THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 76, Art. 3]

Whether Ignorance Excuses from Sin Altogether?

Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance excuses from sin

altogether. For as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9), every sin is

voluntary. Now ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above (Q.

6, A. 8). Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is done beside the intention, is done

accidentally. Now the intention cannot be about what is unknown.

Therefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human

acts. But what is accidental does not give the species. Therefore

nothing that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be

deemed sinful or virtuous.

Obj. 3: Further, man is the subject of virtue and sin, inasmuch as he

is partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge which

perfects the reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) that "some

things done through ignorance are rightly reproved." Now those things

alone are rightly reproved which are sins. Therefore some things done

through ignorance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether

excuse from sin.

_I answer that,_ Ignorance, by its very nature, renders the act which

it causes involuntary. Now it has already been stated (AA. 1, 2) that

ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would

have prevented; so that this act, if knowledge were to hand, would be

contrary to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary.

If, however, the knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, would not

have prevented the act, on account of the inclination of the will

thereto, the lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling,

but not willing, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 1: and such like

ignorance which is not the cause of the sinful act, as already

stated, since it does not make the act to be involuntary, does not

excuse from sin. The same applies to any ignorance that does not

cause, but follows or accompanies the sinful act.

On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it

makes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses from sin,

because voluntariness is essential to sin. But it may fail to excuse

altogether from sin, and this for two reasons. First, on the part of

the thing itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin,

in so far as something is not known to be a sin. Now it may happen

that a person ignores some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of

which circumstance would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong

to the substance of the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge

is sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful; for

instance, if a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man (which

suffices for it to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact that it

is his father, (which is a circumstance constituting another species

of sin); or, suppose that he is unaware that this man will defend

himself and strike him back, and that if he had known this, he would

not have struck him (which does not affect the sinfulness of the

act). Wherefore, though this man sins through ignorance, yet he is

not altogether excused, because, not withstanding, he has knowledge

of the sin. Secondly, this may happen on the part of the ignorance

itself, because, to wit, this ignorance is voluntary, either

directly, as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of

certain things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as

when a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to

acquire the knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For such

like negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful,

provided it be about matters one is bound and able to know.

Consequently this ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin. If,

however, the ignorance be such as to be entirely involuntary, either

through being invincible, or through being of matters one is not

bound to know, then such like ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

Reply Obj. 1: Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated

above (Q. 6, A. 8). Hence not every ignorance excuses from sin

altogether.

Reply Obj. 2: So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person,

the intention of sin remains in him: so that, in this respect, his

sin is not accidental.

Reply Obj. 3: If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of

reason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with

madmen and imbeciles: but such is not always the ignorance that

causes the sin; and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 502 / 746 题