CHAPTER III.

SPECIES AND RACE IN THE NATURAL SCIENCES.

I. The question of the unity or multiplicity of the human species

may be stated in the following terms: are the differences which

distinguish the human groups characteristic of _species_ or of _race_?

It is evident that the question depends entirely upon the two words

species and race. It is then absolutely necessary to determine

as accurately as possible the sense of each, and yet there are

anthropologists, such as Knox, for instance, who declare that any

discussion or investigation in connection with this subject is idle.

There are others, like Dr. Nott, who would suppress the race and

only establish various _categories of species_. In order to support

their doctrines these authors ignore the work which has been carried

on for nearly two centuries by the most illustrious naturalists, and

the innumerable observations and experiments made by a vast number of

eminent men upon plants and animals.

In fact the theory of species and race has not been formed _à

priori_, as it has been too often falsely asserted, but has been

gradually acquired, and in a strictly scientific manner.

II. The word _Species_ is one which exists in all languages which

possess abstract terms. It represents, therefore, a general common

idea. The idea is, in the first place, that of a great outward

_resemblance_; but even in ordinary language that is not all. The

idea of _filiation_ is connected, even in the most uncultivated

minds, with that of resemblance. No peasant would hesitate to regard

the children of the same parents as _belonging to the same species_

whatever real or apparent differences might distinguish them.

Science has in reality done nothing more than define the idea of

which the public had merely a vague consciousness, and it was

not till very lately, and after a very curious oscillation, that

she succeeded in doing so. In 1686, Jean Ray, in his _Historia

Plantarum_, considered that those plants which had a common origin

and could be reproduced by seed belonged to the same species,

whatever their apparent differences might be. He only took filiation

into account. Tournefort, on the contrary, who in 1700 was the first

to make a clear statement of the question, termed the collection

of plants a _species_ which were distinguished by some particular

character. He relied only on resemblance.

Ray and Tournefort have had from time to time a few imitators,

who, in their definition of species, have clung to one of the two

ideas. But the immense majority of zoologists have been aware of the

impossibility of separating them. To convince ourselves of this fact

it is only necessary to read the definitions which they have given.

Each one of them, from Buffon and Cuvier to MM. Chevreul and C. Vogt

has, so to speak, proposed his own. Now, however they may differ in

other respects, they all agree in this. The terms of the definitions

vary, each endeavours to represent in the best manner possible the

complex idea of species; some extend it still further, and connect

with it the ideas of cycle and variation: but in all the fundamental

idea is the same.

In a case of such difficulty as that of finding a good definition

for a combination of ideas, the latest comer always hopes to improve

upon his predecessors. For this reason I have also given my formula:

“Species is a collection of individuals more or less resembling

each other, which may be regarded as having descended from a single

primitive pair by an uninterrupted and natural succession of

families.”

In this definition, as also in that of some of my colleagues, among

others of M. Chevreul, the idea of resemblance is made of less

importance and subordinate to that of filiation. The fact is that

there never is an identity of characters between one individual and

another. Putting aside the variations resulting from age and sex, it

is at once evident that all representatives of the same specific type

differ in some points. Although these differences are very slight,

they constitute _individual traits_, _shades_ as Isidore Geoffroy

said, which enable us to distinguish between two of the same species.

But the differences are not confined within these limits. The

specific types are _variable_, that is to say, every kind of physical

character is modified in their derivatives and, under the influence

of certain conditions, to such an extent as to make it often very

difficult to recognise their unity of origin. This, again, is a fact

upon which all naturalists agree. Blainville even, who, defined

species as “the individual repeated and continued through time and

space,” distinctly recognised this _variability_; for the individual

is perpetually undergoing modification, and does not retain its

similarity during the various stages of life. He admitted, moreover,

the existence of distinct races.

The _variability of species_ has also been the subject of animated

discussion among naturalists. The memorable contention which arose

upon this subject between Cuvier and Geoffroy is not yet forgotten,

a struggle considered by Goethe as more important than the gravest

political events. In the present day a school to which many of the

most illustrious names in England, Germany and elsewhere belong,

has taken up, with certain modifications, the ideas of Lamarck

and Geoffroy; it gives support to them from retaining the term

_variability of species_.

There is a grave confusion of words in this formula. Lamarck,

Geoffroy, Darwin and his school, consider the species not only as

_variable_ but as _transmutable_. The specific types are not merely

_modified_, they are _replaced_ by new types. _Variation_ is in

their estimation only a phase of the very different phenomena of

_transmutation_.

I shall discuss these theories presently. I shall now confine

myself to the remark that _true variability_, admitted even by the

defenders of _dogmatic invariability_, by Blainville, for example,

a variability which I fully accept, has nothing in common with the

_transmutability_ of Lamarck, Geoffroy and Darwin. Let us briefly

determine the limits of this variability.

III. When an individual trait is exaggerated and passes a limit

always very loosely defined, it constitutes an exceptional character

which clearly distinguishes the individual affected by it from all

those most nearly resembling it. This individual constitutes a

_Variety_.

The same term must be applied to all those individuals, which, like

certain plants reproduced by slips, grafts, or shoots, derive their

origin from the first exceptional individual, without having the

power of transmitting their distinctive characters by means of normal

generation. I borrow from M. Chevreul a curious example of these

_multiple varieties_. In 1803 or 1805, M. Descemet discovered in his

garden at Saint Denis, in the midst of a bed of acacias (_Robinia

pseudo-acacia_) an individual without thorns which he describes

under the epithet _spectabilis_. It is to the multiplication of

this individual by the art of the gardener that all the _thornless

acacias_, now distributed over every part of the globe, owe their

origin. Now these individuals produce seeds, but if the seeds are

sown they only yield _thorny acacias_. The _acacia spectabilis_ has

remained a _Variety_.

The latter may then be defined as:—“An individual or a number of

individuals belonging to the same sexual generation, which is

distinguished from the other representatives of the same species by

one or several exceptional characters.”

It will readily be seen how great the number of varieties in one

species may be. There is, in fact, scarcely any either external or

internal part of an animal or plant, which cannot be exaggerated,

diminished or modified in a thousand ways, and each of these

exaggerations, diminutions or modifications will characterise a fresh

variety, with the one condition of its being sufficiently marked.

IV. When the characters peculiar to a variety become _hereditary_,

that is to say, when they are transmitted from generations to the

descendants of the first modified individual, a _race_ is formed.

For example, if a _thornless acacia_ ever reproduced by seed, trees

resembling itself and enjoying the same power, then the Acacia

spectabilis would cease to be a simple variety, and would have become

a race.

The race, then, will consist of:—“A number of individuals resembling

each other, belonging to one species, having received and

transmitting, by means of sexual generation, the characters of a

primitive variety.”

Thus the _Species_ is the point of departure; the _variety_ appears

amongst the _individuals_ of which it is composed, and, when the

characters of this variety become hereditary, a _race_ is formed.

Such are the relations which, according to all naturalists, “from

Cuvier to Lamarck himself,” as Isidore Geoffroy said, exist between

these three terms. We have here a fundamental idea which we should

never lose sight of in the study of the questions with which we are

engaged. From neglect of it men of the highest distinction have

failed to understand most significant facts.

We see that the idea of _resemblance_, which is much curtailed in the

_species_, reassumes in the _race_ an importance equal to that of

_filiation_.

We see also that the number of races which spring directly from one

species may be equal to the number of varieties of the same species,

and consequently very considerable. But this number has a tendency

to increase still further to an indefinite extent. In fact, each

of these _primary races_ is susceptible of fresh modifications,

which may either extend no further than one individual, or become

transmissible by means of generation. Thus _secondary_ and _tertiary

varieties_ or _races_ come into existence. Our plants and domestic

animals furnish innumerable examples of these facts.

V. By reason of races originating in this manner from one another,

and from their multiplication, they may assume differential

characters which become more and more decided. But however numerous

they may be, and whatever differences there may be between them, and

however far they may seem to be removed from the primitive type, they

nevertheless, still form part of the species from which the primitive

races derived their origin.

On the other hand, every species comprises, independently of the

individuals which have preserved their primitive characters, all

those which compose the primary, secondary and tertiary, etc., races,

derived from the fundamental type.

In other words the _species_ is the _unit_ and the _races_ are the

_fractions_ of this unit. Or again, the _species_ is the _trunk of

the tree_, of which the _several series of races_ represent the

_principal_ and _lesser branches_ and the _twigs_. The general unity

and relative independence of the trunk and the branches of the tree

represent in an obvious manner the connections existing between the

species and its races.

The human species · 第 3 / 15 章