GENERAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL DOCTRINES; MONOGENISM AND POLYGENISM.
I. As soon as we have determined the place which should be assigned
to man in the great order of the universe, the first question which
rises is, whether there is one human species, or several.
It is well known that this question has caused a division amongst
anthropologists. The _Polygenists_ regard the differences of height,
features, and colour, which distinguish the inhabitants of different
countries of the globe, as fundamental; the _Monogenists_ consider
these differences merely as the result of accidental conditions,
which have modified, in various degrees, a primitive type. The former
hold that there are _several_ human _species_ perfectly independent
of each other; the latter that there is _but one species_ of man
which is divided into several races, all of which are derived from a
common stock.
However slight may be our familiarity with the language of zoology
and botany or their applications, it is evident that the question
before us is a purely scientific one, and entirely within the
province of the natural sciences. Unfortunately the discussion has by
no means been confined to this ground.
A dogma supported by the authority of the Book which is held in
almost equal respect by Christians, Jews and Mussulmans, has long
referred the origin of all men without opposition to a single
father and mother. Nevertheless, the first blow aimed at this
ancient belief was founded upon the same book. In 1655 La Peyrère,
a Protestant gentleman in Condé’s army, interpreting to the letter
the two narratives of the creation contained in the Bible as well as
various particulars in the history of Adam and of the Jewish nation,
attempted to prove that the latter alone were descended from Adam and
Eve; that they had been preceded by other men who had been created
at the same time as the animals in all parts of the habitable globe;
that the descendants of these _Preadamites_ were identical with the
_Gentiles_, who were always so carefully distinguished from the Jews.
Thus we see that polygenism generally regarded as the result of _Free
Thought_ was biblical and dogmatic in origin.
La Peyrère attacked the Adamic dogma in the name of the respect due
to the text of a sacred Book. The philosophers of the eighteenth
century spoke in the name of Science and Reason. It is to them that
the school of Polygenists in reality owe their origin. But it is
easy to see that the greater number of them were only guided in
their writings by a controversial spirit, their chief aim was the
destruction of a dogma. Unfortunately, the same prepossession appears
in too many works published in our own day. On the other hand certain
monogenists are guilty of seeking in religious doctrines arguments in
favour of their theory, and anathematising their adversaries in the
name of dogma.
Social and political prejudices in addition to dogmatic and
anti-dogmatic prejudices have helped to make still more obscure a
question already very difficult in itself. In the United States in
particular the advocates of slavery and its opponents have often
fought upon this ground. Further still in 1844 Mr. Calhoun, Minister
of Foreign Affairs, when replying to the representations made to him
by France and England on the subject of slavery, did not hesitate
to defend the institutions of his country by urging the radical
differences, which, according to him, separated the Negro from the
White man.
Besides those polygenists who are influenced by prejudices almost
or entirely unscientific, there are sincere and disinterested men of
science who believe in the multiplicity of human origins. Foremost
among the latter are _medical_ men, who are accustomed to the study
of the _individual_ and who only possess a slight familiarity with
the study of the _species_. Then again there are palæontologists,
who from the nature of their work are compelled only to take into
account morphological resemblances and differences, without even
turning their attention to facts of reproduction or of _filiation_.
Finally, there are entomologists, conchologists, etc., who,
exclusively interested in the distinction of innumerable species by
purely external characters, are entirely ignorant of physiological
phenomena, and judge living beings as they would fossils.
On the other hand, monogenism reckons among its partisans nearly all
those naturalists who have turned their attention to the phenomena
of life, and among them some of the most illustrious. In spite of
the difference of their doctrines, Buffon and Linnæus, Cuvier and
Lamarck, Blainville and the two Geoffroys, Müller the physiologist
and Humboldt agree upon this point. Apart from any influence which
the name of these great men might exercise, it is clear that I share
their opinion. I have on different occasions explained the purely
scientific reasons for my convictions. I shall now endeavour to sum
them up in as few words as possible.
II. Let us first establish the importance of the question. It escapes
many minds and I have heard a doubt expressed upon it by men who have
enthusiastically followed anthropological studies. It is, however,
easily proved.
If the human groups have appeared with all their distinctive
characters in the isolated condition, and in the various localities
where geography teaches us to seek them; if we can trace them up
to stocks originally distinct, thus constituting so many _special
species_, then the study of them is one of the most simple,
presenting no more difficulty than that of animal or vegetable
species. There would be nothing singular in the diversity of the
groups. It would be sufficient to examine and describe them one
after the other, merely determining the degree of _affinity_ between
them. At most we should have to fix their limits and to discover the
influence which groups geographically brought in contact had been
able to exercise upon each other.
If, on the contrary, these groups can be traced to one common
primitive stock, if there is _but one single species_ of man, the
differences, sometimes so striking, which separate the groups,
constitute a problem similar to that of our animal and vegetable
races. Further, man is found in all parts of the globe, and we must
account for this dispersion; we must explain how the same species
has been able to accommodate itself to such opposite conditions of
existence as those to which the inhabitants of the pole and the
equator are subject. And lastly, the _simple affinity_ of naturalists
is changed into _consanguinity_; and the problems of _filiation_ are
added to those of _variation_, _migration_, and _acclimatisation_.
It is clear that, independently of every religious, philosophical, or
social consideration, this science will differ entirely in character
as we consider it from a polygenistic point of view, or according to
theories of monogenism.
III. If the former of these doctrines claims such a large number of
adherents, the reason may for the most part be found in the causes
mentioned above. But its seductive simplicity and the facility
which it seems to lend to the interpretation of facts also stand
for a great deal. Unfortunately these advantages are only apparent.
Polygenism conceals or denies difficulties; it does not suppress
them. They are suddenly revealed, like submarine rocks, to anyone who
tries, however little, to go to the root of the matter.
The case is the same with this doctrine as with the _Systems_ of
classification formerly employed in botany and zoology which rested
upon a small number of arbitrary data. They were undoubtedly very
convenient, but possessed the serious fault of being conducive to
most erroneous opinions from a destruction of true relations and an
imposition of false connections.
Monogenism acts in the same manner as the _Natural Method_. The
zoologist and the botanist are by this method brought face to face
with each problem which is put before them under every aspect. It
often displays the insufficiency of actual knowledge, but it is the
only means of destroying illusions, and of preventing a belief in
false explanations.
It is the same with Monogenism. It also brings the anthropologist
face to face with reality, forces him to investigate every question,
shows him the whole extent of each, and often compels him to confess
his inability to solve them. But by this very means it protects
him against error, provoking him to fresh investigation, and from
time to time rewards him with some great progress which remains an
acquisition for ever.
I shall return to these considerations, the truth of which will
be better understood when the principal general questions of
anthropology have been reviewed. Henceforward I shall attempt to
justify as briefly as possible the preceding criticisms and eulogies.