A CENTURY OF DECLINE, 1598-1700
[Sidenote: Spanish defeats of the sixteenth century.]
The unfortunate policies of Charles I and Philip II were continued
during the seventeenth century in the reigns of Philip III, Philip IV,
and Charles II, but Spain was no longer able to hold her front rank
position in European affairs, especially after the buffets of fortune
which fell to her lot in the reign of Philip IV. Not only that, but a
decline also set in which affected Spanish civilization in all its
phases. The impetus of Spain’s greatness in the sixteenth century
carried her along to yet loftier heights in some manifestations of her
inner life, notably in art and literature, but even in these
characteristics the decline was rapid and almost complete by the end of
the reign of Charles II. Italy, France, and the Low Countries continued
to absorb Spanish effort, but now it was Spain’s turn to acknowledge
defeat, while France, the great power of the century, took toll for the
losses she had suffered at the hands of Charles I and Philip II. The
unsuccessful Catalan revolt and the victorious war of the Portuguese for
independence assisted to drain Spain of her resources, financial and
otherwise, while the last-named event destroyed peninsula unity,
carrying with it such of the Portuguese colonies as had not already been
lost. Spain yielded the aggressive to her strongest opponent, and
endeavored herself to maintain the defence. Nevertheless, great
achievements were still the rule in the colonies, even if of a less
showy type than formerly. Spain was still the conqueror and civilizer.
On the other hand, the efforts of other nations to found colonies in
lands claimed by Spain began to be successful, and this movement
gathered force throughout the century, together with the direct
annexation of some lands which were already Spanish.
[Sidenote: Philip III and Spanish relations with England, the Low
Countries, and the Empire.]
Philip III (1598-1621) was the first of three sovereigns, each of whom
was weaker than his predecessor. The fifteenth-century practice of
government by favorites was restored. Philip III turned over the
political management of his kingdom to the Duke of Lerma, while he
himself indulged in wasteful extravagances, punctuated by an equal
excess in religious devotions. He had inherited wars with England and
the Protestant Netherlands, but the first of these was brought to an end
in 1604, shortly after the accession of James I of England. The war in
the Low Countries was characterized by the same features which had
marked its progress in the previous reign. Philip II had endeavored to
solve the problem by making an independent kingdom of that region, under
his daughter and her husband as the rulers, with a proviso for a
reversion to Spain in case of a failure of the line. This measure was
practically without effect, for Spanish troops and Spanish moneys
continued to be the basis for the wars against the Dutch, or Protestant,
element. Before the end of Philip III’s reign the decision for a
reversion to Spanish authority had already been made and accepted. There
were two factors in the Dutch wars of the period worthy of mention. For
one thing the Dutch became more bold on the seas, and began a remarkable
career of maritime conquest which was to last well over half a century.
As affecting Spain this new activity manifested itself mainly in
piratical attacks on Spanish ships, or in descents upon Spanish coasts,
but a number of Philip’s Portuguese colonies were picked up by the
Dutch. The Dutch wars also produced a man who was both a great soldier
(a not uncommon type in that day of Spanish military importance) and a
great statesman, who sensed the evil course which Spain was following in
her European relations and argued against it, all to no avail. This man
was Ambrosio Spínola. Spínola won victory upon victory from the Dutch,
but was often obliged to rely on his personal estate for the funds with
which to carry on the campaigns; so when the Dutch asked for a truce he
favored the idea, and on this occasion his views were allowed to
prevail. A twelve-year truce was agreed upon in 1609, one condition of
which was the recognition of the independence of the Protestant states.
In 1618 the great conflict which has become known as the Thirty Years’
War broke out in Germany, having its beginnings in a dispute between the
Hapsburg emperor, Ferdinand, and the Protestant elector of the
Palatinate. Spain entered the war on the side of Ferdinand, largely
because of family reasons, but also in support of Catholicism. Spínola
was sent into the Palatinate with a Spanish army, where he swept
everything before him. Thus casually did Spain enter a war which was to
be a thirty-nine years’ conflict for her (1620-1659) and productive of
her own undoing.
[Sidenote: Relations with France, the Italian states, Turkey, and the
pirates of the Barbary Coast.]
Affairs with France were characterized by a bit of good fortune which
postponed the evil day for Spain. Henry IV had reorganized the French
kingdom until it reached a state of preparation which would have enabled
it to take the offensive, a policy which Henry had in mind. The
assassination of the French king, in 1610, prevented an outbreak of war
between France and Spain at a time when the latter was almost certain to
be defeated. Marie de Medici became regent in France, and chose to keep
the peace. Italy was a constant source of trouble in this reign, due to
the conflict of interests between the kings of Spain and the popes and
princes of the Italian peninsula. There was a succession of petty wars
or of the prospects of war, which meant that affairs were always in a
disturbed condition. The Turks continued to be a peril to Europe, and
their co-religionists and subjects in northern Africa were the terror of
the seas. Spain rendered service to Europe by repulsing the attempts of
the former to get a foothold in Italy, but could do nothing to check
piratical ventures. The pirates of the Barbary Coast plied their trade
both in the Mediterranean and along Spain’s Atlantic coasts to their
limits in the Bay of Biscay, while English and Dutch ships were active
in the same pursuits.
[Sidenote: Philip IV and Olivares.]
The storm broke in the reign of Philip IV (1621-1665). Philip IV was
only sixteen at the time of his accession to the throne. He had good
intentions, and tried to interest himself in matters of government, but
was of a frivolous and dissolute nature, unable to give consideration
for any length of time to serious affairs. The result was the rule of
another favorite, the Count-Duke of Olivares. Olivares was possibly the
worst man who could have been chosen, precisely because he had
sufficient ability to attempt the execution of his mistaken ideas. He
was energetic, intelligent, and well educated, but was stubborn, proud,
irascible, boastful, and insulting. He was able to make plans on a
gigantic scale, and had real discernment as to the strength of Spain’s
enemies, but lacked the practical capacity to handle the details. The
times were such as demanded a Spínola, but the counsels of Olivares
prevailed, and their keynote was imperialism in Europe and a centralized
absolutism in the peninsula.
[Sidenote: Spanish losses in the Thirty Years’ War.]
The truce with the Dutch came to an end in 1621. Spínola urged that it
be continued, but Olivares gave orders for the resumption of
hostilities. No advantages of consequence were obtained by Spain, but
the Dutch were again successful in their career on the seas. The Thirty
Years’ War continued to involve Spain. France, though Catholic and
virtually ruled by a Catholic cardinal, Richelieu, was more intent on
the development of the French state than upon the religious question,
and aided the Protestants against their enemies. Richelieu did not bring
France into the war until 1635, but, in the meantime, through grants of
money and skilful diplomacy, he was able to make trouble for Spain in
Italy and in the Low Countries. When at length it seemed as if the
Catholic states might win, due largely to the effectiveness of the
Spanish infantry, France entered the war on the side of the Protestant
princes. Spanish troops continued to win battles, without profiting
greatly because of the incessant difficulties from lack of funds. In
1643 the French, under Condé, defeated the Spaniards at Rocroy. The
moral effect of this victory was tremendous, like the surrender of the
ancient Spartans at the Island of Sphacteria, for it was the first time
in some two centuries that the Spanish infantry had been defeated in
pitched battle under nearly equal conditions. Henceforth defeats were no
novelty. The tide had turned; Rocroy spelled Spain’s doom as a great
power. The treaties of Westphalia in 1648 affected Spain only so far as
concerned the war with the Protestant Netherlands. Dutch independence
was reaffirmed, and the colonies which the Dutch had won, mainly from
the Portuguese in the East Indies, were formally granted to them. The
Catholic Netherlands remained Spanish. The war with France went on until
1659. In 1652 Cromwell offered Spain an alliance against France, but the
price demanded was high; one of the conditions was that Spain should
permit Englishmen to trade with the Spanish colonies,--an entering wedge
for an English commercial supremacy which might easily be converted into
political acquisition. Spain declined and Cromwell joined France. The
English conquest of Jamaica in the ensuing war was the first great break
in the solidarity of the actually occupied Spanish domain, marking a
turning point in colonial history, as Rocroy had done in that of Europe.
By the treaty of 1659 Spain gave up the Roussillon and Cerdagne, thus
accepting the Pyrenees as the boundary between herself and France. Spain
also surrendered Sardinia and large parts both of the Catholic
Netherlands and of her former Burgundian possessions. The most fruitful
clause in the treaty was that providing for the marriage of the Spanish
princess, María Teresa, with Louis XIV of France. The former was to
renounce for herself and her heirs any rights she or they might
otherwise have to the Spanish throne, while a considerable dowry was to
be paid by Spain on her behalf. The results of this marriage will be
mentioned presently.
[Sidenote: Catalan discontent.]
Intimately related to the wars just referred to was the Catalan revolt.
The Catalans had long been a nation so far as separate language and
institutions go, and their traditions compared well with those of
Castile, which had now come to dominate in the Spanish state. The whole
course of the revolt is illustrative of the difficulties under which
Spain labored in this era of European wars. The Catalans had objected
for centuries, even before the union with Castile, to the policy of
centralization and absolutism of the kings, alleging their charter
rights which were thus contravened. Such acts as the failure of the
kings to call the Catalan _Cortes_, the increases in taxation, or the
levying of taxes like those paid in Castile, and the introduction of the
Castilian Inquisition had been unfavorably received in the past. Now
came the monarchical designs of Olivares, coupled with the unavoidable
exigencies of the wars, to heighten the discontent. Aside from the
increased taxation there were two matters to which the Catalans were
strenuously opposed on the ground that they were against their legal
rights,--the maintenance of foreign troops (even Castilians and
Aragonese being so regarded) in Catalonia and the enjoyment of public
office by persons who were not Catalans. Furthermore they objected to
the employment of Catalan troops in foreign countries, holding that
their obligations were limited to defending Catalonia, and similarly
they maintained that funds raised in Catalonia should not be used for
wars outside that province. Philip IV tried to procure a subsidy from
the Catalan _Cortes_ in 1626, but the grant was denied. Another attempt
was made in 1632, on which occasion Olivares imprudently followed the
methods of Charles I at the time of the _Cortes_ of Santiago-Coruña. He
got the funds, but his action caused great dissatisfaction in the
province. Meanwhile the danger of an invasion from France had led to the
sending of troops to Catalonia, and constant friction followed their
arrival. The imperfect military discipline of that age, together with
the annoyances usually inseparable from the presence of armies, resulted
in many abuses, which were resented even to the point of armed conflict;
as early as 1629, eleven years before the outbreak, there was a bloody
encounter between the citizens and the soldiery at Barcelona. The
irksome requirement calling upon the towns to lodge the troops was also
productive of ill feeling. By law the most that could be demanded was
the use of a room, a bed, a table, fire, salt, vinegar, and service,
while all else must be paid for. Lack of funds was such, however, that
more than this was exacted. In addition to this there came an order from
Madrid calling for the imposition of the _quinto_, or fifth, of the
revenues of the municipalities. France took advantage of the situation
to fan the flame of discontent and to win certain Catalan nobles of the
frontier to her side. Nevertheless, when the French invaded the
Roussillon in 1639 the Catalans rushed to arms and helped to expel them
early in 1640.
[Sidenote: Beginning of the Catalan revolt.]
The questions of lodging the soldiers and of procuring additional funds
continued to provoke trouble. Olivares said in an open meeting of the
_Consejo Real_ that the Catalans ought to be made to contribute in
proportion to their wealth. Later he ordered an enforced levy of Catalan
troops for use in Italy, and stated in the decree so providing that it
was necessary to proceed without paying attention to “provincial
pettiness” (_menudencias provinciales_). The impulse for the outbreak
proceeded, however, from the conflicts between the soldiers and the
peasantry of the country districts, especially on account of the
excesses of the retreating royal troops at the time of the French
invasion of the Roussillon. Curiously enough, the peasantry acted very
largely from religious motives. Many of the soldiers were utter
foreigners to the Catalans,--such, for example, as the Italians and the
Irish, both of which elements were present in considerable numbers. To
the ignorant peasants these strange-mannered people, who were Catholics
in fact, seemed most certainly heretics. Attacks on the soldiery began
in the mountain districts early in 1640, and soon extended to the cities
as well. In June a serious riot occurred in Barcelona, during which the
hated royal viceroy was killed. That act marked the triumph of the
revolution and the beginning of the war.
[Sidenote: The war against the Catalans.]
It is possible that a policy of moderation might still have avoided the
conflict, but such action was not taken. The war lasted nineteen years,
and was fought bitterly until 1653. In 1640 the Catalans formed a
republic, and made an alliance with France, putting themselves under the
protection of the French monarchy. The republic was short-lived; in 1641
the monarchical form returned, with a recognition of the king of France
as ruler. French troops aided the Catalans in many expeditions, but in
this very fact lay the remedy for the grievances against Spain. The
Catalans found that French officials and French soldiers committed the
same abuses as those which they had objected to in the case of Castile.
Coupled with a statement of Philip IV that he had never intended to
interfere with the Catalan _fueros_, or charter rights (although
Olivares certainly had so intended), this proved to be the turning
point. Philip confirmed the charters in 1653, but the fighting went on
in certain regions until 1659, when Catalonia was recognized as part of
Spain in the treaty of peace with France. The war had one good result;
it occasioned the dismissal of Olivares in 1643. Nevertheless, the evil
had been done beyond repair, though the dispute had experienced a turn
for the better, dating from Olivares’ deprivation from office.
[Sidenote: Mildness of Spanish rule in Portugal.]
Meanwhile, Olivares had involved Spain in another direction. From the
time of the acquisition of Portugal by Philip II that region had been
exceedingly well treated by the Spanish kings: no public offices were
given to any but Portuguese; no military or naval forces and no taxes
were required for purely Spanish objects; the Portuguese colonies were
left to the Portuguese, and the route around Africa to the Far East was
closed to Spaniards; Lisbon continued to be the centre of Portuguese
colonial traffic, as Seville was for Spain; and even the members of the
House of Braganza, despite their dangerous claim to the throne, were
allowed to remain in Portugal, and were greatly favored. Furthermore,
Philip II abolished customs houses between Portugal and Castile, made
advantageous administrative improvements (among other things, reforming
colonial management, on the Spanish model), and attempted something in
the way of public works. The annexation weighed very lightly on the
country. The king was represented by a viceroy; there were a few Spanish
troops in Portugal; and some taxes were collected, though they were far
from heavy in amount. Spain has been charged with the responsibility for
the loss of many Portuguese colonies, on the ground that Portugal became
involved in the wars against the Spanish kings, and therefore open to
the attack of Spain’s enemies. There is reason for believing, however,
that the connection served rather as a pretext than a cause; this was an
age when the North European powers were engaging in colonial
enterprises, and it is worthy of note that the Dutch, who were the
principal successors to the Portuguese possessions, continued to make
conquests from Portugal after they had formed an alliance with that
country in the war of Portuguese independence from Spain. In fact, very
little passed into foreign hands prior to the Portuguese separation from
the Spanish crown as compared with what was lost afterward.
[Sidenote: The imperialism of Olivares and the uprising in Portugal.]
While the nobility and the wealthy classes favored the union with Spain,
there were strong elements in the country of a contrary opinion, for
whom leaders were to be found in the lower ranks of the secular clergy
and especially among the Jesuits. The masses of the people still hated
Spaniards; several generations were necessary before that traditional
feeling could be appreciably lessened. A current of opposition
manifested itself as early as the reign of Philip III, when the Duke of
Lerma, the king’s favorite minister, proposed to raise the prohibition
maintained against the Jews forbidding them to sell their goods when
emigrating, and planned to grant them civil equality with Christians.
This had coincided with a slight increase in taxation to produce
discontent. It was natural that the imperialistic Olivares should wish
to introduce a radical change in the relations of Spain and Portugal. He
early addressed the king on the advisability of bringing about a
veritable amalgamation of the two countries, and suggested that
Portuguese individuals should be given some offices in Castile, and
Castilians in like manner awarded posts in Portugal. When this purpose
became known it was used as one of the principal means of stirring up
opposition to Spain, on the ground that Portugal was to be deprived of
her autonomy. The renewal of legislation such as that proposed by the
Duke of Lerma with respect to the Jews and an increase in taxation added
to the dissatisfaction in Portugal to such an extent that there were
several riots. Spain’s financial difficulties arising from the European
wars led Olivares to turn yet more insistently to Portugal, and in the
year 1635 new and heavier taxes began to be imposed, together with the
collection of certain ecclesiastical rents which had been granted to the
king by the pope. This produced the first outbreak against the royal
authority. A revolution was started at Évora in 1637 which soon spread
to all parts of Portugal, but the nobles, the wealthy classes, and the
Duke of Braganza were not in favor of the movement, and it was soon
suppressed. The condition of affairs which had provoked it continued,
however, and was accentuated by new burdens and fresh departures from
the agreement of Philip II. Taxes became heavier still; Portuguese
troops were required to serve in the Low Countries; and the Duke of
Braganza, of whom Olivares was unreasonably suspicious, was appointed
viceroy of Milan, with a view to getting him out of Portugal. It was
this last measure which was to bring about a fresh and more determined
uprising than that of 1637. The duke refused the appointment, whereupon
Olivares completely changed front, possibly with a view to concealment
of his real suspicions, and made Braganza military governor of Portugal,
besides sending him funds with which to repair the fortifications of the
kingdom. The duke would almost certainly have been satisfied with this
arrangement, had it not been for his wife, whose ambitious character was
not duly taken into account by Olivares. This lady was a Spaniard of the
family of the dukes of Medina Sidonia, but she was desirous of being a
queen, even though it should strike a blow at her native land. She
conspired to bring about a Portuguese revolution headed by her husband,
who should thus become king of Portugal. The Catalonian outbreak of 1640
furnished a pretext and the propitious occasion desired. The Duke of
Braganza and the nobility generally were ordered to join the royal army
in suppressing the Catalans. Instead, the nobles rebelled, and the
revolution broke out on the first of December in the same year, 1640.
Fortresses were seized, and the Duke of Braganza was proclaimed as João
(or John) IV, king of Portugal.
[Sidenote: The war of Portuguese independence.]
The war lasted twenty-eight years, but, although it might well have been
considered as more important than any of the problems of the time, other
than the equally momentous Catalan revolt, it was not actively
prosecuted by Spain. Spain was engaged in too many other wars, to which
she gave perhaps an undue share of her attention, and was more than ever
beset by her chronic difficulty of lack of funds. France, England, and
the Protestant Netherlands gave help to Portugal at different times,
whereby the last-named was able to maintain herself against the weak
attacks of Spain. The decisive battle was fought at Villaviciosa in
1665, but it was not until 1668, in the reign of Charles II, that peace
was made. Portugal was recognized as independent, retaining such of her
former colonies as had not already been taken by the Dutch,--with one
exception; the post of Ceuta, in northern Africa, remained Spanish,--the
only reminder of Spain’s great opportunity to establish peninsula unity
through the union with Portugal.
[Sidenote: Other revolts and plottings.]
Still other difficulties arose in Italy and in Spain to harass the reign
of Philip IV. There were revolts in Sicily in 1646-1647, and in Naples
in 1647-1648, both of which were put down. An Aragonese plot was
discovered, and there was no uprising. A similar plot in Andalusia was
headed by the Duke of Medina Sidonia, captain general of the province
and brother of the new queen of Portugal. This too was uncovered in time
to prevent an outbreak. In Vizcaya there was a serious revolt, growing
out of an alleged tampering with local privileges, but it was eventually
put down. In fine, the reign had been one of disaster. Olivares had been
the chief instrument to bring it about, but, after all, he only
represented the prevailing opinion and traditional policies. The moment
of reckoning had come.
[Sidenote: Charles “the Bewitched.”]
[Sidenote: French aggressions.]
The reign of Charles II (1665-1700) was a period of waiting for what
seemed likely to be the end, unless fate should intervene to give a new
turn to affairs. The king himself was doubly in need of a regent, for he
was only four years old when he succeeded to the throne and was also
weak and sick in mind and body. He was subject to epileptic fits, on
which account he was termed Charles “the Bewitched” (_el Hechizado_),
and many people believed that he was indeed possessed of a Devil. This
disgusting, but pitiful, creature was expected to die at any moment, but
he lived to rule, though little more than in name, for thirty-five
years. The whole reign was one of plotting for the succession, since it
early became clear that Charles II could have no heir. There was a
pro-French party, a pro-Austrian party, and a very strong group which
favored a Spaniard, Juan of Austria, illegitimate son of a Spanish
king, as his predecessor of the same name had been. Juan of Austria
became virtual ruler in 1677, but died in 1679, thus eliminating the
only prominent claimant in Spain. France, at the height of her power
under Louis XIV, was unwilling to wait for the death of Charles II
before profiting by Spanish weakness, and therefore engaged in several
wars of aggression, directed primarily against Spain’s possessions in
the Low Countries and against the Protestant Netherlands. In many of
these wars other powers fought on the side of Spain and the Dutch,
notably the Holy Roman Emperor, many princes of Germany, and Sweden,
while England and the pope joined the allies against the French military
lord in the last war of the period. Four times Spain was forced into
conflict, in 1667-1668, 1672-1678, 1681-1684, and 1689-1697. Province
after province in northern Europe was wrested away, until, after the
last war, when Louis XIV had achieved his greatest success, little would
have remained, but for an unusual spirit of generosity on the part of
the French king. Instead of taking further lands from Spain, he restored
some which he had won in this and previous wars. The reason was that he
now hoped to procure the entire dominions of Spain for his own family.
[Sidenote: Plottings of the Austrian and French parties for the
succession.]
The leader of the party favoring the Hapsburg, or Austrian, succession
in Spain was the queen-mother, María Ana, herself of the House of
Austria. After many vicissitudes she at length seemed to have achieved a
victory, when she brought about the marriage of Charles II to an
Austrian princess in 1689, the same year in which the king’s former
wife, a French princess, had died. The situation was all the more
favorable in that Louis XIV declared war against Spain in that year for
the fourth time in the reign. The very necessities of the war, added to
the now chronic bad administration and the general state of misery in
Spain, operated, however, to arouse discontent and to provoke opposition
to the party in power. Thus the French succession was more popular, even
during the war, than that of the allied House of Austria. After the war
was over, the French propaganda was established on a solid basis, for it
was evident, now, that Charles II could not long survive. Louis XIV put
forward his grandson, Philip of Anjou, as a candidate, and the Holy
Roman Emperor urged the claims of his son, the Archduke Charles. Not
only did Philip have the weaker hereditary claim, but he also had the
renunciation of his grandmother, María Teresa, wife of Louis XIV,
against him. The last-named objection was easily overcome, since Spain
had never paid the promised dowry of María Teresa, wherefore Louis XIV
held that the renunciation was of no effect.
[Sidenote: Success of the French party.]
The fight, after all, was a political one, and not a mere determination
of legal right, and in this respect Louis XIV and his candidate, Philip,
had the advantage, through skilful diplomacy. The French party in Madrid
was headed by Cardinal Portocarrero, a man of great influence, assisted
by Harcourt, the French ambassador. The imperial ambassador, Harrach,
and Stanhope, the representative of England, worked together; the union
of France and Spain under Bourbon rulers, who would probably be
French-controlled, represented a serious upsetting of the balance of
power, wherefore England desired the succession of the Archduke Charles,
who at that time was not a probable candidate for the imperial crown.
For several years Madrid was the scene of one of the most fascinating
diplomatic battles in European history. The feeble-minded king did not
know what to do, and asked advice on all sides, but could not make up
his mind about the succession. The Austrian party had his ear, however,
through his Austrian wife, and through the king’s confessor, who was one
of their group, but by a clever strike of Portocarrero’s the king was
persuaded that his wife was plotting to kill him, and was induced to
change confessors, this time accepting a member of the French party. To
divide his opponents Louis XIV proposed the dismemberment of Spain and
her possessions among the leading claimants, assigning Spain, Flanders,
and the colonies to a third candidate, the Prince of Bavaria. The French
king did not intend that any such division should take place, and in any
event the Bavarian prince soon died, but through measures of this type
Louis XIV eventually contrived to supplant in office and in influence
nearly all who opposed the Bourbon succession. Meanwhile, the
unfortunate king was stirred up and worried, although possibly without
evil design, so that his health was more and more broken and his
mentality disordered to the point of idiocy, hastening his death.
Strange medicines and exorcisms were used in order to cast out the Devil
with which he was told he was possessed, exciting the king to the point
of frenzy. In 1700 Louis XIV abandoned his course of dissimulation to
such an extent that it became clear that he would endeavor to procure
all the Spanish dominions for Philip. Henceforth it was a struggle
between the two principal claimants for exclusive rule. The wretched
Spanish monarch was at length obliged to go to bed by what was clearly
his last illness. Even then he was not left in peace, and the plotting
continued almost to the very end. On October 3, Philip was named by the
dying king as sole heir to all his dominions. On November 1, Charles II
died, and with him passed the rule of the House of Austria.