Whether Sins Differ Specifically in Reference to Their Causes?
Objection 1: It would seem that sins differ specifically in reference
to their causes. For a thing takes its species from that whence it
derives its being. Now sins derive their being from their causes.
Therefore they take their species from them also. Therefore they
differ specifically in reference to their causes.
Obj. 2: Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to have
least reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like its
material cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically according
to their objects, it seems that much more do they differ in reference
to their other causes.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 79:17, "Things set on
fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to fear
inducing false humility, or to love enkindling us to undue ardor."
For it is written (1 John 2:16) that "all that is in the world, is
the concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] the concupiscence
of the eyes, or [Vulg.: 'and'] the pride of life." Now a thing is
said to be in the world on account of sin, in as much as the world
denotes lovers of the world, as Augustine observes (Tract. ii in
Joan.). Gregory, too (Moral. xxxi, 17), distinguishes all sins
according to the seven capital vices. Now all these divisions refer
to the causes of sins. Therefore, seemingly, sins differ specifically
according to the diversity of their causes.
_On the contrary,_ If this were the case all sins would belong to one
species, since they are due to one cause. For it is written (Ecclus.
10:15) that "pride is the beginning of all sin," and (1 Tim. 6:10)
that "the desire of money is the root of all evils." Now it is
evident that there are various species of sins. Therefore sins do not
differ specifically according to their different causes.
_I answer that,_ Since there are four kinds of causes, they are
attributed to various things in various ways. Because the _formal_
and the _material_ cause regard properly the substance of a thing;
and consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and
form, both in species and in genus. The _agent_ and the _end_ regard
directly movement and operation: wherefore movements and operations
differ specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways,
however, because the natural active principles are always determined
to the same acts; so that the different species of natural acts are
taken not only from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those
acts, but also from their active principles: thus heating and cooling
are specifically distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the
other hand, the active principles in voluntary acts, such as the acts
of sins, are not determined, of necessity, to one act, and
consequently from one active or motive principle, diverse species of
sins can proceed: thus from fear engendering false humility man may
proceed to theft, or murder, or to neglect the flock committed to his
care; and these same things may proceed from love enkindling to undue
ardor. Hence it is evident that sins do not differ specifically
according to their various active or motive causes, but only in
respect of diversity in the final cause, which is the end and object
of the will. For it has been shown above (Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 4,
6) that human acts take their species from the end.
Reply Obj. 1: The active principles in voluntary acts, not being
determined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human
acts, unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the
end, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15, 16), and
consequently sin derives both its being and its species from the end.
Reply Obj. 2: Objects, in relation to external acts, have the
character of matter "about which"; but, in relation to the interior
act of the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to
this that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even
considered as the matter "about which," they have the character of
term, from which movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4;
_Ethic._ x, 4); yet even terms of movement specify movements, in so
far as term has the character of end.
Reply Obj. 3: These distinctions of sins are given, not as distinct
species of sins, but to show their various causes.
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