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THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC SERIES.
THE
HUMAN SPECIES.
BY
A. DE QUATREFAGES,
PROFESSOR OF ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY, PARIS.
NEW YORK:
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY,
549 AND 551 BROADWAY.
1879.
CONTENTS.
BOOK I.
UNITY OF THE HUMAN SPECIES.
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
EMPIRES AND KINGDOMS OF NATURE.—THE HUMAN KINGDOM.—ANTHROPOLOGICAL
METHOD 1
CHAPTER II.
GENERAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL DOCTRINES; MONOGENISM AND POLYGENISM 30
CHAPTER III.
SPECIES AND RACE IN THE NATURAL SCIENCES 35
CHAPTER IV.
NATURE OF VARIATIONS IN ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE RACES;
APPLICATION TO MAN 41
CHAPTER V.
EXTENT OF VARIATIONS IN ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE RACES;
APPLICATION TO MAN 47
CHAPTER VI.
INTERCROSSING AND FUSION OF CHARACTERS IN ANIMAL RACES;
APPLICATION TO MAN 56
CHAPTER VII.
CROSSING OF RACES AND SPECIES IN THE ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE
KINGDOMS.—MONGRELS AND HYBRIDS 63
CHAPTER VIII.
CROSSING BETWEEN VEGETABLE AND ANIMAL RACES AND SPECIES;
MONGRELS AND HYBRIDS; REALITY OF SPECIES 70
CHAPTER IX.
CROSSING BETWEEN HUMAN GROUPS.—UNITY OF THE HUMAN
SPECIES 85
BOOK II.
ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN SPECIES.
CHAPTER X.
ORIGIN OF SPECIES.—HYPOTHESES OF TRANSMUTATION.—DARWINISM 89
CHAPTER XI.
ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN SPECIES.—DIFFERENT HYPOTHESES 104
BOOK III.
ANTIQUITY OF THE HUMAN SPECIES.
CHAPTER XII.
AGE OF THE HUMAN SPECIES.—PRESENT GEOLOGICAL EPOCH 129
CHAPTER XIII.
AGE OF THE HUMAN SPECIES.—PAST GEOLOGICAL EPOCHS 142
BOOK IV.
ORIGINAL LOCALISATION OF THE HUMAN SPECIES.
CHAPTER XIV.
AGASSIZ’S THEORY.—CENTRES OF CREATION 154
CHAPTER XV.
PROGRESSIVE LOCALISATION OF ORGANISED BEINGS.—CENTRES OF
APPEARANCE.—ORIGINAL LOCALISATION OF MAN 168
BOOK V.
PEOPLING OF THE GLOBE.
CHAPTER XVI.
MIGRATIONS BY LAND.—EXODUS OF THE KALMUCKS FROM THE
VOLGA 179
CHAPTER XVII.
MIGRATIONS BY SEA.—POLYNESIAN MIGRATIONS.—MIGRATIONS TO
NEW ZEALAND 185
CHAPTER XVIII.
MIGRATIONS BY SEA.—MIGRATIONS IN AMERICA 199
BOOK VI.
ACCLIMATISATION OF THE HUMAN SPECIES.
CHAPTER XIX.
INFLUENCE OF CONDITIONS OF LIFE AND RACE 214
CHAPTER XX.
CONDITIONS OF ACCLIMATISATION 224
BOOK VII.
PRIMITIVE MAN.—FORMATION OF THE HUMAN RACES.
CHAPTER XXI.
PRIMITIVE MAN 239
CHAPTER XXII.
FORMATION OF HUMAN RACES UNDER THE SOLE INFLUENCE OF
CONDITIONS OF LIFE AND HEREDITY 244
CHAPTER XXIII.
FORMATION OF MIXED HUMAN RACES 260
CHAPTER XXIV.
INFLUENCE OF CROSSING UPON MIXED HUMAN RACES 276
BOOK VIII.
FOSSIL HUMAN RACES.
CHAPTER XXV.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 287
CHAPTER XXVI.
THE CANSTADT RACE 302
CHAPTER XXVII.
THE CRO-MAGNON RACE 311
CHAPTER XXVIII.
RACES OF FURFOOZ 337
BOOK IX.
PRESENT HUMAN RACES.—PHYSICAL CHARACTERS.
CHAPTER XXIX.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.—EXTERNAL CHARACTERS 349
CHAPTER XXX.
ANATOMICAL CHARACTERS 370
CHAPTER XXXI.
PHYSIOLOGICAL CHARACTERS 409
CHAPTER XXXII.
PATHOLOGICAL CHARACTERS 422
BOOK X.
PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERS OF THE HUMAN SPECIES.
CHAPTER XXXIII.
INTELLECTUAL CHARACTERS 431
CHAPTER XXXIV.
MORAL CHARACTERS 459
CHAPTER XXXV.
RELIGIOUS CHARACTERS 473
THE HUMAN SPECIES.
BOOK I.
UNITY OF THE HUMAN SPECIES.
CHAPTER I.
EMPIRES AND KINGDOMS OF NATURE.—THE HUMAN KINGDOM.—ANTHROPOLOGICAL
METHOD.
I. The naturalist who meets with an object for the first time,
instinctively asks the question:—What is this object? This question
leads to another:—With what other objects shall I class it? To what
group, and, in the first place, to what kingdom does it belong? Is it
a mineral, a plant, or an animal?
The answer is not always easy. We know that, in what may be called
the basis of each kingdom, there are ambiguous forms, whose nature
has long been, and still is, the subject of contention among
naturalists. We know that polyps were long regarded as plants, and
that nullipores, at first taken for polyps, are now divided between
the vegetable and mineral kingdoms; and, finally, we know that even
now, botanists and zoologists dispute over certain diatoms and
transfer them from one kingdom to the other.
Similarly the question has been asked:—What is man? and it has been
answered from several points of view. To the naturalist it has but
one meaning, and signifies, in which kingdom must man be placed? or
better: is man an animal?
In spite of all the differences which a comparison of man with the
mammalia presents, should he be classed with them? This question is
similar to that which Peysonnel is said to have asked himself, when,
struck by the special phenomena presented by the coral, he asked
himself whether the object before him was a vegetable.
It is evident that, in order to solve the first problem which arises
from a study of the natural history of man, we must have a clear idea
what are these great groups of beings, which are called kingdoms; we
must give an account of the characters which distinguish and separate
them from each other, and then of their true scientific meaning. It
will be sufficient for the purpose to explain the well-known laws of
Linnæus, supplementing the theory of the immortal Swede by some ideas
borrowed from Pallas and de Candolle, and by one of the fundamental
conceptions which Adamson and A. L. de Jussieu have almost equally
contributed to introduce into science.
II. It is impossible for anyone, whether learned or otherwise, not to
recognise at once the difference between two kinds of objects very
distinct from each other: inanimate bodies and organised beings.
These are the two groups into which Pallas has divided kingdoms under
the name of empires. Their distinction is generally easy, and I shall
confine myself to recalling some of the most essential differences.
Inanimate bodies, when placed under favourable circumstances, last
for an indefinite time, neither taking nor giving anything to the
surrounding world; organised beings, under whatever conditions they
are placed, only last for a fixed period of time, and, during this
existence, undergo every moment losses of substance which they repair
by means of materials taken from without. Inanimate bodies, even
when they assume the fixed and definite form of crystals, are formed
independently of all other bodies resembling them; they have from
their commencement fixed forms, and increase simply by superposition
of new layers. Every organised being is connected either directly or
indirectly with a similar being, in the interior of which it first
appeared in the form of a germ, then grew and acquired its definite
form by intussusception.
In other words, filiation, nutrition, birth and death, are so many
characteristics of the organised being, of which no trace is found
in inanimate bodies. I agree with Pallas in making inanimate bodies
compose the Inorganic Empire, and organised beings the Organic Empire.
I must here make an observation, the importance of which will be
easily understood.
The existence of the two groups which have been recognised by the
good sense of the general public as well as by the science of
Pallas, is a fact absolutely independent of all hypothesis. Whatever
explanation we may propose to account for the differential phenomena
which distinguish them, these phenomena will not the less exist; the
inanimate body will never be an organised being.
To attempt, under any pretext whatever, to reconcile or confound
these two kinds of objects with each other, is to go in direct
opposition to all the progress made for more than a century, and
especially during the last few years, in physics, chemistry and
physiology. It is inexplicable to me that some men, whose merits I
otherwise acknowledge, should have recently again compared crystals
to the simplest living forms, to the sarcodic organisms, as they were
called by Dujardin, who discovered them, and was the first to give a
comprehensive theory of them from minute observations. A change of
name is useless; the things remain the same, and protoplasm has the
same properties as sarcode. The animals, whose entire substance they
seem to form, have not altered their nature; whether monera or amœbæ,
these forms are the antipodes of the crystal from every point of view.
A crystal, as M. Naudin has well remarked, closely resembles one
of those regular piles of shot which may be seen in every arsenal.
It only increases from the exterior, as the pile is increased when
the soldier adds a fresh layer of shot; its molecules are just as
immovable as the balls of iron. It is exactly the contrary with the
organised being, and the simpler its composition the greater the
contrast. The small size of the moneron and the amœba prevents,
it is true, certain observations. I appeal, however, to all those
naturalists who have studied certain marine sponges in a living
state. They must like myself have remarked the strange activity of
the _vital whirlpool_ in the semi-sarcodic substance which surrounds
their siliceous or horny skeleton; they will have seen the sea water
in which they are placed move with a rapidity which it never exhibits
when in contact with any other animal.
The reason is that, in the organised being, the repose of the crystal
is replaced by an incessant movement; that, instead of remaining
immovable and unalterable, the molecules are unceasingly undergoing
transformation, changing their composition, producing fresh
substances, retaining some and rejecting others. Far from resembling
a pile of shot, the organised being may much rather be compared to
the combination of a number of physico-chemical apparatus, constantly
in action to burn or reduce materials borrowed from without, and ever
making use of their own substance for its incessant renewal.
In other words, in the crystal once formed the forces remain in a
state of _stable equilibrium_, which is only interrupted by the
influence of exterior causes. Hence the possibility of its indefinite
continuance without any change either of its forms or of its
properties. In the organised being the equilibrium is _unstable_, or
rather, there is no equilibrium properly so called. Every moment the
organised being expends as much _force_ as _matter_, and owes its
continuance solely to the _balance of the gain and loss_. Hence the
possibility of a modification of its properties and form without its
ceasing to exist.
Such are the bare facts which rest upon no hypothesis whatever; and
how can we, in the presence of these facts, compare the crystal which
grows in a saline solution to the germ which becomes in succession
embryo, fœtus, and finally a complete animal? How can we confuse the
_inanimate body_ with the _organised being_.
The two groups are easily separated by the phenomena they exhibit. It
is the same with the causes of the phenomenon.
Naturalists and physiologists are here divided. Some would have it
that the cause, or the causes, are identical, and that conditions,
which are almost accidental, alone determine the difference in
the results by changing their mode of action. In their opinion
the formation of a crystal or of a moneron is only a question of
resultant.
Others consider living beings as the result of a cause entirely
different from those which act in inanimate bodies, and refer to this
cause alone everything which takes place in these beings.
These two methods appear to me, from the exclusive element in each,
to be equally ill-founded. It cannot be denied that phenomena
identical with those characteristic of inanimate bodies are found in
organised beings, and we have, therefore, no scientific reason to
attribute them to different causes.
But organised beings have also their special phenomena radically
distinct from, or even opposed to, the former. Is it possible to
refer all of them to one, or to several, identical causes? I think
not. For this reason, I admit with a great number of eminent men
of every age and country, and, I believe, with the majority of
those that respect modern science, that organised beings owe their
distinctive characteristics to a _Special Cause_, to a _Special
Force_, to _Life_, which in them is associated with the inorganic
forces. For this reason I consider it legitimate to call them _Living
Beings_.
I shall often, however, return to this class of considerations,
in order to make it quite clear in what sense I take these words,
_Force_, and _Life_.
III. The two Empires of Pallas are themselves sub-divided into
Kingdoms, which are characterised by special facts and phenomena,
becoming more and more complicated as we ascend the scale of nature.
And, in the first place, I distinctly admit with de Candolle the
existence of a _Sidereal Kingdom_. To any one who considers, as
far as we are able, the little that we know of the universe, the
celestial bodies, suns, planets, and comets or satellites only
appear as molecules of the great All which fills indefinite Space.
One general phenomenon which is unchangeable, however varied in its
forms, is, as it were, the attribute of these bodies. All, whether
gaseous or solid, obscure or luminous, hot or cold, move within
curves of the same nature, obeying the laws discovered by Kepler. It
is now well known that _fixed stars_ do not exist.
In order to explain this _phenomenon_ philosophers have admitted the
existence of a _force_ which they have called _Gravitation_, the
effect of which is to precipitate the stars towards one another,
as if they mutually attracted each other, whilst obeying the laws
of Newton. Now it is well known that the great Englishman himself
gave no opinion upon the mode of action of this force, and that
he hesitated between the hypothesis of _Attraction_ and that of
_Impulsion_. The first should prevail as being more in accordance
with the immediate results of observation; but the second also has
had serious partisans, among whom I will only mention M. de Tessan.
Thus Newton, in spite of all his genius, cannot tell us what was the
cause of the movement of the stars; he was not even able to determine
the immediate mode of action of this cause; and yet there is not a
scientific term more universally received than that of _Gravitation_,
there is not a case in which the expression _Force_ is more generally
accepted. The reason of this is, that in the presence of general
facts and groups of phenomena, it is necessary to make use of terms
as simple as possible. We must, however, avoid the delusion of
thinking that _naming_ is equivalent to _explaining_.
In cases analogous to that of which we have been treating, the word
Force merely indicates the presence of an _Unknown Cause_, which
gives rise to a _group of fixed phenomena_. In assigning names to
each of the Forces or Unknown Causes to which we consider ourselves
able to refer certain groups of phenomena, we facilitate the
demonstration and discussion of the facts. The scientific man knows
very well that he cannot go beyond this.
It is in this sense, and in this sense alone, that I have used above
the expressions _Force_ and _Life_. Astronomers consider gravitation
the unknown cause of the movement of the stars; I consider Life
as the unknown cause of the phenomena which are characteristic of
organised beings. It may be that both gravitation and Life, as well
as the other general forces are merely as _x_, of which the equation
has not yet been discovered. I shall presently return to these
considerations.
Be this as it may, whatever our real ignorance, whatever the Cause
of which we are here treating, and though _Impulsion_ should one day
replace _Attraction_ in our Theories, the facts would still remain
the same. The stars would still be distributed through space, and
subject to the laws of Newton and Kepler; they would still constitute
a perfectly distinct whole, in the part assigned to the bodies which
compose it, and in the nature of the relations which unite them. They
would still form the _Sidereal Kingdom_.
This kingdom is then characterised by a _general phenomenon_, the
_Keplerian Movement_, which may be attributed to a single force,
namely that of _gravitation_.
IV. Let us now return to the Earth, the only celestial body which
we can study in detail. Modern discoveries, however, judging from
the relation of the elements and their mutual action, make it almost
certain that the greatest similarity exists between the stars
distributed in space, between all those at least which form part of
our heavens.
Let us first establish the fact that upon our globe we again meet
with the Keplerian Movement in falling bodies. Attraction is here
represented by _Weight_. Gravitation reappears with all its laws,
acting upon grains of dust as it acts upon worlds. The parts of the
whole, of cosmos, as Humboldt would have said, cannot escape from the
force which governs the whole.
But upon the surface of our Earth and in its interior, as far as
we have been able to penetrate either by direct observation or
scientific induction, we notice the appearance of other movements
which are not subject to the laws of Kepler or Newton; phenomena
appear which are entirely new and perfectly distinct from those due
to gravitation. They are the _physico-chemical_ phenomena. From their
number and their difference in character they were long attributed
to the action of distinct forces which were called _Electricity_,
_Heat_, _Magnetism_, etc. Modern science, however, by transforming,
so to speak, one into the other, has demonstrated their original
unity. Physicists refer them all to nothing more than so many
manifestations of the undulations of ether. The vibration of the
latter is then the fundamental phenomenon from which all the others
rise.
But this ether is absolutely hypothetical; its nature is perfectly
unknown; no one knowing whence it acquires this quantity of movement,
which, according to actual theory, should be subject neither to
increase nor diminution. Now, in reality, we have here the _Unknown
cause_ of all physico-chemical phenomena. For this reason, and also
for convenience, we shall give a name to this unknown cause, to this
_force_, and call it _Etherodynamy_ (Ethérodynamie).
But is not Etherodynamy only a particular form, a simple
modification, or an effect of gravitation? Are not these two forces
only different manifestations of a more general force? Many eminent
men are much inclined to admit one or other of these hypotheses.
Still, up to the present time, the facts do not seem to me to shew
much agreement with them. Etherodynamy is displayed even in space and
among the stars by variable, localised and temporary phenomena; the
action of gravitation is one, universal and constant. Man has always
been able to exercise a certain amount of control over the former; he
can produce at will light and heat; modern science cannot act upon
the second. We can neither augment nor diminish, reflect or refract,
or polarise weight; we cannot arrest its action. Even in the fall of
bodies the regularity in the acceleration of the motion proves that
the cause of this movement is subject to no alteration. Here then is
no _transmutation of force_ similar to that in a machine worked by
electricity or heat.
But whatever be the progress of science, and though M. de Tessan’s
theory should be confirmed by experiment, the difference between the
phenomena would not be diminished; the conclusions to be drawn from
the facts in connection with the question we are here discussing
would remain the same.
It is scarcely necessary to remark that the physico-chemical
phenomena produced by etherodynamy can act upon masses or be
exclusively molecular. They are in all cases similar to those which
depend upon gravitation, they are subject to invariable laws and
are always repeated in a similar manner when produced under similar
circumstances.
No antagonism, it is true, exists between gravitation and
etherodynamy. It is no less true that the action of the first is
always disturbed in a peculiar manner by that of the second, and that
in some phenomena it seems as if the latter would neutralise the
former. This fact is most strikingly shown in some of the commonest
experiments in physics. The gold leaves of the electroscope separate,
the pith-balls are attracted towards electrified bodies in spite of
their weight, and are repelled with a rapidity greater than that
which would result merely from their own weight. And yet these bodies
have no more ceased to possess weight than those masses of iron
raised by the powerful magnets of M. Jamin. Etherodynamy in these two
cases merely overcame gravitation and either modified or imitated its
action.
Those terrestrial bodies which present no other phenomena than those
which can be referred to either gravitation or etherodynamy have,
since the time of Linnæus, been termed _Inanimate Bodies_. Together
they constitute the _Mineral Kingdom_. We see that the existence
and the distinction of this group are perfectly independent of any
hypothesis intended to explain the phenomena.
_Two kinds of phenomena_ then are characteristic of the mineral
kingdom: _phenomena of the Keplerian movement_ and _physico-chemical
phenomena_, which may be attributed to the action of two forces:
_gravitation_ and _etherodynamy_.
V. The sidereal and mineral kingdoms form the Inorganic Empire.
Passing from it we enter the domain of organized and living
beings. We have already seen the essential phenomena by which they
are distinguished. These phenomena differ essentially from all
those which we have observed in inanimate bodies. It seems to me,
therefore, necessary to attribute them to a special cause,—to _Life_.
I know that in the present day any one making use of this word is
readily accused by a great number of physicists and chemists, and by
an entire physiological school, of introducing into science a vague
and almost mysterious expression. There is, however, nothing in it
more vague or mysterious than in the word _gravitation_.
It is very true that we do not know _what_ Life _is_; but no more
do we know _what_ the force _is_ that set the stars in motion and
retains them in their orbits. If astronomers have been right in
giving to the _force_, or _unknown cause_, which gives the worlds
their mathematical movements, naturalists have a perfect right to
designate by a special term that _unknown cause_ which produces
filiation, birth and death.
It will be apparent that my idea of Life is not the same as it was
with many ancient vitalists, that it is no more the _arche_ of
van Helmont than the _vital principle_ of Barthez. Its function
appears to me very different to that attributed to it by most
of our predecessors, and which is still attributed to it by some
physiologists.
Far from merely animating the organs, it is closely associated with
the forces of which we have already spoken. Living beings are heavy,
and therefore subject to gravitation; they are the seat of numerous
and various physico-chemical phenomena which are indispensable
to their existence and which must be referred to the action of
etherodynamy. But these phenomena are here manifested under the
influence of _another force_. It is for this reason that the results
of these phenomena are often quite different to those in inanimate
bodies, and that living beings have their special products. Life is
not antagonistic to the inanimate forces, but it governs and rules
their action by its laws. Therefore it makes them produce tissues,
organs and individuals instead of crystals; it organizes germs,
and maintains through space and time, in spite of the most complex
metamorphoses, that _unity of definite living forms_ which we call
_Species_.
If the anti-vitalists would only seriously reflect upon the matter,
they would acknowledge that, considered from this point of view,
there is nothing more mysterious in living beings than in some of the
commonest phenomena presented by inanimate bodies. The intervention
of Life as a modifying agent of actions purely etherodynamic may
be as easily admitted as that of etherodynamy itself modifying and
overcoming the action of weight. It is just as strange to see a
piece of iron attracted and supported by a magnet, as to see carbon,
oxygen, hydrogen and nitrogen combine and dispose themselves so as to
form an animal or vegetable cell instead of any imaginable inorganic
composition.
I have repeatedly, and for many years, maintained the doctrine which
I have summed up here. It seems to me confirmed in the highest degree
by the researches undertaken for the elucidation of the problem of
which we are treating. The experiences of M. Bernard in particular,
relative to the action exercised by anæsthetics upon plants as well
as upon animals, makes it impossible for us to doubt for a moment
the intervention of an agent distinct from physico-chemical forces in
organic beings. In employing the word _Life_ to designate this agent,
I only make use of an established expression, without pretending
to go beyond the information gained from experiment and scientific
observation.
Beings, in which life alone is added to gravitation and etherodynamy
constitute the _Vegetable Kingdom_. Now there is one general fact
displayed by this group, the significance of which has not, it seems
to me, been sufficiently understood. With the exception of certain
phenomena of _unconscious irritability_ which have long been known
in some plants of a superior order, and of facts, probably of the
same class, which have been established chiefly with reference to
some reproductive organs of plants of an inferior order, every
movement which takes place in plants appears to be produced _solely_
by inanimate forces. The transfer of matter in particular, which is
necessary for the development and sustenance of every vegetable,
belongs to actions of this kind. Can we believe that these forces,
as they are known to us from innumerable experiments, could, if left
to themselves, have formed an oak, or even raised a mushroom? Can
we believe that they could have _organised_ the acorn or the spore,
and hidden in those minute bodies the power of reproducing the
parent? And yet without them the vegetable cannot exist. But, in my
opinion, nothing makes their real subordination more apparent than
the importance of their part in the process of execution. They may be
compared to workmen raising an edifice under the eye of the architect
who has made the plan.
Are we then to conclude that life is an intelligent force, conscious
of the part it plays, and enjoying the dominion it exercises over the
subordinate inanimate forces? Not at all. Like these forces, it is
ruled by general and fixed laws. Nevertheless, we do not find in the
application of these laws, and in the results to which they lead, the
mathematical precision of the laws and phenomena of gravitation and
etherodynamy. Their mode of action merely seems to oscillate between
limits which remain impassable. This kind of liberty, and the bounds
imposed upon it, are conspicuous in the constant diversity of the
products of life, a diversity which contrasts in so striking a manner
with the uniformity of the products of etherodynamy. Crystals, when
similar in composition, and when formed under similar circumstances,
resemble each other perfectly; but we never find two leaves exactly
alike upon the same tree.
The vegetable kingdom is, therefore, characterised by _three kinds of
phenomena_: _the Keplerian movement_, _physico-chemical phenomena_,
and _vital phenomena_, which may be ascribed to the action of three
forces: _Gravitation_, _Etherodynamy_, and _Life_.
VI. We find repeated among animals all the phenomena which we have
noticed amongst plants, and, especially in the highest orders, those
movements due to unconscious irritability, of which examples are
presented by plants. Some eminent men, Lamarck among the number,
have even wished to refer all acts performed by inferior animals
to this order of phenomena. But here the author of _La Philosophie
Zoologique_ has fallen into an anatomical error, which has been long
since recognised; and whoever has lived, even for a short time, by
the sea-side, or has followed closely the habits and actions of worms
and zoophytes will certainly protest against this manner of regarding
them.
Passing from the plant to the animal, the latter executes movements
belonging either to the part or to the whole which are perfectly
independent of the laws of gravitation and etherodynamy. The
regulating and determining cause of these movements is evidently
within the animal itself. It is the _Will_. But the Will itself is
intimately connected with _sensibility_ and _consciousness_. To
everyone who judges animals by what he finds takes place within
himself, personal experiment and observation prove that the animal
_feels_, _judges_, and _wills_, that is to say _reasons_, and
consequently is _intelligent_.
This proposition will, I know, be contested by men whose learning
I profoundly respect, and objections will be made on all sides. On
the one hand the Automatism of Descartes will be revived in some
schools, and will now be supported by physiology and the experiments
of vivisection. I am far from denying the great interest which is
attached to the latter, and to the phenomena of reflex actions. But
the conclusions which are drawn from them appear to me singularly
exaggerated; Carpenter has rightly opposed them with personal
experiment. I will add that the study of animals placed far below,
and certainly inferior to, the frog, would doubtless lead to very
different interpretations. Moreover, Huxley himself admits that
animals are probably _sensible_ and _conscious automata_. But if
they were merely machines we should be obliged to allow that they
performed their functions _as if_ they felt, judged, and willed.
On the other hand, in the name of philosophy and psychology, I
shall be accused of confounding certain _intellectual_ attributes
of the human _reason_ with the exclusively _sensitive_ faculties of
animals. I shall presently endeavour to answer this criticism from
the standpoint which should never be quitted by the naturalist, that,
namely, of experiment and observation. I shall here confine myself
to saying that, in my opinion, the animal is _intelligent_, and,
although a _rudimentary_ being, its _intelligence_ is nevertheless
of the _same nature_ as that of man. It is, moreover, very unequally
distributed among the animal species; in this respect there are many
intervening stages between the oyster and the dog.
In addition to the phenomena which spring from the intelligence
and reasoning, we find in animals other impulses which arise from
_Instinct_, a blind impulse, or at least apparently so, which
often is the characteristic of animal species, and with which each
individual is endowed. These two orders of facts are very often
confounded, but the confusion can be explained as follows. In
the first place, instinct has as its object the attainment of a
determined and fixed result, but in the multitude of ways and means
necessary to attain this result a portion which is often very large
is due to the intelligence. The distinction is not always easy. It
will, moreover, be apparent that I cannot here enter into the details
required by the examination of this question, so entirely foreign to
that which is before us.
Besides the acts of intelligence and instinct, phenomena have been
established among animals which are closely connected with what we
call _character_, _sentiment_, or _passion_. The familiarity of the
terms is in itself a proof that upon this point ordinary observation
has outstripped scientific examination.
All these phenomena are perfectly new and have no analogy with those
which we have noticed in the preceding kingdoms. They evidently
justify the formation of an equally important group. The _animal
kingdom_ is thus universally admitted, independently of every theory
which attempts to explain its characters.
Facts radically different cannot be attributed to the same cause. We
must admit, then, that the characteristic phenomena of the animal
depend upon something different to those met with in the vegetable
or mineral kingdoms. They are, moreover, united by such intimate
relations, that it would be impossible not to attribute them to a
single cause. From motives already mentioned we will give a name
to this _Unknown Cause_, and, making use of an expression already
established, though open, I can see, to more than one criticism, we
will call it the _Animal Mind_ (l’âme animale).
Does the animal mind liberate the beings it animates from the
inferior forces? By no means, for we find them repeated with all
their characteristics. In order to raise the least of its organs,
the animal must contend with weight; it cannot perform the smallest
movement without the intervention of physico-chemical phenomena;
it cannot breathe, and, therefore, cannot live, without constantly
consuming some of its constituents. In the animal, moreover, just as
much as in the plant, the inanimate forces, etherodynamy especially,
appear in their double character of constancy and of ubiquity in the
accomplishment of phenomena, and of subordination to life, which
governs their action in the animal as in the plant.
Moreover, a large part is reserved for purely vegetative life in
animals of the highest order. The entire organism is formed without
any intervention of the animal mind. Again, a certain number of
organs always escape more or less from the influence of the latter,
and seem to be subject to life alone. Now these organs are precisely
those upon which _nutrition_, and consequently the constitution and
duration of the whole, depend. Thus life, which reigned supreme in
the vegetable kingdom, now in its turn, appears in a subordinate
character. We might say that it was essentially entrusted with the
organisation and maintenance of the instruments of the animal mind.
As to the latter, even where its intervention is most questioned,
it is only revealed to observation by _voluntary movements_. Now
personal experiment and the faculty of reasoning, are necessary to
enable us to comprehend the nature, and appreciate the signification
of these movements. It is only by regarding himself as normal, that
man can judge of the animal, a subject to which I shall presently
return.
_Phenomena of four kinds_ are then characteristic of the Animal
Kingdom: _phenomena of the Keplerian movement_; _physico-chemical
phenomena_; _vital phenomena_; and _phenomena of voluntary
movement_; attributable to the action of four forces: _gravitation_,
_etherodynamy_, _life_, and the _animal mind_.
VII. Although the preceding statements are so much abridged, I have
thought it well to give the condensed results in the following table:
+-----+-----------+---------------+---------------------+--------------+
| | EMPIRES. | KINGDOMS. | PHENOMENA. | CAUSES. |
+-----+-----------+---------------+---------------------+--------------+
| | | {Sidereal | {Phenomena of the | |
| | | {(de Candolle)| { Keplerian movement| Gravitation. |
| | | { | | |
| |Inorganic | { | {Phenomena of the | |
| { | (Pallas).| {Mineral | { Keplerian movement| Gravitation. |
| A { | | { (Linnæus) | {Physico-chemical | |
| l { | | { | { phenomena | Etherodynamy.|
| l { | | | | |
| { | | { | {Phenomena of the | |
| { | | { | { Keplerian movement| Gravitation. |
| B { | | {Vegetable | {Physico-chemical | |
| o { | | { (Linnæus) | { phenomena | Etherodynamy.|
| d { | | { | {Vital phenomena | Life. |
| i { | | { | | |
| e { | Organic | { | {Phenomena of the | |
| s { | (Pallas).| { | { Keplerian movement| Gravitation. |
| { | | { | {Physico-chemical | |
| | | {Animal | { phenomena | Etherodynamy.|
| | | { (Linnæus) | {Vital phenomena | Life. |
| | | | {Phenomena of | |
| | | | { voluntary movement| The Animal |
| | | | | Mind. |
+-----+-----------+---------------+---------------------+--------------+
From this table, and the expansions which it sums up, rise the
following conclusions.
1. Each kingdom is characterised by a certain number of phenomena,
whose existence is independent of all hypothesis and theory.
2. The phenomena increase in number from the sidereal to the animal
kingdom.
3. In passing from one kingdom to another, and proceeding from the
simple to the composite, a number of phenomena appear, which are
entirely unknown in the inferior kingdoms.
4. The superior kingdom presents, independently of its special
phenomena, the characteristic phenomena of the inferior kingdoms.
5. Each group of phenomena indicated in the table is connected with a
small number of fundamental phenomena, which can, in some cases with
certainty, in others with more or less probability, be referred to a
single cause.
6. All these causes are equally unknown to us as regards their
nature and mode of action. We know them merely by phenomena. We can,
therefore, make no conjecture as to the relations, more or less
close, which may exist between them.
7. We nevertheless give names to these causes for the sake of
convenience, and of facilitating the discussion of the facts.
VIII. We can now return to the problem which gave rise to these
expansions, and ask the question: Whether Man should take his place
in the animal kingdom? a question which evidently leads to another:
Is man distinguished from animals by important and characteristic
phenomena, absolutely unknown in the latter? For more than forty
years I have answered this question in the affirmative, and my
convictions, tested by many controversies, are now stronger than ever.
But it is neither in the material disposition, nor in the action of
his physical organism, that we must look for these phenomena. From
this point of view, man is neither more nor less than an animal.
From an anatomical point of view, there is less difference between
man and the superior order of apes, than between the latter and the
inferior orders. The microscope reveals equally striking resemblances
between the elements of the human organism and those of the animal
organism; and chemical analysis leads to the same result. It was easy
to foresee that the action of elements and organs would be exactly
the same in man and beast, and such was found to be the case.
Passions, sentiments, and characters, establish between animals and
ourselves equally close relations. The animal loves and hates; we
recognise in it irritability and jealousy; unwearying patience, and
immutable confidence. In our domestic species, these differences are
more apparent, or perhaps we only notice them more closely. Who has
not known dogs which have been playful or snappish, affectionate or
savage, cowardly or courageous, friendly with everybody, or exclusive
in their affections.
Again, man has true instincts, were it only that of sociability.
Faculties, however, of this order, which are so fully developed in
certain animals, in man are evidently very much reduced in comparison
with the intelligence.
The relative development of the latter certainly establishes an
enormous difference between man and animal. It is not, however, the
_intensity_ of a phenomenon which gives value to it from our present
point of view, but simply its _nature_. The question is whether human
intelligence and animal intelligence can be considered as of the same
order.
As a rule philosophers, psychologists, and theologians, have replied
in the negative, and naturalists in the affirmative. This opposition
can be easily understood. The former make the human mind, considered
as an indivisible whole, their principal study, and attribute to it
all our faculties. Unable to deny the similarity, external at least,
between certain animal and human acts, and yet being anxious to
clearly distinguish man from the brute, they have given to the acts
different interpretations as they have been performed by one or the
other. Naturalists have regarded the phenomena more closely without
thinking of anything else, and when they have seen the animal behave
in the same manner as they themselves would have done under the given
circumstances, they have concluded that the motives of the action
must be fundamentally the same. I must ask permission to remain a
naturalist, and to recall some facts, and regard them from this point
of view.
The theologians themselves allow that the animal possesses sensation,
formation and association of images, imagination, and passion (R.
P. de Bonniot). They allow that the animal feels the relation of
fitness or of unfitness between sensible objects and his own senses;
that it experiences sensible attractions and repulsions, and acts
perfectly in consequence, and that _in this sense the animal reasons
and judges_ (l’Abbé A. Lecomte). Therefore, they add, we cannot doubt
but that the animal possesses a principle superior to that of mere
matter, and we may even give it the name of mind (R. P. Bonniot).
But in spite of all, theologians and philosophers maintain that the
animal cannot be intelligent, because it has neither _innate sense_,
_consciousness_ nor _reason_.
Let us leave for a moment the last term, with which the idea of
phenomena which we shall presently discuss, is connected in the
mind of our opponents. Is it true that animals are wanting in
innate sense, and are not conscious of their actions? Upon what
facts of observation does this opinion rest? We each one of us feel
that we possess this sense, that we enjoy this faculty. By means
of speech we can convey to another the results of our personal
experience. But this source of information is wanting when we come
to deal with animals. Neither in them nor in ourselves are innate
sense and consciousness revealed to the outer world by any special
characteristic movement. It is, therefore, only by interpreting these
movements, and by judging from ourselves, that we can form an idea of
the motives from which the animal acts.
Proceeding in this manner, it seems to me impossible to refuse to
allow animals a certain amount of consciousness of their actions.
Doubtless, they do not form such an exact estimate of them, as even
an illiterate man can do. But we may be very certain that when a cat
is trying to catch sparrows on level ground, and creeps along the
hollows, availing herself of every tuft of grass however small, she
knows what she is about, just as well as the hunter who glides in a
crouching attitude from one bush to another. We may be equally sure
that kittens and puppies when they fight, growl and bite without
hurting each other, know very well that they are playing and not in
earnest.
I must here beg permission to relate the remembrance of my struggles
with a mastiff of pure breed, and which had attained its full size,
remaining, however, very _young in character_. We were very good
friends, and often played together. As soon as ever I assumed an
attitude of defence before him, he would leap upon me with every
appearance of fury, seizing in his mouth the arm which I had used
as a shield. He might have marked my arm deeply at the first onset,
but he never pressed it in a manner that could inflict the slightest
pain. I often seized him by his lower jaw with my hand, but he never
used his teeth so as to bite me. And yet the next moment the same
teeth would indent a piece of wood, I tried to tear away from them.
This animal evidently knew what it was doing when it feigned the
passion precisely _opposite_ to that which it really felt; when,
even in the excitement of play, it retained sufficient mastery over
its movements to avoid hurting me. In reality it _played a part in a
comedy_, and we cannot act without being conscious of it.
It is useless for me to insist upon many other facts which I
could bring forward, and I refer my reader to the works of those
naturalists who have studied the question, especially those of F.
Cuvier. But the more I reflect upon it, the more is my conviction
confirmed that man and animals think and reason in virtue of a
faculty which is common to both, and which is only far more developed
in the latter than in the former.
What I have just said of the intelligence I do not hesitate to say
also of language, the highest manifestation of the intelligence.
It is true that man alone possesses _speech_, that is to say the
_articulate voice_. But two classes of animals possess _voice_. With
us it is, again, only a high degree of perfection, nothing radically
new. In both cases the sounds, produced by the air which is thrown
into vibration by the voluntary movements accorded to the larynx,
convey impressions and personal thoughts which are understood by
individuals of the same species. The mechanism of the production, the
object and the result are fundamentally the same.
It is true that the language of animals is most rudimentary and, in
this respect, in harmony with the inferiority of their intelligence.
We might say that it was almost entirely composed of interjections.
Such as it is, however, this language is sufficient for the wants of
the mammalia and birds who understand it perfectly, while man himself
can learn it without very much trouble. The hunter can distinguish
the accents of anger, love, pleasure, sorrow, the call and the
signal of alarm and makes use of these indications as an unfailing
guide, and often imitates these accents and cries in such a manner
as to deceive the animal. Of course I exclude from the _language
of brutes_, the song, properly so called, of birds, that of the
nightingale for example. It appears to me void of all meaning, as are
the notes of a singer, and I do not believe in the interpretation of
Dupont de Nemours.
It is not, therefore, in the phenomena connected with the
intelligence that we shall find the basis of a fundamental
distinction between man and animals.
But in man the existence has been proved of fundamental phenomena
of which nothing either in living beings or inanimate bodies has
hitherto been able to give us any conception. 1st. Man has the
_perception of moral good and evil_ independently of all physical
welfare or suffering. 2nd. Man _believes in superior beings_ who can
exercise an influence upon his destiny. 3rd. Man _believes in the
prolongation of his existence after this life_.
The last two phenomena have always been so closely connected that
it is natural to refer them to the same faculty, to that namely of
_Religion_. The first depends on _Morality_.
Psychologists attribute religion and morality to the _reason_, and
make the latter an attribute of man. But with the _reason_ they
connect the highest phenomena of the intelligence. In my opinion, in
so doing they confound and refer to a common origin, facts entirely
different. Thus since they are unable to recognise either morality
or religion in animals, which in reality do not possess these two
faculties, they are forced to refuse them intelligence also, although
the same animals, in my opinion, give decisive proof of their
possession of this faculty every moment.
The generality of the phenomena which we are discussing is, I
believe, indisputable, especially since the investigation to which it
has been subjected by the Society of Anthropology in Paris, where the
question of the human kingdom has been long and seriously discussed.
I cannot here reproduce the discussion, even in an abridged form,
but refer my readers either to the summary in my _Rapport sur les
progrès de l’anthropologie en France_, or to the _Bulletins_ of the
Society. I shall, moreover, go into this subject in some detail in
the chapters devoted to the moral and religious characters of the
human races.
A host of manifestations of human activity are derived, as so many
consequences, from the three facts which I have pointed out. Customs
and institutions of every kind are connected with them; they alone
explain some of the great events which change the destiny of nations
and the face of the earth.
For reasons which I have several times pointed out already, we
must give a name to the _Unknown Cause_ from which are derived the
phenomena of morality and religion. We will call it the _Human mind_
(l’âme humaine).
I must here repeat the formal declaration which I have often made
already. When I employ this term, which is established by custom, it
is with the understanding that I strictly confine myself within the
limits imposed upon anyone who intends to be exclusively faithful to
science, experiment and observation. I consider the human principle
as the _Unknown Cause_ of exclusively human phenomena. To go beyond
that would be to encroach upon the domain of philosophy or theology.
To them belongs the solution of the formidable problems raised by
the existence of the ‘_something_’ which makes a man of an organism
entirely animal, and I give everyone leave to choose from the
proposed solutions the one which agrees most satisfactorily with the
demands of his own feelings and reason.
But whatever this solution may be, it will in no way affect the
phenomena; those which I have just described will neither be
diminished nor modified. Now they exist in man alone, and it is
impossible to deny their importance. Thus they distinguish man from
the animal as much as the phenomena of intelligence distinguish the
animal from the plant, and as the phenomena of life distinguish the
plant from the mineral. They are, therefore, the attributes of a
kingdom, which we will call the _Human Kingdom_.
From this conclusion it will seem that I am at variance with Linnæus,
whose idea I have, however, only developed and stated more precisely.
In fact, the immortal author of the _Systema Naturæ_ has placed his
_Homo sapiens_ amongst the mammalia in the class of primates, and
has made him congenous with the gibbon. This is because Linnæus had
recourse to the _System_ in order to establish his _nomenclature_. To
classify man as well as other beings, he has made an arbitrary choice
of a certain number of characteristics, and only taken those into
consideration which were furnished by the body.
But the language of Linnæus is very different, even in his remarks
relating to the genus _Homo_, and still more so in the kind of
introduction entitled _Imperium Naturæ_. He there almost places man
in opposition with all beings, and particularly with animals, and in
such terms as necessarily to suggest the idea of a _human kingdom_.
The reason of this is that here Linnæus no longer speaks of
_physical_ man, but of man _as a whole_. Now, thanks to the labours
of Adanson, Jussieu and Cuvier, naturalists now know that this is
the right course to pursue in judging of the relations which exist
between beings. The _Natural Method_ no longer allows the choice of
such or such a group of characteristics; it demands, together with
an appreciation of their relative value, a consideration of all. It
is on this account that I have been led to admit the existence of
this human kingdom, which has been already proposed under several
appellations by some eminent men, but to which I believe myself to
have given a more precise and rigorous determination.
The table given above must then be completed in the following manner:—
+--------+--------------------------------------+-------------+
| | PHENOMENA. | CAUSES. |
|--------+--------------------------------------+--------------
| | {Phenomena of the Keplerian movement | Gravitation |
| | {Physico-chemical phenomena | Etherodynamy|
|Human | {Vital phenomena | Life |
|Kingdom | {Phenomena of voluntary movement | Animal mind |
| | {Phenomena of morality and religion | Human mind |
+--------+--------------------------------------+-------------+
Thus in the human kingdom we find by the side of the phenomena which
characterise it all those which we have met with in the inferior
kingdoms. We are consequently forced to admit that all the _forces_
and all the _unknown causes_ to which we have attributed these
effects are acting in man. From this point of view man deserves the
name which has sometimes been given to him of _microcosm_.
We have seen that in the vegetable kingdom the inanimate forces
perform their functions _under the control_, so to speak, of Life,
which afterwards, in the animal, showed incontestable signs of its
subordination to the animal mind. Life now appears under similar
conditions with regard to the human mind. In the most characteristic
human actions, the intelligence almost always plays the most
prominent part from the executive point of view; but it is manifestly
under the direction of the human mind. All legislation affects to
rest upon the one foundation of morality and of justice, which is
only a form of it; the immediate cause of the Crusades, of the spread
of the Arabs, and the conquests of Islam, was religious fervour. The
true legislator and the great leader are indeed necessarily men of
high intelligence, but is it not clear that in the cases mentioned
the intelligence has been placed at the service of morality or of
religion, and consequently of the _Unknown Cause_ to which man owes
these faculties?
But however preponderating the part claimed by this cause in acts
exclusively human may be, it has nothing to do with those phenomena
which have their origin in the intelligence alone. The learned
mathematician who seeks by the aid of the most profound abstractions
the solution of some great problem, is completely without the moral
or religious sphere into which, on the contrary, the ignorant,
simple-minded man enters when he struggles, suffers, or dies for
justice or for his faith.
IX. It was necessary to recall all the facts and theories which
I have just summed up, in order to facilitate the comprehension
and the justification of the method which alone can guide us in
anthropological studies.
The object of anthropology is the study of man _as a species_. It
abandons the _material individual_ to physiology and medicine; the
_intellectual_ and _moral individual_ to philosophy and theology. It
has, therefore, its own special field of study, and on that account
alone its special questions, which often could not be solved by
processes borrowed from cognate sciences.
In fact, in some questions, and in some of the most fundamental ones,
the difficulty lies in the interpretation of phenomena connected
with those which are characteristic of all living beings. For the
very reason that they are to a certain extent obscure in man, we
cannot seek for an explanation of them in man, since he becomes, so
to speak, the unknown quantity of the problem. An endeavour to solve
the problem by the study of man, who is the object of it, would be
equivalent to a mathematician representing the value of _x_ in terms
of _x_ itself.
How does the mathematician proceed? He seeks in the data of the
problem for a certain number of _known quantities_ equivalent to the
_unknown quantity_, and by means of these quantities he determines
the value of _x_.
The anthropologist must act in the same manner. But where must he
seek for the known quantities which will enable him to state the
equation?
The answer to this question will be found in what we have said
above, and in the table of kingdoms. Man, although he has his special
and exclusively human phenomena, is above all an organised and living
being. From this point of view he is the seat of phenomena common to
animals and plants; he is subjected to the same laws. In his physical
organisation he is nothing more than an animal, somewhat superior
in certain respects to the most highly developed species, but
inferior in others. From this point of view he presents organic and
physiological phenomena identical with those of animals in general,
and of mammalia in particular; and the laws which govern these
phenomena are the same in both cases.
Now plants and animals have been studied for a much longer period
than man, and from an exclusively scientific point of view, without
any trace of the prejudice and party feeling which often interferes
with the study of man. Without having penetrated very deeply into
all the secrets of vegetable and animal life, science has acquired a
certain number of fixed and indisputable results which constitute a
foundation of positive knowledge, and a safe starting point. It is
there that the anthropologist must seek the _known quantities_ of
which he may stand in need.
Whenever there is any doubt as to the nature or signification of
a phenomenon observed in man, the corresponding phenomena must be
examined in animals, and even in plants; they must be compared with
what takes place in ourselves, and the results of this comparison
accepted as they are exhibited. What is recognised as being true for
other organised beings cannot but be true for man.
This method is incontestably scientific. It is similar to that of
modern physiologists, who, since they are unable to experiment upon
man, experiment upon animals, and form their conclusions upon the
former from the latter. But the physiologist devotes his attention
to the _individual_ only, and, therefore, examines little more than
those groups which in their organisation approach most nearly to the
being whose history he wishes to explain. The anthropologist on the
contrary studies the _species_. The questions with which he has to
deal are much more general, so he is forced to direct his attention
to plants as well as to animals.
This method is accompanied by its criterion; it allows the control of
the various, answers which are often made to one question. The means
of estimation are simple and easily applied.
In anthropology, every solution to be sound, that is to say, true,
should refer man in everything which is not exclusively human to the
general recognised laws for other organised and living beings.
Every solution which makes or tends to make man an exception, by
representing him as free from those laws which govern other organised
and living beings, is unsound and false.
Again, when we reason and form our conclusions in this manner, we
remain faithful to the mathematical method. To be received as true,
a solution of a given problem must agree with admitted axioms,
with truths previously proved. Every hypothesis which leads to
results at variance with these axioms or these truths, is, on that
account alone, declared false. In anthropology, the axiom or the
truth which serves as a criterion is the fundamental, physical, and
physiological identity of man with other living beings, with animals,
with mammalia. All hypotheses at variance with this truth should be
rejected.
Such are the absolute rules which have always acted as my guide in
anthropological studies. I do not pretend to have invented them. I
have scarcely done more than formulate what has been more or less
explicitly admitted by Linnæus, Buffon, Lamarck, Blumenbach, Cuvier,
the two Geoffroy St.-Hilaire, J. Müller, Humboldt, etc. But, on the
one hand, my illustrious predecessors have seldom treated the subject
with sufficient precision, and have too often omitted to give the
reasons for their decisions. On the other hand these principles have
been, and are daily forgotten by men who, in other respects, enjoy
with justice the title of great authorities. As I shall be compelled
to disagree with them, I thought it necessary to show clearly the
general ideas which serve as a foundation for my own scientific
convictions. The reader will thus be able to appreciate and discern
the causes of this difference of opinion.