opposition had grown up around Ferdinand,
the eldest son of the king, directed by an ambitious canon, named
Escoiquiz. Napoleon now had a political force at hand, to employ
whenever he should desire it, against Godoy. Early in 1803 Napoleon was
again at war with England, and proceeded to woo Spain’s support by
charges that she was favoring England and by threats of war. In the same
year, too, he sold Louisiana to the United States, although he had
promised Spain at the time of the recession that France would never
transfer that region to any country other than Spain. Spain protested,
but soon accepted the situation. Later in 1803 Napoleon compelled Spain
to consent to a so-called treaty of neutrality, which in fact amounted
to the paying of a monthly tribute to France. England objected, and
followed up her complaints by capturing three Spanish frigates and
stopping merchantmen, without a declaration of war. England announced
that she was holding the frigates as a guarantee of Spanish neutrality.
Thus courted with equal roughness by France and England, Spain was again
under the necessity of choosing which of her enemies to fight. England
was selected, and in 1804 war against that country was declared.
[Sidenote: Napoleon and Godoy, and the project to partition Portugal.]
In 1805 there occurred the great battle of Trafalgar, in which the
French and Spanish navies were virtually destroyed by the English under
Nelson. The immediate results of this defeat as affecting Spanish action
was the decision of Godoy, who had never enjoyed cordial relations with
Napoleon, to seek an alliance with England. Through this agency he
hoped to bolster up his own power as against the rapidly growing body of
his enemies in Spain. In the midst of his plans came Napoleon’s great
victory over Prussia at Jena in 1806, which, following that of
Austerlitz over Austria in 1805, once again made the French emperor
dangerously predominant on the continent of western Europe. Godoy, who
had already compromised himself, made haste to explain. Napoleon
pretended to be satisfied, but decided then that he would make an end of
the Bourbon monarchy. The unpopularity of Godoy and the strength of the
party of Ferdinand, who was now a popular favorite, were among the means
of which he availed himself; Ferdinand even wrote him letters in which
he alluded freely to his mother’s adulterous relations with Godoy.
Meanwhile, Napoleon profited by Godoy’s willingness to do anything to
win the favor of the emperor by arranging for the conquest of Portugal.
A partition of that territory was projected whereby the Bourbon monarch
of Etruria was to have northern Portugal, Godoy (as Prince of Algarve)
was to have the south, and the centre was to be exchanged for Gibraltar,
Trinidad, and other colonies which England had taken from Spain. The
usual ultimatum having been sent and rejected, the war began for what
seemed a brilliant objective for Spain,--if Napoleon had had any
intention of his keeping his word.
[Sidenote: Plottings of Napoleon and the abdication of Charles IV.]
The campaign of 1807 resulted in a rapid, almost bloodless conquest of
Portugal by the French general Junot, placing Napoleon in a position to
fulfil his treaty obligations. Nothing was further from his plans,
however, and, indeed, Godoy and the king had recently had cause to
suspect his sincerity; action had been taken against Ferdinand and his
party, resulting in the exposure of the prince’s correspondence with
Napoleon. Napoleon occupied Etruria,--and gave the queen of that country
to understand that she need not look for compensation in Portugal.
Godoy, meanwhile, remained without Algarve, although hoping against hope
that he might yet get it. All this time, French troops were pouring into
Spain, and through deceit were possessing themselves of the Spanish
strongholds in the north. To the credit of Godoy it must be said that
he divined the emperor’s intentions, and favored a demand for the
withdrawal of the French troops, with the alternative of war. Charles IV
and his other leading advisers were opposed to this idea; the king was
frightened at the very thought of fighting Napoleon. The emperor now
began to unmask himself. The Spanish ambassador to France returned to
Madrid as the bearer of a message from Napoleon, asking for the cession
of certain Spanish provinces in the north as far as the Ebro, or else
for the recognition of the emperor’s title to Portugal, together with a
military road thereto across Spanish territory; the ambassador added
that he believed Napoleon intended to possess himself of the northern
provinces and perhaps of all Spain, though possibly not until the death
of Charles IV. It was now perfectly clear to Godoy and the king what
Napoleon meant to do, but the party of Ferdinand, unaware of all the
facts, was wedded blindly to the emperor, believing that his sole desire
was to get rid of Godoy and assure the succession of Ferdinand. Charles,
Godoy, and the queen thought of escaping to the Americas, and as a
preliminary step moved the court from Madrid to Aranjuez. A riot
followed at Aranjuez in which Godoy was captured by the followers of
Ferdinand, and was with difficulty saved from death. Realizing that the
army and the people were almost wholly on the side of Ferdinand, and
unable to see any way out of his difficulties, Charles IV decided to
abdicate, and accordingly on March 19, 1808, did so. All Spain rejoiced,
for Godoy had fallen, and the idolized prince had now ascended the
throne as Ferdinand VII.
[Sidenote: Duplicity of Napoleon and the journeys of Ferdinand VII and
Charles IV to Bayonne.]
Napoleon was much displeased at the course of events in Spain. The
flight of Charles would have fitted in with his plans, whereas the
accession of Ferdinand placed him under the necessity of exposing his
hand. Temporarily he saved the situation by one of the most remarkable
exhibitions of successful duplicity in history. On March 23 General
Murat entered Madrid with a French army, and the next day Ferdinand made
his royal entry, and was received by the people with delirious joy. The
foreign diplomats at once recognized him as king,--except the French
ambassador. Uncertain yet what to do, Napoleon was on the one hand
giving indications of an intention to restore Charles IV, and on the
other planning to set up one of his own brothers as king of Spain.
Charles IV gave the emperor the opening he desired. In order to obtain
some material advantages from his abdication and to save Godoy, who was
still in prison, he entered into communication with Murat, and as a
result secretly retracted his abdication, placing himself entirely in
the hands of Napoleon. Meanwhile, Murat told Ferdinand that the emperor
was coming to see him, and suggested that Ferdinand should go to Burgos
to meet him. When Ferdinand decided against the journey, lest it produce
a bad effect in the minds of the people, Napoleon sent General Savary
with orders to bring Ferdinand whether he wanted to come or not. Savary
succeeded in persuading the young prince to go to Burgos, and when
Napoleon was not found there to Vitoria. Beyond this point Ferdinand was
at first not disposed to go, but, urged on both by Savary and Escoiquiz,
who still believed in the French emperor, the party proceeded across the
boundary line to Bayonne. There indeed they found Napoleon,--and
Ferdinand was informed that he must abdicate the throne. A few days
later, on April 30, Charles IV, María Luisa, and Godoy arrived; they had
been easily persuaded to go there by Murat. The reunion of the royal
family at Bayonne was accompanied by disgraceful quarrels of the parents
and the son and by the humiliating weakness of all in the presence of
Napoleon. Charles IV was again induced to abdicate, and was given a rich
pension and estates in France to which he and his family, Godoy, and the
royal servants might repair. Ferdinand was also granted rents and lands.
To Napoleon was given the right to name a king of Spain.
[Sidenote: Uprising of the Dos de Mayo against Napoleon.]
Meanwhile, the French troops in Madrid and elsewhere had been conducting
themselves like conquerors, and had aroused considerable hostility in
the people, who were not so easily deceived and dominated as their
rulers had been. After the departure of Ferdinand from Madrid the French
officers did not hesitate to say that Napoleon would not recognize
him,--which only increased the popular discontent. The climax came when
an order was received from Napoleon for the young Bourbon prince,
Francisco de Paula, and for the queen of Etruria with her children to be
sent to France. The departure from Madrid was set for the morning of the
second of May. A crowd gathered to see the royal party off, and heard
rumors which excited it to a feeling of frenzy,--for example, that the
young Francisco (then only thirteen) had protested in tears against
going. Insults were offered the French soldiery, and the harness of the
coaches was cut. These scenes were interrupted by the appearance of a
French battalion, which fired without warning into the crowd. The crowd
scattered, and spread the news over the city. This was the signal for a
general uprising against the French. The Spanish troops were under
strict orders from the government to stay in barracks, but a number of
them declined to obey. Prominent among those joining the people against
the French were Captains Pedro Velarde and Luis Daoiz, the heroes of the
day. When the people were driven out of the central square of the city,
the Plaza del Sol, by the French artillery, Velarde hastened to the
battery commanded by Daoiz. Convincing the latter that the interests of
the country were superior to discipline he joined with him and a certain
Lieutenant Ruiz in directing the fire against the French troops.
Superior in numbers and armament, the French were successful after a
battle lasting three hours in which Velarde and Daoiz were killed. The
dramatic events of the _Dos de Mayo_, or the second of May, were the
prelude to a national uprising against the French. Without a king or a
government Spain began the war which was to usher in a new era in
Spanish history,--for, just as Americans look back to the Fourth of July
in 1776, so the Spaniards consider the _Dos de Mayo_ of 1808 as the
beginning of modern Spain.