CHARLES I OF SPAIN, 1516-1556
[Sidenote: Historical setting of the era of the House of Austria.]
From the standpoint of European history the period of the House of
Hapsburg, or Austria, covering nearly two centuries, when Spain was one
of the great powers of the world, should be replete with the details of
Spanish intervention in European affairs. The purposes of the present
work will be served, however, by a comparatively brief treatment of this
phase of Spanish history; indeed, the central idea underlying it reduces
itself to this: Spain wasted her energies and expended her wealth in a
fruitless attempt, first to become the dominant power in Europe, and
later to maintain possessions in Italy and the Low Countries which were
productive only of trouble; what she took from the Americas with the one
hand, she squandered in Europe with the other. Internally there were
changes which were to react on the Spanish colonial dominions, wherefore
a correspondingly greater space must be accorded peninsula history than
directly to the wars in Europe. The greatest feature of the period was
the conquest of the Americas, accomplished in part by the spectacular
expeditions of the _conquistadores_, or conquerors, and in part by the
slower advance of the Spanish settlers, pushing onward the frontier of
profits. Not only was this the most notable achievement when considered
from the American angle, but it was, also, when taken from the
standpoint of Spain, and possibly, too, from that of Europe and the
world.
[Sidenote: Vast empire of Charles I of Spain, the Emperor Charles V.]
The Italian venture of the Aragonese kings had yielded probably more of
advantage than of harm down to the time of Ferdinand, and it may be that
even he did not overstep the bounds of prudence in his ambitious
designs. When his policies were continued, however, in the person of
Charles I, better known by his imperial title as the Emperor Charles V,
the results were to prove more disastrous to Spain than beneficial. The
circumstances were in fact different for the two monarchs, although
their aims were much the same. Some writers have supposed that Ferdinand
himself recognized the danger of a union of the Austrian, Burgundian,
and Spanish dominions under one king, and they assert that he planned to
make Charles’ younger brother, Ferdinand, ruler of Spain and the Two
Sicilies in case the former should be elected emperor. In his will,
however, he respected the principle of primogeniture, and left all to
Charles, eldest son of Philip the Handsome and Juana la Loca. Through
his mother and Ferdinand, Charles inherited Castile, Aragon, and
Navarre, the Castilian dominions in Africa and America (where the era of
great conquests was just about to begin), the Roussillon and Cerdagne
across the Pyrenees, and Sardinia, Sicily, and Naples in Italy; through
his father he had already become possessed of the territories of the
House of Burgundy, comprised of Flanders and Artois in northern France,
Franche-Comté and Charolais in the east, Luxembourg, and the Low
Countries. This was not all, for Charles was heir of the Emperor
Maximilian, and in addition to inheriting the latter’s Austrian
dominions might hope to succeed to the imperial title as ruler of the
Holy Roman Empire. To be sure, the system of electing the emperors by
the electoral princes still obtained, but the Germanic states of the
empire were almost certain to prefer a powerful Hapsburg, with such
dominions as Charles had, to any other candidate, if only to serve as a
counterpoise to the ambitions of France. Nevertheless, the electors did
not miss the opportunity to make a profit out of the situation, and
encouraged the candidacy of Henry VIII of England and especially of
Francis I of France as well as that of Charles, receiving bribes and
favors from all. In the end, following the death of Maximilian in 1519,
they decided in favor of Charles. He was now ruler, at least in name, of
one of the most vast empires in the history of the world.
[Sidenote: Inherent weakness of his empire.]
The mere possession of such extensive domains inevitably led to an
imperialistic policy to insure their retention. Each of the three
principal elements therein, Spain, Burgundy, and the Austrian dominions,
was ambitious in itself and especially hostile to France, and all of
these aspirations and enmities were now combined in a single monarch.
Charles himself was desirous not only of conquest but also of becoming
the most powerful prince in the world, thus assuring the Hapsburg
supremacy in Europe, and making himself the arbiter in European
political affairs and the protector of Christianity; he may even have
dreamed of a world monarchy, for if he did not aspire to such a state
for himself he believed its attainment possible of realization. In the
achievement of a less vast ideal, however, Charles was certain to
experience many difficulties, and at some point or other was bound to
encounter the hostility not only of France but also of the other states
of Europe. If this were not enough there came along the unforeseen
dilemma of the Reformation. Finally, his own dominions were none too
strongly held together, one with another or within themselves. They were
widely separated, some indeed entirely surrounded by French territory,
leading to a multiplicity of problems of a military and a political
nature. The imperial rank carried little real authority in Germany, and
the Burgundian realms were not a great source of power. It appears,
therefore, that the empire was more a matter of show than of strength,
and that Spain, who already had a surfeit of responsibility, what with
her conquests in Italy, Africa, and the Americas, must bear the burden
for all. The reign of Charles would seem to be the parting of the ways
for Spain. If she could have restricted herself to her purely Spanish
inheritance, even with the incubus of her Italian possessions, she might
have prolonged her existence as a great power indefinitely. A century
ahead of England in colonial enterprise, she had such an opportunity as
that which made the island of Britain one of the dominant factors in the
world. Even as matters were, Spain was able to stand forth as a first
rank nation for well over a century. Whatever might have happened if a
different policy had been followed, it hardly admits of doubt that
Spain’s intervention in European affairs involved too great a strain on
her resources, and proved a detriment politically and economically to
the peninsula.
[Sidenote: Dissatisfaction over foreign favorites and increased
taxation.]
Charles had been brought up in Flanders, and, it is said, was unable to
speak Spanish when he first entered the peninsula as king of Spain. His
official reign began in 1516, but it was not until his arrival in the
following year that the full effect of his measures began to be felt.
Even before that time there was some inkling of what was to come in the
appointments of foreigners, mostly Flemings, to political or
ecclesiastical office in Castile. At length Charles reached Spain,
surrounded by Flemish courtiers, who proceeded to supplant Spaniards not
only in the favor but also in the patronage of the king. The new
officials, more eager for personal profit than patriotic, began to sell
privileges and the posts of lower grade to the highest bidders. Such
practices could not fail to wound the feelings of Spaniards, besides
which they contravened the laws, and many protests by individuals and
towns were made, to which was joined the complaint of the _Cortes_ of
Valladolid in 1518. To make matters worse Chièvres, the favorite
minister of the king, caused taxes to be raised. The amount of the
_alcabala_ was increased, and the tax was made applicable to the
hitherto privileged nobility, much against their will. In like manner
the opposition of the clergy was roused through a bull procured from the
pope requiring ecclesiastical estates to pay a tenth of their income to
the king during a period of three years. Furthermore it was commonly
believed, no doubt with justice, that the Flemish office-holders were
sending gold and other precious metals out of the country, despite the
laws forbidding such export. Nevertheless the _Cortes_ of 1518 granted a
generous subsidy to the king, but this was followed by new increases in
royal taxation. Opposition to these practices now began to crystallize,
with the nobles of Toledo taking the lead in remonstrance against them.
[Sidenote: Charles’ manipulation of the _Cortes_ in Galicia.]
The situation in Castile was complicated by the question of the imperial
election. Between the death of Maximilian in January, 1519, and the
election of Charles in June of the same year it was necessary to pay
huge bribes to the electoral princes. Once chosen, Charles accepted the
imperial honor, and prepared to go to Germany to be crowned, an event
which called for yet more expenditures of a substantial nature. So,
notwithstanding the grant of 1518, it was decided to call the _Cortes_
early in 1520 with a view to a fresh subsidy. Since all Castile was in a
state of tumult it was deemed best that the meeting should take place at
some point whence an escape from the country would be easy in case of
need. Thus Santiago de Compostela in Galicia was selected, and it was
there that the _Cortes_ eventually met, moving to the neighboring port
of Coruña after the first few days’ sessions. The call for the _Cortes_
provoked a storm of protest not only by Toledo but also by many other
cities with which the first-named was in correspondence. Messengers were
sent to the king to beg of him not to leave Spain, or, if he must do so,
to place Spaniards in control of the affairs of state, and complaints
were made against the practices already recounted and numerous others,
such, for example, as the royal use of the title “Majesty,” an unwonted
term in Spain. From the first, Charles turned a deaf ear, refusing to
receive the messengers of the towns, or reproving them when he did give
them audience, and he even went so far as to order the arrest of the
Toledan leaders. The _Cortes_ at length met, and gave evidence of the
widespread discontent in its demands upon the king. In accordance with
their instructions most of the deputies were disinclined to take up the
matter of a supply for the king until he should accede to their
petitions. Under the royal eye, however, they gradually modified their
demands, and when Charles took it upon himself to absolve them from the
pledges they had given to their constituents they voted the subsidy
without obtaining any tangible redress of grievances. The king did
promise not to appoint any foreigners to Spanish benefices or political
holdings during his absence, but broke his word forthwith when he named
Cardinal Adrian, a foreigner, as his representative and governor during
his absence. This done, Charles set out in the same year, 1520, for
Germany.
[Sidenote: War of the _Comunidades_ in Castile.]
Meanwhile, a riot in Toledo, promoted by the nobles whom Charles had
ordered arrested, converted itself into a veritable revolt when the
royal _corregidor_ was expelled from the city. This action was stated
to have been taken in the name of the _Comunidad_, or community, of
Toledo, and served to give a name to the uprising which now took place
in all parts of Castile. Deputies to the _Cortes_ who had been faithless
to their trust, some of whom had accepted bribes from the king, were
roughly handled upon their return home, and city after city joined
Toledo in proclaiming the _Comunidad_. In July, 1520, delegates of the
rebellious communities met, and formed the _Junta_ of Ávila, which from
that town and later from Tordesillas and Valladolid served as the
executive body of the revolution. For a time the _Junta_ was practically
the ruling body in the state; so complete was the overturn of royal
authority that Cardinal Adrian and his advisers made no attempt to put
down the rebellion. Time worked to the advantage of the king, however.
The revolt of Toledo had begun as a protest of the nobles and clergy
against the imposition of taxes against them. The program of the _Junta_
of Ávila went much further than that, going into the question of the
grievances of the various social classes. At length many of the
_comuneros_ began to indulge in acts of violence and revenge against
those by whom they regarded themselves as having been oppressed, and the
movement changed from one of all the classes, including the nobles,
against the royal infractions of law and privileges, to one of the
popular element against the lords. Thus the middle classes, who objected
to the disorder of the times as harmful to business, and the nobles, in
self-defence, began to take sides with the king. City after city went
over to Charles, and late in 1520 the government was strong enough to
declare war on the communities still faithful to the _Junta_.
Dissension, treason, and incompetent leadership furthered the decline of
the popular cause, and in 1521 the revolt was crushed at the battle of
Villalar. Charles promised a general pardon, but when he came to Spain
in 1522 he caused a great many to be put to death. Not until 1526 did he
show a disposition to clemency. Moreover he retained his Flemish
advisers.
[Sidenote: Social wars in Valencia and Majorca.]
During the period of the revolt of the _Comunidades_ in Castile even
more bitter civil wars were going on in Valencia (1520-1522) and
Majorca (1521-1523). The contest in Valencia was a social conflict from
the start, of plebeians against the lords, whereas the Castilian
conflict was fundamentally political. In Majorca the strife began over
pressure for financial reforms, but developed into an attempt to
eliminate the nobility altogether. Both uprisings were independent of
the Castilian revolt, although serving to aid the latter through the
necessary diversion of troops. As in Castile, so in Valencia and
Majorca, Charles took sides against the popular element, and put down
the insurrections, displaying great severity toward the leaders.
[Sidenote: Charles’ difficulties in Germany and war with France.]
While the civil wars were at their height Charles was having more than
his share of trouble in other quarters. The princes of Germany compelled
him to sign a document affirming their privileges, in which appeared
many paragraphs similar to those of the Castilian petitions to the king,
together with one requiring Charles to maintain the empire independently
of the Spanish crown. The acceptance of these principles by the emperor
is an evidence of the weakness of his authority in the subject states of
Germany, for not only was he a believer in the divine origin of the
imperial dignity, a doctrine which would have impelled him to establish
his personal and absolute rule in all of his realms if possible, but he
seems also to have intended to make Spain the political centre of his
dominions, because she was, after all, his strongest element of support.
At the same time, a fresh difficulty appeared in Germany with the
Lutheran outbreak of 1521. Charles himself favored reform in the church,
but was opposed to any change in dogma. Before he could confront either
the political or the religious problem in Germany, he found himself
attacked on another quarter. Francis I of France had seized upon
Charles’ difficulties as affording him a rich opportunity to strike to
advantage; so in 1521 he twice sent French armies into Spain through the
western Pyrenees on the pretext of restoring the crown of Navarre to the
Labrit family. With all these questions pressing for solution Charles
was in an exceedingly unsatisfactory position. Thus early in the period
lack of funds to prosecute European policies was chronic. Spain herself,
even if there had been no civil wars, was not united internally like
the compact French nation, and the other Hapsburg dominions could give
but little help. Finally, Charles could not depend on the alliance of
any other power, for his own realms were neighbors of all the others,
and his designs were therefore generally suspected. Nevertheless,
Charles brought to his many tasks an indomitable will, marked energy, a
steadfast purpose, and an all-round ability which were to do much toward
overcoming the obstacles that hindered him.
[Sidenote: Wars with France, the pope, the Italian states, and German
princes.]
[Sidenote: The outcome.]
It is profitless, here, to relate the course of the wars with France and
other European states. In the years 1521 to 1529, 1536 to 1538, and 1542
to 1544, France and Spain were at war, and at other times, down to the
death of Francis I in 1547, the two countries enjoyed what was virtually
no more than a truce. Meanwhile, Charles was usually in conflict with
the popes, whose temporal dominions in central Italy were threatened by
the growing power of Spain and the empire in the Italian peninsula.
Other states in Italy fought now on Charles’ side, now against him,
while the princes of Germany were an equally variable quantity. England
favored each side in turn, but offered little effective aid to either.
As affecting the history of religion these wars gave Protestantism a
chance to develop. Neither Charles nor Francis disdained the aid of
Protestant princes, and the former had little opportunity to proceed
against them on religious grounds. Francis even allied himself with the
Moslem power of Turkey. On the whole, Charles was the victor in the
wars, and could point to the occupation of Milan as a tangible evidence
of his success,--about the only territorial change of consequence as a
result of the many campaigns. Perhaps the most noteworthy fact as
affecting the history of Spain and Spanish America was the financial
drain occasioned by the fighting. Time and again lack of funds was
mainly responsible for defeats or failures to follow up a victory. Spain
and the Americas had to meet the bills, but, liberal as were their
contributions, more were always needed.
[Sidenote: Wars with the Turks and the Moslems of northern Africa.]
The wars with Turkey had a special significance because of the ever
impending peril from Moslem northern Africa. The pirates of the Berber,
or Barbary, Coast, as the lands in northwestern Africa are often
called, seemed to be more than ever audacious in the early years of the
reign of Charles. Not only did they attack Spanish ships and even
Spanish ports, but they also made numerous incursions inland in the
peninsula. Aside from the loss in captives and in economic wealth that
these visitations represented, they served to remind the authorities of
the Moslem sympathies of Spanish Moriscos and of the ease with which a
Moslem invasion might be effected. Furthermore the conquests of Isabella
and Ximénez had created Castilian interests in northern Africa, of both
a political and an economic character, which were in need of defence
against the efforts of the tributary princes to free themselves by
Turkish aid. The situation was aggravated by the achievements of a
renegade Greek adventurer and pirate, known best by the sobriquet
“Barbarossa.” This daring corsair became so powerful that he was able to
dethrone the king of Algiers and set up his own brother in his stead. On
the death of the latter at the hands of the Spaniards in 1518,
Barbarossa placed the kingdom of Algiers under the protection of the
sultan of Turkey, became himself an admiral in the Turkish navy, and
soon afterward conquered the kingdom of Tunis, whence during many years
he menaced the Spanish dominions in Italy. Charles in person led an
expedition in 1535 which was successful in dethroning Barbarossa and in
restoring the former king to the throne, but an expedition of 1541, sent
against Algiers, was a dismal failure. On yet another frontier, that of
Hungary, Spanish troops were called upon to meet the Turks, and there
they contributed to the checking of that people at a time when their
military power threatened Europe. The problem of northern Africa,
however, had been little affected by the efforts of Charles.
[Sidenote: Charles’ failure to stamp out Protestantism.]
Meanwhile, the religious question in Germany had all along been
considered by Charles as one of his most important problems. The first
war with France prevented any action on his part until 1529, since he
needed the support of the Protestant princes. The movement therefore had
time to gather headway, and it was evident that Charles would meet with
determined opposition whenever he should decide to face the issue.
Various factors entered in to complicate the matter, such, for example,
as the fear on the part of many princes of the growing Hapsburg power
and the belief that Charles meant to make the imperial succession
hereditary in his family. A temporary adjustment of the religious
situation was made by the imperial Diet held at Spires in 1526, when it
was agreed that every prince should decide for himself in matters of
religion. With the close of the war with France in 1529, Charles caused
the Diet to meet again at Spires, on which occasion the previous
decision was revoked. The princes devoted to the reform ideas protested,
giving rise to the name “Protestant,” but without avail. The Diet was
called for the next year at Augsburg, when Charles sat in judgment
between the two parties. The Protestants presented their side in a
document which became known as the confession of Augsburg. The Catholic
theologians replied, and Charles accepted their view, ordering the
Protestant leaders to submit, and threatening to employ force unless
they should do so. The international situation again operated to protect
the reform movement, for the Turks became threatening, and, indeed, what
with the wars with France and his numerous other difficulties Charles
was unable to proceed resolutely to a solution of the religious problem
until the year 1545. At last he was ready to declare war. In 1547 he won
what seemed to be a decisive victory in the Battle of Mühlberg,
resulting in the subjection of the Protestant princes to the Roman
Church. They protested anew, and, aided by the opposition to Charles on
other grounds,--for example, because of his introduction of Italian and
Spanish soldiery into what was regarded as a domestic quarrel,--were
able to present a warlike front again. This time they were joined by
Charles’ former powerful ally, Maurice of Saxony, through whose
assistance they successfully defended themselves. Peace was made at
Passau in 1552, ratified by the Diet of Augsburg in 1555, whereby the
Protestant princes obtained equal rights with the Catholic lords as to
their freedom in religious beliefs.
[Sidenote: Other failures of Charles and his abdication.]
Great as were to be the results of Charles’ reign on its European side,
it had nevertheless been a failure so far as Spain and Charles’ own
objects were concerned. Yet other disappointments were to fall to his
lot. He aspired to the imperial title for his son Philip. In this he was
opposed both by the Germanic nobility, who saw in it an attempt to foist
upon them a Spanish-controlled absolutism, and by his brother Ferdinand,
who held the Austrian dominions as a fief of the empire and aimed to
become emperor himself. Unable to prevail in his own policy Charles
eventually supported Ferdinand. For many years, too, he thought of
establishing an independent Burgundian kingdom as a counterpoise to
France, but changed his mind to take up a plan for uniting England and
the Low Countries, with the same object in view. For this latter purpose
he procured the hand of Queen Mary of England for his son Philip. The
marriage proved childless, and Philip was both unpopular and without
power in England. The death of Mary in 1558 ended this prospect. At last
Charles’ spirit was broken. For nearly forty years he had battled for
ideals which he was unable to bring to fulfilment; so he resolved to
retire from public life. In 1555 he renounced his title to the Low
Countries in favor of Philip. In 1556 he abdicated in Spain, and went to
live at the monastery of Yuste in Cáceres. He was unable to drop out of
political life completely, however, and was wont to intervene in the
affairs of Spain from his monastic retreat. In 1558 he gave up his
imperial crown, to which his brother Ferdinand was elected. Thus Spain
was separated from Austria, but she retained the Burgundian inheritance
and the Italian possessions of Aragon. The marriage of Philip the
Handsome and Juana la Loca was still to be productive of fatal
consequences to Spain, for together with the Burgundian domains there
remained the feeling of Hapsburg solidarity.
[Sidenote: Greatness of Charles in the history of Spain and Spanish
America.]
Charles had failed in Europe, but in Spain and especially in the
Americas he had done more than enough to compensate for his European
reverses. His achievements in Spain belong to the field of institutional
development rather than to that of political narrative, however. As for
the Americas his reign was characterized by such a series of remarkable
mainland conquests that it is often treated as a distinct epoch in
American history, the era of the _conquistadores_, and Spanish America
is, after all, the principal monument to the greatness of his reign. The
Emperor Charles V was a failure; but King Charles I of Spain gave the
Americas to European civilization.