Whether Ignorance Diminishes a Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin.
For that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now
ignorance is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iii, 1) that "every evil man is ignorant." Therefore ignorance does
not diminish sin.
Obj. 2: Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But
ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore it does
not diminish a sin.
Obj. 3: Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and diminish
sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrose commenting on Rom.
2:4, "Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to
penance?" says: "Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not."
Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.
Obj. 4: Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this
would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which
removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does
not diminish sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher says (Ethic.
iii, 5) that the "punishment is doubled for a drunken man." Therefore
ignorance does not diminish sin.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven,
diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from 1 Tim. 1:13:
"I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly." Therefore
ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin.
_I answer that,_ Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish
sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not
render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is
evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether (through
making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does
away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance which is not
the cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it,
neither diminishes nor increases the sin.
Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such
as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does not excuse
from the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like
ignorance is directly and essentially voluntary, as when a man is
purposely ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this
kind seems rather to make the act more voluntary and more sinful,
since it is through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to
bear the hurt of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning.
Sometimes, however, the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being
committed, is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally,
as when a man is unwilling to work hard at his studies, the result
being that he is ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much
wine, the result being that he becomes drunk and indiscreet, and this
ignorance diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the
sin. For when a thing is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be
said to consent to the sin directly, but only accidentally;
wherefore, in that case there is less contempt, and therefore less
sin.
Reply Obj. 1: The ignorance whereby "every evil man is ignorant," is
not the cause of sin being committed, but something resulting from
that cause, viz. of the passion or habit inclining to sin.
Reply Obj. 2: One sin added to another makes more sins, but it does
not always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two sins do not
coincide, but are separate. It may happen, if the first diminishes
the second, that the two together have not the same gravity as one of
them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if
committed by a man when sober, than if committed by a man when drunk,
although in the latter case there are two sins: because drunkenness
diminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own
gravity implies.
Reply Obj. 3: The words of Ambrose may be understood as referring to
simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a species of
the sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that man even
ignores the benefits he has received; or again, they may be an
allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the
foundation of the spiritual edifice.
Reply Obj. 4: The drunken man deserves a "double punishment" for the
two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which
results from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the
ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin, and
more, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated
above (ad 2). It might also be said that the words quoted refer to an
ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered drunkards to
be more severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye,
not to the indulgence which the drunkard might claim, but to
expediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober,
as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii).
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