FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 4]

Whether Sin Is Fittingly Divided into Sin Against God, Against

Oneself, and Against One's Neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin

against God, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that

which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the

division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against God: for

it is stated in the definition of sin that it is "against God's law,"

as stated above (Q. 66, A. 6). Therefore sin against God should not

be reckoned a part of the division of sin.

Obj. 2: Further, every division should consist of things in

opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not

opposed to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins

against himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly

divided into these three.

Obj. 3: Further, specification is not taken from things external. But

God and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are not

distinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin

is unfittingly divided according to these three.

_On the contrary,_ Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of

sins, says that "man is said to sin against himself, against God, and

against his neighbor."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 71, AA. 1, 6), sin is an

inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in

relation to the rule of reason, in so far as all our actions and

passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason: another

order is in relation to the rule of the Divine Law, whereby man

should be directed in all things: and if man were by nature a

solitary animal, this twofold order would suffice. But since man is

naturally a civic and social animal, as is proved in _Polit._ i, 2,

hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed in relation

to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of these orders the second

contains the first and surpasses it. For whatever things are

comprised under the order of reason, are comprised under the order of

God Himself. Yet some things are comprised under the order of God,

which surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith, and things

due to God alone. Hence he that sins in such matters, for instance,

by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is said to sin against God. In

like manner, the first order includes the third and surpasses it,

because in all things wherein we are directed in reference to our

neighbor, we need to be directed according to the order of reason.

Yet in some things we are directed according to reason, in relation

to ourselves only, and not in reference to our neighbor; and when man

sins in these matters, he is said to sin against himself, as is seen

in the glutton, the lustful, and the prodigal. But when man sins in

matters concerning his neighbor, he is said to sin against his

neighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer. Now the things

whereby man is directed to God, his neighbor, and himself are

diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their

objects, according to which the species of sins are diversified: and

consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different

species of sins: because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed,

differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from

what has been said (Q. 62, AA. 1, 2, 3) that by the theological

virtues man is directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to

himself; and by justice to his neighbor.

Reply Obj. 1: To sin against God is common to all sins, in so far as

the order to God includes every human order; but in so far as order

to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a special

kind of sin.

Reply Obj. 2: When several things, of which one includes another, are

distinct from one another, this distinction is understood to refer,

not to the part contained in another, but to that in which one goes

beyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers and

figures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not

in respect of its being contained thereby, but in respect of that in

which it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies to the numbers

three and four.

Reply Obj. 3: Although God and our neighbor are external to the

sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are

related to it as to its object.

________________________

Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 466 / 746 题