THE REIGN OF PHILIP II, 1556-1598
[Sidenote: Resemblance of the reign of Philip II to that of Charles I.]
In underlying essentials the reign of Philip II was a reproduction of
that of Charles I. There were scattered dominions and family prestige to
maintain, the enemies of the Catholic Church to combat, the dominant
place of Spain in Europe to assure, the strain on Spanish resources,
and, as glorious offsets to general failure in Europe, the acquisition
of some European domains and the advance of the colonial conquests. Only
the details varied. Philip had a more compact nation behind him than had
fallen to the lot of Charles, although there was still much to be
desired in that respect; France was hostile, though less powerful than
formerly, but England and Philip’s rebellious Protestant Netherlands
more than made up for the weakness of France; issues in Germany no
longer called for great attention, but family politics were not
forgotten; on the other hand Philip achieved the ideal of peninsula
unity through the acquisition of Portugal, carrying with it that
country’s colonies; and, finally, his conquests in the new world, though
less spectacular than those of Charles, compared favorably with them in
actual fact.
[Sidenote: Education and character of Philip II.]
Historians have often gone to extremes in their judgments of Philip II.
Some have been ardently pro-Philip, while others were as bitterly
condemnatory. Recently, opinions have been more moderately expressed. In
addition to native ability and intelligence Philip had the benefit of an
unusually good education in preparation for government. Charles himself
was one of the youth’s instructors, and, long before his various
abdications, had given Philip political practice in various ways,--for
example, by making him co-regent of Spain with Cardinal Tavera during
Charles’ own absence in Germany. Philip also travelled extensively in
the lands which he one day hoped to govern,--in Italy (1548), the Low
Countries (1549), and Germany (1550). In 1543 he married a Portuguese
princess, María, his first cousin. One son, Charles, was born of this
marriage, but the mother died in childbirth. His fruitless marriage with
Mary Tudor, in 1553, has already been mentioned. He remained in England
until 1555, when he went to the Low Countries to be crowned, and thence
to Spain, of which country he became king in 1556, being at that time
twenty-nine years old. His abilities as king of Spain were offset in a
measure by certain unfortunate traits and practices. He was of a
vacillating type of mind; delays in his administration were often long
and fatal, and more than once he let slip a golden opportunity for
victory, because he could not make up his mind to strike. Of a
suspicious nature, he was too little inclined to rely upon men from
whose abilities he might have profited. A tremendous worker, he was too
much in the habit of trying to do everything himself, with the result
that greater affairs were held up, while the king of Spain worked over
details. Finally, he was extremely rigorous with heretics, from motives
of religion and of political policy.
[Sidenote: War with the pope.]
The principal aim of Philip’s life was the triumph of Catholicism, but
this did not hinder his distinguishing clearly between the interests of
the church and those of the popes as rulers of the Papal States. Thus it
was not strange that Philip’s reign should begin with a war against Pope
Paul IV. The latter excommunicated both Charles and Philip, and procured
alliances with France and, curious to relate, the sultan of Turkey, head
of the Moslem world. The pope was defeated, but it was not until the
accession of Pius IV, in 1559, that the bans of excommunication were
raised.
[Sidenote: Wars with France.]
There was a constant succession of war and peace with France throughout
the reign, with the campaigns being fought more often in northern France
from the vantage ground of Flanders than in Italy as in the time of
Charles. In 1557 Philip might have been able to take Paris, but he
hesitated, and the chance was lost. Many other times Philip’s generals
won victories, but attacks from other quarters of Europe would cause a
diversion, or funds would give out, or Philip himself would change his
plans. France was usually on the defensive, because she was weakened
during most of the period by the domestic strife between Catholics and
Protestants. When in 1589 the Protestant leader became entitled to the
throne as Henry IV, Philip and the uncompromising wing of the French
Catholic party endeavored to prevent his actual accession to power. At
one time it was planned to make Philip himself king of France, but, as
this idea did not meet with favor, various others were suggested,
including the proposal of Philip’s daughter for the crown, or the
partition of France between Philip and others. Henry IV settled the
matter in 1594 by becoming a Catholic, wherefore he received the
adhesion of the Catholic party. Philip was not dissatisfied, for it
seemed that he had rid himself of a dangerous Protestant neighbor. Had
he but known it, Henry IV was to accomplish the regeneration of a France
which was to strike the decisive blow, under Louis XIV, to remove Spain
from the ranks of the first-rate powers.
[Sidenote: War with the Granadine Moriscos.]
While Philip had no such widespread discontent in Spain to deal with as
had characterized the early years of the reign of Charles, there was one
problem leading to a serious civil war in southern Spain. The Moriscos
of Granada had proved to be an industrious and loyal element, supporting
Charles in the war of the communities, but there was reason to doubt the
sincerity of their conversion to Christianity. The populace generally
and the clergy in particular were very bitter against them, and procured
the passage of laws which were increasingly severe in their treatment of
the Moriscos. An edict of 1526 prohibited the use of Arabic speech or
dress, the taking of baths (a Moslem custom), the bearing of arms, the
employment of non-Christian names, and the giving of lodging in their
houses to Mohammedans whether free or slave. The Moriscos were also
subjected to oppressive inspections to prevent Mohammedan religious
practices; they were obliged to send their children to Christian
schools; and a branch of the Inquisition was established in Granada to
execute, with all the rigors of that institution, the laws against
apostasy. The full effect of the edict was avoided by means of a
financial gift to the king, but the Inquisition was not withdrawn. For
many years the situation underwent no substantial change. The clergy,
and the Christian element generally, continued to accuse the Moriscos,
and the latter complained of the confiscations and severity of the
Inquisition. In 1567, however, the edict of 1526 was renewed, but in
harsher form, amplifying the prohibitions. When attempts were made to
put the law into effect, and especially when agents came to take the
Morisco children to Christian schools, by force if necessary, an
uprising was not long in breaking out. The war lasted four years. The
Moriscos were aided by the mountainous character of the country, and
they received help from the Moslems of northern Africa and even from the
Turks. The decisive campaign was fought in 1570, when Spanish troops
under Philip’s half-brother, Juan (or Don John) of Austria, an
illegitimate son of Charles I, defeated the Moriscos, although the war
dragged on to the following year. The surviving Moriscos, including
those who had not taken up arms, were deported _en masse_ and
distributed in other parts of Castilian Spain.
[Sidenote: Wars with the Turks.]
[Sidenote: Juan of Austria.]
The external peril from the Moslem peoples had not confined itself to
the period of the Morisco war. Piracy still existed in the western
Mediterranean, and the Turkish Empire continued to advance its conquests
in northern Africa. Philip gained great victories, notably when he
compelled the Turks to raise the siege of Malta in 1564, and especially
in 1571, when he won the naval battle of Lepanto, in which nearly 80,000
Christians were engaged, most of them Spaniards. These victories were
very important in their European bearings, for they broke the Turkish
naval power, and perhaps saved Europe, but from the standpoint of Spain
alone they were of less consequence. Philip failed to follow them up,
partly because of the pressure of other affairs, and in part because of
his suspicions of the victor of Lepanto, the same Juan of Austria who
had just previously defeated the Moriscos. Juan of Austria was at the
same time a visionary and a capable man of affairs. He was ambitious to
pursue the Turks to Constantinople, capture that city, and restore the
Byzantine Empire, with himself as ruler. Philip withdrew his support,
whereupon Juan devised a new project of a great North African empire.
Juan even captured Tunis in pursuance of his plan, but Philip would give
him no help, and Juan was obliged to retire, thus permitting of a
Turkish reconquest. Philip was always able to offer the excuse of lack
of funds,--and, indeed, the expenditures in the wars with Turkey, with
all the effects they carried in their train, were the principal result
to the peninsula of these campaigns.
[Sidenote: Wars in the Low Countries.]
The greatest of Philip’s difficulties, and one which bulked large in its
importance in European history, was the warfare with his rebellious
provinces in the Low Countries. Its principal bearing in Spanish history
was that it caused the most continuous and very likely the heaviest
drain on the royal treasury of any of Philip’s problems. The war lasted
the entire reign, and was to be a factor for more than a half century
after Philip’s death. It got to be in essence a religious struggle
between the Protestants of what became the Netherlands and Philip, in
which the latter was supported to a certain extent by the provinces of
the Catholic Netherlands, or modern Belgium. Religion, however, was not
the initial, or at any time the sole, matter in controversy. At the
outset the causes were such practices as the Castilian communities had
objected to in the reign of Charles, namely: the appointments of
foreigners to office; the presence of foreign (Spanish) troops; measures
which were regarded as the forerunner to an extension of the Spanish
Inquisition to the Low Countries (against which the nobles and the
clergy alike, practically all of whom were Catholic at that time, made
strenuous objections); Philip’s policy of centralization and absolutism;
the popular aversion for Philip as a Spaniard (just as Spaniards had
objected to Charles as a Fleming); and the excessive rigors employed in
the suppression of heresy. The early leaders were Catholics, many of
them members of the clergy, and the hotbed of rebellion was rather in
the Catholic south than in the Protestant north. It was this situation
which gave the Protestants a chance to strike on their own behalf. The
war, or rather series of wars, was characterized by deeds of valor and
by extreme cruelty. Philip was even more harsh in his instructions for
dealing with heretics than his generals were in executing them. Alba
(noted for his severity), Requesens (an able man who followed a more
moderate policy), Juan of Austria (builder of air castles, but winner of
battles), and the able Farnese,--these were the Spanish rulers of the
period, all of them military men. The elder and the younger William of
Orange were the principal Protestant leaders. In open combat the Spanish
infantry was almost invincible, but its victories were nullified,
sometimes because it was drawn away to wage war in France, but more
often because money and supplies were lacking. On various occasions the
troops were left unpaid for so long a time that they took matters into
their own hands. Then, terrible scenes of riot and pillage were enacted,
without distinction as to the religious faith of the sufferers, for even
Catholic churches were sacked by the soldiery. The outcome for the Low
Countries was the virtual independence of the Protestant Netherlands,
although Spain did not yet acknowledge it. For Spain the result was the
same as that of her other ventures in European politics, only greater in
degree than most of them,--exhausting expenditures.
[Sidenote: The annexation of Portugal.]
In the middle years of Philip’s reign there was one project of great
moment in Spanish history which he pushed to a successful
conclusion,--the annexation of Portugal. While the ultimate importance
of this event was to be lessened by the later separation of the two
kingdoms, they were united long enough (sixty years) for notable effects
to be felt in Spain and more particularly in the Americas. The desire
for peninsula unity had long been an aspiration of the Castilian kings,
and its consummation from the standpoint of the acquisition of Portugal
had several times been attempted, though without success. The death of
King Sebastián in 1578 without issue left the Portuguese throne to
Cardinal Henry, who was already very old, and whom in any event the pope
refused to release from his religious vows. This caused various
claimants to the succession to announce themselves, among whom were the
Duchess of Braganza, Antonio (the prior of Crato), and Philip. The
first-named had the best hereditary claim, since she was descended from
a son (the youngest) of King Manuel, a predecessor of Sebastián. Antonio
of Crato was son of another of King Manuel’s sons, but was of
illegitimate birth; nevertheless, he was the favorite of the regular
clergy, the popular classes, some nobles, and the pope, and was the only
serious rival Philip had to consider. Philip’s mother was the eldest
daughter of the same King Manuel. With this foundation for his claim he
pushed his candidacy with great ability, aided by the skilful diplomacy
of his special ambassador, Cristóbal de Moura. One of the master strokes
was the public announcement of Philip’s proposed governmental policy in
Portugal, promising among other things to respect the autonomy of the
kingdom, recognizing it as a separate political entity from Spain. A
Portuguese _Cortes_ of 1580 voted for the succession of Philip, for the
noble and ecclesiastical branches supported him, against the opposition
of the third estate. A few days later King Henry died, and Philip
prepared to take possession. The partisans of Antonio resisted, but
Philip, who had long been in readiness for the emergency, sent an army
into Portugal under the Duke of Alba, and he easily routed the forces of
Antonio. In keeping with his desire to avoid giving offence to the
Portuguese, Philip gave Alba the strictest orders to punish any
infractions of discipline or improper acts of the soldiery against the
inhabitants, and these commands were carefully complied with,--in
striking contrast with the policy which had been followed while Alba was
governor in the Low Countries. Thus it was that a Portuguese _Cortes_ of
1581 solemnly recognized Philip as king of Portugal. Philip took oath
not to appoint any Spaniards to Portuguese offices, and he kept his word
to the end of his reign. Portugal had now come into the peninsula union
in much the same fashion that Aragon had joined with Castile. With her
came the vast area and great wealth of the Portuguese colonies of Asia,
Africa, and more particularly Brazil. If only the Spanish kings might
hold the country long enough, it appeared inevitable that a real
amalgamation of such kindred peoples would one day take place.
Furthermore, if only the kings would have, or could have, confined
themselves to a Pan-Hispanic policy, embracing Spain and Portugal and
their colonies, the opportunity for the continued greatness of the
peninsula seemed striking. The case was a different one from that of the
union of Castile and Aragon, however, for a strong feeling of Portuguese
nationality had already developed, based largely on a hatred of
Spaniards. This spirit had something to feed upon from the outset in the
defeat of the popular Antonio of Crato and in the discontent of many
nobles, who did not profit as much by Philip’s accession as they had
been led to expect. It was necessary to put strong garrisons in
Portuguese cities and to fortify strategic points. Nevertheless, Philip
experienced no serious trouble and was able to leave Portugal to his
immediate successor.
[Sidenote: Causes of the war with England.]
Philip’s relations with England, in which the outstanding event was the
defeat of the Spanish Armada, had elements of importance as affecting
Spanish history, especially in so far as they concerned English
depredations in the Americas. They were more important to England,
however, than to Spain, and the story from the English standpoint has
become a familiar one. From the moment of Protestant Elizabeth’s
accession to the English throne in 1558, in succession to Catholic Mary,
there was a constant atmosphere of impending conflict between Spain and
England. Greatest of the motives in Philip’s mind was that her rule
meant a Protestant England, a serious break in the authority of Catholic
Christianity, but there were other causes for war as well. English aid
of an unofficial but substantial character was helping to sustain the
Protestant Netherlands in revolt against Spain. In the Americas “beyond
the line” (of Tordesillas) the two countries were virtually at war,
although in the main it was a conflict of piratical attacks and the
sacking of cities on the part of the English, with acts of retaliation
by the Spaniards. This was the age of Drake’s and Hawkins’ exploits
along the Spanish Main (in the Caribbean area), but it was also the age
of Gilbert and Raleigh, and the first, though ineffectual, attempts of
England to despoil Spain of her American dominions through the founding
of colonies in the Spanish-claimed new world. Incidents of a special
character served to accentuate the feeling engendered by these more
permanent causes,--such, for example, as Elizabeth’s appropriation of
the treasure which Philip was sending to the Low Countries as pay for
his soldiers: the Spanish vessels took shelter in an English port to
escape from pirates, whereupon Elizabeth proceeded to “borrow,” as she
termed it, the wealth they were carrying. Hard pressed for funds as
Philip always was, this was indeed a severe blow.
[Sidenote: Why a declaration of war was delayed.]
Nevertheless, a declaration of war was postponed for nearly thirty
years. English historians ascribe the delay to the diplomatic skill of
their favorite queen, but, while there is no need to deny her
resourcefulness in that respect, there were reasons in plenty why Philip
himself was desirous of deferring hostilities, or better still, avoiding
them. In view of his existing troubles with France and the Low Countries
he drew back before the enormous expense that a war with England would
entail, to say nothing of the military difficulties of attacking an
island power. Though he received frequent invitations from the Catholics
of England and Scotland to effect an invasion, these projects were too
often linked with similar proposals to the kings of France, the leading
European opponents of the Spanish monarch. Philip wished to break the
power of Elizabeth and of Protestantism if possible, however, and gave
encouragement to plots against the life of the English queen or to
schemes for revolutionary uprisings in favor of Mary Stuart, a Catholic
and Elizabeth’s rival, but none of these designs met with success. Many
Spanish leaders urged a descent upon England, among them Juan of
Austria, who wished to lead the expeditionary force himself, dreaming
possibly of an English crown for his reward, but it was not until 1583
that Philip viewed these proposals with favor.
[Sidenote: Preparations for a descent upon England.]
Once having decided upon an expedition Philip began to lay his plans.
Mary Stuart was persuaded to disinherit her son, who was a Protestant
(the later James I of England), and to make Philip her heir. The pope
was induced to lend both financial and moral support to the undertaking,
although it was necessary to deceive him as to Philip’s intentions to
acquire England for himself; the pope was told that Philip’s daughter
was to be made queen of England. The proposed descent upon England was
no secret to Elizabeth, who made ready to resist. With a view to
delaying Philip’s preparations, Drake made an attack upon Cádiz in 1587,
on which occasion he burned all the shipping in the bay. This only
strengthened Philip’s resolutions with regard to the undertaking, and
tended to make him impatient for its early execution. Plans were made
which proved to be in many cases ill considered. The first mistake
occurred when Philip did not entertain a proposition of the Scotch and
French Catholics that he should work in concert with them, thus
declining an opportunity to avail himself of ports and bases of supply
near the point of attack; political reasons were the foundation for his
attitude in this matter. Against advice he also decided to divide the
expedition into a naval and a military section, the troops to come from
the Low Countries after the arrival of the fleet there to transport
them. The worst error of all was that of Philip’s insistence on
directing the organization of the fleet himself. All details had to be
passed upon by the king from his palace of the Escorial near Madrid,
which necessarily involved both delay and a faulty execution of orders.
Evil practices and incompetence were manifest on every hand; quantities
of the supplies purchased proved to be useless; and the officers and men
were badly chosen, many of the former being without naval experience. A
great mistake was made in the appointment of the Duke of Medina Sidonia
to lead the expedition; the principal recommendation of the duke was
that of his family prestige, for he was absolutely lacking in knowledge
of maritime affairs, and said as much to the king, but the latter
insisted that he should take command.
[Sidenote: Defeat of the Armada.]
At length the fleet was able to leave Lisbon, and later Coruña, in the
year 1588. Because of its great size it was termed the _Armada
Invencible_ (the Invincible Fleet), a name which has been taken over
into English as the Spanish, or the Invincible, Armada. In all there
were 131 ships, with over 25,000 sailors, soldiers, and officers. The
evil effect of Philip’s management followed the Armada to sea. He had
given detailed instructions what to do, and the commander-in-chief
would not vary from them. Many officers thought it would be best to make
an attack on Plymouth, to secure that port as a base of operations, but
Philip had given orders that the fleet should first go to the Low
Countries to effect a junction with the troops held in readiness there.
The story of the battle with the English fleet is well known. The
contest was altogether one-sided, for the English ships were both
superior in speed and equipped with longer range artillery.
Nevertheless, storms contributed more than the enemy to the Spanish
defeat. The Armada was utterly dispersed, and many vessels were wrecked.
Only 65 ships and some 10,000 men were able to return to Spain.
[Sidenote: Domestic troubles and death of Philip.]
The decisive blow had been struck, and Spain was the loser. The English
war went on into the next reign, and there were several spectacular
military events, not all of them unfavorable to Spanish arms, but they
affected the general situation only in that they continued the strain on
the royal exchequer. In the final analysis Philip had failed in this as
in so many other enterprises. This fact was clear, even at the time,
although the eventualities of later years were to make the outcome
appear the more decisive. Philip’s evil star did not confine its effects
to his international policies. His eldest son, Charles, proved to be of
feeble body and unbalanced mind. Getting into difficulties with his
father, he was placed in prison by the latter’s orders, and was never
seen again, dying in 1568. Charges have been made that Philip caused his
death, but he was probably blameless, although he did plan to disinherit
him. Philip had no other son until 1571, when his eventual successor was
born, by his fourth wife. Certain other domestic troubles, not divorced
from scandal (although the evidence is in no case conclusive), may be
passed over, except to mention the crowning grief of all. It early
became clear that his son and heir, the later Philip III, was a weak
character. “God, who has given me so many kingdoms,” Philip is reported
to have said, “has denied me a son capable of ruling them.” In 1598
Philip died. His last days were passed in extreme physical suffering,
which he endured with admirable resignation. Philip, like the Emperor
Charles, his father, had been indeed a great king, but he was a victim,
as Charles had been, of a mistaken policy. Nevertheless, they had ruled
Spain in her century of greatness, when Spain was not only the leading
power in Europe, but was planting her institutions, for all time, in the
vast domains of the Americas.