Whether Moral Virtue Differs from Intellectual Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from
intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 21) "that
virtue is the art of right conduct." But art is an intellectual
virtue. Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ.
Obj. 2: Further, some authors put science in the definition of
virtues: thus some define perseverance as a "science or habit
regarding those things to which we should hold or not hold"; and
holiness as "a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his
duty to God." Now science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral
virtue should not be distinguished from intellectual virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6) that "virtue is the
rectitude and perfection of reason." But this belongs to the
intellectual virtues, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Therefore moral
virtue does not differ from intellectual.
Obj. 4: Further, a thing does not differ from that which is included
in its definition. But intellectual virtue is included in the
definition of moral virtue: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6)
that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed by
reason as a prudent man would appoint it." Now this right reason that
fixes the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual virtue, as
stated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ
from intellectual.
_On the contrary,_ It is stated in _Ethic._ i, 13 that "there are two
kinds of virtue: some we call intellectual; some moral."
_I answer that,_ Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and
whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey
reason somewhat, but in various ways. For some obey reason blindly
and without any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of the
body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason
commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action. Hence the
Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "the soul rules the body like a
despot," i.e. as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel.
Accordingly some held that all the active principles in man are
subordinate to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act
well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since
virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions,
it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that there would be
none but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion of Socrates, who
said "every virtue is a kind of prudence," as stated in _Ethic._ vi,
13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of
knowledge, he cannot sin; and that every one who sins, does so
through ignorance.
Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive
faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain power of
opposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "reason
commands the appetitive faculty by a politic power," whereby a man
rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of
opposition. Hence Augustine says on Ps. 118 (Serm. 8) that "sometimes
we understand (what is right) while desire is slow, or follows not at
all," in so far as the habits or passions of the appetitive faculty
cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. And
in this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so
long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not sin:
provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of
reason in this individual act of choice.
Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only
that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual
virtue; but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a
habit of moral virtue. And so moral differs from intellectual virtue,
even as the appetite differs from the reason. Hence just as the
appetite is the principle of human acts, in so far as it partakes of
reason, so are moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as
they are in conformity with reason.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine usually applies the term "art" to any form of
right reason; in which sense art includes prudence which is the right
reason about things to be done, even as art is the right reason about
things to be made. Accordingly, when he says that "virtue is the art
of right conduct," this applies to prudence essentially; but to other
virtues, by participation, for as much as they are directed by
prudence.
Reply Obj. 2: All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were based
on the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what we
have said about art (ad 1).
The same applies to the Third Objection.
Reply Obj. 4: Right reason which is in accord with prudence is
included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its
essence, but as something belonging by way of participation to all
the moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction of
prudence.
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