Whether Virtue Is Adequately Divided into Moral and Intellectual?
Objection 1: It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into
moral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between moral
and intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual
virtues (Ethic. vi, 3, 5); and again is placed by all among the four
cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further
on (Q. 61, A. 1). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into
intellectual and moral, as though there were no mean between them.
Obj. 2: Further, continency, perseverance, and patience are not
reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral
virtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are
consistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue is not
adequately divided into intellectual and moral.
Obj. 3: Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are
not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz.
science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above
(Q. 57, AA. 2, 3, 5). Neither are they moral virtues; since they are
not about the passions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue.
Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and
moral.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "virtue
is twofold, intellectual and moral."
_I answer that,_ Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of
his doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of
human actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for
these are the two principles of movement in man as stated in _De
Anima_ iii, text. 48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a
perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if it perfects
man's speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may
be good, it will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects
his appetite, it will be a moral virtue. It follows therefore that
every human virtue is either intellectual or moral.
Reply Obj. 1: Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But
considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with
the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as
stated above (Q. 57, A. 4). It is in this sense that it is reckoned
with the moral virtues.
Reply Obj. 2: Continency and perseverance are not perfections of the
sensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact that passions abound
in the continent and persevering man, which would not be the case if
his sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making it
conformable to reason. Continency and perseverance are, however,
perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the passions lest
reason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: since
intellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself well in
respect of moral matters, presupposes a right appetite of the end, so
that it may hold itself aright in respect of principles, i.e. the
ends, on which it builds its argument: and this is wanting in the
continent and persevering man. Nor again can an action proceeding
from two principles be perfect, unless each principle be perfected by
the habit corresponding to that operation: thus, however perfect be
the principal agent employing an instrument, it will produce an
imperfect effect, if the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence
if the sensitive faculty, which is moved by the rational faculty, is
not perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be, the
resulting action will be imperfect: and consequently the principle of
that action will not be a virtue. And for this reason, continency,
desisting from pleasures, and perseverance in the midst of pains, are
not virtues, but something less than a virtue, as the Philosopher
maintains (Ethic. vii, 1, 9).
Reply Obj. 3: Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues: for
they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God.
________________________