Whether the Division of Sins According to Their Debt of Punishment
Diversifies Their Species?
Objection 1: It would seem that the division of sins according to
their debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance,
when sin is divided into "mortal" and "venial." For things which are
infinitely apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even to the
same genus. But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since
temporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal punishment to
mortal sin; and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the
gravity of the fault, according to Deut. 25:2: "According to the
measure of the sin shall the measure be also of the stripes be."
Therefore venial and mortal sins are not of the same genus, nor can
they be said to belong to the same species.
Obj. 2: Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species
[*_Ex genere,_ genus in this case denoting the species], as murder
and adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in
an idle word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial and mortal
sins differ specifically.
Obj. 3: Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its
reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward
is the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of
sin. Now sins differ specifically in relation to their ends, as
stated above (A. 1, ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically
distinct according to the debt of punishment.
_On the contrary,_ Those things that constitute a species are prior
to the species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin
as the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically
according to the debt of punishment.
_I answer that,_ In things that differ specifically we find a twofold
difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to
be found save in different species, e.g. "rational" and "irrational,"
"animate," and "inanimate": the other difference is consequent to
specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may [follow from
the diversity of species], yet, in others, it may be found within the
same species; thus "white" and "black" are consequent to the specific
diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within
the one species of man.
We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal
sin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of punishment,
cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is
accidental never constitutes a species; and what is outside the
agent's intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is
evident that punishment is outside the intention of the sinner,
wherefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the
sinner. Nevertheless it is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle,
viz. the justice of the judge, who imposes various punishments
according to the various manners of sin. Therefore the difference
derived from the debt of punishment, may be consequent to the
specific diversity of sins, but cannot constitute it.
Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the
diversity of that inordinateness which constitutes the notion of sin.
For inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of
order, and another which, without destroying the principle of order,
implies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle:
thus, in an animal's body, the frame may be so out of order that the
vital principle is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death;
while, on the other hand, saving the vital principle, there may be
disorder in the bodily humors; and then there is sickness. Now the
principle of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in
the same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable
principle does to matters of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8). Therefore
when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away from its last
end, viz. God, to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin;
but when it is disordered without turning away from God, there is
venial sin. For even as in the body, the disorder of death which
results from the destruction of the principle of life, is irreparable
according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be repaired
by reason of the vital principle being preserved, so it is in matters
concerning the soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is
impossible to convince one who errs in the principles, whereas one
who errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the
truth by means of the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he
who, by sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider the
nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin
mortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas when a man sins
without turning away from God, by the very nature of his sin, his
disorder can be repaired, because the principle of the order is not
destroyed; wherefore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he
does not sin so as to deserve to be punished eternally.
Reply Obj. 1: Mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart as regards
what they _turn away from,_ not as regards what they _turn to,_ viz.
the object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same
species from including mortal and venial sins; for instance, in the
species "adultery" the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle
word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may even be a mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 2: From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its
species, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows that
this difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins, not
that it is the cause thereof. And this difference may be found even
in things of the same species, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: The reward is intended by him that merits or acts
virtu[ous]ly; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner,
but, on the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails.
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