I asked Admiral Matthieu about the naval preparations of France.

'The "Moniteur,"' I said, 'denies that you are making any.'

'The "Moniteur,"' he answered, 'does not tell the truth. We are

augmenting largely, both the number and the efficacy of our fleet.

'Four years ago, at the beginning of the Russian war, we resolved to

build a steam fleet of 150 steam ships of different sizes for fighting,

and 74 steam ships for the transfer service, and to carry fuel and

stores. Though we set about this in the beginning, as we thought, of a

long war, we have not allowed the peace to interrupt it. We are devoting

to it sixty-five millions a year (2,600,000_l_.) of which from fifteen to

seventeen millions are employed every year in building new ships, and

from forty to forty-two in adding steam power to the old ones. We hope to

finish this great work in fourteen years.'

'What,' I asked, 'is the amount of your present fleet of steamers?'

'We have thirty-three screws,' he answered, 'fifty-seven paddles, and

sixty-two sailing vessels in commission, and seventy-three, mostly

steamers, _en réserve_, as you would say, in ordinary.'

'Manned by how many men?' I asked.

'By twenty-five thousand sailors,' he answered, 'and eleven thousand

marines. But our _inscription maritime_ would give us in a few months or

less one hundred thousand more. Since the times of Louis XVI. the French

Navy has never been so formidable, positively or relatively.'

'How,' I asked, 'has your "Napoleon" succeeded?'

'Admirably,' he answered. 'I have not seen the "Wellington," but she is a

much finer ship than the Agamemnon. Her speed is wonderful. A month ago

she left Toulon at seven in the morning, and reached Ajaccio by four in

the evening. But the great improvement is in our men. Napoleon knew

nothing and cared nothing about sailors. He took no care about their

training, and often wasted them in land operations, for which landsmen

would have done as well.

'In 1814 he left Toulon absolutely unguarded, and sent all the sailors to

join Augereau. You might have walked into it.

'In 1810 or 1811 I was on board a French corvette which fought an action

with an English vessel, the "Lively." We passed three times under her

stern, and raked her each time. We ought to have cleared her decks. Not a

shot touched her. The other day at Cherbourg I saw a broadside fired at a

floating mark three cables off, the usual distance at which ships engage.

Ten balls hit it, and we could see that all the others passed near enough

to shake it by their wind.

'A ship of eighty guns has now forty _canonniers_ and forty _maîtres de

pièces_. All practical artillerymen, and even the able seamen, can point

a gun. Nelson's manoeuvre of breaking the line could not be used against

a French fleet, such as a French fleet is now. The leading ships would be

destroyed one after another, by the concentrated fire. Formerly our

officers dreaded a maritime war. They knew that defeat awaited them,

possibly death. Now they are confident, and eager to try their hands.'

In the evening L. took me into a corner, and we had a long conversation.

Correspondence & Conversations of Alexis de Tocqueville with Nassau William Senior from 1834 to 1859, Volume 2 · 第 64 / 83 题